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ABSTRACT 
 
This work looks at the proliferation of human rights in Mexico in the 1970s.  By 
looking at how the term entered Mexico, one can determine that individualistic notions 
of rights (human rights) proliferated in Mexico in the late 1970s as a result of the arrival 
of South American refugees, the rise of a freer press, through Mexico's first NGO 
(CENCOS), and the 1979 Jimmy Carter visit to negotiate an oil deal.  The diffusion of 
internationalist notion of rights reveals a shift from a corporate protection of rights to 
more individualist conceptions of rights--particularly as Mexico made a shift to 
Neoliberal economic politics.  The consequences of human rights development in 
Mexico have had numerous consequences, one being that Mexico avoided international 
scrutiny for its human rights violations until the 1990s.  It avoided such scrutiny 
precisely because of its relationship with the United States and also because it 
appropriated the language of rights protections by welcoming South American political 
refugees fleeing military dictatorships.  As such, this work reveals the unique trajectory 
of the rise and usage of international human rights.
	 1 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
Dawning the Age of Human Rights:  
The Nationalization of Human Rights Concepts in Mexico, 1970-1980 
 
“The tragic irony of this age of human rights –  
where greater numbers are enjoying human rights  
than perhaps ever in history –  
is that it has been repeatedly darkened 
by outbursts of indiscriminate violence  
and organized mass killings.”  
Kofi A. Annan1 
 
 Cada quién habla de la feria según le va en ella, as the old Spanish proverb puts it: 
“Everyone talks about the fair according to how it went for them.”  Something like this 
applies to the much-discussed concept of human rights.  After Amnesty International 
(AI) won the 1977 Nobel Peace Prize, a journalist asked Arturo Zama if awareness of 
human rights existed in the world and whether the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was widely known.  As a former political prisoner of Mexico’s 1968 student 
movement and a member of his country’s AI section, Zama was uniquely qualified to 
offer a perspective on the matter.  He as much as anyone had been to the feria, and he 
offered this laconic reply: “Obviously not.”  The long-time activist believed that often 
people considered human rights mere formalities and that it was important for the 
population to “realize they are entitled to human rights.”  For example, if stopped by 
the police, “there is a set of procedures that ensure the physical and spiritual integrity of 
people.”2   
																																																								
1 Kofi A. Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations (1997-2006), makes reference 
to the phrase “Age of Human Rights” in an article by the same title.  Kofi A. Annan, “The Age of 
Human Rights,” Project Syndicate, 26 September 2000 <www.project-syndicate.org>. 
2 “Premio Nobel de la Paz: Amnistía Internacional, defensora de los prisioneros olvidados,” 
Proceso (No. 50), 17 October 1977, 9. 
	 2 
What lay at stake here was more than simply a matter of public education.  
Rather, attempts to understand and implement something called “human rights” 
involved something more than curbing heavy-handed police behavior.  Rather, the 
question and its brief answer touched on a set of concepts whose interpretation had 
been in a state of rapid evolution for the better part of a quarter-century.  Both Zama 
and Amnesty International employed the term human rights to refer to a selected set of 
civil and political guarantees established in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and utilized in the organization’s global campaign on behalf of political 
prisoners.  Prior to the 1960s, most people in Mexico (if not the world) would have 
interpreted the term “human rights” to refer to vague abstract principles to be born in 
mind when making basic decisions about our lives, much in the same way that we might 
say, “Everyone has a right to be happy.”  In the 1970s, however, the term came to 
signify something more specific: individual rights, primarily civil and political, and 
imbedded not in national constitutions, bur rather in international covenants.  Zama 
had something like this latter concept in mind when he stated that few people around 
the world knew of the “human rights” protections that safeguarded individuals from a 
state overextending its use of violence on its citizens.  But how was it that human rights 
came to signify primarily political and civil rights, as Amnesty International promoted 
them and as Zama understood them?  What happened at the feria that changed so many 
minds? 
This work seeks to understand how human rights became the global lingua franca 
of rights demands in the 1970s.  Building on a growing historiographical trend 
regarding the genesis of those rights, I incorporate Mexico into the larger debate by 
looking at the process by which the term entered the intellectual set, the political sphere, 
	 3 
and the national press.  Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History has been 
the guiding model for attempting to answer why human rights “emerged in the 1970s 
seemingly from nowhere.”  According Moyn, the triumph of the concept can best be 
understood in the context of its “struggle against internationalist rivals old and new”—
like revolutionary communism and nationalism.  Once other universalist ideologies 
phased out, human rights emerged as the last utopia, and in the context of the 1970s 
these rights came to refer not to groups rights or to national emancipation, but rather to 
“individual protection against the state.”3  Unlike thinkers who place the genesis of 
human rights in ancient philosophies as far back as Buddhism and Christianity, in 
natural law, in the American and French Revolutions, in the international abolitionist 
movement, in World War II, in the U.S. civil rights movement, or even in the 1960s 
and 1970s anticolonial movements,4 Moyn looks to human rights as a struggle beyond 
those movements that sought citizenship rights within the framework of the nation-
state.5  In other words, “the central event in human rights history is the recasting of 
rights as entitlements that might contradict the sovereign nation-state from above and 																																																								
3 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2010), 3-10. 
  4 See, Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), Micheline Ishay, The History of 
Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 
Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 
2007), Jean Quataert, Advocating Dignity: Human Rights Mobilizations in Global Politics (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).  
5 Kenneth Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States.” The Journal of 
American History 86:3 (December 1999), 1231-1250, Kenneth Cmiel, “The Recent History of Human 
Rights,” American Historical Review 109:1 (February 2004), 117-135, Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human 
Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), Samuel Moyn, 
“Human Rights in History,” The Nation, 30 August/6 September 2010 (No. 291), 31-38, Snyder, Sarah B. 
Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, Nico Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom 
in the United States and India (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
	 4 
outside rather than serve as its foundation.”6  As such, human rights movements of the 
1970s went beyond the state and into the universal realm questioning the states’ 
sovereignty over the individual, and, as I will argue, Mexico was no exception to that 
trend.7   
 
Reconciling the Global (Macro) with the Particular (Micro) 
The rise of human rights in Mexico seeks to compliment the global narrative of 
their emergence.  By looking at the actors, processes, and the local context that allowed 
for the diffusion of a concept of rights at a national level, the global narrative is not only 
enriched but also complicated when scholars look for protagonists beyond western 
philosophy, the United States, and European countries.  A number of scholars, 
including Moyn, retell a historical narrative that only furthers the idea that human 
rights derived from the West and were designed for their application abroad, 
particularly in developing countries.  While this is true to a certain extent, we need to 
move away from this somewhat limiting approach and seek to incorporate the role 
developing countries and a select number of citizens played in globalizing human 
rights—particularly when the so-called Third World became a prime recipient of 
governmental and non-governmental policies.  When looking at the micro-narrative of 
their development, as the case of Mexico will show, human rights can be understood as 
a construct particular to the social, political, and economic context of each country—
and contingent on the time and global geopolitics exerted toward a particular region.  
For instance, Mexico was not directly targeted by President Jimmy Carter’s human 																																																								
6 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 13. 
  7 For an example of a linear approach to historical analysis, in this case of liberal democracy, see 
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006).  
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rights foreign policy or by Amnesty International’s campaign on behalf of political 
prisoners in the same measure as its South American military counterparts.  In Mexico, 
human rights emerged as a response to a more diverse set of problems—not exclusively 
state violence—and this difference has led to some important distinctions in the way the 
country responds to human rights cases today.  Initial reference to the terms in the 
Mexican press and the actors behind the diffusion of those same terms reveal a 
confluence between an amenable global and national context that made it possible to 
replace previous rights terminologies and promote individual rights in what had been a 
guarded corporatist system in which its citizens demanded rights through their group 
membership.8  
Moreover, by exploring their genesis and development at a national level, 
scholars can best discern on their legacy.  For instance, a comparable student movement 
in the United States that unfolded in the fall of 2015 at the University of Missouri did 
not utilize the universalist language embedded in international rights.  Rather, Missouri 
students demanded the fulfillment of citizenship rights much in the same form their 
predecessors did during the Civil Rights movement.  Meanwhile, mobilizations in 2015 
on behalf of forty-three missing students from Ayotzinapa, Guerrero employed a 
language beyond national citizenship that exemplifies the legacies of international 
human rights policies produced and manufactured for developing countries—this, while 
the United States advanced public policies centered on citizenship, rarely if ever 
appealing to universalist conceptions of rights.  Other examples include mobilizations 
on behalf of journalists, mobilizations that have moved beyond citizenship and into the 																																																								
  8 Historian José C. Moya employs the macro/micro mythology in his study of Spanish 
immigration to Argentina.  See José C. Moya, Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-
1930 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
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international realm as a measure of self-preservation with organizations like Artículo 19 
(Article 19) that reference not an article of the Mexican constitution, but rather freedom 
of speech as delineated in article nineteen of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  Today, most Latin Americans employ the term “human rights” and the 
guarantees embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to advance their 
cause.  The legacy of their usage in Mexico reveals that human rights came from the 
international community transforming previous rights terminologies and conceptions; 
however, they were appropriated and shaped as they best fitted the needs of the local 
population and the government at the time.  Their development in the country remains 
particular to Mexico, and the various particularities from Latin America merit greater 
incorporation into the macro narrative of their explosion in the 1970s—revealing that 
although seemingly universalist, human rights retain nationalist elements in their form.  
 
The Tumultuous 1970s 
 Alongside the ascent of individualistic notions of rights in the 1970s stood the 
breakdown of Mexico’s revolutionary system and its accompanying economic model.  
Not only in Mexico, but also in most of Latin America, state-directed economic policies 
sanctioned after the 1930 world depression up to the 1970s ultimately lost much of their 
promise and appeal.  Technocrats, many of whom had been educated in the United 
States, made their way into the ranks of Mexico’s governing party, Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) as early as the 1970s and certainly 
led the structural reforms toward a system of free-market economics by the 1980s.9  
																																																								
  9 Chile is perhaps the most studied case on the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in 
Latin America, particularly the role of the so-called Chicago Boys, a group of monetarist economists 
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Mexico’s debt, inflation, peso devaluation and trade deficits also paved the way for the 
International Monetary Fund to place the country on a path toward recovery by 
slashing state budgets, promoting foreign investment and deregulation, supporting 
funding for the extraction of oil and gas, and forcing an overall slimming of the state.  
Years later, Mexico’s economic crisis of the 1980s (known as the “Lost Decade” in Latin 
America) proved so severe that state-directed economic policies not only lost ground, 
but so did nationalism and its revolutionary project of corporatist representation.  In this 
context, and just as Mexico opened itself to the outside world during the 1970s, 
abandoning decades of isolationism, human rights emerged amid the breakdown of a 
revolutionary structure of social justice in which the state had balanced the interests of 
diverse social groups.  The corporatist arrangement began to erode as the country 
moved toward a more individually based society: individual in initiative, individual in 
terms of access to state protection from hardship and abuses.  By focusing primarily on 
the 1970s, this work places the rise of human rights in the context of Mexico’s structural 
changes and those taking place at a global scale, such as large-scale transformations 
transcending the nation-state—many of which resulted in an international shift away 
from Keynesianism toward Neoliberalism.10 
 Likewise, the 1970s proved one of the most tumultuous politically for the 
revolutionary leaderships.  After the 1968 student massacre in the Plaza of Tlatelolco, 																																																																																																																																																																		
working mostly out of the University of Chicago.  For Mexico see, Miguel Ángel Centeno, Democracy 
Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1994).  For Chile see, Philip J. O’Brien and Jacqueline Roddick, Chile, the Pinochet Decade: The Rise and Fall 
of the Chicago Boys (London: Latin America Bureau, 1983), Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists: The 
Chicago School of Economics in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Miguel Lawner and 
Orlando Letelier, Orlando Letelier: el que lo advirtió: los Chicago Boys en Chile (Santiago de Chile: LOM 
Ediciones, 2011).  
  10 A recent work pioneering research on the global transformations of the 1970s is Niall 
Ferguson’s edited book The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2010).  
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the PRI struggled to reign in political dissidence and regain the political legitimacy it 
had enjoyed since the 1930s.  After 1968, the revolutionary government found itself on 
the offensive.  While Mexico has a long tradition of social mobilization, by the 1970s the 
government moved away from its traditional negotiated, carrot-and-stick approach to 
dissidence and employed its national security apparatus to combat civil and armed 
resistance much in the same form as South American military governments—through 
violence.  While this project analyzes how social groups mobilized on behalf of Mexico’s 
political prisoners, it does not directly contribute to the growing historiography of 
Mexico’s Dirty War.11  Many scholars label the happenings in 1968 and the assault of 
leftist groups, particularly Cuban-inspired guerrilla movements, as one of the gravest 
assaults on human rights of the post-war period.  Interestingly enough, the term has 
been retroactively applied to the Tlatelolco student movement, yet at the time no one 
utilized “human rights” when discussing the military assault.12  It was not until the late 
1970s that the press and other activists began utilizing the term “human rights” to 
reference the internal violence of the country’s counterrevolutionary measures.  This 
change came about in part due to the efforts of Amnesty International (Mexico section), 
leftist leaning journalists and the nascent non-governmental organizations like Comité 																																																								
  11 For recent works on Dirty War see, Tanalís Padilla, Rural Resistance in the Land of Zapata: The 
Jaramillista Movement and the Myth of the Pax Priísta, 1940-1962 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 
Adela Cedillo and Fernando Calderón, eds., Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and 
the Dirty War, 1964-1982 (New York: Routledge, 2012), Jaime M. Pensado, Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and 
Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long Sixties (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), Alexander 
Aviña, Specters of Revolution: Peasant Guerrillas in the Cold War Mexican Countryside (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2014).  
12 At the time not even the most prominent newspaper in Mexico, Excélsior, utilized the term 
human rights to refer to the happenings in Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968.  It was not until the late 1970s 
that journalists and civil society began employing the term human rights to refer to the government’s 
repressive measures toward political dissidents—this after it had long been utilized to refer to the 
happenings in South American dictatorships.  Prominent human rights scholar, Sergio Aguayo Quezada 
has commonly used the term to reference the violations that took place in the Plaza de Tlatelolco in 1968.  
See, Sergio Aguayo Quezada and Javier Treviño Rangel, “Neither Truth nor Justice: Mexico’s De Facto 
Amnesty,” Latin American Perspectives 33 (2006): 56-68.  
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¡Eureka! (Defense Committee for Political Prisoners, Disappeared Persons and Exiles).13  
While not exclusively centered on leftist or guerrilla movements of the period, this work 
does build on recent scholarship on the post-1968 presidencies of Luis Echeverría (1970-
1976) and José López Portillo (1976-1982).14  After all, it was this turbulent decade, in 
combination with a political and economic crisis to the revolutionary system that 
provided the contextual ground for the rise and proliferation of human rights in 1970s 
Mexico.  
 
Liberal Democracy and the Non-Violent and Non-Institutionalized Left 
 Mexico’s human rights genesis, therefore, is linked to the rise of a non-violent 
and a non-institutionalized democratic left.  Scholars like Jorge G. Castañeda associate 
the rise of human rights with the fall of the Latin American left; while to an extent true, 
in Mexico those rights conceptions derived from an emerging middle current swayed by 
liberal democracy, on neither side of the communist or nationalist divide, sympathetic to 
the victims of the armed struggle and relatively far removed from traditional party 
politics.  Leftist parties did manage to sway remnants of the early human rights struggle, 
but not until the late 1970s and certainly by the 1980s, as proved the case of Rosario 
Ibarra (founder of Comité ¡Eureka!) and José Álvarez Icaza (leader of what began as a 
Catholic press organization, CENCOS)—two key figures and founding members of 
																																																								
13 In Spanish, Comité Pro-Defensa de Presos Perseguidos, Desaparecidos y Exiliados Políticos de 
México.  
  14 Gabriela Soto Laveaga, Jungle Laboratories: Mexican Peasants, National Projects, and the Making of the 
Pill (Durham [NC]: Duke University Press, 2009), María L. O. Muñoz, “‘We Speak for Ourselves’: The 
First National Congress of Indigenous Peoples and the Politics of Indigenismo in Mexico, 1968-1982,” 
(Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Arizona, 2009). Amelia M. Kiddle and María L. O. Muñoz, eds.,  
Populism in Twentieth Century Mexico: The Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría (Tucson: University 
of Arizona Press, 2010), Louise E. Walker, Waking from the Dream: Mexico’s Middle Classes After 1968 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 
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non-governmental organizations (hereafter NGOs), who joined the ranks of leftist 
parties.15  The middle democratic leftist current converged with Presidents Echeverría 
and López Portillo’s foreign policy toward South American dictatorships, a fact that 
aided both leaders in forging an international image of rights protectors rather than 
violators.  Saltalamacchia Ziccardi and Covarrubias Velasco described it as taking an 
“ambiguous position before the international human rights agenda: supporting and even 
ebullient in discourse but in practice suspicious and even obstructionist…”16 Their 
diplomacy also included the welcoming of Argentine, Chilean, and Uruguayan political 
refugees to Mexico; these figures played a significant role in disseminating individual 
rights conceptions in the press as they shunned the military dictatorships of their home 
countries from abroad.  The politicization of progressive Catholics, particularly Jesuits, 
and media organizations created to broadcast the sessions of Vatican II also engaged the 
language of human rights, in part due to their connection with international and 
religious-based media networks.  Finally, a brief democratic opening in the press 
resulting from a government assault on Mexico’s most important daily in 1976, Excélsior, 
allowed for the proliferation of new print sources that devoted significant coverage to 
the atrocities committed in South American dictatorships and consistently reproduced 
President Jimmy Carter’s human rights foreign policies toward the region.  By late 1978 
and 1979, the term “human rights,” which had originally been linked exclusively to 
happenings in South America, journalists and non-governmental organizations began to 																																																								
15 Rosario Ibarra joined the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Revolutionary Party, 
PRT), while Álvarez Icaza supported the Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (Mexican Workers’ Party, 
PMT), the latter one of several parties that joined to form a single leftist party for the 1988 election, the 
Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD). 
16 Natalia Saltalamacchia Ziccardi and Ana Covarrubias Velasco, “La trayectoria de los 
derechos humanos en la política exterior de México (1945-2006),” in Derechos humanos en política exterior: seis 
casos latinoamericanos, edited by Natalia Saltalamacchia Ziccardi and Ana Covarrubias Velasco (México, 
D.F.: ITAM, 2011), 164.  
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apply and associate to the counterrevolutionary measures within Mexico—long after its 
dissemination and appropriation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.   
 
Without Anachronisms: Anthropology of the Term in Print Media  
As in the studies by Moyn, this work also attempts to study the diffusion of 
human rights in Mexico through a non-linear and non-teleological narrative of moral 
progress.17  Rather than ascribing their genealogy to a build-up or continuation of 
previous social movements, this work seeks to differentiate the dissemination of human 
rights in the 1970s from previous social movements that sought to protect the rights of 
citizens within national borders, with little or no interaction with networks outside the 
nation-state framework.  That is not to say that movements on behalf of rights did not 
exist before, but rather that people proclaimed constitutional guarantees and mobilized 
for the advancement of group rights, often demanding reconfiguration in the 
relationship between the state and the group in question through negotiated, localized, 
and at times violent mobilization.  Moreover, social movements in the decade, like 
guerrillas or workers strikes, did not engage on individual rights either because they 
were not entirely aware of such or if they were because they perceived human rights to 
be an imperialistic construct deriving from the United States and counterintuitive to the 
social and economic rights espoused by nationalist or communist ideology.  Human 
rights, thus, emerged as part of what correspondent Alan Riding described as a “non-
violent Left [which] sought to grow in the narrow space between the ‘armed struggle’ 
and cooptation by the government.”18  Rather than looking exclusively within the left, 
																																																								
17 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 11-43. 
  18 Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 103. 
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this project builds on a growing historiography of the 1980s and on the work of scholars 
who have attempted to historicize Mexico’s modern human rights movement by tracing 
their links to non-governmental organizations and South American exiles in Mexico.  
However, this work takes a somewhat different perspective by looking to an earlier 
decade than most.19 
The following chapters represent historical moments in which individuals 
utilized human rights terminologies.  By following the language of rights in print media, 
the research will attempt to capture the various actors engaged with the language of 
human rights and the ideological transformations taking place in Mexico regarding 
individual guarantees.  Print media can serves as one of the key chroniclers of capturing 
the usage of the term and its transformation over the course of a decade.  But most 
importantly, the approach seeks to capture a broad spectrum of players consciously and 
unintentionally disseminating the universalist concept of human rights in Mexico: from 
U.N. representatives, Jesuit priests, journalists, women, government representatives, and 
exiles, to President Jimmy Carter.  This work seeks a diverse set of voices; however, it 																																																								
19 Joy Lee Peebles Lane, Las organizaciones no gubernamentales de derechos humanos en México: su 
formación y esfuerzos para realizar cambios socio-políticos (Master’s thesis, Estudios Latinoamericanos, Facultad 
de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Universidad Autónoma de México, México, 1993), Edward L. Cleary, 
“Human Rights Organizations in Mexico: Growth in Turbulence,” Journal of Church and State 37:4 
(Autumn 1995): 793-812, Sergio Aguayo Quezada, “Auge y perspectiva de los derechos humanos en 
México,” in México a la hora del cambio, Luis Rubio et al., 355-384 (México, D.F.: Aguilar, León y Cal 
Editores: Centro de Investigación para el Dersarrollo: Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, 1995), 
Edward L. Cleary, The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America (Westport: Praeger, 1997), Kathryn 
Sikkink, “The Emergence, Evolution, and Effectiveness of the Latin American Human Rights Network,” 
in Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America, edited by Elizabeth Jelin and 
Eric Hershberg (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 59-84, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 
Mariana de Heredia Romo, “México en la red transnacional de defensa de los derechos humanos en 
Uruguay (1973-1985): Estrategias y acciones representativas” (Bachelor’s thesis, Relaciones 
Internacionales, ITAM, México, 2011).  The following works also explore human rights, but specifically 
in foreign policy.  See, Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), Ana Covarrubias, “La política exterior ‘activa’…una vez más,” Foro 
internacional 48: 1-2 (Enero-Junio 2008), 13-34, Natalia Saltalamacchia and Ana Covarrubias Velasco. 
Derechos humanos en política exterior: seis casos latinoamericanos (México, D.F.: ITAM, 2011).  
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does exclude many others that rightfully deserve their incorporation into the larger 
narrative of those forging what has become the lingua franca of rights movements in the 
world.  
Chapter One follows the work of Canadian diplomat John P. Humphrey and his 
attempt to keep the United Nations’ Human Rights program alive.  One way he 
promoted human rights at a national level was through seminars.  By exploring the 
1961 conference in Mexico City the chapter reveals how early UN human rights 
promoters sought to strengthen national laws for the protection of individual rights 
without questioning or threatening state sovereignty.  For Humphrey and other jurists at 
the conference, the protection of human rights lay primarily in constitutions and had to 
be processed through national courts.  In this reading, and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights stood merely as reinforcement, something that would no longer be the 
case decades later.  The 1961 conference also illustrates the disassociation between the 
legal promotion of human rights and the attempt to dissociate from social movements.  
For example, protests arose in Mexico City while the conference took place demanding 
the release of muralist painter David Alfaro Siqueiros.  At the time, John P. Humphrey 
and his human rights program avoided intervening in a country’s internal affairs.  The 
efforts by Humphrey reveal that by 1961 the UN Rights Program in no way questioned 
or meddled in national matters, and that in fact it deeply respected state sovereignty.   
Chapter Two illustrates how President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976) 
sought to utilize the emerging international system to promote his Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, while appropriating the language of human rights for his 
cause.  The Mexican government responded fiercely against President Richard Nixon’s 
economic policies, especially his 1971 ten percent import surcharge, which gave rise to a 
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movement for the creation of a more equitable economic world system.  This chapter 
explores how the Mexican government believed its citizens’ rights could not be 
protected unless the state countered the advantages of its more powerful adversaries.  As 
such, the Mexican press believed that Echeverría’s proposal for the Charter would 
surpass the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in importance.  This was another 
moment when Mexican journalists actively engage the term “human rights.”  Moreover, 
Mexico’s unique positioning in the international community permitted the 
government’s appropriation of human rights.  President Echeverría, in search of 
political legitimacy after the crisis of 1968, projected what Margaret E. Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink described as a “progressive stance on international human rights.”20  
Echeverria did this by introducing the rhetoric of human rights into his policy of Third-
worldism; he denounced human rights violations in places like Chile and Spain and 
welcomed South American political refugees to Mexico.  In 1973 Echeverría also broke 
diplomatic relations with Chile after the overthrow of democratically elected Salvador 
Allende, under the similar pretexts.  Of the three hundred prisoners released from Chile 
in 1975, 163 settled in Mexico.21   And so long as Mexico’s national security did not 
pose a threat to the United States, then the country would remain outside Carter’s 
human rights concerns.22   
																																																								
  20 Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 111. 
21 Gabriela Díaz Prieto, “Un exilio venturoso: chilenos en México (1973-1990),” in Revolución y 
exilio en la historia de México: del amor de un historiador a su patria adoptiva: homenaje a Friedrich Katz, edited by 
Garciadiego Dantan, Javier, Emilio Kourí, and Friedrich Katz (México, D. F.: El Colegio de México, 
2010), 806.  
  22 Sergio Aguayo Quezada, “The Uses, Misuses, and Challenges of Mexican National Security: 
1946-1990,” in Mexico: In Search of Security, edited by Bruce Michael Bagley, and Sergio Aguayo (Coral 
Gables, Fla: North-South Center, University of Miami, 1993), 99.  
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Chapter Three explores the competing understandings and definitions of human 
rights in the 1975 International Women’s Year Conference in Mexico City.  The 
conference moved locations several times, from a communist country to Colombia, and 
finally to Mexico as a result of President Echeverría’s relationship with UN Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim.  By following the various discussions regarding women’s 
rights, this chapter shows how representatives from European countries and the United 
States steered away from human rights concepts given their association with rights they 
did not see as gender-specific.  Latin American women, on the other hand, were more 
likely to engage the concept of human rights in association with their demands for 
economic reforms in their home countries, while women from industrialized nations 
focused on gender specifics, from sexual to reproductive rights.  For many western 
women, the language of human rights carried too much political baggage they perceived 
as distracting from rights particular to their gender, while women from developing 
countries gravitated to human rights because these for them implied significant 
structural changes for their country which they deemed as key to their immediate needs 
for survival.  
Chapter Four explores the role Liberation theology played in mobilizing 
Catholics toward the internationalist human rights cause, in this case through the life 
and work of José Álvarez Icaza, founder of one of Mexico’s first modern human rights 
organizations.  CENCOS emerged as a media organization reporting to Mexico from 
the Vatican.  However, as the organization grew more critical of the government, 
Álvarez and his team were forced to break with the Catholic Church, although not 
completely abandoning its Catholic social teachings.  The organization published a 
human rights magazine focusing on Latin American dictatorships, often with exiles as 
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contributors.  This chapter demonstrates how human rights were initially linked with 
state terror in South America, and not with events in Mexico.  However, over time 
human rights publications began to look to Mexico’s own repressive measures toward 
leftists and guerrillas.  From the CENCOS building emerged Comité ¡Eureka!, an 
organization created by Rosario Ibarra, whose son was killed by the government.  Both 
José Álvarez Icaza and Rosario Ibarra helped diffuse human rights in Mexico and 
worked closely with secular and religious international organizations.  Both eventually 
supported and mobilized for leftist political parties seeking to derail the PRI.  This 
chapter captures early human rights organizations that pioneered yet eventually 
engaged in party politics. 
Chapter Five follows the emergence of new print sources and a brief moment of 
liberalization of the press after the government removed the editor of the cooperative-
owned newspaper Excélsior, one of Latin America’s most important papers in 1976.  In 
July 1976 the director Julio Scherer García and his assistant general were removed from 
their post through a cooperative meeting.  The paper had grown in prestige, but also in 
its critical stance toward the government.  As such, Scherer and those who left with him, 
including poet Octavio Paz, created new print sources.  Scherer and others began the 
political magazine Proceso (“Process”), thus becoming one of the first publications in the 
country to actively disseminate the term “human rights.”  Proceso published reports no 
one else bothered to look at, such as those of Amnesty International, and rendered 
significant coverage to Latin American dictatorships.  While Proceso initially utilized the 
term to refer to repression in South America, eventually journalists began to associate 
the concept to happenings within Mexico.  The ascent of human rights concepts in 
Proceso reflect the rise of a non-violent, democratic left that sought transformation in 
	 17 
Mexico through a modern human rights movement, and not necessarily through violent 
or traditional party politics.  
Chapter Six traces how Mexico avoided international scrutiny for its human 
rights violations, and in particular how it managed to be excluded from Jimmy Carter’s 
rights initiatives.  While President Jimmy Carter’s short visit to Mexico in February 
1979 proved key in diffusing the human rights concept in the Mexican press, his trip to 
resume talks on natural gas purchase did not force discussions regarding human rights 
violations in the country.  While in Mexico, Carter chose not to force the discussion on 
human rights.  His speech to Congress made no reference to the term.  The 
consequences have been long lasting.  Carter’s 1979 trip and his notorious silence 
established a precedent by which economic and drug eradication negotiations have 
been given priority over those of human rights.  As such, the U.S. government’s human 
rights stance toward Mexico has differed from other Latin America, especially as both 
countries have grown closer together economically.  Consequently, Mexico avoids 
public scrutiny for its violations, and has been a large receptor of military aid for the 
Drug War.  I argue that this has been a consequence of both Mexico’s attempt to forge 
an image of a rights protector and the United States and international organizations’ 
failure to look to the Dirty War crimes until decades after similar pressure was exerted 
on its South American counterparts.  The consequences have been long-lasting and 
have only furthered the climate of impunity in the country, with little or no public 
shaming to demand internal reform
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PART I: 
Forging a Global Rights Agenda: Individual vs. Economic States’ Rights 
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ILLUS. 1.1.  “Professor John P. Humphrey, Director of the Division of Human Rights of the United 
Nations Department of Social Affairs,” 6 January 1948, United Nations, Lake Success, New York. Photo 
from the United Nations Secretariat, United Nations Photo Archive, Photo #324084 
<http://www.unmultimedia.org>. (Reproduced without permission) 
 
 
ILLUS. 1.2.  “Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Professor John P. Humphrey at the second session of the 
Human Rights Commission,” United Nations, Lake Success, New York. Photo from the Human Rights 
Commission, United Nations Photo Archive, Photo #292444 <http://www.unmultimedia.org>. 
(Reproduced without permission) 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
The United Nations’ Rights Experiment: 
Constitutionalism in John P. Humphrey’s 1961 Human Rights Seminar in Mexico City 
 
“Why human rights now,  
when human rights violations  
have been part of the Latin American  
condition for decades?”1 
 
 
Introduction: Promoting Individual Rights in a Corporatist State 
 As in so many countries, Mexico’s own human rights debate began amid the 
competing global and national rights projects in the postwar period.  The global rights 
project derived from the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which attempted to fortify individual rights outside the context of the nation-
state.  Yet, for several years after the drafting of the declaration, very few people utilized 
the term “human rights,” a concept that would eventually become synonymous with 
individual and international rights.  This notion of protections promised by sources 
outside of the nation-state “died in the process of being born,” as an NGO leader put 
it.2  In the 1950s and 1960s, then, the term so commonly tossed around in today’s world 
remained largely confined to diplomats and professionals in legal circles. 
 Initially, the international human rights initiative faltered against competing 
national projects.  In the case of many Latin American countries, Mexico included, 
promotion of individual rights failed to gain currency within systems of state-directed 
industrialization that negotiated conflict through corporate relationships.  Under this 
latter model, it was assumed that individuals demanding justice would do so through 																																																								
1 Edward L. Cleary, “Struggling for Human Rights in Latin America,” America, 5 November 
1994, 20. 
2 Samuel Moyn, “Human Rights in History,” The Nation, 30 August/6 September 2010 (No. 
291), 34. 
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group struggles involving both peaceful and violent confrontations with the state.  When 
dealing with peasants, industrial workers, or salaried employees, the dominant party 
mitigated rights demands through a carrot-and-stick approach.  Any suggestion at 
resolving national conflicts through international mitigation was thus perceived as an 
infringement upon the much-guarded notion of sovereignty.   
Yet, the United Nations through its Human Rights Division promoted 
individual rights as opposed to group rights.  This global UN project offered a legal and 
non-violent “third way” between the political rights underscored by constitutional 
democracies and the social and economic rights ascribed by its socialist counterpart.  In 
other words, the human rights approach aimed at filling the gaps left by constitutional 
governments in matters of individual protections.  Under the auspices of Canadian 
diplomat John P. Humphrey, the United Nations sponsored a series of country seminars 
on human rights.  In the case of Mexico City, the seminar focused on two constitutional 
instruments imperative in the protection of individual rights: amparo and habeas corpus 
(and to a lesser extent on the Brazilian mandado de segurança, or write of security, often 
mistaken for the writ of mandamus).3  
The 1961 meeting in Mexico City underscores how UN representatives shaped 
the meaning of “human rights” in the postwar era through national seminars.  In this 
meeting, attendees discussed constitutional remedies to individual rights protections, 																																																								
3 The writ of security was added to the 1934 Brazilian Constitution.  According to one author, 
the writ of security is often mistranslated as the writ of mandamus.  The writ of security “is a unique 
summary constitutional remedy that combines aspects of the Anglo-American writs of mandamus, 
injunction, prohibition and quo warranto, as well as the motion for summary judgment.  The writ of 
security can be brought by an individual or legal entity to protect a ‘liquid and certain right’ unprotected 
by habeas corpus or habeas data against actual or threatened illegality or abuse of power.”  Interestingly 
enough, the writ of security can be used by government agencies against other public entities.  Moreover, 
“The writ can only be brought against a public authority or an agent of a legal entity performing public 
duties.” Keith S. Rosenn, “Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights in Brazil,” American Journal of 
Comparative Law 59 (Fall 2011), 1024.  
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which at the time most country representatives interchangeably referred to as human 
rights.  Yet, in the context of this seminar, human rights had yet to become synonymous 
with universalities, but rather remained at the level of greater enforcement for existing 
constitutional protections.  Owing in part to this confusion over concepts and 
definitions, the global approach in diffusing human rights concepts initially stalemated.  
 
Designing Human Rights: John P. Humphrey’s Seminars  
 In very many ways, the introduction of human rights into post-revolutionary 
legal and political discourse dates from the watershed 1961 visit of John P. Humphrey.  
After a series of travels between Australia, New Zealand and Romania, John P. 
Humphrey prepared for a summer trip to Mexico.  With a cast on his foot, the then 
director of the United Nations Human Rights Division arrived in the Mexico City.  His 
colleague John Male picked him up from the airport and updated Humphrey on the 
arrangements for a two-week seminar on human rights.  From what Male explained, 
Humphrey “gathered the Mexican government was not being overcooperative.”4  
Perhaps he hoped the Mexico City experience would compare with that of its South 
American counterparts.  When he traveled to Chile in 1957, Humphrey wrote in his 
memoir he had no trouble “getting the Chileans to agree to host the seminar in 1958.”  
Not only that, given his connection to Hernán Santa Cruz, prominent Chilean 
representative to the UN, he even had the pleasure of dining with a future president of 
																																																								
4 John P. Humphrey, A. J. Hobbins, and Louisa Piatti, On the Edge of Greatness: The Diaries of John 
Humphrey, First Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights (Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 
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Chile, Salvador Allende.  And the following year he visited another president-to-be, 
political centrist Eduardo Frei, in his home.5   
Humphrey’s experience in Mexico nonetheless proved different.  He later 
confessed that the seminar had not gone as well as he hoped.  And neither had the 
Chilean nor the Argentine meetings years earlier.  Characterized by rhetoric-filled 
speeches, the conferences had simply not reached the standards of those held in Asia.6  
In this particular forum, however, Humphrey hoped to impress the American 
participant in the seminar, Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, State Department 
representative that went on to serve as Attorney General during the Lyndon Johnson 
administration (1963-1969).7  If the Mexico City Human Rights Seminar impressed Mr. 
Katzenbach, that meant one less battle for Humphrey in defense of the rights program, 
under threat of dissolution almost since the 1948 UDHR adoption.   
Undaunted, Humphrey fervently pursued regional seminars as the only strategy 
likely to bear any fruit.  Ever since the drafting the UDHR, of which Humphrey was the 
main author, the priorities within the UN regarding the rights program lost momentum.  
And with every year that passed, Humphrey became discouraged, frustrated, and at 
times depressed by the constant disregard for his work.  When he first accepted the 
directorship of the rights division in 1946, at the invitation of his friend Henri Laugier, 
then Assistant Secretary-General of the UN Department of Social Affairs, optimism 
prevailed.  In those early years of hacking out the plans of what the nature of the UN 
would be, many of the organization’s original staff acted with unprecedented optimism.   																																																								
5 Ibid., 238. 
6 Ibid., 279, 261.  
7 Humphrey mistakenly titles Katzenbach U.S. Deputy Attorney General.  In 1961 Katzenbach 
served as U.S. Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel but was not assigned as U.S. 
Deputy Attorney General until 1962.  
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But over time Cold War politics soon displaced human rights.  After his friend 
Henri Laugier left the Secretariat, Humphrey found few allies within the United 
Nations as interested in promoting the rights program.  When the threats of dissolution 
came from the very top and especially from Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General 
(1953-1961), Humphrey disputed the Secretariat’s claims that the rights program only 
“increased international tensions.”8  Humphrey continued to promote human rights 
while in a hostile global environment and carved a structure and a space for its growth.  
He defined what the program would do, and more importantly its role within the 
United Nations.  
While the pioneer NGO leader Moses Moskowitz claimed human rights “died in 
the process of being born,” John P. Humphrey’s trajectory at the United Nations 
suggests otherwise.9   Human rights within the United Nations remained in gestation 
but still very much alive.  Humphrey’s work in keeping UN Division of Human Rights 
solidified an international structure for human rights promotion.  The seminar program 
he established and passionately carried out opened a space for discussion at a national 
level without disregarding established constitutions.  While many political leaders 
remained adamant about human rights and the threat to sovereignty, they nevertheless 
tolerated these seminars.  As the Mexico Seminar would show, this became the first of 
many meetings where constitutional issues collided with more universal concerns.  And 
it would also show why universal ideas of rights did not prevail until decades later. 
 
																																																								
8 See footnote 39 in A.J. Hobbins, “Humphrey and the High Commissioner: the Genesis of the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,” Journal of the History of International Law 3 (2001), 
45. 
9 Moyn, “Human Rights in History,” 34. 
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1961 Mexico City: Amparo and Habeas Corpus 
 The seminar took place on August 15-28 in the Hotel del Prado, located in the 
heart of Mexico City’s commercial center and famous as the original home of one of 
Diego Rivera’s most important murals, “Sueño de una tarde dominical en la Alameda Central” 
(Dream of Sunday Afternoon in Alameda Park), relocated after the 1985 earthquake.  
Most of the delegates resided in the hotel during the event, and just a few days after 
their arrival many ended up getting sick with intestinal problems.  In order for the 
seminar to proceed as scheduled, John P. Humphrey made a trip to the World Health 
Organization “and returned to the hotel with a flight bag filled with antibiotics” for 
everyone, a step that took care of the problem. The participants, who represented over 
twenty-five European and American countries, discussed the English concept of habeas 
corpus and the Latin American institution of writ of amparo, a complicated practice of 
staying orders against potentially unjust or arbitrary legal decisions.  In the course of the 
discussion, delegates analyzed both recourses as important constitutional instruments in 
the protection of individual rights.  For that reason Humphrey thought it “useful to 
compare the two institutions and appropriate…that this should be done in Mexico, 
where amparo has had an especially interesting development.”10 
At least initially, UN seminar discussions on human rights tended to take place 
among men of law.  The Mexico City meeting proved no different, pulling legal 
specialists from around the globe.  At least fifteen jurists made up the Mexican 
delegation headed by Dr. Felipe Tena Ramírez, minister of the Supreme Court of 
Justice.  Their ideological viewpoints and nationalist allegiances varied, and while some 
																																																									 	 10 John P. Humphrey, Human Rights & the United Nations: A Great Adventure (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: 
Transnational Publishers, 1984), 279.  
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seemed protective of their constitution, others spoke freely against articles they thought 
in violation of individual rights.  Of the attendees, many went on to play prominent 
roles in human rights in the 1980s, including Héctor Fiz-Zamudio and César 
Sepúlveda, the latter a founding member of one of Mexico’s first NGOs, the Mexican 
Academy for Human Rights (Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos).  Others, like the 
Sinaloan jurist Raúl Cervantes Ahumada, who published a book on amparo the same 
year as the conference, contributed to international law or human rights topics.11   
Among the delegates most recognized for their human rights work today stands 
the only official female representative, María Lavalle Urbina.  In 1973 the United 
Nations awarded Lavelle Urbina with the UN Prize in the Field of Human Rights.  
Today she rests among other distinguished women in the cemetery of the Rotunda of 
Illustrious Persons (Rotonda de las Personas Ilustres) alongside writer Emma Godoy and 
actress Dolores del Río.12  Other women participants were those from non-
governmental organizations.  One attendee represented the Friends World Committee 
for Consultation and five others the International Federation of Women Layers.13  
In the opening remarks, the Mexican delegates underscored the importance of 
the writ of amparo.  Tena Ramírez stated Mexico’s posture “would stress the need for 
countries to include in their legislation juridical systems for the protection of the rights of 
man, in semblance to the writ of amparo in Mexico.”14  The following day, Tena also 
																																																								
11 “25 Países en la Junta Sobre Derecho: México Hará Amplia Explicación de su ley de 
Amparo,” Excélsior, 14 August 1961, 1, 8; “Hoy, Seminario de Derechos Humanos: Se Inaugurará a las 
10, con Delegados de Toda la América,” Excélsior, 15 August 1961, 1, 5.  
12 “Hoy, Seminario de Derechos Humanos: Se Inaugurará a las 10, con Delegados de Toda la 
América,” Excélsior, 15 August 1961, 5. 
13 UN Documents ST/TAO/HR/12, “Seminar on Amparo, Habeas Corpus and Other Similar 
Remedies” (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 1962), 5. 
14 “25 Países en la Junta Sobre Derecho: México Hará Amplia Explicación de su ley de 
Amparo,” Excélsior, 14 August 1961, 8.  
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emphasized that no resolutions would be made: rather, the seminar would only be an 
exchange of experiences excluding all political issues, and chiefly concerned with 
technical matters.  Yet other members declared their desire for the adoption of 
jurisdictional recourses similar to that of amparo across the globe.  Attorney General 
Fernando López Arias affirmed Mexico’s unique legal instrument stood as an effective 
remedy for mending any violation to the rights and liberties of man. Standing in for 
President Adolfo López Mateos, the attorney general explained that Mexico’s desire was 
not simply to make of amparo an article for export, “We have never pretended to be a 
model for any nation on earth.  There should be no misunderstanding on that fact,” he 
declared.  Yet he proposed close scrutiny on the concept that became the basis for 
Article Eight of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the efforts of the 
Mexican delegation to the San Francisco conference in 1948, where the “writ of 
amparo was elevated to the category of an international legal instrument.”15    
John P. Humphrey then proceeded with his own remarks.  “It is uniquely suited 
to hold a human rights seminar on amparo and habeas corpus in Mexico,” he stated, “the 
country where the great institution of amparo was born over a hundred years ago.”  
Humphrey saw these two instruments as the most effective in law for protecting human 
rights.  While familiar with the criticisms directed toward the United Nations, he 
assured his audience that it was hard to measure the exact progress the organization had 
made in the terms of human rights.  The Canadian then acknowledged that perhaps the 
“most important contribution has been in changing certain traditional attitudes in these 
matters and the contribution in creating, both in the national as well as in the 																																																								
15 “Derechos de Amparo en Todas las Naciones: Tesis de México al Inaugurarse el Seminario de 
Derechos Humanos,” Excélsior, 16 August 1961, 1; Héctor Fiz-Zamudio, “The Writ of Amparo in Latin 
America,” Lawyers of the Americas 13:3 (Winter 1981), 363.  
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international sphere, the climate of public opinion conducive for the respect of human 
rights.” These seminars certainly opened a space for discussing individual protections 
framed in human rights terms.16 
Humphrey also worked toward keeping the seminar free of political oration.  
Noting a certain cultural affinity among the Latin American delegates for sidetracking 
important issues, he wrote, “Latinos ran true to form; their speeches were unusually 
brilliant and sometimes erudite and well documented, but they were inclined to skate 
around reality.”  Regarding this particular Chilean seminar, Humphrey also mentioned 
“he would have been happier to hear one of them say, for example, that the reason a 
particular institution didn’t work was that the judges were poorly paid or that there was 
political interference.”17  Perhaps with the performance of past seminars in mind, he 
reminded the Mexico City delegation that although their governments selected them, 
they should engage as guests of the United Nations and of the Mexican government, as 
citizens of the world, as men of good will, as experts basing their opinions on their great 
expertise.  In other words, Humphrey hoped to minimize political bickering that 
surfaced when delegates acted as ideologues of their home countries.  In his experience, 
that had often been the case when Soviet and U.S. delegates sat in the same room 
discussing human rights.18  
Certainly, Humphrey hoped for concrete resolutions.  From the very beginning, 
these seminars focused on a particular legal instrument native to the host country.  
Often times this approach proved invaluable.  The young UN Human Rights 																																																								
16 “Derechos de Amparo en Todas las Naciones: Tesis de México al Inaugurarse el Seminario de 
Derechos Humanos,” Excélsior, 16 August 1961, 15. UN Documents ST/TAO/HR/12, 12. 
17 Humphrey, Human Rights & the United Nations, 248. 
18 “Derechos de amparo en todas las naciones: Tesis de México al inaugurarse el Seminario de 
Derechos Humanos,” Excélsior, 16 August 1961, 15. 
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Commission and its leaders, had to tacitly negotiate spaces for non-imposing rights 
promotion during a volatile political climate of leftist revolutionary movements.  They 
advocated a national, legal, and institutional approach, contrasting that of social leaders 
demanding change from urban streets or rural backwaters.  Nevertheless, by framing 
the seminars as neutral legal conferences, Humphrey hoped the participants would 
return home and develop legislation pertinent to institutional reform for the protection 
of rights.  At the time he cited as precedent for action the establishment of a 
parliamentary commissioner (ombudsman) in New Zealand, an idea that grew out of a 
seminar in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).19 
 Probably to the organizer’s displeasure, these human rights conferences also 
opened a space for demonstrators.  In Mexico City, “leftist militants protested in the 
streets against the incarceration of the painter, David Alfaro Siqueiros,” wrote 
Humphrey in his memoir.  In the 1940s, the Mexican public came to know Siqueiros 
both for his monumental frescos and for his part in an attempt on Leon Trotsky’s life.  
At the time Siqueiros, a staunch Stalinist and Mexican Communist Party member, was 
one of Mexico’s most renowned political prisoners, incarcerated in 1960 for criticizing 
the Mexican government in defense of the teachers’ and electricians’ unions.20  Yet, UN 
leaders did not seek association with social movements, nor did they feel compelled to 
engage in local controversies.  On the contrary, Humphrey kept human rights debates 
among professional men and within the confines of the private spaces of hotel 
conference rooms.21    																																																								
19 “Derechos de amparo en todas las naciones: Tesis de México al inaugurarse el Seminario de 
Derechos Humanos,” Excélsior, 16 August 1961, 15.  
  20 Anthony White, Siqueiros: Biography of a Revolutionary Artist (U.S.A.: Booksurge, 2008), 381-392. 
21 “Derechos de amparo en todas las naciones: Tesis de México al inaugurarse el Seminario de 
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Nor did Humphrey resent the Mexican government’s lack of “official 
entertainment.”  Humphrey suspected the administration downplayed the seminar due 
to the Siqueiros protests.  At least for him, government disengagement proved “a relief.”  
Less time mingling with presidential representatives meant more travel.  Humphrey’s 
diaries reveal him to have been an avid local traveler with a passion for bird watching.  
While on official trips he most often toured alongside his wife Jeanne Godreau, whom 
he met while sailing to France soon after graduating from McGill University Law 
School in Montreal.  In this particular trip, he and Jeanne took a trip to the 
Teotihuacán archeological site located on the outskirts of Mexico City, last visited by 
both in 1940.  That same weekend, one of the Mexican delegates invited the couple and 
other seminar attendees to a ranch where Humphrey and Jeanne drank tequila and 
tasted turtle for the very first time.  The latter proved “unappetizing”, but “thanks 
perhaps to the tequila, we ate it with no bad results,” wrote Humphrey.22  
With the unraveling legal discussions surfaced representatives’ divergent 
understandings of human rights.  For instance, U.S representative Assistant Attorney 
General Katzenbach brought up the importance of placing limits on public power as 
key in the protection of the “rights of man,” which he used interchangeably with 
“human rights.” He argued human rights should be guaranteed by making sure that 
public officials correctly applied laws, and added that authorities should also be vigilant 
of the actions of the executive branch.  Katzenbach‘s insistence on the executive 
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perhaps referred to Latin America’s history with powerful leaders whose administrations 
had more than once resulted in overreaches and dictatorial governments.23 
Then came the first order of business, calling for the identification of “judicial 
remedies” for individual rights.  In this case, the scope of protections happened to center 
on political rights, such as those involving the 
right to freedom of movement; right to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention 
and exile; right to be free from torture and from cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; right to a fair trial; right to freedom of opinion and of 
expression; right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association . . . 
 And lastly mentioned were “social and economic rights,” which were largely absent 
from the discussions. The promptness and effectiveness of these remedies also generated 
concern.  In this legalistic consideration, the “authority or person against whose acts 
these remedies” applied spurred the most debate.  Finally, participants discussed the 
protection of individual rights under “emergency situations,” which given the Latin 
American political context of the 1960s most likely meant military dictatorships.24   
 
Particularities in Collectivities: Genealogy of Amparo 
Thereafter, the discussion centered mainly on amparo.  Since its inception in 
1840s, the writ of amparo had failed to spur the interest of Mexican legal scholars, 
probably until the second half of the twentieth century.  In the early 1980s Héctor Fix-
Zamudio, a conference attendee and well-respected research professor from the 
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National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), admitted that it had been US 
scholars who had “written most extensively on the Mexican amparo.”  At least the 
conference’s president, Felipe Tena Ramírez, had published an article on the writ in 
1955, and most of the Mexican delegation possessed basic knowledge of amparo.25 Tena 
Ramírez and Fix-Zamudio both went on to publish material on the subject in the 
succeeding decade.  While amparo stands as an important judicial remedy today, as a 
tool for human rights protections it remains unknown or misunderstood and in large 
part absent from the language used by human rights leaders in the country.26  For 
scholars underscoring the writ’s peninsular heritage, the origin of amparo dates to the 
mid-thirteenth century.  Rooted in Spanish law, both “amparo” and amparamiento first 
appeared in a Castilian legal code established during the reign of Alfonso X of Castile, 
also known as Alfonso “El Sabio” or the “The Wise” (1221-1284).27  Las Siete Partidas or 
The Seven Parts, included provisions regarding local laws (fueros), codes of conduct for 
royal leaders, war, justice, family relationships, trade, and criminal law.  The latter even 
delineated the mischiefs of practices such as those of sorcery and fortune telling.  
References most closely resembling the modern notion of amparo can be found in the 
third partida, which provides a clause for appeals by “taking matters to higher courts or 
through asking the king’s mercy.”28 
 By the sixteenth century, amparo as an instrument informing individual rights had 
emerged from complaint hearings in the region of Aragón in northeastern Spain.  At 																																																								
25 Felipe Tena Ramírez, “The Mexican amparo procedure as a means of protecting human 
rights,” and “El aspecto mundial del amparo.  Su expansión internacional,” México ante el pensamiento 
jurídico-social de occidente, edited by Luis Chico Goerne (Mexico: Edit. Jus, 1955).  
26 Fiz-Zamudio, “The Writ of Amparo in Latin America,” 361 [see footnote 1]. 
27 Ibid., 364. 
28 Madaline W. Nichols, “Las Siete Partidas,” California Law Review 20:3 (March 1932), 275; Fiz-
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least one scholar links this Aragonese procedure of manifestación de personas, or 
“demonstration of persons,” to the modern-day amparo writ used in defense individual 
rights as outlined in Latin American constitutions. As such, peoples’ demonstrations 
hearings transferred to the Spanish colonies indirectly through the Law of the Indies, a 
colonial blueprint crafted during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabel.29  Subsequent forms 
of amparo emerged in colonial Spanish-America to safeguard real property.   Referred 
to as “royal” or “colonial” protections (amparos reales or coloniales), in theory these legal 
provisions protected indigenous communal landholdings from illegal seizures by 
Spanish officials.30 
Most Latin American scholars underscore the Spanish genealogy of amparo, as 
opposed to linkage to the British habeas corpus.  Most will also argue that the Latin 
American writ affords a broader set of protections than the British equivalent, which 
does little more than safeguard against arbitrary detention.  If indeed the modern writ of 
amparo derives from colonial Spain, then Víctor Fairén Guillén argument regarding 
complaint hearings achieving “a wider scope of protection than did its contemporary, 
the British habeas corpus,” would somewhat explain the modern-day differences of both 
legal instruments.31   
Nevertheless, tracking the exact origin of amparo requires deciphering Latin 
America’s broader legal tradition.  The latter proves a challenging task given the 
varying ideological influences.  After the revolutionary wars, independence leaders 
forged new constitutions by borrowing principally from the North American founding 
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fathers and their own Spanish predecessors.32  For example, historian Jaime E. 
Rodríguez O. underscores continuity between the colonial legal practices and those 
established after independence.  In the case of Mexico, Rodríguez writes of the Spanish 
heritage in Mexico’s Constitution kept “with Hispanic constitutional practices” of “a 
powerful legislature and a weak executive.”  Conversely, John Lynch’s work on the 
origins of Spanish American nationality speaks to the role the United States played in 
exciting “the imagination of Spanish Americans” through various forms of economic 
and cultural contact.  Lynch cites the writings of Thomas Paine, John Quincy Adams 
and Thomas Jefferson, as well as copies of the American Declaration of Independence 
and Constitution, all circulating in Spanish America in the decades preceding the 
revolutionary wars, as sources of ideological influence.  For Lynch, it is no coincidence 
that “Constitutions in Venezuela, Mexico and elsewhere would be closely modeled on 
that of the United States.”  Yet, Mexico’s first constitution of 1824 proved more of a 
synthesis of the U.S. and the Spanish Constitution of 1812.33    
Still, the modern-day amparo did not become an immediate fixture of Latin 
American constitutions until the mid-nineteenth century.  Much like other Latin 
American legal frameworks, Mexico’s constitution evolved to become a distinctly 
nationalist construct.  After independence, Latin American liberal elites had “succeeded 
in introducing the notions of constitutionalism and modern representative government 
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in the context of traditional political systems.”34  At least early in the nineteenth century, 
among the competing ideas of citizenship, the liberal notion of “the modern citizen” 
entailed “the abstract and universal individual, free and equal to the rest.”35  It was 
precisely during this early form of political liberalism in Mexico, that the writ of amparo 
emerged as an instrument for the protection of individual rights: that is, as a mechanism 
that legal thinkers recognize as a distinctly Mexican invention, or “indigenously 
Mexican.”36  
The writ of amparo emerged during the long and turbulent nineteenth century. 
The various groups of people making up the Mexican republic had lived through an 
unending series of civil wars, local rebellions, foreign invasions and at least one 
territorial succession.  In the course of a single century, political and military leaders 
forged, altered, and reformulated their country’s constitutions to meet the social and 
political needs of the time.  In the words of the renowned Mexican intellectual Daniel 
Cosío Villegas, Mexico’s constitutional history proved “long and painful.”37  He, like 
many scholars, partly attributed this to the fact that “liberal ideas were applied in 
countries which were highly stratified, socially and racially, and economically 
underdeveloped, and in which the tradition of centralized state authority ran deep.”38  
Until 1855 liberalism remained very much a minority movement that consistently 
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clashed with the “inherited colonial order of institutions and social patterns.”39  Two of 
these institutions, the Church and the military, often intervened on behalf of their 
special juridical privileges (fueros) established during the colonial period.40 
Attempts to forge a judicial system governed by an individualist conception thus 
failed to take root prior to the 1860s.  The social and political unrest frightened the 
governing elites and the “initial liberal drive was soon replaced by a more conservative 
mood.”41  While the Liberal revolution of Benito Juárez and Miguel Lerdo de Tejada 
between 1855 and 1867 may have nipped at the old corporations (church, communal 
land, military), new “collectivities” emerged in their place.42  Just as the Spanish colonial 
authorities had dealt with the “rural village as a corporate, legal unit of the empire,” a 
new and more conservative liberal consensus emerged in the latter decades of the 
nineteenth century, one that incorporated individuals into the national polity as groups, 
“construing the individual as an integral part of the social organism.”43  The scientific, 
positivist infused version, which Alan Knight refers to as developmental Liberalism, 
“provided the language of political consensus as well as a ‘unifying myth’” with just 
enough social and political satiability that allowed for the economic growth seen during 
the thirty-five-year reign of President Porfirio Díaz (1876-1880; 1884-1911).  With the 
emergence of the era of the so-called científicos, a faction of men who based their claim to 																																																								
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authority on technical knowledge and training, ideas regarding individual rights soon 
digressed into rights through polity membership in a way strongly reminiscent of 
Mexico’s colonial past.44 
Within a traditionally corporatist or collectively organized Mexico, the amparo 
stood as one of the few instruments for individual rights protections.  And as procedural 
instrument, other Latin American countries adopted this same writ, but not in its exact 
form.  Oddly enough, though, its actual authorship remains somewhat unclear. José 
Emilio Rabasa (1856-1930), the well-respected liberal diplomat, historian, jurist, and 
occasional novelist, eulogized and credited the tapatío Mariano Otero (1817-1850) as the 
author of the writ of amparo, which eventually became Article 101 and 102 of the 1857 
liberal constitution.  Rabasa admired the American Constitution.  While in the United 
States he carefully studied the country’s system of constitutional law.  In the words of 
Charles A. Hale, Rabasa idealized the way Anglo-American constitutionalism had 
developed.  Probably for that reason, Rabasa argued that Otero had taken “the path of 
the American Constitution, found the formula to enforce individual guarantees and 
established, in a masterful way, the writ of amparo.” Although he also expressed concern 
over the writ’s limitations, which he believed had derived as a “carelessly formulated 
version” of the Due Process Clause found in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.45  
Perhaps Rabasa was correct in crediting Otero as the original author of the 
constitutional writ.  When Felipe Tena Ramírez gave his acceptance speech as the 																																																								
44 Thomson, “Popular Aspects of Liberalism in Mexico, 1848-1888,” 267-68. 
45 Mariano Otero “tomó el sendero de la constitución americana, encontró la formula para 
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Hale, Lucrecia Orensanz and Dra. María del Refugio González, “La tradición del derecho continental 
europeo y el constitucionalismo en el México del siglo XX: el legado de Emilio Rabasa,” Historia mexicana 
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newly elected Chairman of the Mexico City Human Rights seminar, he “noted that the 
institution had originated a little over a century ago,” which in 1961 would have meant 
he too looked to Otero as the true author to the modern version of amparo.46  A 
committed liberal, Otero aimed “to protect the individual in federal tribunals against 
legislative, administrative or jurisdictional acts in violation of individual rights included 
in the first 29 articles of the Constitution.”  Interestingly, once the amparo became a 
constitutional institution its scope broadened to prevent “federal interference with State 
sovereignty and vise versa.”  It was also in 1867 that amparo acquired similar 
protections as those of the writ of habeas corpus, which protects against “illegal arrest 
and confiscation.”  Rabasa was indeed correct about the U.S. influence on amparo, 
given that the latter’s use as an instrument of due process was apparently “taken almost 
verbatim from the Fifth Amendment.”47  
Even so, another regional statesman receives credit with its authorship at a state 
level.  Seven years before Mariano Otero added his version of the amparo to the 
Reform Act of 1847, Manuel Crescencio Rejón (1799-1849) had already designed and 
named the amparo judicial procedure for the 1841 Yucatecan Constitution.48  Rejón, 
along with Pedro C. Pérez and Darío Escalante, headed a committee that drafted a 
number of amendments for the state constitution.  From this project emerged the writ of 
amparo when Rejón proposed that the Supreme Court have the power “to defend 
(amparar) individuals in the enjoyment of both their civil and political rights.”49  These 
individual protections would be afforded through the defense against “the application of 																																																								
46 UN Documents ST/TAO/HR/12, 12. 
47 Pedro Pablo Camargo, “The Right to Judicial Protection: ‘Amparo’ and Other Latin 
American Remedies for the Protection of Human Rights,” Lawyers of the Americas 3:2 (Jan. 1971), 202-203. 
48 Richard D. Baker, Judicial Review in Mexico: A Study of the Amparo Suit, 12-13; Fiz-Zamudio, “The 
Writ of Amparo in Latin America,” 368. 
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	 39 
unconstitutional laws and decrees of the legislature and illegal actions of the executive.”  
Perhaps Rejón’s amparo spoke to the local quest for legal defense mechanisms against 
federal encroachment upon a region that continually rejected incorporation into the yet 
unconsolidated Mexican nation-state.  According to Pedro Pablo Camargo, when 
broadened into a constitutional remedy, it served “also as a means of preventing federal 
interference with State sovereignty and vice versa.”  In the context of nineteenth-
century Yucatán, the amparo proved less an institution of individual rights protections 
and more of an instrument for state rights framed in an emergent liberal language of 
universal suffrage, sovereignty, and individual representation.50 
 Regardless of the amparo’s origins, by the mid-twentieth century, UN 
representatives like John P. Humphrey identified it as instrument for individual rights 
protections.  But unlike the North American or British habeas corpus, the Mexican writ 
had evolved within a society where rights discussions revolved around group 
membership, not all that different than a century earlier.  Furthermore, the use of 
amparo within Mexico’s legal community differed significantly from its originally 
intended goal and “has a much broader scope and field of application than” its habeas 
corpus counterpart.51  Nevertheless, amparo by 1961 had been selected by international 
representatives to mean individual representation as understood by the Western and 
First World countries.  That is precisely the perspective Mexican scholars adopted 
thereafter.  Felipe Tena Ramírez described the utility of amparo “as a means of 
challenging the abuses committed by the public authorities, the venality of the judges 																																																								
50 Pedro Pablo Camargo, “The Right to Judicial Protection: ‘Amparo’ and Other Latin 
American Remedies for the Protection of Human Rights,” Lawyers of the Americas 3:2 (Jan. 1971), 202-203; 
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51 Carlos Sánchez Mejorada, “The Writ of Amparo. Mexican Procedure to Protect Human 
Rights,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 243 (Jan. 1946), 107. 
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and violations of the laws.”52  In the context of the UN seminar, representatives 
discussed amparo in the context of individual protections, knowing little of the abuse of 
the writ in the latter decades—particularly by private companies and corporations. 
 
Flirting with Universalities: Promoting Human Rights in 20th Century Corporatist Mexico 
Humphrey and his fellow activists may have drawn inspiration from the example 
of twentieth-century Europe’s terrible ideological wars, but as the foregoing material 
demonstrates, they were in fact entering a nation with a long history of debate regarding 
rights and their legal formulation.  The chief difference was between those espousing 
individual vs. corporate rights.  Within the international context of the 1950s and 1960s, 
the early definition of the term “human rights” had come to signify the protection of the 
individual from the excesses of the state.  In the backdrop of Latin America in the 
1960s, where the state placed economic and social rights above political guarantees, the 
United Nations promoted a collage of applications under the term’s insignia, especially 
in political matters.  Within the UN internationally driven campaign at fortifying the 
position of the individual rights within more collectively based societies, the initial 
definition of human rights meant individual and political rights.  This emphasis paved 
the way for the infusion of human rights into U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s.  Within 
the Cold War conflict, human rights often functioned as a weapon against the Soviet 
Union, whereby the U.S. government attempted to underscore its role as a “protector” 
of rights and simultaneously counter any arguments regarding communist policies as 
empathic toward social and economic rights.  However, rights policy could also be used 
to challenge criticism regarding American backing of dictators.   																																																								
52 UN Documents ST/TAO/HR/12, 12. 
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In the face of these ambiguities, John P. Humphrey promoted individual rights 
found within liberal constitutions.  His original idea initially used the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights to fill constitutional gaps regarding individual rights.  
This meant safeguarding individual and internationalist notions of rights, first through 
the traditional and constitutional avenues, without necessarily recurring to avenues 
outside the context of the state.  Even legal scholar Fiz-Zamudio continually emphasized 
that a prerequisite to resorting to international provisions included the exhaustion of 
domestic avenues.53  For that reason the 1961 Conference on the amparo and other 
legal mechanisms focused primarily on debating the application of national juridical 
instruments for safeguarding individual rights, which at least Carlos Sánchez Mejorada 
in 1946 believed that human rights in legal terminology were “incorrectly called 
‘individual guarantees.’”54  In the case of the amparo, the focus on the individual tended 
to downplay its potential for group protections; according to Fiz-Zamudio “one 
common purpose of the amparo is to protect . . . whether in individual or group 
form.”55  Although initially centered on the local approach, by the 1970s this legal 
selectivity gave way to a new view that conceptualized human rights as individual, 
universal, in antagonism with group demands, and often seen as anti-national.   
The first clash between individual and group rights arose during a discussion on 
the variations of the amparo in Latin America.  Mariano Azuela, judge of the Supreme 
Court of Justice, attempted to bring the debate back to the essentials of these legal 																																																								
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instruments, instead of getting caught up on the diverse applications of the amparo 
throughout the region.  Azuela began by stating “leaders of the French Revolution had 
ingeniously believed that it was sufficient to proclaim the rights of the individual and 
that infringements of personal liberty were rooted in ignorance.”  In scorn of the French 
approach to consecrating rights simply through the creation of states and the drafting of 
constitutions, Azuela spoke of the institutions needed to actively protect these codified 
rights.  In the case of workers, he believed that rights should “be achieved through 
special organizations” (trade unions).  It was only when an individual lacked 
membership in a union that he or she could turn to the writ of amparo for protection.  
In this reading, the amparo functioned as a last resort that “did not leave the worker 
undefended, but operated as an indirect safeguard for him.”  But even then, the worker 
first had to appeal a type of union conciliation and arbitration board (juntas de conciliación 
y arbitraje).  The union then deliberated and decided upon non-member and individual 
worker’s rights, and only after exhausting that avenue could a person request protection 
through the amparo writ.56 
Azuela’s reading had deep historical roots.  Since the Mexican Revolution 
(1910-1920), the government negotiated rights through institutionalized means.  
President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928), while exercising power behind the scenes, 
created the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party, PNR) in 1929, 
which eventually became the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, PRI) establishing a non-armed and negotiated approach for the 
country’s political leadership through a single-party structure.  By the time of populist 
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) came to power, he consolidated the corporatist system of 																																																								
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representation by incorporating the populace into the official party through group 
membership.  Indeed, Cárdenas relied on this system to help carry out his landmark 
policies of land reform and the 1938 nationalization of the foreign-dominated petroleum 
industry.  Cárdenas successfully incorporated three broad social groups into the party 
structure: campesinos (rural peasants), the middle classes, and urban industrial workers.  
The military successfully resisted formal incorporation, but over the course of the next 
thirty years was professionalized and depoliticized to the point that it no longer 
represented a challenge to civilian control.  In that form, the government retained a 
comfortable level of stability from 1940 until 1968.  When instances of rural or urban 
protest skirmishes emerged, as in the case of the height of the railroad workers in 1958-
1959 or the brutal assassination of agrarian leader Rubén Jaramillo in 1962, the 
government, operating through official or non-official channels, resolved conflict 
through a combination of negotiation and subtle repression.57 
As for worker demands, the government operated – and continues to operate – 
through the arbitration and conciliation board system that Mariano Azuela referenced.   
Its legal function includes “registering collective labor agreements, resolving individual 
and collective labor disputes, and (in local-jurisdiction economic activities) registering 
labor unions.”  The board representatives include business, government, and labor 
representatives.  As a type of intermediary between workers and businesses, these boards 
determine “the legality of strike petitions, and enforce a variety of specific legal 
requirements regarding collective labor contracts, working conditions, minimum wages, 																																																								
57 For additional information on the professionalization of politics in Mexico through the 
removal of the military from politics and the establishment of intelligence services in the country see 
Aaron W. Navarro’s Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954 (University Park: 
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and so forth.”  In some cases, both at the federal and local level, they stand as the main 
administrative channel for employee demands after workers and employers fail to reach 
an agreement.  One of the largest local arbitration boards in Chihuahua, created in 
1936 and located in Ciudad Juárez, has jurisdiction over grievances varying from the 
construction and agricultural sector to that of the university.  Whatever their original 
intention, these boards over time came to favor management.  Even today, places like 
the border maquiladora region possess an air of anti-unionism whereby government 
authorities consistently work to attract foreign investment by promising a progressive 
labor environment.58    
It is possible that northern Mexico border states may possess more individualist 
driven approaches to rights demands than more union embedded places like Mexico 
City or Veracruz.  This historical phenomenon predates the Revolution.  In his work on 
salaried workers on haciendas, Friedrich Katz describes the northern region as one 
possessing very distinct labor patterns in comparison to southern or central Mexico.  
Workers in the “North,” according to Katz, showed a certain independent streak from 
their hacendado, such is the case of laborers who served as armies for their bosses.  These 
“resident peons on northern haciendas had managed to secure a large measure of 
autonomy from the hacienda.”  Other factors offering wage autonomy included the 
growth of the Southwestern economy in the United States and the expansion of the 
railroads.  With larger labor markets and more opportunities for mobility, Mexican 
hacendados had to offer better wages in order to secure a stable workforce.59  In other 																																																								
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words, the north has tended to possess a far more mobile workforce and one inevitably 
linked and often persuaded toward the North American labor market.  This certainly 
played into the formation of the business culture characteristic of northern cities like 
Monterrey and Chihuahua City and the border’s maquiladora belts.  
While Azuela focused on the amparo for workers left out of a union, the 
Brazilian delegate discussed the breach of power by union leadership.  Unlike habeas 
corpus and amparo, the Brazilian mandado de segurança gave legal jurisdiction over mishaps 
committed by labor leaders.  Mr. Antonio Calvo, Attorney General of the Federal 
Government, believed “the acts of labour leaders were subject to the jurisdiction of the 
mandado de segurança.”  But Calvo recognized that some legal scholars believed unions 
functioned under public law, while “others still considered them as mixed institutions of 
both private and public law.”60  If indeed labor leadership were treated as public 
officials and held liable for ill or unjust decisions, then that would in some form 
reconfigure the internal workings of union leaderships and their relationship with the 
government.  In the case of Mexico, amparo did not possess such jurisdiction over 
unions like the protections afforded by the Brazilian legal instrument for individual 
rights protections. 
Additional debate emerged regarding the inapplicability of amparo to other 
Revolutionary corporate pillars: education, land, and water rights.  It all began when a 
Venezuelan Professor of Constitutional Law, José Guillermo Andueza Acuña, called 
attention to inconsistencies within Mexico’s 1917 Constitution.  “I found parts that are 
incongruent with Latin American public law,” and some of which “drew my attention” 
said the Professor.  On this fourth day of the conference, he hoped the Mexican 																																																								
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delegates could explain how they interpreted those articles that denied any type of legal 
protections, whether it be amparo or some other legal construction.  For Andueza these 
articles stood in divergence with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.61  Ignacio 
Burgoa, Professor of Law of the UNAM responded to the contradictions Andueza found 
in a paragraph of Article three and another from Article twenty seven of the Mexican 
Constitution “which precluded the remedy of amparo in any form whatsoever in cases 
concerning education or the apportionment or restitution of lands or waters.”62   
Education and land reform stood as two key institutions of the revolutionary 
process of nation-building.  For that reason they have attracted heated criticized and 
equally heated defense.  Mr. Burgoa seemed chiefly concerned with clarifying some 
historical precedents for the articles’ air of unconstitutionality.  The Canadian and 
Costa Rican rapporteurs of the seminar, Eldon M. Woolliams and Carlos Bolaños 
Morales, summarized Burgoa’s comments regarding education, which he argued “had 
been considered an essential human freedom by the Constituent Congress of 1850-1857 
but in 1934 had become an obligation of the Government and not a right of the 
governed.”  Although Article three remained within the section of guarantees of the 
constitution, the article “embodied no guarantee and recognized no right” and for that 
reason the recourse of amparo was not applicable.63  With Article three as an obligation 
and not a right, the government became the principal educator of the Mexican urban 
and rural populace, superseding the position of the Catholic Church.  Through a 
federally directed system under the auspices of the Secretaría de Educación Pública 
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(Secretariat of Public Education, SEP), today one of the largest bureaucracies in all of 
Latin America, revolutionary planners brought education to the most remote corners of 
the countryside.  Created in 1921, the SEP represented “the most important institution 
of social engineering during that critical period of State and nation formation,” 
according to Stephen E. Lewis.64 
This program aimed at forging a national ideology did so at the expense of 
certain freedoms commonly associated with education.  Or at least that seemed to be 
the consensus for those that upheld the third section of Article twenty-six of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights stating “Parents have a prior right to choose 
the kind of education that shall be given to their children.”  And even while Burgoa 
explained, “it was purely a historical accident of copyright that the article had remained 
in the section of the Constitution which dealt with guarantees,” he rightly clarified that 
“education could be given privately in Mexico in accordance with the freedom of 
expression, in which case article 3 was without effect.”65  While Burgoa recognized 
constitutional imperfections, he nonetheless used historical explanations to justify what 
the Venezuela delegate, at least, had deemed a contradiction and possible infringement 
upon individual rights.  
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On the other hand, Mariano Azuela fiercely criticized Article three for 
representing juridical legacies of the Revolution.  What Burgoa saw as a constitutional 
“imperfection,” the Supreme Court of Justice Azuela described as a “dictatorial 
imposition.” Azuela began by stating that in the context of this international seminar, he 
was not going to defend his rights as a Mexican when responding to the important 
inquiry made by the Venezuelan delegate.  As a private citizen, and not as a 
representative of his government, he argued, “the people of Mexico were living under a 
precarious system so far as freedom of education was concerned.”66   
Ghosts of Mexico’s ideological past stood behind much of this discussion. Azuela 
himself was the grandson of the Jalisciense author by the same name, famous for his 
revolutionary novel Los de abajo (The Underdogs) published in the United States in midst of 
the conflict.  The installments were first printed by the El Paso del Norte newspaper and 
published in book form in Mexico in 1920, receiving positive reviews.67  The novel 
faithfully reflected the elder Azuela’s profoundly porfirian views, contemptuously 
portraying revolutionary soldiers as ignorant masses carried along by forces they neither 
understood nor desired. The younger Azuela’s viewpoint kept faith with his family’s 
roots.  He argued that simply because Article three belonged to the revolutionary sector, 
that it should not be unfalteringly upheld.68  For Azuela the government had too much 
educational oversight, and Article Three gave the Mexican government unfettered 
power to suppress any institution it deemed unfit.  Any proposals for new schools 
required “official permission, which was granted at the whim of the authorities,” and 																																																								
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inevitably “tied to the official programmes laid down by the Government.”  The 
amparo could be utilized to challenge Article Three of the constitution, even if the 
freedom of education was clearly violated, or schools unjustly closed.69  Interestingly 
enough, the delegates themselves recognized that even while not judicially recognized, 
the revolutionary government did tolerate freedom of education, a fact evidenced by the 
number of private institutions across the nation.  Nevertheless, this article spurred 
significant debate and disagreement for its historical links to the revolutionary and 
nation-building process.  
Azuela’s recycled porfirian attitudes naturally resonated with people for whom 
the revolution had in one way or another proved unsatisfactory.  Political discontent 
cloaked by the so-called Mexican Miracle (the rapid economic growth between the 
1940s and1970s) surfaced in popular culture.  It was Daniel Cosío Villegas’ 1947 essay, 
“La crisis de México,” or “The Crisis of Mexico,” that opened up the arena for public 
debates regarding the failed promises of the Mexican Revolution.70  On the big screen, 
Luis Buñuel’s 1950 film Los olvidados (The Forgotten Ones) “exposed and criticized the 
fissures, cracks and failures of Classical Mexican Cinema,” a genre that Buñuel disliked 
for its tendency to deal in revolutionary, yet folkloric images of Mexico.  This highly 
acclaimed film underscored the ideological vacuum of the revolutionary project to the 
artist and intellectual classes.71 
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Literary figures too had begun to question the Mexican social order.  The author 
Carlos Fuentes punctured revolutionary discourse in his well-received first novel titled 
La región más transparente (Where the Air is Clear).  This 1958 work delivers vignettes of 
characters living side-by-side in Mexico City, a place whose persistent inequalities and 
sharp class distinctions typify the revolution’s ambiguous legacy.72  Another key work 
capturing the gaps of the revolutionary myth was the 1961 best-seller by North 
American anthropologist Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sánchez.  This book proved 
profoundly controversial when it first appeared in Spanish by the Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, one of the leading publishers since 1934 created by Cosío Villegas himself.  
The Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, for example, considered Lewis’s study 
“obscene, defamatory, subversive and antirevolutionary.”73  In fact, the Fondo’s 
Argentine editor, the socialist-leaning Arlando Orfilia, received loud criticisms that led 
to his ouster from the publishing house he had directed since 1948.  This episode led to 
the creation of a new publishing house in 1966, Siglo XXI, which began its trajectory 
with Lewis’ book.  The Children of Sánchez even made it to the theater under the direction 
of screenwriter Vicente Leñero, at the request of Lewis himself.  These and other 
contemporary cultural productions portrayed a Mexico City starkly different from the 
optimistic ideology of the revolutionary party.74 
 The other revolutionary issue that figured into the seminar’s conversations 
included land reform.  After 1915 every single president had carried out some version of 
agrarian reform. President Cárdenas in particular distributed vast amounts of land 																																																								
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through the ejido system, communally administered and federally controlled land grants.  
This system, marred by conflict from the beginning, “considered that the engine of 
agrarian production had to be the ejido and reiterated the need to support it with credit 
and infrastructure.”  Ideally, the countryside would become the breadbasket for urban 
centers.  However, many peasants concentrated on cultivating for their basic needs 
(maize) and not commercial crops, and when the plots distributed were of unfertile land 
without access to water, these thwarted reform expectations for higher agricultural 
output.75 
 For those Mexicans organized under the land system of collective representation, 
the amparo writ often proved more an obstacle than a protection.  At least ideally, the 
ejido was created to “arm the peasants and create self-defense units that would enable 
them to defend their rights,” whereby this collective unit would form the basis of social 
and political organization for the rural countryside.76  But this collectivity also 
obstructed a path to individual rights protections.  When the Venezuelan representative 
raised this point to the Mexican delegation, Ignacio Burgoa responded first by stating 
“the unfair distribution of land had been one of the major evils afflicting the country in 
the course of its history.”  While the situation of the rural farmer had deteriorated to 
some extent since Cárdenas golden age of land reform, many families benefited 
significantly from land distribution, while others had outgrown the small plots, thus 																																																								
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forcing migration upon the succeeding generations.  Nevertheless, Burgoa concluded by 
recognizing that individual rights were not protected under the ejido system.  “The 1917 
Constitution had prescribed that no petition for amparo should be receivable in matters 
of land tenure, but only in relation to the apportionment or restitution of lands or water 
to towns,” and “that irreceivability had later been restricted for the benefit of small 
landowners.”77  Whatever the truth behind these politically charged comments, they 
clearly struck a nerve among national intellectuals.  Soon after Burgoa’s commentary 
the seminar’s president, Tena Ramírez, announced the change of topic, and Mexico’s 
revolutionary collectivities were not discussed thereafter.78 
 The following day, at least one Mexican delegate came to the defense of the 
Constitution.  Just before the conference attendees left for the city of Cuernavaca in the 
state of Morelos, located an hour south of Mexico City, UNAM professor Luis Araujo 
Valdivia defended Mexico’s rule of law.  Araujo underscored that Article Fourteen and 
Sixteen of the Mexican Constitution protected human rights with the guarantees 
afforded by legality and constitutionality.79  A newspaper article in Excélsior stated that 
Araujo’s words seemed in “warm defense of our Constitution, which two days ago was 
harshly criticized for its article three.”  Interestingly, the delegate indicated that in 
addition to these constitutional guarantees for the protection of human rights stood 
those safeguards afforded with the perpetuation of state sovereignty.  A state would 
																																																								
77 UN Documents ST/TAO/HR/12, 50-51. 
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therefore need to seek protection (amparo) when violations of sovereignty occurred.  If 
such were the case, the need to guarantee citizens’ rights would proceed through the 
restitution of constitutional order.80  Araujo underscored the state’s obligation toward 
protecting human rights by maintaining the rule of law.  Yet, this proves especially 
problematic to individual rights when governmental authorities deem civil unrest as a 
threat to the rule of law and state sovereignty, as was the case for hundreds of thousands 
of Latin Americas during the wave of military dictatorships that was soon to engulf most 
of the region.  
 
Emergency Powers  
As observers of Latin American affairs understand, leaders’ unwavering defense 
of sovereignty during the Cold War often justified the restitution of order by calling 
upon emergency powers.  Such was the case that by the 1990s most Latin American 
countries had come under emergency powers at one point or another as a way to 
remedy internal dissidence deemed a threat to national security.  “Full-blown 
emergencies typically deploy violence against real or imagined opponents even before 
the threatened violence by others emerges,” according to one author.   That proved the 
case in Uruguay in 1968 and 1970, Argentina in 1976, and Colombia in 1979.81  
Probably the most well-known case of extended use of emergency decrees to govern 
include those invoked in Guatemala after the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz, and in 
Chile by Augusto Pinochet after overthrowing democratically elected Salvador Allende 
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in 1973.  Other examples include that of Brazil in the 1960s, Nicaragua in the 1970s, 
Guatemala in the 1970s and 1980s, or Peru in the 1990s.  However, Latin American 
was certainly no stranger to military coups before 1961, and given the relevance of the 
topic, conference attendees discussed the extent of juridical remedies for individual 
rights protections, like amparo, under emergency situations.  “All the participants 
recognized, at least implicitly, that there were in the lives of nations exceptional 
situations, known as ‘state of emergency,’ in which it was necessary to restrict the rights 
of the individual in order to safeguard the security of the state,” stated the UN report.82 
In the case of Mexico, emergency powers were left out of the first constitutions.  
A group of men led by the priest Miguel Ramos Arizpe (1775-1843) opposed such 
exclusion from the 1824 Mexican Constitution.  Since his participation in the drafting of 
the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz, Ramos Arizpe stood as a proponent for emergency 
powers as a realistic response for the context of the time.  Yet, this minority group was 
defeated, mostly because of the reaction against Spanish authoritarianism and the short-
lived empire of Agustín de Iturbide (1822-1823).  According to one author, emergency 
provisions were finally incorporated in 1857, after the first constitutions failed to bring 
order to Mexico and the numerous extrajudicial attempts to bring stability.  Thereafter, 
numerous leaders, most notably Benito Juárez himself, invoked and liberally employed 
emergency powers.83   
But prior to delving into discussions regarding individual rights under 
emergency situations, the delegation met with the president.  The August 21 morning 
session of the seminar concluded at 11:30 a.m., at which point the participants headed 																																																								
82 UN Documents ST/TAO/HR/12, 25.  
83 José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, El manto liberal: los poderes de emergencia en México, 1821-1876, 10; 
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to the National Palace located in Mexico City’s main plaza, the Zócalo.84  President 
Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) welcomed the delegation.  Often regarded as the last 
of the authentically popular priísta85 presidents, López Mateos was a highly intelligent 
man, a notorious bon vivant, and a witty conversationalist capable of immense charm.  
He also suffered from chronic ill health, and in fact died in a coma a mere two years 
after leaving the presidency.  The president (who was in fact rumored to have been born 
in Guatemala) listened to a brief presentation by Dr. Raúl Cervantes Ahumada on 
amparo and emergency legislation.86  Ahumada detailed the long history of Mexico’s 
emergency situations, most of which he attributed to a turbulent nineteenth century and 
a revolution.  In speaking about the last time Mexico lived under such a state, Ahumada 
paid homage to President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946), who had invoked 
emergency powers due to World War II.  Ahumada expressed gratitude and admiration 
for the manner in which Ávila Camacho exercised these; “gently, without extreme 
violations and in accordance with the laws.”87 
Yet most agreed that under such emergency situations, individual rights 
remained threatened.  Attendee Fiz-Zamudio wrote years later “it can be generally 
established that the writ of amparo, as consecrated in several Latin American 
constitutions, is diminished in practice because of constant declarations of 
emergency.”88  In the opening remarks for this section, Venezuelan Andueza Acuña 
mentioned, “If habeas corpus and amparo were suspended during states of emergency, the 
two remedies could not be used…but they were available for the protection of other 																																																								
84 “Urge proteger los derechos humanos: Llamado del delegado de Venezuela en la reunión 
sobre amparo,” Excélsior, 22 August 1961, 1.  
85 A person associated with the PRI party.  
86 Soledad Loaeza, “El Guatemalteco que Gobernó México,” Nexos, 6 July 2009.  
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88 Fiz-Zamudio, “The Writ of Amparo in Latin America,” 388.  
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rights not subject to the state of emergency.”89  But in most cases each state determined 
the extent of rights subject to limitations.  Dr. Jean Marie Cotteret of Martinique (A 
French Department in the eastern Caribbean Sea) spoke about the state of emergency 
in France, which had been in place since April 1961.  “He explained that they entailed a 
suspension of all the constitutional rights of the individual and that no appeal lay against 
decisions of the President of the Republic during the state of emergency,” meaning 
“states of emergency had a total effect,” diminishing legal avenues for individual 
protections.90  Both Andueza Acuña and Cotteret served as the rapporteurs for the 
seminar discussions on emergency powers and individual rights.  
The problems generated by emergency state powers did not end there.  Even 
after emergency situations receded, some governments, including highly democratic 
ones, prolonged the restriction of rights.  The Canadian delegate, Eldon M. Woolliams, 
explained that after World War II ended the Canadian government  “was not greatly 
disposed to abandon the powers it had acquired by virtue of declaration of state of 
emergency” until 1960.  Because states of siege are temporary, the delegates agreed on 
the importance of criteria for determining when they have ended.  At least for Cotteret 
“they should terminate when the reasons justifying them had ceased to exist.”  On the 
other hand, Panamanian delegate Camilo O. Pérez, Professor of Political Science, 
explained that people should have the right to revolt if sieges extend and as a way “to 
regulate states of emergency.”  Professor Pérez was the only delegate in the seminar who 
advocated extrajudicial paths to individual rights protections through “collective 
violence.”  Given the predisposition for governmental abuse of emergency powers, 
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Pérez rightfully expressed the role of the people on restitution the rule of law once 
deemed appropriate.91 
Next to address the problem of emergency situations was the Argentine delegate, 
who spoke on the role of judges.  Genaro R. Carrió, Law Professor at the National 
University of Buenos Aires, concluded that political institutions should determine the 
particularities of emergency situations; however, he considered the possibility that 
judicial “authorities might intervene to rule on the propriety of a declaration of state of 
emergency in certain special circumstances.”  Carrío believed judicial control and the 
use of the special remedies like habeas corpus and the amparo were justified when, for 
example, unauthorized government institutions overextended restrictions or when 
“administrative authorities adopted measures which clearly had no connections with the 
causes of the state of emergency.”  Ideally judicial oversight could prevent extreme 
violations of individual rights, yet the invocation of emergency powers most often voided 
any constitutional remedies like amparo.92  Therefore, “Only if the amparo is admissible 
under emergency situations can one speak of true procedural safeguards for human 
rights in Latin America,” wrote Fix-Zamudio.93  
As the conference came to an end, the delegates expressed their expectations.  
The outspoken Venezuelan delegate, Andueza Acuña insisted the seminar’s guiding 
principle “is that legal institutions should be effective for the protection of human 
rights.”94  Dr. Benjamín Laureano Luna of the International League for the Rights of 
Man, early NGO working for individual rights, took on a more internationalist stance 
																																																								
91 Ibid., 99-103.  
92 Ibid., 104-105.  
93 Fiz-Zamudio, “The Writ of Amparo in Latin America,” 389.  
94 Excélsior, 22 August 1961, 11.  
	 58 
regarding human rights.  Luna made reference to Europe and argued that tensions 
resulted from the “negotiation of one human right: peoples’ right to self-
determination.”95  Luna surprised the assembly with his intervention and was advised to 
keep his comments brief.  His examples of recent self-determination victories included a 
number of African states and Germany, where the work of the United Nations has been 
vital.  Nevertheless, Luna insisted the extralegal and legal states of emergency 
compromised human rights and asked delegates to contemplate the role international 
preoccupation accomplished for protecting basic liberties of populations under 
dictatorships.  And he recommended to the seminar organizers that attendees sign some 
kind of human rights convention with which member states should comply; without 
such an agreement and without international law there would be little progress.96  
Mr. Luna also spoke for international avenues for human rights protections.  
Seminar participants focused on the exhaustion of constitutional remedies without 
making reference to alternatives outside the context of national courts.  Luna argued 
that a person should be “granted the right of direct appeal to international bodies to 
assert their dignity or to protest against transgressors of their fundamental rights.”97  
Yet, attendees did not discuss international avenues after the exhaustion of instruments 
such as amparo and habeas corpus.  On the contrary, seminar discussions encouraged 
legal thinkers to return home and appraise internal judicial remedies for individual 
rights protections by working “in their respective countries for the adoption, 
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maintenance and improvement of all remedies and judicial procedures necessary for the 
protection of human rights.”98   
Nevertheless, there existed an understanding that the UN sponsored seminar 
was to impart ideas of human rights as delineated in the UDHR.  And the “men of law” 
had an “inescapable duty to fight for the rule of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,” thus appealing “to all jurists of the world to intensify their efforts” for the 
recognition, enforcement, and effectiveness of human rights for all peoples.99  While 
Luna proposed the recognition of international law as an additional source, aside from 
the state, in rights protections, delegates themselves made little reference to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or to cases of international jurisdiction.100  Raúl 
Cervantes Ahumada (Mexico) rightfully encapsulated the purpose of the meetings, 
which he believed “was to promote the establishment of a psychological climate in 
which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could hold full sway.”101  Even while 
the social, political, and economic climate proved uncongenial for individual rights, a 
concept gradually replaced the notion of human rights.  
And this nationalist approach to rights violations proved inefficient and legalistic.  
Pedro Pablo Camargo in 1970 wrote that certainly the Mexican amparo filled a number 
of constitutional gaps in relation to “individual rights” by often serving as a “writ of 
habeas corpus, [or] as an indirect means of judicial review” to name a few.  But on 
another note, Camargo pointed out the ill use the writ resulting in the obstruction of 
justice in some cases, important mishap prominent Mexican legal scholars failed to 
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mention in their work.  Camargo pointed out that certainly it was not “as quick and 
efficient as it had been claimed to be,” and rather than a source of protection many saw 
it as the “last bastion of the administration of justice in Mexico.”  And Camargo even 
cited Fiz-Zamudio to exemplify that when Mexican intellectuals “refer to the amparo” 
they do so to endorse its importance.  Fiz-Zamudio wrote extensively on amparo and 
also served in key administrative positions in the university and within the government.  
In many ways it makes sense that he believed this writ to be “the most efficient and 
adequate procedural instrument for the specific protection of human rights stipulated in 
the Constitution,” but very often left out the abuse of this important instrument.102 
 
“Minimum Flying Speed”: Why universal approach to rights failed…momentarily?  
What to make of the 1961 Mexico City conference?  It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that it represented a rights approach of at best limited appeal.  The United 
Nations as a global rights experiment clearly did not gain the desired momentum or 
influence its promoters had desired.  Nor did the project of universal human rights, at 
least initially.  John P. Humphrey took on the rights program at the United Nations, 
and his friend Laugier assured him it would be a “great adventure.”103   In some ways 
this turned out to be correct, but tangible results proved more elusive.  Indeed, there 
had been moments when Humphrey expressed his displeasure, stating, “My position 
was becoming impossible and perhaps I should have resigned from the Secretariat there 
and then.”  During those difficult periods, in one instance the Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld asked him into his office where they discussed the faith of the rights 																																																								
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program at the UN.  “There is a flying speed below which an airplane will not remain 
in the air,” explained Hammarskjöld, “I want you to keep the program at that speed 
and no greater.”104  By keeping this minimum flying speed, Humphrey “saved the 
Human Rights Division, which Hammarskjöld wanted to replace,” and in large part 
with country seminars as the one held in Mexico City in 1961.   
Most fundamentally, campaigns such as Humphrey’s initially failed because they 
could not compete with existing social and political realities.  In Mexico, at least, that 
meant the corporatist arrangements that had emerged from the country’s history.  
Historian Samuel Moyn has argued that human rights are a relatively new 
phenomenon, distinct from citizenship rights.  Even while a number of individuals and 
international organisms championed human rights in the postwar period, these failed to 
arouse the attention of the majority.  It was not until the 1970s that once other 
ideological utopias failed, like communism, an alternative ideology emerged, that of 
human rights as “the last utopia.”105  The Mexico City human rights seminar of 1961 
captures the reception toward internally promoted notions of rights that, as Moyn points 
out, legal scholars understood simply failed to become an alternative language for rights 
demands or avenue for rights protections.  As John P. Humphrey’s rights seminar 
shows, human rights initially did not adhere to universalist notions of rights and did not 
transcend constitutional citizenship.  Even while the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights factored into the discussions, the seminars almost immediately focused on 
national remedies for rights violations.  
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Yet, rights leaders in the 1960s framed their demands in nationalist terms.  The 
relatively new and internationalist language of rights remained obscure and absent from 
any movement in the country.  And the dominant party negotiated the allotment of 
rights.  This corporate practice dated back to the Mexican Revolution in 1910, and 
clearly had its limits.  At the same time, demanding individual rights as promoted by the 
United Nations in the height of military dictatorships in Latin American seemed futile, 
given the absence of legal mechanisms outside the context of the state.  This probably 
explains why leftist leaders in Latin America, especially in the aftermath of the Cuban 
Revolution, never adhered to internationally framed notion of individual rights.  
Nevertheless, as Mariano Azuela put it, “Mexican jurists had a paternal affection for the 
institution of amparo and were averse to any change in its characteristics.”106  In sum, 
initial human rights campaigns failed to gain popularity with either defenders or 
opponents of statism. 
The United Nations initially proclaimed the exhaustion of internal protections, 
but offered little or no international alternatives for redressing rights violations.  The 
dormancy of human rights in the 1950s and 1960s also owed to the fact that 
international networks were in their embryonic stages.  Human rights fed off extended 
networks of communications in the 1970s, which were also developing in the decades 
earlier.  Thereby, human rights discussions in Latin America proved less about 
individuals and far more about easing the excesses of the state.  And that is how in early 
post-war era rights debates centered on provincial approaches to the global theme of 
human rights, and not the other way around.  In Mexico, human rights discussion could 
not take root given its revolutionary structure of negotiating rights through corporate 																																																								
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relations.  Entirely absent from these discussion were the movements for rights on the 
ground, especially those of indigenous peoples, a population traditionally relegated to a 
second-class citizenship.  Nevertheless, when those corporate relationships began to 
show signs of wear in 1968, a Catholic satellite organization became the first national 
institution to appropriate the language of human rights.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
Universalizing Nationalism:  
Luis Echeverría’s Carta de Derechos y Deberes Económicos de los Estados, 1972-1974 
 
“Ya quería el país una política exterior  
autónoma, activa y de apertura.” 
--Emilio O. Rabasa1 
 
Third Worldism and International Justice…for States 
 The second key appearance of the term “human rights” in the press ensued from 
President Luis Echeverría Álvarez’s pro Third World politics.  In April 1972, the 
Mexican leader proposed the creation of the Carta de derechos y deberes económicos de los 
Estados (Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States) to the III United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Santiago, Chile.  Echeverría’s 
suggested idea for a charter in protection of States’ rights launched his engagement with 
“Third Worldism,” an internationalist ideology espousing state directed-development.  
Echeverría’s new engagement with global politics ensued from what his Secretary of 
Foreign Relations, Emilio O. Rabasa, described as Mexico’s desire to partake on a more 
active foreign policy.  In that sense, the president launched Mexico into the era of global 
politics with close engagement with a growing inter-American system—leaving behind 
decades of isolationism.  And it would be this same initiative that helped create a 
national atmosphere in which the concept of human rights could mature.  
 In the early 1970s, Echeverría’s revolutionary nationalism took on the 
international scene.  With the success of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970, for example, 
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and President Echeverría’s campaign on behalf of the rights of States for more equitable 
economic relations—surfaced a type of revolutionary internationalism that many world 
leaders gravitated towards by supporting the Carta.  By 1974, the press compared the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States to what many perceived as the failed 
project of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).  Many suggested the 
Charter was destined toward the same faith of an abandoned international document 
filed away with so many other non-binding agreements that lacked the legal apparatus 
of enforcement.  However, others suggested Echeverría’s Charter project proved far 
more realistic and could indeed contribute to the establishment an alternative model to 
the failed Bretton Woods monetary system by serving as the basis for the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO).  Since the Charter essentially called for the 
continuation of the developmentalist and state-directed model espoused by Latin 
American economists for decades—the project was largely abandoned at home and 
abroad after 1976.  The idea of protecting States’ rights in order to safeguard social 
justice initiatives at home faded away.  Yet, the international system to which 
Echeverría and others looked to in the 1970s paved the way for the revival of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of another internationalist experiment—
human rights as an individual based alternative to social and economic justice espoused 
by nationalist governments, and one far more complementary of neoliberal systems of 
governance.  It was then in the context of the 1970s that Echeverría’s Carta gained 
prominence, but also lost against what Moyn described as other competing universalist 
schemes.   
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 The economic charter emerged as a measure of renewal for Mexico’s failing 
economic and political revolutionary project.  After decades of economic success, the 
state-directed model of industrialization began to falter; this while the political 
legitimacy of the governing party took a powerful blow after 1968—a moment 
intimately tied to President Luis Echeverría.  While his presidential legacy includes 
many dimensions, above all he remains closely linked to Mexico’s 1968 Olympic 
massacre.  Echeverría served as the Secretary of Gobernación (Interior or Government) 
when the 1968 student protests broke out in Mexico City.  Although most of the blame 
fell on President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970), the blood of Tlatelolco also tainted 
Echeverría, for he served as the president’s right hand.2  But his involvement did not 
keep him from inheriting the presidency.  Upon taking office in December 1970 he 
sought to repair the image of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, PRI), while ridding Mexico of its radical elements, a campaign 
that included a violent sequel to 1968—the Corpus Christi massacre on June 10, 1971, 
named after the feast day celebration.  The violent assault on students marching toward 
the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (National Polytechnic Institute, IPN), in the historic Casco 
de Santo Tomás in the suburbs of Mexico City, left twenty-nine protestors dead.  
However, Echeverría made efforts to distance himself from the errors of 1968.3  That 
evening Echeverría offered televised announcement that his administration would 
investigate the incidents that resulted in the deaths of the young students.4  Although 
Echeverría’s administration is not known for its amicable relationship with youth 																																																								
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movements, he nonetheless made an attempt in 1971 briefly to recognize the violence 
against the students.   
Indeed, Echeverría’s official response to Corpus Christi significantly contrasted 
with that of his predecessor.  Unlike Díaz Ordaz, who went to extreme measures to 
conceal the police shootouts against the students, Echeverría’s administration did 
precisely the opposite by acknowledging the attack.  The new president did not have to 
conceal the events from the international community because the spotlight was not 
there, and there was no Olympic press mania to worry about.  Instead, the press 
continued with its daily duties, “published freely, and reported on the Falcons, or Los 
Halcones,” the paramilitary group created to harass political dissidents.  The relative 
freedom of the media gave the impression that the orders did not come from the 
president himself; rather, the use of violent force appeared to result from misconduct 
among lower-level party members.  Two high-ranking officials resigned as a result of the 
Corpus Christi attack: Alfonso Martínez Domínguez, regent (appointed mayor) of the 
Distrito Federal, who later became governor of the state of Nuevo León, and Rogelio 
Flores Curiel, Chief of Police, who went on to fill the governor’s post in the state of 
Nayarit.5  By publicly shunning the events, Echeverría commiserated with the victims by 
sacrificing two officials, rather than actually carrying out an investigation; but as the 
case of Martínez and Flores demonstrates, these political misdeeds rarely ended careers, 
instead often served as catapults for better posts.  
Who exactly was this chameleon that led the Mexican political system through 
one of its most difficult moments?  Aside from the dark episodes of 1968 and their 1971 
echo, historians know little about the man himself.  There is not a single scholarly 																																																								
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biography on Luis Echeverría, even though texts on Tlatelolco massacre abound.6  Born 
in 1922, he grew up in a middle-class family in the Colonia del Valle in Mexico City 
and studied law in the country’s largest public university, the UNAM.  Echeverría 
followed the conventional path to power, gradually rising through the ranks of the PRI, 
which he joined in 1946.  He served in the Secretaria de Educación Pública (Ministry of 
Public Education) during the administration of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958), and 
in 1958 President Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) appointed him Assistant Secretary 
of Gobernación, which he became head during the following Díaz Ordaz administration.7  
In Gobernación he learned the ropes of the intelligence apparatus and in fact served as one 
its contributing architects.  Some charge that Echeverría ordered the “creation, training, 
and financing” of the Halcón paramilitary group in charge of sweeping student 
dissidents off the streets of Mexico City and other metropolitan areas.8  Whatever the 
truth of this latter accusation, Echeverría’s historical legacy still remains intimately tied 
to Mexico’s Guerra Sucia (Dirty War) and the violent assaults on student movements.  For 
Echeverría, the Charter served as an international expression of a revolutionary project 																																																								
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Femospp [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado],” La Jornada 4 March 2006, 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/03/04/index.php?section=politica&article=025n1pol>. 
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he attempted to save at home, and an escape valve for the rising dissidence at home—
whereby abroad he stood as a champion of social justice.   
 
“Rupture and Continuity”  
When Echeverría took office, he prepared to revamp the four-decade long 
revolutionary system.  The president held deep loyalty to the political structure that 
made his career.  As Enrique Krauze puts it, Echeverría was a child of the PRI, whose 
corporatist structure had singlehandedly-sustained Mexico’s political system since the 
1930s, a system “he wanted to preserve.”9  Given the rift of 1968, the president also 
understood the importance of reforming the PRI and distancing it from the Díaz Ordaz 
years, if only for the sake of its survival.  Writer José Agustín, in describing the 
inauguration ceremonies in the Auditorio Nacional (National Auditorium) in Mexico City, 
best captures the tension between “rupture and continuity” in Echeverría’s nationalist 
project.  According to Agustín the invitation included “four old Indians” whose presence 
symbolized a newfound preoccupation for indigenous matters.  Wearing a lavish 
leopard coat, actress María Félix embodied the appendage of state-driven cultural 
projects like the muralist movement and the mass film productions later dubbed the 
Mexican Golden Age of Cinema (1930s-1960s).  On the development and foreign end, 
the industrial mogul Henry Ford, Jr., also made an appearance—yet all signaling 
continuity.10  However, by far the clearest act of defiance and rupture arose when 
Echeverría announced an accord with the students and his so-called political opening or 																																																								
9 Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, 741. 
10 Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2. La vida en México de 1970-1982 (México: Grupo Editorial 
Planeta, 1992), 7-9; Jesús Orozco, and Francisco J. Núñez, Ideología y programa de gobierno en los 
discursos de toma de posesión de los presidentes de México, 1928-1982 (Guadalajara, Jal., México: 
ITESO, 1983), 26. 
	 70 
apertura, signaling a break with his predecessor yet well within the party’s well-founded 
tradition of negotiating conflict though the incorporation of dissidents into the political 
machine.  Echeverría sought “to lower the repressive profile of the regime and improve 
its adaptiveness,” argued scholar Yoram Shapira.11  Certainly the president’s 
predecessor Díaz Ordaz was stunned by Echeverría’s sudden transformation from a 
“stiff, reserved and servile man” to “a loquacious leader of the youth.”12  The acclaimed 
journalists Julio Scherer García wrote: “From one day to next he appeared in the scene 
eloquent, lively, jaunty. He learned to smile, lost weight.  If he had been rigid, he threw 
suits and ties into the wardrobe and put to use the guayabera.”13  Echeverría’s 
transformation, or better said, repairs to the political system continued with the 
longstanding tradition of diffusing conflict through institutional means, only this time it 
attempted to repair its severed image by kindling relations with a group previously left 
out of the revolutionary pact: the recent constituency of educated youth.  
Despite his work in increasing Mexico’s visibility within the world, Echeverría by 
no means became what might be called a beloved leader.  His presidency was closely 
scrutinized.  Intellectuals, for example, observed the changing nature of Mexico’s 
presidential post.  Daniel Cosío Villegas, an intellectual who easily navigated both the 
academic and public waters, became one of the first in the country to analyze publicly 
the changing role of the Mexican presidency.  In 1974 Cosío Villegas published the 
literary essay El estilo personal de gobernar (The Personal Style of Rule), the sequel to El 
sistema político mexicano (Mexico’s Political System, 1972), where Echeverría stood as the 																																																								
11 Yoram Shapira, “The Impact of the 1968 Student Protest on Echeverría’s Reformism,” Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 19:4 (November 1977), 566.  
  12 Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2, 7-9.  
13 “De un día para otro apareció en escena elocuente, vivaz, desenvuelto.  Aprendió a sonreír, 
perdió peso.  Si había sido tieso, arrojaba sacos y corbatas al guardarropa y ponía en circulación la 
guayabera,” Julio Scherer García, Los presidentes (México: Grijalbo, 1986), 10.  
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object of analysis.  The text immediately became a best seller, edited five times in a 
single year with some 70,000 copies sold.  In the text Cosío Villegas sarcastically 
deciphered the contradictions and incongruences of the Echeverria presidency, 
something that must have prompted an uncomfortable reaction from the president.  
Even if Echeverría felt resentment toward Cosío Villegas, he nevertheless managed to 
conceal his true feelings in the many private gatherings that brought both men together, 
or when Echeverría himself invited Cosío Villegas to Los Pinos, the presidential 
residence.  Echeverría tolerated this to an extent, but carried out a slander campaign 
against the renowned academic.14  Cosío Villegas, on the other hand, openly expressed 
his views of the president. Cosío Villegas explains their relationship as such:     
Since becoming acquainted, we both strive to make a clear distinction between 
public relations and personal relations, to where he may consider me a good 
friend, but a bad writer, and I, in turn, can esteem him more as a friend than as 
a governing leader.15 
Historian Enrique Krauze, Cosío Villegas’s pupil and biographer, reveals that President 
Echeverría had “assiduously courted” the scholar.  Echeverría went so far as to award 
the “eminent and aged intellectual” the Premio Nacional de Letras (National Price for Arts 
and Sciences, 1971), one of the country’s loftiest prizes, after the completion of the 
multivolume series, Historia moderna de México (Modern History of Mexico, 1954-1974) 
																																																								
 14 Roderic A. Camp, Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1985), 201.  
15  “…desde que entramos en relaciones, ambos nos empeñamos en trazar una clara distinción 
entre las relaciones públicas y las relaciones personales, de modo que él puede considerarme un buen 
amigo, pero un mal escritor, y yo, a mi vez, puedo estimarlo más como amigo que como gobernante,” 
Daniel Cosío Villegas, El estilo personal de gobernar (Mexico City, D.F.; Editorial Joaquín Mortiz, S. A., 
1974), 13.  La sucesión presidencial (The Presidential Succession) was the last of the series, published in 1975.  
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under the editorship of Cosío Villegas.16  While the president successfully wooed other 
intellectuals and veterans of the 1968 student movement into his government, Cosío 
Villegas instead “observed him at first with cautious respect and then with growing 
astonishment.”17  The tiff between these two high-profile individuals embodied the 
problems inherent in the post-1968 government’s attempt to harness the hearts and 
minds of dissent groups and prominent intellectuals into the revolutionary political 
machine.  
Nevertheless, Cosío Villegas’s indifference and curiosity eventually changed 
under provocation.  In an attempt to clamp down on an emerging free press, the 
Echeverría government financed propaganda that caricatured Cosío as a puppet for the 
U.S. government.  Attacks included a booklet titled “Dany, el sobrino del Tío Sam” 
(“Danny, Uncle Sam’s Nephew”).18  Julio Scherer García and Carlos Monsiváis explain, 
“At the time books circulated sin madre (without origin), born of the wind, without legal 
registration, no copyright, without a publisher responsible, anonymous.”19  Julio Scherer 
García too had been subjected to Echeverría’s political ploys for breaching the level of 
accepted press criticism of the government, ousted in 1976 as editor of Excélsior, one of 
Mexico’s leading newspaper.  As in the case of Cosío, an anonymous booklet titled “El 
																																																								
16 The Premio Nacional de Letras is short for Premio Nacional de Artes y Ciencias (México). The prize 
began in the 1940s and is currently awarded annually by the government to the most outstanding 
individuals in the categories of History, Social Sciences, and Philosophy; Physics, Mathematics, and 
Natural Sciences; Language and Literature; Technology and Design; Popular Arts and Traditions; and 
Fine Arts.  
17 Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, 746-747; Stanley Robert Ross, “Cosío Villegas’ Historia 
moderna de México,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 46:3 (August 1966), 274.  
18 Krauze translates the title of the publication to “Danny the Disciple of Uncle Sam,” Krauze, 
Mexico: Biography of Power, 749. 
19 Scherer, on the other hand, translates the title to “Danny el Travieso.”  Meanwhile, the text 
on Julio was titled, “El Excélsior de Scherer García.” Julio Scherer García, Los presidentes (México: Debolsillo, 
©1986, 2007), x; Daniel Cosío Villegas, Memorias (México: J. Mortiz, 1976), 288; Lorenzo Meyer, “Daniel 
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Excélsior de Scherer” slandered Scherer.20  It is likely the government’s campaign to 
discredit Scherer may have inspired Cosío Villegas to think more deeply about the 
president’s proclivity for political dirty tricks, especially as related to the enlargement of 
the Mexican presidency.  In doing so, Cosío Villegas did not hold back.  In El estilo 
personal de gobernar’s unapologetically caricatured prose, the Mexican scholar takes his 
readers through the intricacies of an emerging political system with an ever-growing 
presence of savvy technocrats, epitomized by Echeverría himself—a contradictory figure 
flirting with democratic orotundity while debasing Mexico’s liberal institutions.   By 
1973 Cosío had dubbed Echeverría El Predicador (The Preacher) and had diagnosed him 
with “an incurable case of loquacity, monomania, and genuine mental disturbance.”21  
Other intelligentsia left out of the immediate circle of power contributed to the image of 
incompetency and idiosyncrasies of the Echeverría presidency, including poet Salvador 
Novo, who chronicled daily entries of Echeverría’s presidential activities blended with 
narrative.  Life in Mexico During the Presidency of Luis Echeverría is one of six presidential texts 
where Novo, like many of his generation, uses literature to disguise the political 
discontent of a nation when it was not yet permitted to openly criticize a Mexican leader 
through journalistic means.22  
Nevertheless, Daniel Cosío Villega’s image of a politically schizophrenic 
president has deeper political meanings.  Echeverría’s governing inconsistencies derived 																																																								
20 Translates to “Scherer’s Excélsior.” Julio Scherer García, Los presidentes (México: Debolsillo, 
©1986, 2007), x; 
21 Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, 747. 
  22 Salvador Novo, La vida en México en el periodo presidencial de Luis Echeverría (México: Consejo 
Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 2000); Other presidential chronicles include: La vida en México en el 
período presidencial de Lázaro Cárdenas (México: Empresas Editoriales, 1964), La vida en México en el período 
presidencial de Manuel Avila Camacho (México: Empresas Editoriales, 1965), La vida en México en el período 
presidencial de Miguel Alemán (México: Empresas Editoriales, 1967), La vida en México en el período presidencial de 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (México, D.F.: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1996), La vida en México en 
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from his attempt to juggle political reforms within a national context of social upheaval 
and a crumbling development model.  The president inherited a country in the midst of 
a new social revolution.  First, the 1968 student massacre marred the ruling party and its 
well-crafted political system of social control dating back to the Mexican Revolution 
(1910-1920).  Second, maintaining the state-directed agricultural and industrial project 
that had brought prosperity, together with social and political stability, meant plunging 
the country further into debt.  Given that reality, Echeverría revived his own version of 
the political system by stepping into the presidency as the redeemer of the Revolution.  
Just before taking office, the opportunity arose for Echeverría to engage in nationalist 
rhetoric when General Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) died, the latter being one of the 
country’s premiere revolutionary statesmen.23  Attempting to ride Cárdenas’ legacy, the 
president “returned to the nationalist, peasant origins of the Revolution and its concern 
with social justice,” or at least tried to do so.24  Responding to the social context that 
welcomed him, he first called for an “apertura democrática” (democratic opening), which 
initially entailed amnesty of student and labor dissidents.  At first, the brief democratic 
opening offered some tolerance for a free press.  While nationally Echeverría presented 
himself as a redeemer of the Revolution, his political style inevitably served as fodder for 
intellectuals to taint him as erratic.  
 
Isolation Interrupted: Echeverría and the World  
With little luck at home, Echeverría looked to the international realm for 
legitimacy—where he seemed to have had better luck in selling his revolutionary 																																																								
23 José Gutiérrez Casillas, Jesuitas en México durante el siglo XX (México: Editorial Porrúa, 1981), 
384.  
24 Ibid., 741.  
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project.  Echeverría’s assertive foreign policy should also be understood as an extension 
of his nationalist policy of apertura and his attempt to revive the revolutionary economic 
project.  Abroad Echeverría fostered a gallant persona.  In 1970 began “in Mexico the 
search for an active foreign policy, as well as greater participation in international 
affairs,” explained eminent scholar Mario Ojeda Gómez.  Since the 1910s the country 
had remained largely isolated from major international engagements, political or 
economic, in part due to its revolutionary past but also in response to the crisis of 
capitalism after the market crash of 1929.  The Revolution and the 1938 nationalization 
of foreign-owned American and European oil companies drove the government towards 
greater focus on matters in the home front.25  Also pursuant to nationalist policies of the 
time and the global depression, Mexico, along with such Latin American countries as 
Argentina and Brazil, remodeled its economy inward through a constellation of 
programs known as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), or desarrollo estabilizador 
(stabilizing development).  These policies further isolated Mexico in the interwar years 
and placed the country on a bilateral relationship with the United States.  The revenues 
from raw materials supplied during World War II “created an independent stimulus to 
continued import substitution.”26  For Mexico it meant the extension of a declining 
state-directed model in desperate need of capital by the 1970s, and this fact pushed 
Echeverría to search abroad for a better economic position for Mexico. The echeverrista 
foreign policy’s most emphatic initiatives called for the reconfiguration of the 
international economic system, a structure that he believed disadvantaged developing 																																																								
  25 Mario Ojeda Gómez, México: el surgimiento de una política exterior activa (México: CulturaSep, 
1986), 9.  
26 Rosemary Thorp, “A Reappraisal of Origins of Import-Substituting Industrialisation 1930-
1950,” Journal of Latin American Studies 24:S1 (March 1992), 186.  See also Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The 
Economic History of Latin America Since Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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countries.  This argument was much favored by the developmentalist theories of 1970s, 
including Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory.   
Echeverría’s foreign policy also suggests he saw international cooperation as a 
possible relief valve for problems at home.  Indeed, if Mexico’s involvement in World 
War II had opened  “a window to the exterior,” the 1970s opened a door.27  Part of this 
opening to the outside derived from an economic compression marking the crisis of the 
desarrollo estabilizador model.  Rosario Green explains that it was in the early 1970s that 
“the first negative effects of the ‘desarrollo estabilizador’ appeared in the Mexican 
economy.”  Inflation and the “contraction of private investment,” according to Green, 
proved the two most severe limitations signaling the model’s exhaustion.28  Echeverría 
responded by expanding Mexico’s diplomatic relations with sixty-seven countries to 
almost 130 by 1976.29  “We are not a walled country. Our borders are open to human, 
economic, and cultural communication,” stated Echeverría upon taking office.30  Even 
though he initially claimed he would be doing little traveling abroad (“I really do not 
plan on leaving the country in the next two or three years”), he did express his desire for 
visiting “la provincia mexicana,” that is, provincial México.  But the reality proved 
different.31  In similar manner, Echeverría’s North American contemporaries—that is, 
Richard Nixon and Pierre Trudeau—also traveled extensively in the midst of 
intractable problems at home.  By the end of his presidency Echeverría and his 
																																																								
  27 Ojeda Gómez, México, 9.  
28 Rosario Green, La deuda externa de México, 1973-1987: de la abundancia a la escasez de créditos 
(México, D.F.: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1988), 16. 
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30 Luis Echeverría, “Discurso de toma de posesión,” Tiempo, 7 December 1970, 11-22, cited in 
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31 Ricardo Valero, “La política exterior en la coyuntura actual de México,” Foro internacional 12: 2 
(October-December 1972), 294, cited in Ojeda Gómez, México, 64. 
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entourage embarked on some twelve international trips to some thirty-six countries, a 
traveling frenzy foreshadowed by his extensive pre-election campaign mingling.32  
Both at home and abroad, Echeverría displayed a flair for social gatherings.  
After fifty-two days of campaign, and having spent Christmas and New Year with 
“ejidatarios” and miners, Echeverría and his wife María Ester Zuno made their way to 
the San Angel neighborhood in the southwest of Mexico City, popularly known for its 
historic buildings and markets, and home to some of Mexico’s wealthy elite.  There the 
president-to-be engaged with over 250 guests made up of “banking, commerce and 
industry magnate, artists, intellectuals, and professionals.”33  Mogul guests included one 
of the country’s premiere bankers, Anibal de Iturbide Preciat, along with Manuel 
Espinosa Yglesias a man whom John Womack Jr. in 1970 dubbed one of the “virtual 
barons” of the country, representative of power elite managing “half of the national 
income.”34  From the artistic realm, present were cellist Carlos Prieto, actress Fanny 
Cano Damián, and the renowned Zapotecan painter, Justo Rufino Tamayo.  Other 
prominent guests included diplomats José Gallástegui and Luis Quintanilla, as well as 
muralist Diego Rivera’s daughter, Guadalupe Rivera Marín.  As guests of Emilio 
Rabasa, the son of Porfirian cientifico, and then director of the Banco Cinematográfico 
(Cinematography Bank), an artistic branch of the National Bank of Mexico funding the 
nation’s film industry, Echeverría and his wife drank ponche de frutas, or the traditional 
winter hot fruit punch, served in the clay mugs known as jarritos, while feasting on 																																																								
32 Ricardo Valero, “La política exterior en la coyuntura actual de México,” Foro internacional 12: 2 
(October-December 1972), 294, cited in Ojeda Gómez, México, 64. 
33 Francisco Cárdenas Cruz and René Arteaga, “‘México Necesita una Revolución Estructural’: 
Gómez Morín,” Excélsior, 9 January 1970, 1.  
34 See footnote 2 in Roderic A. Camp, “Informal and Formal Networking among Elite Mexican 
Capitalists and Politicians,” Comparative Sociology 2:1 (2003), 141; John Womack Jr., “The Spoils of the 
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tamales, reported Mexican columnist Francisco Cárdenas Cruz and Salvadorian in 
exile, René Artega. 35  Extensive traveling and mingling, along with emphasizing 
regional wear at home and abroad, became a hallmark of the president and the First 
Lady’s populist legacy.36    
 
The Third World Mobilized 
Along with his famous guayabera shirts, Echeverría also traveled clothed in a 
grand idea.  The Mexican leader thrived in the international spotlight, pitching a 
project for more equitable relations for the Third World after a spring trip to Chile in 
1972.  The focus on seeking new markets would ideally move Mexico away from its 
almost exclusive bilateral relationship with the United States—one that had provided 
Mexico and Canada with preferential economic terms in the height of the Cold War.  
In the early years of the war, Washington leaders offered favorable terms to the United 
States’ neighbors as part of national security strategy to safeguard its adjoining 
territories from Soviet intrusion by plane.  With the emergence of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (IBM) and nuclear submarines, the threat of attack on U.S. soil 
expanded to include its neighboring countries.  But as the threat of nuclear warfare 
diminished and U.S.-Soviet tensions subsided, Mexico’s privileged relationship with 
Washington, or what had been referred to as “preferential [economic] rights,” fractured 
when President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) announced on August 15, 1971 a ten 
percent hike on import taxes, a “measure decided on unilaterally and one to be applied 																																																								
35 Francisco Cárdenas Cruz and René Arteaga, “‘México Necesita una Revolución Estructural’: 
Gómez Morín,” Excélsior, 9 January 1970, 1.  
36 Bill Beezley, “Conclusion: Gabardine Suits and Guayabera Shirts,” in Populism in Twentieth 
Century Mexico: The Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría, edited by Amelia M. Kiddle and María 
L. O. Muñoz (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 198-205; Cárdenas Cruz and Arteaga, 
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to all countries in the globe indiscriminately.”37  In an evening address to the nation on 
August 15, Nixon explained the ten percent tax as “an action to make certain that 
American products will not be at a disadvantage because of unfair exchange rates.  
When the unfair treatment is ended, the import tax will end as well.”38  Nixon hoped his 
policies could protect American products and relieve the population from the effects of 
growing inflation and unemployment.  As for neighboring countries, Nixon’s policies 
signaled Americans’ “growing protectionism,” especially when the U.S. administration 
refused to negotiate the tax for any one country.39 
According to Ojeda Gómez, Mexico and Canada were the only two countries 
that bilaterally tried to negotiate with Washington and failed.40  In an August 30, 1971 
memorandum, to Secretary of Foreign Relations Emilio O. Rabasa (1970-1975), 
Ambassador to the United States, José Juan de Olloqui y Labastida (1971-1976) noted 
President Nixon summoned ambassadors to the White House for a 10:00 p.m. meeting 
“to be informed more widely by Undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs, 
Paul A. Volcker [1969-1974], of the measures announced by President Nixon.”  Two 
days later, on August 17, De Olloqui was asked to report to the State Department with 
President Echeverría’s response to the Nixon measures.  Echeverría noted that it was 
evident that the policies suggested by its North American neighbor were not aimed at 
developing countries, but rather at First World powers (European countries and Japan).  
Nevertheless, the Mexican Ambassador manifested Echeverría’s inconformity, especially 																																																								
37 Mario Ojeda Gómez, “México y Canadá,” in “Documentos y comentarios en torno al viaje 
del Presidente Echeverría (Marzo-abril de 1973), Foro internacional 14:1 (July-September 1973), 3. 
38 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: ‘The Challenge of 
Peace,’” 15 August 1971, The American Presidency Project, 
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39 Ojeda Gómez, “México y Canadá,” 4; Carlos Arriola, “El acercamiento mexicano-chileno,” 
Foro internacional 14:4 (April-June 1974), 509.  
40 Ojeda Gómez, “México y Canadá,” 4; Arriola, “El acercamiento mexicano-chileno,” 509.  
	 80 
since “Mexico is the most candid friend of the United States.” The American president 
was reminded that Mexico supported the dollar as a currency reserve, the majority of 
which were held by American banks and for that reason had not purchased gold.  And 
unlike Canada, which held important trade relations with China and Cuba, Mexico was 
severely battered by the import surcharge when two-thirds of its exports went 
exclusively to the United States—not even Argentina or Brazil were hurt due to their 
diversified exportations.41  De Olloqui noted several State Department officials 
sympathized with Mexico’s position, including Secretary of the Treasury John B. 
Conally (1971-1972), who noted to the ambassador his concern especially for Mexico 
and Canada.  Two weeks later, in promoting Mexico’s case, De Olloqui included a 
newspaper clipping from the Washington Post noting the unintended weight of Nixon’s 
policies on Latin America.  “The extreme examples are Mexico and Brazil.  Mexico 
does more business with the United States than any other country in Latin America and 
will be more severely damaged by the surtax than any other.”  As the article noted, 
“The United States did not really intend to harm the Latin economies last month when 
it imposed its 10 per cent surtax on imports.”  Yet, for the Nixon administration Latin 
America was not an economic priority; however, the president was pressured to respond 
to the unintended consequences of his policies on its southern neighbor.42     
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Nixon’s economic policies also had a ripple effect on competing markets like 
Japan and Germany.  Nixon’s Executive Order 11615 closed “the gold window” that 
allowed the exchange of dollars to gold.43  In order to protect the dollar, the United 
States ended its commitment “to backing every dollar overseas with gold.”  By the 
1960s, the circulation of dollars in Asian and European countries had grown 
exponentially mainly due to foreign aid, the Vietnam War, and other investments.  By 
the time Nixon took office, the U.S. Treasury could no longer back every dollar to gold, 
as had been the standard in the Bretton Woods monetary system that fixed foreign 
currencies to the dollar at the price of $35 per ounce.  Although the economic practice 
had worked well for the United States all through the post-war period, by 1971 the 
country lacked sufficient gold for convertibility demands.  On August 12, for example, 
Britain had asked the U.S. government to guarantee a total of $750 million.  Three days 
later, Nixon and his advisers, including Treasury Secretary John Connally, drafted the 
economic package in secret in the presidential retreat home at Camp David.44  In an 
August 15 evening address, Nixon introduced the proposed reforms. He explained to 
the world it was time for its “strong competitors” to “bear their fair share of the burden 
of defending freedom around the world.”  In deference to the American people, the 
president argued the time had “come for exchange rates to be set straight and for the 
major nations to compete as equals. There is no longer any need for the United States 
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to compete with one hand tied behind her back.”45  The “Nixon Shock,” as these 
policies became known, did precisely that—they shook the Bretton Woods monetary 
system and opened the age of floating currency.   
As for Mexico, the ten percent tax also struck at the already economically 
strapped economy.  Like any other country, Mexicans felt the economic nip of the 
global retrenchment of the 1970s.  Even before the import tax, the “contraction of 
public spending and the decline of investments” hurt economic growth, especially when 
coupled with import pressures from its northern neighbor.  “Atony,” as this financial 
slump became known, also compromised Mexico’s project of state-centered 
industrialization, which Echeverría ardently endorsed as part of his nationalist politics.  
Nixon’s tax, coupled with domestic economic and political frictions, thus convinced the 
hard-pressed Echeverría that the solution lay in the international community.  The 
Mexican leader embarked on a series of tours seeking to diversify the country’s 
economic and political relations, with hopes of courting foreign investors “to collaborate 
in the development of Mexico’s export industry.”46  For the rest of the world, unilateral 
policies like the Nixon reforms intensified demands for an alternative international 
economy, especially energizing underdeveloped countries’ engagement with the politics 
of tercermundismo, or third worldism.   President Echeverría engaged with the nascent 
language of international law to demand economic protections for developing countries.  
As such, the president made appearances and when possible gave speeches in regional 
and international forum in hopes of rallying discussion on the disadvantageous position 																																																								
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of underdeveloped countries within the post-war international economy.47  It was in this 
form that an alternative universalist project emerged, one spearheaded by Mexico, one 
that promoted state sovereignty in States’ control over their economic model and 
natural resources, social and economic justice derivative from equitable trade relations 
between countries—this while engaging with international mechanisms and demanding 
the strengthening of international law.  
Initial inklings of Echeverría’s newfound embrace of Third World ideology stood 
out as early as October 5, 1971.48  Only months after Nixon’s reforms, Echeverría gave 
a speech to a UN General Assembly meeting in New York in which he denounced the 
great powers and their exclusive control over world affairs.  He maintained peaceful 
relations would not be possible unless economic relations were significantly altered.  For 
Echeverría more equitable relations lay in the reformulation of post-World War II 
“regulatory mechanisms” that privileged the interests of powerful countries, including a 
financial institution “notoriously favorable to a dominant economy,” and not designed 
to satisfy the long-term needs of the international community.  As the post-war tensions 
eased, the Mexican leader warned that unless an international alternative materialized, 
a new global threat could emerge from the polarization between privileged and 
underdeveloped countries.49  With an incisive use of social justice terminology, 
particularly in relations to States’ rights, he expressed hope for the fulfillment of “a 																																																								
47 Third World countries pushed a series of policies in the 1970s known as the New International 
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49 Luis Echeverría, “Discurso pronunciado ante la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, en 
su XXVI Período Ordinario de Sesiones,” in México ante el mundo, 50-51. 
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genuine international democracy, both politically and economically,” while calling on 
underdeveloped countries to join efforts in order “to obtain better terms of trade.”50 
Echeverría did envision developing countries spearheading a movement of global 
proportions, seemingly taking lessons from the recent wave of what he termed “political 
decolonization,” and like the leaders of that wave he hoped an era of “economic 
decolonization” would follow.51  As expressed to his General Assembly colleagues, 
Echeverría’s considerations offered an embryonic version of an idea for an international 
charter for the protection of States’ rights, one that gained footing just months later in 
the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
Santiago, Chile.52  
 
UNCTAD: Latin American Developmentalism Internationalized  
In its 1970s heyday, many world leaders were drawn to UNCTAD forum 
because it stood as one of the last international bastion of state-directed growth 
initiatives.  Established in 1964 as an “appendage” of the United Nations General 
Assembly, the Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) grew from the 																																																								
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demands of newly decolonized UN member states—“feeling marginalized in the 
decision-making process of the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as in the GATT 
negotiations”—for a more inclusive international forum attentive to their economic 
needs.53  Developing countries’ collective voice had grown in strength since swelling the 
ranks of the United Nations, constituting about 70 percent of the organization’s 
membership by the mid-1970s.  According to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim 
(1972-1981) “some people were shocked to see the UN reflect the ‘entirely new balance 
of power in the world.’”54  The UNCTAD, and other institutions of its kind, represented 
the United Nations shift in focus toward the needs of the “the South,” especially during 
the reign of Burmese U Thant as Secretary-General (1961-1971), the first Third World 
representative to hold such post.55  UNCTAD member states, of which also included 
the Holy See, sought solutions to developmental problems of the time, particularly an 
international market that historically seemed to give preferential trading terms to 
industrialized countries.56  
Until the global shift to neoliberal politics, UNCTAD pushed for an alternative 
to the Bretton Woods system.  The organization’s first session took place in Geneva in 
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1964, and the second in New Delhi four years later, in 1968.57  From its inception, 
revising international codes governing global commerce became one of the 
organization’s key strategies.  In the post-war period one of the most important 
multilateral agreements was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, most 
commonly known as the GATT.  For UNCTAD members the incorporation of the 
Third World into the world economy demanded alterations to the GATT.  Many 
developing nations argued the agreement restricted their bargaining power since the 
“negotiating structures” lay “in the hands of the developed world,” where negotiations 
usually took place between key producers and consumers; developing countries “rarely 
accounted for major market shares either as producers or consumers.”58  As key 
producers of staple foodstuffs and raw materials, they experienced few benefits.  GATT 
further disadvantaged poor countries by failing “to incorporate provisions dealing with 
commodity agreements.”59  Given the economic hurdles for countries still attempting to 
industrialize in the 1970s, the GATT and other multilateral agreement proved “inimical 
to their development.”60  Thereby, for most of the 1960s and 1970s UNCTAD 
representatives tackled GATT’s “ground rules” and sought “an alternative system of 
international trade” more favorable to emerging economies.61  
																																																								
57 TD/180, Vol. I, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Proceedings of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Third Session, Santiago De Chile, 13 April to 21 May 1972, 
Volume I (Report and Annexes) (New York: United Nations, 1973), 1. 
58 Ian Taylor and Karen Smith, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 7; UNCTAD/GDS/2006/1, UNCTAD secretariat, UNCTAD: A Brief 
Historical Overview (Geneva: [UN], 2006), 4. 
59 UNCTAD/GDS/2006/1, UNCTAD secretariat, UNCTAD: A Brief Historical Overview 
(Geneva: [UN], 2006), 4.  
60 Ian Taylor and Karen Smith, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 6-7. 
61 Thomas G. Weiss, “Forward” in Ian Taylor and Karen Smith, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) (London: Routledge, 2007), ix. 
	 87 
Up to the 1970s, Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch’s dependency theory held 
sway over UNCTAD’s governing ideology.  Especially in the period when Prebisch 
served as secretary-general (1964-1969), the “ideological mix of global Keynesianism 
and dependency theory” that characterized the organization in its first decades held 
Prebisch’s imprint.62  Some have even called him “Latin America’s Keynes.”63  Ousted 
from his government post in Argentina shortly after the 1943 military overthrow of the 
disreputable Ramón S. Castillo (1942-1943), Prebisch joined the United Nations in 
1949 and from 1950 to 1963 he led the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) or CEPAL, which since 1984 has come to include the Caribbean 
(ECLAC).  As ECLA’s headquarters, Santiago, Chile served as a Latin American 
epicenter for dependency theory, discussions largely spearheaded by Prebisch himself.64    
Dependency theory emerged in the 1950s from studies regarding the relationship 
between industrialized and poor countries, whereby, men like Prebisch and many of his 
contemporaries explained underdevelopment by observing the place of poor countries 
within the international structures of economic exchange that presumably kept them 
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from advancing industrially.65  Prebisch put these ideas into practice in ECLA, from 
where economists, including the often forgotten work of Spanish sociologist José Medina 
Echeverría, put forward the “paradigm for the analysis of development 
[Developmentalism], which became the most influential theory in Latin American social 
sciences since the early fifties.”  True, some thought that  ECLA analyses failed to 
consider the role of “imperialist relationships between countries,” or matters of class, 
and thus criticized for its “narrowness” in its approach.66  Nevertheless, the 
developmentalism that Prebisch and ECLA proposed stood midway between Marxist 
and classical liberal orthodoxy and meshed well with UN thought of the time.  When 
the opportunity to head UNCTAD came, Prebisch accepted whole-heartedly, for he 
believed this new commission had been “deployed through the United Nations on the 
basis of activities in ECLA.”  Most importantly, UNCTAD offered Prebisch the space to 
internationalize his Latin American development project, “to forge a new organization 
just as he had molded ECLA into a powerful regional secretariat.”67  Undoubtedly, both 
organizations shared Prebisch’s vision of integration and fair access to global markets, at 
least up until the 1980s and 1990s, when UNCTAD gave “way to a slightly modified 
version of liberal orthodoxy,” embracing and promoting neoliberalism worldwide.68  
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Although well intended, Prebisch’s hopes for Latin America did not come to 
fruition. His economic philosophy reflected a deep concern for the developmental gap 
between industrialized countries and the rest of the world.  The region’s state-directed 
initiatives generated more social ferment than long-term industrial sustainability.  And 
as commodity prices, these continued to spiral downward owing to the now-increased 
global production, Prebisch acknowledged that Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) “had been costly and inefficient.”  The probability of closing the economic gap 
through mass importation of commodities seemed unlikely, for him developing 
countries required of specific protections and guarantees.  By 1972, like Prebisch, 
UNCTAD’s goals reflected a global reorientation toward protecting the descending 
price of commodity markets through tariffs, a loss that had been costly to developing 
countries, especially as first world technological advancement replaced some primary 
products with synthetics.69  If such conditions persisted, Prebisch warned, the long-term 
effects would include increased disparities of wealth, a “polarization between rich and 
poor.”70  Indeed, by the 1970s, with the easing of Cold War tensions, for many leaders it 
seemed as though “the problems of relations of industrialized rich and agricultural poor 
had replaced the problem of relations between western capitalist and eastern 
Communist.”71  Under this consideration, the third session of UNCTAD proved timely.  
UNCTAD III echoed Third World trepidations, and stood as one of the few 
organizations in which the “global South” could articulate “its needs and problems and 
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where international development is firmly on the agenda.”72  Moreover, developing 
countries’ participation in UNCTAD and other similar summits signaled the Third 
World’s engagement with the nascent international system for the purpose of asserting 
economic rights needed for national development, in contrast with Western countries 
that employed the international bureaucracy to promote individual guarantees, and 
most commonly political rights.  
UNCTAD thus proved the perfect forum for Echeverría to flesh out his 
emerging economic vision.  In his New York speech, Echeverría expressed satisfaction 
that in the convocation for the III UNCTAD meeting, the General Assembly “warned 
of its deep concern over the trend of some countries toward growing protectionism that 
harms the vital interests of less advanced nations,” thus impeding the organization’s 
goals for development.73 The Mexican leader’s delight ensued from what he perceived 
as the assembly asserting concern over the Nixon administration’s monetary policies 
enacted just months prior to the New York meeting.  In his speech, Echeverría took the 
opportunity to reiterate their probable effect: “I think my duty to point out that the 
imposition of an additional tax of 10 percent ad valorem on American imports harms the 
interests of my country, and those of all developing nations.”74  With such policies, he 
argued, the volume of manufacturing products—barely making inroads into 
industrialized nations—was necessarily limited.  In addition to a contraction of these 
products, emerging economics had to deal with the trickling effect of great powers’ 																																																								
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inflation, balance of payment deficit, and unemployment problems.  In this evident 
outcry against American protectionist policies, Echeverría consistently reminded his 
audiences of the long-term consequences of an ever-growing economic disparity 
between nations and he did so in the context of Cold War politics, warning of the 
political volatility of an unjust international system and its detriment to world peace: 
“An arms race should be accompanied by a race to protectionism.”  In the UNCTAD 
Echeverría saw a forum for encouraging hemispheric cooperation, especially for Latin 
America, and more specifically, for Mexico he sought agricultural and industrial 
resolves, but not limited to social matters like the redistribution of wealth and access to 
education.75  Like Echeverría, other Third World leaders voiced their economic 
concerns and their demands for more equitable relations through conferences like 
UNCTAD.   
 
¡Viva México! ¡Viva Chile! ¡Viva Latinoamérica Unida!76 
For President Echeverría the site for UNCTAD III could not have been more 
politically fortuitous.  State representatives met in Santiago, Chile, from April 13 
through May 21, at the time the Latin American center of revolutionary changes.77  
Chile was the home of President Salvador Allende (1970-1973), the world’s first 																																																								
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democratically elected Marxist, and the experimental grounds for the socialization of 
national industries, land, labor, and politics—a country on the path to socialism.  Chile’s 
experiments coincided admirably with Echeverría’s own attempt to revamp Mexico’s 
revolutionary project.  Overall, Chile was the fertile space for intellectual discussion 
regarding Latin America’s development.  Although it had only been a few years since 
having left his post as the organization’s secretary-general, Raúl Prebisch still held 
important sway over the region, and Santiago served as his laboratory since it was the 
home to ECLA.  For the 1972 meeting of UNCTAD, the international monetary 
system proved the overarching theme of the conference.  Just as Echeverría stressed in 
New York, the 131 participating countries “argued that while they were in no way 
responsible for the monetary crisis, they had to bear the brunt of the economic 
uncertainty engendered by the crisis, and the subsequent currency realignments 
contributed to the depletion and erosion of the value of their foreign reserves.”78  For 
Echeverría, UNCTAD served as an outlet for his ideas on development, which came to 
define elements of his foreign and national policies after 1972.79    
Echeverría also sought to strengthen his relationship with Allende in hopes of 
levering legitimacy among discontented leftist groups.  His 1972 trip to Santiago 
signaled “the highest expression” of Mexico-Chilean entente, to the point that the head 
of the oppositional party, Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, PAN), affirmed 
Echeverría attempted to “allendizar” Mexico.80  For Echeverría “the support of the 
Popular Unity government proved extremely important due to President Allende’s 																																																								
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personal prestige and the global interest the Chilean experience prompted.”81  
Echeverría landed in the Pudahuel airport on the afternoon of Monday, April 17, and 
immediately heaped praise on the Unidad Popular experiment.  “Here advances one 
aspect of Latin America’s liberation,” said Echeverría to those welcoming him, 
including President Allende.82  He explained he had come to observe Chileans efforts to 
overcome underdevelopment, the same way “a brother comes to see their problems up 
close to find in them and in their solutions” the model for the region’s deliverance.  
While “some” questioned the timing of the trip, the Mexican president insisted that it 
was an opportune moment to observe how Chileans responded to the difficulties major 
transformations entailed, and of which Mexico’s Revolution had already faced.  Finally, 
the Mexican leader explained the UNCTAD conference as the other leading reason for 
his trip and where he sought to join his voice to those of other developing nations in the 
struggle the liberation of the Third World.83  Allende then escorted Echeverría to the 
Mexican Embassy where a journalist from Radio Balmaceda awaited him for an 
interview.84  Echeverría legitimized his own project of revitalizing Mexico’s revolution 
by linking his policies to those of Allende’s, and spoke of the undergoing changes in the 
country as an older brother having already lived through similar struggles and as one 
seeking to provide support.  
 
Orderly Revolution  																																																								
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The following day, Echeverría gave a speech to Congress in which he stressed 
the importance of legality and non-violence within revolutionary change.  After visiting 
La Moneda Palace, the president’s official seat, and the monument to independence 
leader Bernardo O’Higgins, Echeverría proceeded to the Chilean Congress.  In his 
discourse, the Mexican leader featured Chile as the embodiment of lawfulness.  He also 
drew parallels between both countries democratic heritage, yet recognized Mexico had 
“lived a difficult transit to democracy,” since its institutions grew out of a revolutionary 
process, a revolution that today signified “the fulfillment of the legal order.”  Echeverría 
explained he had visited the country thirty years earlier, and in 1972 he returned with 
the same enthusiasm—“to become acquainted with its institutions.”85  As a nineteen 
year-old law student at the UNAM, he had won a scholarship to attend a series of 
conferences at the University of Chile.  Echeverría recalled that the then President 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941) and “revolutionary” leader had a keen interest for 
Mexico, explaining the Chilean government’s grant sponsorship.  On board the “El 
Maipo” petroleum tanker, Echeverría and another student left the port of Tampico, 
Veracruz, crossed the Panamanian isthmus, and arrived on the Pacific coast of 
Valparaíso, Chile thirteen days later on the second of January 1941, “just as General 
Lázaro Cárdenas had left office.”86  Following his speech Echeverría paid a visit to the 
Mexico Sports and Cultural Club, and then made his way to the municipality of 
Santiago that awarded him a medal.  The evening concluded in the Moneda Palace 
where President Allende and his wife Hortensia Bussi threw a dinner in honor of 
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Echeverría and First Lady Esther Zuno and where both leaders gave speeches.87  
Echeverría’s trip to Chile, thereby, extolled Mexico’s revolutionary project while also 
tying its roots to the social and economic transformations transpiring in Chile in 1972.  
While both leaders rooted their projects in their respective countries’ revolution, 
and democratic institutions, they asked for order from their populace.  Echeverría, 
nonetheless, recognized that both countries still called for “profound” changes of which 
could be implemented through “peaceful means and within an institutional 
framework.”88  But he insisted that this fact did not diminish the importance of 
criticizing political leaders and for the government to practice self-criticism, actions 
constituting “living elements of a democracy.”89  Echeverría promoted a type of 
dialogue with civil society rather than outright confrontation, the latter characterizing 
the youth mobilizations common during his administration.  And Allende supported 
Echeverría in “condemning violent youth activities” and argued for the electoral 
politics: “There we fight for change within the framework of bourgeois democracy.”90  
In his trip to Mexico in December 1972, Allende gave a speech to the students of the 
University of Guadalajara where he argued that learning and work were youth’s key 
responsibility.  While he deemed their participation important, he underscored the 
notion that young people were indeed the movers of the revolution and affirmed; 
however, that the “Revolution does not pass through the University.”91  In Mexico of 
the 1970s existed a dual revolutionary discourse; one historically linked to the official 																																																								
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party, and the other embraced by the leftist groups influenced by Marxist ideologies 
running counter to the government.  Public dissidents were, thereby, perceived in 
defiance of the revolutionary process.92  At least for some in Mexico, like writer Carlos 
Monsiváis, “Allende came to collaborate…in the international and national legalization 
of the advertising process of echeverrismo as restoration of the Mexican Revolution.”93  
Allende, thereby, exported the Chilean model of revolution abroad and Echeverría 
hoped to legitimize his project of reviving Mexico’s revolutionary institutions, including 
the economic project of “balanced development,” while embracing legality and order—
a peaceful state-sponsored notion of revolution.  
Most importantly, Echeverría and Allende presented the Chilean revolution as a 
model of economic justice.  The Mexican leader explained, “Mexico has chosen the 
path of development in democracy,” and he suggested the same for the international 
community, for a “democratic order in the international life.”  For Echeverría, Chile 
epitomized a country’s right to self-determination, in this case meaning “Free 
election…over the economic model that best suits each nation.”  Respect for the 
Chilean model signaled an inclusive and democratic international community, and “the 
only path leading to a balanced international system.”94  In his trip to Mexico, Allende 
emphasized the region’s dire position: “we are mono producing countries within the 
immense majority: we are the countries of cacao, bananas, coffee, tin, copper or oil.  We 
are commodity producing countries and importers of manufactured goods; we sell 
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cheap and buy dear.”95  While Echeverría underscored Chile as a model for the Third 
World, both leaders called for a more inclusive and respectful system for countries on 
the path to industrialization, for “potentially rich countries” that live in poverty and 
must borrow “To stay alive.”96  Finally, Allende concluded with: “I know, from what I 
have experienced, that Mexico has been and will be—thanks for that—a friend of my 
country.”97  The comradery between both leaders called for other countries to emulate 
and recognize the Chilean revolution as a model of economic liberation but also probed 
the support of developing countries so it would manage the counterrevolutionary 
challenges posed by its capitalist adversaries, or what Pablo Neruda described as a 
“silent Vietnam,” meaning an economic blockade rather than a military one.98 
The language of legality and the constitutionality of Chile’s economic project 
suited Echeverría’s own engagement with developing nations and legitimized Allende at 
home.  “When the President of Mexico reached Santiago, the political crisis of the 
Popular Unity government had already begun.”99  According to Mexican correspondent 
in Santiago Guillermo Ochoa, five days before the UNCTAD conference “Greece 
Avenue had been roamed by the highest human concentration,” a manifestation led by 
the president of the Senate at the time and future president of the country, Patricio 
Aylwin and Allende’s predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), both Christian 
Democrats. “Hundreds of thousands of people expressed their discontent with the 
regime of the Socialist Salvador Allende,” wrote Ochoa.100  Echeverría stood behind 																																																								
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Allende and argued Chile acted “within a legal framework with liberties.”  The Chilean 
press ran the comments of support: “Momios, did you hear what the President of Mexico 
said: in Chile exists democracy and all-embracing liberty.”101  Another newspaper 
published “Mexico supports Chile in its copper dispute with the USA,” and Echeverría 
is “officially in favor of the Chilean position on expropriations.”102  The latter comment 
came as Chileans negotiated their foreign debt in Paris, as the UNCTAD conference 
was in session, and as the United States was suggesting a line of credit with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) if Chile agreed to a series of guidelines—a proposal 
they rejected.103  Allende too gained from the political rapprochement with Echeverría 
and the Charter’s call for the right of States to define their economic models and the 
manner in which they disposed of their natural resources—and certainly from Mexico’s 
allegiance as the Chilean president faced pressures from the home and foreign fronts. 
Yet, for Echeverría his proposal for a charter proved the most fruitful outcome 
of his Chilean voyage.  Almost a week into the conference, Echeverría addressed 
UNCTAD members and called for a new economic relationship between industrialized 
and developing countries.  However, prior to his evening address the president spent the 
day exploring the Huechun farm organization, followed by a visit to the Supreme Court 
of Justice.104  Echeverría then proceeded to the UNCTAD tower, today the Gabriela 
Mistral Cultural Center, renamed after the first female Nobel laureate of Latin America, 
a building at the time referred to as “La plancha” (The Iron), and constructed especially 
for UNCTAD III.  “An extensive short structure…a tower whose floors I did not stop to 																																																								
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count,” built in “only eight months and fourteen days,” and by some referred to as the 
“Muro de Lamentaciones” (The Wailing Wall), wrote Mexican correspondent Ochoa, and 
he speculated on the name since no one seemed to know the real origin.105  In reality, it 
was more like 275 days for its completion and the tower remains an archetype of Latin 
American modernity—and a relic of UN edifices—bearing the imprint of various 
architects, engineers, mathematicians and pupils from universities across Chile, as well 
as an air of corrosion from its Pinochet-era military tenancy.  In the fall of 1973 the 
Ministry of Defense took possession of the building, alongside the scavenging of other 
public buildings, when the military junta “decided to use the best and most modern 
public infrastructure that was available at that time for its new seat of Government,” 
thus becoming the Diego Portales Building.106  Yet the evening of April 19, the 
attendees entered a brand new building, and made their way toward “an enormous hall 
of ivory colored walls and an olive green tribune,” customary colors for many official 
buildings of the time.  Immediately in front of Echeverría stood “representatives from 
the Holy See, the USSR, the United States, and the People’s China.”107  Echeverría 
opened with “Mexico reiterates its confidence in the high resolves of this Conference,” 
and amid “the oscillating purr of exhaust fans and the low drone filming cameras,” he 
continued with one of the most abiding speeches of the conference.108   
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“Economy of Peace”: Protracted Developmentalism  
Echeverría’s speech to UNCTAD members launched him into the international 
spotlight.  He called for an international charter or rights and duties amicable to 
emerging economies, a document that eventually consolidated into the Carta de derechos y 
deberes económicos de los Estados and become a hallmark of his foreign policy.  “We must 
strengthen the precarious legal foundations of the international economy,” stated the 
Mexican leader.  For many present at the UNCTAD forum, his proposal seemed like a 
viable response to economic climate of the time.  Echeverría essentially called for a set of 
“obligations and rights to protect weaker states.”  Without codifying economic 
guarantees, a “just and stable world order” could not prevail.  Echeverría further 
emphasized the need to detach “economic cooperation from the realm of goodwill to 
place it in the realm of law.”109  Since the creation of UNCTAD few things had 
changed; a decade of hope had passed and “developing countries had journeyed 
through a long road of frustration,” said Echeverría.  Nevertheless, he recognized 
enough groundwork existed “for what could well become a Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States.”110  While the Mexican leader may have spoken of the need for a 
Charter in the passing, his idea solidified during the Santiago meeting. 
Echeverría underscored the dire need for addressing international disparities of 
power and income through international law.  “We did not come to negotiate with the 
major industrial countries advantages for economic oligarchies of the underdeveloped 																																																								
109 Víctor L. Urquidi, “La carta de derechos y deberes económicos de los estados: la cuestión de 
su aplicación,” Foro internacional 20 (October-December 1979), 181. 
110 President Luis Echeverría cited in Romeo Flores Caballero, “La elaboración de la carta.  
Antecedentes de un Nuevo orden internacional,” in Justicia económica internacional: contribución al estudio de la 
Carta de derechos y deberes económicos de los Estados (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976), 40-41; Luis 
Echeverría, “Discurso pronunciado durante la Reunión Plenario del Tercer Período de Sesiones de la 
Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo (UNCTAD) [Santiago de Chile, 19 
abril 1972],” in México ante el mundo (México: Secretaría de la Presidencia, 1974), 111-124.  
	 101 
world.” Rather, and among various points made, Echeverría called for adjustments to 
the international standards and institutions, such as those regulating funding, the 
transfer of technology, the environment, and a country’s right to self-determination.  
Regarding the International Monetary Fund, he saw as necessary the democratization 
of the voting making process “through greater participation of developing countries,” so 
the developing world could have greater access to funding.  On matters of technology, 
Echeverría argued one of the conditions of foreign direct investment should be the 
“transfer of technological innovation” and he expressed high hopes for the UNCTAD 
working group researching the problems behind the transfer of technology.  Echeverría 
also made the case for States’ rights over their natural resources, and, recognized “a 
close link between environmental problems and industrial progress.”  Within all the 
proposals, the right to political and economic self-determination resonated, beginning 
with the “the right of every people to adopt the best suitable economic structure,” the 
end of “economic instruments and political pressures” that impinge on a country’s 
sovereignty, the prohibition of “transnational corporations intervention in the internal 
affairs of nations affairs,” as well as the “abolition of trade practices that discriminate 
against exports from non-industrialized countries.”  Echeverría believed in an 
“integrated regional economy” fostered development, alongside the fortification of the 
“precarious legal foundations of the international economy,” and declared his support 
for less developed countries, yet affirmed “special treatment” for Latin American 
countries.  Echeverría thus proposed legality, collectivity, and justice in international 
relations in order to forge “an economy for peace,” which he deemed the “the primary 
duty of the international community”—this in contrast to the individual rights proposals 
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emanating from organizations like the United Nations Human Rights program and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.111  
The charter proposal garnered immediate support and press coverage.  After the 
speech and while Echeverría met with Latin American delegates, reporters took note of 
the various impressions his ideas had made.  According to Guillermo Ochoa, among the 
first to support “Echeverría’s proposal in its initial phase” included delegates from four 
major South American countries: Chile, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay.  In Chile, “The 
next morning, Santiago’s major newspapers featured the proposal on their front pages.”  
Meanwhile in Mexico, Secretary of Foreign Relations Emilio O. Rabasa held meetings 
with various ambassadors.112  On May 12 and on behalf of Group 77—a coalition of 
developing nations created in the first UNCTAD session meeting in 1964 and key 
advocate of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States—Ethiopia took “note 
of the suggestion made by Mexico, introduced a draft resolution to the Conference 
which proposed to draw up such a charter.”  Six days later, conference attendees 
“decided to establish the Working Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, composed of 31 member States,” and nine other members 
subsequently added.113  A total of 90 votes passed the resolution, with 19 abstentions 
and not a single opposing vote.114  An overwhelming majority of developing countries 
supported the initiative, whilst representatives from industrialized economies responded 
with cautionary abstentions.   																																																								
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The United States proved one such abstainee.115  Since the conference’s 
announcement, U.S. officials held an air of caution toward UNCTAD.  In planning for 
the conference, Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin, II (1972-1973), a post created 
under the Nixon administration superseding the Under Secretary of State, “sent a 
memorandum to [Assistant Secretaries] Julius Katz and Charles Meyer, which set out 
the recommended approach the Department of State should take in preparation for the 
[UNCTAD III] Conference.”116  Irwin suggested the US strategy should be one of “low 
profile” for UNCTAD.117  Irwin based his suggestions on a study he requested from the 
Bureau of Economic Affairs on the symposium, which acknowledged the importance of 
the event: “UNCTAD will be one of the longest and largest international economic 
Conferences of recent years…and it will be a major event in the evolving dialogue 
between developed and developing countries.”118  At the same time, the study made 
State Department officials aware of the possible demands to be expected from 
developing countries, at the time referred to as Less Developed Countries (LDCs), on a 
number of outstanding issues like: “aid volumes, LDC participation in monetary reform, 
the SDR link, negotiation of a cocoa agreement, improved market access for LDC 
exports, investment problems, etc.”119  Anticipating criticism of Nixon’s ten percent 
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import tax, the report recognized antagonisms toward the United States may have eased 
as a result of the “lifting of the surcharge” and proposals for Congressional tariff 
legislation.120  Secretary of State William P. Rogers (1969-1973) also informed President 
Nixon “the conference would be difficult because the United States had little to offer the 
developing world and the venue posed a special problem because of the sensitive U.S.-
Chile relations.”121  From the onset, department officials prepared a defensive 
approach—“our posture will be defensible”—toward major demands or possible 
criticism from the Third World at UNCTAD.122   
State Department officials also sought to keep conference aims within the limits 
of “constructive discussion.”123  Rogers underscored the role of UNCTAD as a 
“consultative rather than a negotiating or decision making mechanism.”124  Rogers also 
maintained the United States too shared concerns with Latin American countries on the 
matter of tariffs, and cited “European preferential arrangements” as an example.   Yet 
he emphasized UNCTAD was not the place to negotiate “international commodity 
arrangements”; rather, these questions should be “resolved in the framework of the 
Agreements, not at international Conferences.”125  Investment banker and Deputy 
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Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Nathaniel Samuels (1969-1972) too argued the 
United States “should firmly resist pressures” to make UNCTAD “more operational 
and a forum for negotiations.”126  Rogers added developing countries “should be 
realistic in their expectations.”127  Even while economic frustration existed among 
developing countries, the conclusions drawn from the study predicted no major new 
agreements, considering that developing countries appeared not to be “prepared to 
undertake important new development commitments at this time of uncertainty and 
transition.”  Although State Department officials expressed their understanding of the 
economic difficulties developing countries faced, their support was limited to 
encouraging studies and development programs.  Finally, the study recommended 
representatives “avoid confrontation” by insisting that the conference should be kept as 
an “institution for discussion and consultation” and not to succumb to “pressures to 
make it more operational and a forum for negotiations,” while keeping “political attacks 
against the US out of the UNCTAD forum when possible.”  It was clear enough that a 
hard line of such attacks could come from the radical postures of some developing 
countries, which appear to have unrealistic expectations of the conference.128  In brief, 
Echeverria’s charter proposal proved too radical and too contradictory to U.S. 
economic interests, and thus found little support from State Department representatives 
in Chile. 
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Undeterred, Echeverría and his aide began to promote the Charter after its 
approval. “President Echeverría and Mexican officials” took on the task of “widely 
disseminating the basic principles on which the document rested,” recounted Romeo R. 
Flores Caballero, a Mexican academic with a long career in public posts.  Before leaving 
Chile, the president even agreed to a press conference in the nation’s capital, where he 
outlined his vision of the perceived struggle involving Third World countries, and one in 
which Mexico stood in the fight due to its unique revolutionary past.  By underscoring 
the country’s famous struggle to reverse age-old social problems, Echeverría included 
yet differentiated Mexico from other developing countries.  Nevertheless, he recognized 
that other countries suffered the effects of the widening gap in economic and 
development standing when compared with the more advanced sphere of the world.  
Finally, Echeverría added, “I think if what is happening in countries seeking to 
harmonize their views is not understood, the essence of the problem would go 
uncomprehend.”129  The intensive lobbying for the Charter embodied the climate of the 
time when leaders like Echeverría sought solutions to national problems through a type 
of a Third World power block sanctified through international law—espousing States’ 
rights over individual rights promoted by Western countries.  Echeverría’s proposal 
seemed as one of the last bastions of developmentalist projects of the twentieth century, 
one promoted amid a competing free market model that grew from the tearing down of 
state-directed initiatives and protectionist politics of industrialization.  
Echeverría’s proposals were by no means mere nuance.  The ideas in the 
Charter bore the imprint of Latin American developmentalism.  Many of the 																																																								
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discussions regarding inequitable structures of trade, development, and transfer of 
technology embedded in the Carta built on Prebisch and other Latin American 
economists’ observations on the region’s underdevelopment.  While presiding over 
ECLA, Prebisch encouraged leaders to pursue ISI, an approach to development that 
could initially entail mass exportation of primary products until these countries could 
eventually accumulate sufficient capital goods.130  On April 26 Prebisch spoke in 
Santiago, he reminded participants of the previous UNCTAD meetings—“I could not 
take my place at this third session of the Conference without calling to mind the two 
previous sessions, especially the first,” and recounted, “Each of them was the scene of a 
confrontation of ideas.”  For Prebisch, Echeverría’s proposals, alongside discussions 
regarding the Bretton Woods system as discriminatory international economic model at 
UNCTAD, only confirmed what ECLA scholars had been publishing for years.  “Many 
of these [ideas]—strongly opposed and rejected at the time—have been gaining ground.  
They are now accepted universally, I would say.”  The Latin American economic 
pioneer saw beyond the “monetary crisis” as the source behind the international 
economic context in derail.  For Prebisch another reason for the crisis lay in 
technological advancements, “with its never ending innovations has fed the massive flow 
of trade in manufacturers in which the developing countries have participated hardly at 
all.”131  Yet, Prebisch’s model and its many updates had partially reached a new dead 
end in the 1970s.  Thereby, Echeverría’s proposal stood as one of the many schemes of 
the 1970s to rescue Latin America from economic stagnation resulting from the 																																																								
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decadent industrialization projects of the previous decades—yet still well within 
Prebisch’s developmentalism.  
 
The Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)  
Interest in the Charter thus served as a protracted form of Prebisch’s 
developmentalism.   The difference; however, lay in that Echeverría sought to utilize the 
emerging global context in which human rights discussions proliferated, that of 
international law.  But rather than focusing on the protection of individuals, he lobbied 
for the rights of entire States.  Echeverría also went a bit further.  He underscored the 
duties of States.  Meaning the developed world had obligations, and the Third World 
had rights, and the violations of such duties impinged on the rights of other States.  
Thereby, the Charter of Rights and Duties of States proved a new legal recourse for 
Latin American developmentalism, one bearing similarities in language with the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  While countries like the United States 
employed the language of human rights to protest the violation of individual rights—
particularly political guarantees and under communist regimes—Third World countries 
espoused the language of rights of countries in order to strengthen nationalist economic 
policies.  Thus, promoting the Carta using the emerging language of international 
human rights briefly served the interest of developing nations, for it functioned as a 
counterweight to first world countries’ lobby for economic liberalism and individual 
rights at the cost economic nationalism and group rights.  
Moreover, the Mexican press made comparisons between the Charter and what 
they deemed the obsolete Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  By 1974, when 
academics drew parallels between the Charter and the UDHR, the latter seemed to be 
	 109 
categorized as a document that raised many expectations and hopes but was eventually 
filed away with so many other forgotten UN edicts.  This certainly became evident 
when UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim traveled to Mexico to award Echeverría 
the UN Medal of Peace for advancing UN causes.  He noted: “It is very important 
because all the world is aware that there can be no political stability without economic 
stability and one of the best steps toward achieving economic stability is the Charter of 
Duties and Economic Rights of Nations.”  The Lancaster Farming, a Pennsylvania 
newspaper, reporting on Waldheim’s visit interestingly enough referred to the Charter 
as the “Economic Declaration of Human Rights”—a title closely resembling that of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, yet the note recognized the document’s formal 
name as that of the “Charter of Duties and Economic Rights of Nations.”132   
Meanwhile, in Mexico the air seemed less optimistic about the Charter’s success.  
In the press conference held after the award, intellectuals and correspondents inquired 
into the possibilities of success given the elapsed Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  Gloria Bello from the UNAM asked:  
Mr. Waldheim: The Mexican proposal to establish a Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States has been welcomed by more than one hundred 
countries: however, has the United Nations foreseen the creation of a body to 
monitor and control compliance and apply sanctions to violators, this in order to 
prevent the Charter from suffering the same fate as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which is constantly violated, as is currently the case before the 
powerlessness of the world organization? 
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The UN Secretary General welcomed the reference to the UDHR, and added, “It is 
better—I must say—to be patient and thus produce an instrument that is binding and 
one that engages all countries…” Moreover, he added lessons were learned from the 
UDHR, particularly from the limitations brought forth by article two, paragraph seven 
of the United Nations Charter—which prevents the United Nations from intervening in 
“internal affairs of any Member State.”  This restriction, Waldheim acknowledged, 
proved limiting to the human rights cause since these require any action necessary for 
their protection.  “We do not succeed because there are countries that have not ratified 
the agreements that the human rights declarations entails.”  Waldheim believed the 
right approach had been taken with the Charter, which sought the approval of not only 
UN Member States but of all countries, otherwise no such instrument would ever really 
be observed.133  The optimism for the Carta underscored the limitations of international 
agreements that could predispose it to the same faith, yet reflected opinions regarding 
the obsoleteness of the UDHR—which by 1974 seemed outshined by Echeverría’s 
proposal.    
Others also used Waldheim’s visit to comment on the failure of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  Spanish-exile Ramón de Ertze Garamendi in his 
Excélsior column “Suma y Resta” (Sum and Minus) probed the Declaration in its twenty-
fifth anniversary celebrated on December 10, 1973.  “The usefulness of this kind of 
documents lies in the obligations assumed by States to respect individual rights and to 
draw on them to standardize their performance,” wrote de Ertze Garamendi.  Yet, he 
believed their protection should be less dependent on the good will of  “a few simple 
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declarations”—the same to be said of the Charter, which “involves general principles 
and positive agreements.”134  César Sepúlveda, jurist scholar of international law, added 
some would deem the Charter as another document like the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights “that is often slighted.”  Unlike the UDHR, Sepúlveda believed the Carta 
was far more “pragmatic and less romantic in content,” it had greater applicability, 
particularly because its implementation could be required by one State to another, and 
its provisions could easily be included in bilateral and multilateral agreements.  “In 
other words, the coveted Charter will be like a an arsenal of principles and rules which 
can be selected and inserted into particular treaties.”  In that sense, state sovereignty 
would still prevail.  Most importantly; however, Sepúlveda celebrated this original idea 
by President Echeverría—an idea that made it into the universal realm, and one that 
“constitutes a valuable Mexican contribution to the rights of peoples.”135  Meanwhile, 
Jorge Hernández Campos asked, “To what extent will the Charter resist the brutal 
realities of international politics?”  That is, since the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights “is practically useless in the socialist sphere, where the values are different.”  Or, 
for that matter, what would happen to the deceased Allende’s revolutionary aspirations 
upon different North American aspirations.  In that sense, Hernández Campos 
wondered what would be of the Charter under competing global economic and 
monetary aspirations—and how would the document be applied and by which states 
and against what ideologies?136  In that form, the commentaries stemming from 
Waldheim’s visit underscored the failure of similar documents, particularly the UDHR, 																																																								
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but also acknowledged an emerging Mexican diplomacy evidenced by the global 
support for the Charter.  
 
The Charter Without Allende: The Mexican Revolution and Political Refugees 
 From 1974 onward, Echeverría’s justice rhetoric in support for the Carta 
broadened.  Initially, the origins of the Charter had been intimately linked with the 
UNCTAD III meeting in Chile; legitimized and strongly supported by Salvador 
Allende’s own Socialist Revolution, in part due to the support it rendered to the idea 
that Chilean cooper was the property of the State.137  Political leader Porfirio Muñoz 
Ledo felt compelled to explain Mexico’s rapprochement with Chile by noting that the 
“interest in Salvador Allende’s Chile has been much criticized.”138  The simple answer 
for the countries’ links, he added, would be that Chile stood as the leading State pushing 
progressive goals—through a democratic approach—“based on the nationalization of its 
basic resources.”  Muñoz Ledo recognized that the connection with Chile only 
furthered Mexico’s relations with other progressive Latin American countries 
“consequently, a Third World consciousness arises, precisely from our visit to Chile.”139  
While Mexican diplomats initially built on the Chilean Revolution and gave Allende 
due credit for his support and contribution to the idea and materialization of the 
																																																								
137 Archivo General de la Nación [hereafter AGN], Archivos Particulares, Personas, Porfirio 
Muñoz Ledo Lazo la Vaga, Cargos en la administración pública federal o estatal, Embajador o 
Representante permanente de México ante la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, Informe, Caja 154-
2, Exp. 1, Folio 1-20. 
138 Muñoz Ledo served as Secretary of Labor under President Echeverría and a brief tenure as 
Secretary of Education under José López Portillo (1976-1982).  From 1978 to 1985 he represented 
Mexico in the United Nations.  
139 AGN, Archivos Particulares, Personas, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo Lazo la Vaga, Cargos en la 
administración pública federal o estatal, Embajador o Representante permanente de México ante la 
Organización de las Naciones Unidas, Informe, Caja 154-2, Exp. 1, Folio 1-20. 
	 113 
Charter, after Allende’s overthrow in 1973 Echeverría moved toward a more immediate 
and nationalist predecessor for the Carta: the Mexican Revolution.   
 As the Charter neared its completion, for its promoters the Mexican Revolution 
factored as a key model of inspiration.  Article Two, which notes “Every State has and 
shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, 
over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities,” according to Ledo 
originated in Mexico’s 1917 Constitution.  The right “to dispose of its natural 
resources” he deemed as originating in the Mexican Constitution—the first document to 
embody such a right, a guarantee that made the Article Two of the Charter the most 
contested.140  For the creation of this document Ledo credits Mexican diplomat Jorge 
Castañeda—a man he deemed a “great negotiator, a great talent…” who worked 
diligently for two years, particularly evident in getting Article Two approved.  He 
explained how the group of forty representatives responsible for drafting the Carta 
initially met in New York and then moved to Geneva, and in this process Ledo 
underscores industrial countries’ efforts to keep the article on a State’s sovereignty over 
its natural resources out.  These representatives “proposed all kinds of formulas, how to 
dispose of natural resources within International Law, when this did not really exist.”141  
However, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 clearly stated the right of the State over its 
natural recourses, from the subsoil, water and natural resources, which cannot be 
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owned by private individuals, that is a guarantee coupled with the right to 
nationalization and indemnization to be processed by national tribunals.  Ledo finally 
added that for those reasons the Charter proved particularly important to Chile when 
the country struggled to sustain ownership over its cooper.142  Rooting Article Two of 
the Charter in Mexico’s Constitution furthered Echeverría’s nationalist cause in the 
international realm, although with little ideological success at home.  
 Mexican journalists too presented the Charter as an extension of a Revolution 
and a model of futuristic schemes.  For some, like the Director of International 
Organizations of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Sergio González Gálvez the Charter 
confirmed a newfound Mexican diplomacy, one that compelled the country to leave 
behind a its defensive policy.143  Jorge Hernández Campos writing for Excélsior saw the 
Charter within the tradition of the Mexican Revolution—“appears as an offshoot on the 
trunk of this Mexican tradition.”  Most importantly, the global context of the oil crisis 
had given the government an “unprecedented historical justification” to act on justice 
foundations.144  Canadian Chancellor Mitchel Sharp argued that inflation and the 
energy crisis “had caused major problems for industrialized countries which have 
potentially catastrophic results for developing countries,” this he said in support of the 
Charter and better norms of international conduct.145  Spanish-exile Ramón de Ertze 
Garamendi added that the oil crisis demanded new forms of cooperation in a context 
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where traditional and unequal forms of exchange could no longer be sustained.146  
According to journalist Alejandro Avilés the “energy scarcity alerted human 
consciousness about the problems that many futurologists had not realized.”147  The 
Charter also opened a discussion in Excélsior’s editorials on the various possible futures 
and the futurists who predict them.  Avilés explained it took “an intense imaginative 
effort to anticipate and consider not one, but several possible futures.”148  Genaro María 
González commented on the juridical thesis for the possibility of a more just world 
accompanied by a scientific thesis supporting the idea that “that” imagined world could 
be possible.  Yet, he believed that what Mexico promoted did not suffice to be 
considered one of the many futuristic schemes for the future.  Moreover, these “futures” 
and their positive projections had an immediate function in the present—to “detract 
from immediate conflicts and vaccinate against alarms and pangs of conscience for the 
injustices of the present.”149  Scholar Pablo Latapí noted the Charter would “reach its 
full meaning when confronted with a vision of the future that accepts that our planet is 
subject, today, to the violence of domination”—an unlikely admission by the developed 
world and its models for the future.150  The Charter; nevertheless, engendered a 
discussion about Mexico’s revolutionary past coupled with one regarding the many 
possible scenarios for a better and global future—at times these prodded ideas for a 
better future and in others the Charter and its rhetoric felt much like past, utopian, and 
failed projects.   																																																								
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 Along with the revolutionary rhetoric other diplomats also placed the Charter 
within the post-World War II context of political decolonization.  Muñoz Ledo, for 
instance, explained the Carta culminated “a long process of awareness of the profound 
injustices that survived political decolonization and deepened inequalities between 
nations.”  Mexican diplomats, including Echeverría, believed the Charter 
complimented and coupled political liberalization with that of economic sovereignty—
the latter that seemed to have been largely inaccessible to many newly freed countries.  
Moreover, the 1970s “exhausted” and repressive economic model of development 
offered a space for a type of “international rearrangement” for a more just participation 
in the global economy, added Ledo, signaling the opportunity for a “new social 
contract” embodying “the progress of all in the dignity of each.”  Building on this justice 
terminology, the Mexican diplomat interrelated the struggle for economic liberation 
with the defense of the “fundamental rights of man,” which he also deemed inseparable 
from state sovereignty.  Seemingly building on the internationalist language of 
individual rights, Ledo too called for the legal fortification of the international economy, 
in contrast with the legal apparatus brewing on behalf of individual civil and political 
guarantees—not economic.151  While Ledo spoke of the Charter almost ten years after 
its official approval and passage from memory, he looked to the context of political 
decolonization to grasp the importance of the document—then already deemed 
forgotten.  However, even then, he still noted the rights engendered in the Mexican 																																																								
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Revolution as a foundation for an entirely different world context, that of the 1970s.   
 The political optimism behind the Charter was also subject to critical 
commentaries in Excélsior.  Journalists and intellectuals challenged President Echeverría 
to look inward as he engaged in his international and economic justice crusade.  Samuel 
I. del Villar thought it pertinent to look into the “economic rights and obligations of 
Mexicans” given the government sought support from the international community for 
the rights embedded in the Charter.  In looking into inequalities at a national level, Del 
Villar believed that the country’s economic relations left the majority of Mexicans 
without a “right to an opportunity to lead an independent existence of human 
dignity.”152  Hernández Campos noted the Charter’s Pandora’s box lay in the fact that 
the president should first set “an example on what should be done to carry out order 
internally.”153  Journalist and playwright Vicente Leñero, on the other hand, perceived 
the Charter as the government’s attempt to forge a good image and portray good 
intentions, a “naïve desire to believe that the system can be moralized and that the 
interests of those who wield political power will yield to the imperative of public needs.”  
Leñero saw the government’s efforts as somehow not believable or convincing 
enough.154  Even so, the president continually exalted the humanism behind the 
Charter, and his cause on behalf of the poor, the more the 1,500 million human beings 
that “suffered the tragedy of malnutrition and misery,” and the existence of an 
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underdeveloped world that had been accepted as natural.155  This moralistic and 
economic justice rhetoric became bedrock of his travels and speeches abroad, which 
clashed with the economic and political realities at home—yet he broadened the 
Charter cause by supporting South American exiles, particularly Chilean. 
 
Human Rights and Political Refugees 
Echeverría thus avoided international scrutiny for the state’s political repression 
by promoting the Charter and welcoming refugees.  Echeverría’s Charter, the death of 
Allende, and the global context allowed for the government’s appropriation of the 
internationalist language of human rights.  Even when the government confronted rural 
and urban guerrilla movements—repressed through violent means—Echeverría 
appeared as a promoter of human rights by supporting Latin American leftist through a 
generous asylum program.  These efforts deemed the Mexican government as a 
promoter, rather than a violator of political rights, to not only to the U.S. government 
but also to the emerging system of international human rights monitoring.  Mexico, 
thus, projected what Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink described as a “progressive 
stance on international human rights.”156  Of all the political refugees that arrived in 
Mexico during his presidency, Chileans were believed to have been the president’s most 
privileged group.  According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), some 10,000 South 
American exiles lived in Mexico in 1980.  One source estimates a total of 10,000 
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refugees just from Chile, while another notes a total of 3,345.157  The Secretary of 
Gobernación estimated that in 1976 no more than 1,800 Chileans lived in Mexico.158  
Nevertheless, it was clear that Echeverría had taken immediate action after the 
overthrow of his ally Allende.  In 1973, he broke diplomatic relations with the Chilean 
government and of the 300 prisoners released from the country in 1975, 163 settled in 
Mexico.159  The Mexican government also welcomed Allende’s widow Hortensia Bussi 
and financed the creation of the “Casa de Chile en México” (Chilean House in Mexico), 
a gathering and cultural center that at one point included a printing press.160  The 
national responsiveness toward exiles was such that Echeverría and his wife Esther Zuno 
opened an office to aid in the settling process in Mexico, an entity headed by the first 
lady’s sister, Bertha Zuno “La Chiqui.”161 “However, at the end of his administration, 
Echeverria was severely criticized for the fact that many Chilean refugees were 
occupying better paid and even politically important jobs to the disadvantage of 
Mexican nationals,” according to Hans Wollny.162  By supporting the Latin American 
left, Echeverría exalted Mexico’s tradition of asylum as a tool of international 
legitimacy.  By forging an image of rights protector by opening its door to those who 
suffered under military dictatorships, Mexico separated itself from the repressors and 
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became a player in the international community of human rights monitoring—this as he 
hoped to appease armed revolutionary movements at home.163   
The Latin American left took notice of Echeverría’s efforts toward Chileans, 
even if to legitimize his faltering nationalist projects at home.  Guatemalan writer and 
politician exiled in Mexico since the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in 1954, Mario 
Monteforte Toledo commented on Echeverría’s asylum policy toward persecuted 
Chileans, and concluded:  
this is giving a hand to the Latin American left, one which must be convinced of 
the democratic opening and the sustainability of popular representation, one 
which must be convinced of his progressiveness and its revolutionary spirit 
against imperialist manipulation and rightist dictatorships, one which must be 
convinced within national territory of his well intentioned populism.  Any aid 
granted to oppressed peoples by national and international rightists, renders the 
government honorable and gives credit before the nation. 
While Monteforte Toledo understood Echeverría sought legitimation from Mexico’s 
left, he however could not grapple with the government’s desire to strengthen its links to 
the Department of State and transnational corporation—links with an inveterately 
adversary power.164  His policy resonated worldwide.  In February 1974, a group of 
Chilean exiles in Austria cheered Echeverría’s arrival and greeted him with a letter of 
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gratitude.  Among the sections of the letter reproduced by Excélsior included:  “The 
Mexican people, and you personally, Mr. President, have been able to show in an 
exemplary manner the high spirit of solidarity with the Chilean people,” and hoped that 
other countries would follow Mexico’s example.  Meanwhile, one within the crowd 
cried out “Viva Allende, viva el Presidente de México, Viva Austria” (Long live Allende, long live 
the President of Mexico, and long live Austria).165  These positive reports in the press 
certainly exalted Echeverría’s own legacy toward the international community of 
political dissidents, even while his own government persecuted leftist guerrilla 
movements at home.   
 The arrival of political exiles to Mexico, nevertheless, played an important role 
in disseminating human rights concepts in the country.  In many ways it was South 
American political exiles in the 1970s that helped disperse to the general population the 
emergent language of individualist notions of human rights.  Upon their arrival in 
Mexico, many had already had links with international human rights organizations; 
others joined networks once they arrived.  Exile’s were familiar with and employed the 
language of human rights in Mexico to voice their frustrations with the atrocities 
committed in their home countries.  That is one of the ways in which the term reached 
the Mexican mainstream and how “the Mexican community familiarized itself with the 
victims of repression and the manner in which they used the concept of human rights as 
a measure of self-defense.”166  Interestingly, exile’s cause was aided by transformations 																																																								
165 Rafael Cardona, “El Grito ‘Viva México, Viva Chile, Viva Austria’, Saludó a LE en Viena,” 
Excélsior, 12 February 1974, 1, 9.  
166 “La presencia de los refugiados sur y centroamericanos, tuvieron un impacto en México en 
cuanto a sus ideas sobre derechos humanos.  Con los exiliados del Cono Sur, el pueblo mexicano conoció 
a las víctimas de la represión y la manera en que ellos usaban el concepto de los derechos humanos para 
autodefenderse.” Joy Lee Peebles Lane, Las organizaciones no gubernamentales de derechos humanos en México: su 
formación y esfuerzos para realizar cambios socio-políticos (M.A. thesis, Estudios Latinoamericanos, Facultad de 
	 122 
within the Mexican press, which provided them with new avenues of political 
expression, and the establishment of new universities where many found teaching 
posts.167  However, their use of the concept to press their governments on military 
atrocities took much longer for scholars, activists, and journalists to employ the term 
human rights to the happenings in Mexico.  Exile’s use of the concept solidified the 
notion that what took place in South American countries were indeed “human rights” 
violations, while what transpired in Mexico remained off the international radar—a 
long-lasting legacy of Echeverría’s politics of apertura, of Mexico’s leftist revolutionary 
government, as well as Mexico’s opening and linkages with the emergent international 
system (like the United Nations).   
 
Conclusion 
 Echeverría’s Charter; nevertheless, proved one of the various international 
schemes of the 1970s.  As such the Carta became a formal component of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO).  Because the NIEO project sought to change 
the international economic order, more specifically the Bretton Woods system codifying 
economic relations since World War II, the Carta became a suitable working document 
of support sometime after the 1972 meeting in Chile.  Yet, the proposal for NIEO is in 
itself an extension of Latin American developmentalism: a regional model of 
development broadened in scope and applied on a global scale for the Third World, 
and in some ways the culminating project of developmental schemes dating to the 
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1950s.  Although some scholars contend “that NIEO ideology is not rooted only in 
Third World acceptance of Prebisch’s views on trade” but rather in the crisis of the 
Bretton Woods system and countries’ attempt to find an alternate international 
mechanism.168  The idea for the Carta; nevertheless, derived from the 1972 United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Chile. 169  A month 
after the Santiago meeting, the UNCTAD passed a resolution on May 18, 1972 
“stressing the urgency to establish generally accepted norms to govern international 
economic relations,” just as President Luis Echeverría had suggested.170  By December 
of the same year a Working Group made up of representatives from forty Member 
States began working on the drafting the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States.  While the Carta became a component of the NIEO by 1974, its initial inkling 
was nonetheless a byproduct of the UNCTAD, and influenced by regional thinkers, 
especially since the conference took place in Santiago—the headquarters of ECLA, a 
city with thinkers forging developmentalism.   
 Above all, the idea for the Charter is most often attributed to Mexican President 
Luis Echeverría.  Yet, little scholarly material exists on the actual drafting process.  The 
Charter, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, required a working 
committee for its design.  Very unlike the historical narrative available on the prolonged 
and contentious process on the writing of the UDHR, and whose planning committee 
chairwoman included none other than former first lady Eleanor Roosevelt, little 
historical insights exists on the profile of the Charter’s designers.  Yet, the original idea 																																																								
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scholars overwhelmingly associate with President Echeverría’s speech in Santiago.  
However, the draft approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1974 
procuring the Charter for Economic Rights and Duties of States an official component 
of the NIEO suggests a Working Group “composed of forty Member States.”171  Even 
then, Echeverría’s contribution to the Carta stands out above that of his contemporaries.  
This is probably because unlike any of his counterparts, President Echeverría made the 
Charter a keystone of his foreign policy, explaining the attribution of the Carta to the 
Mexican leader.   
 Although optimism for an alternative international economic system remained 
high, by 1976 it was clear the idea would not prevail.  However, the Carta introduced 
discussions and comparison to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the 
Mexican press—this at a time when few referenced the term.  Most importantly, the 
Charter emanated from a nationalist government projecting a revolutionary model into 
the international realm.  The Carta advanced within international law and mechanisms 
that did not reject but competed with other universalist projects—especially that of 
individual human rights and its equivocal partner—free market economics.  The 
Charter stood as one of the last bastions of state-directed initiatives and as one of the 
leading schemes for the rights of States, not individuals.  While many deemed the 
UDHR practically obsolete as discussions for the Charter arose, the turn toward 
reducing the role of the State, the crisis of Keynesianism, and the globalization of 
markets inevitably led to the downfall of Echeverría and the Third World’s hopes for 
more equitable relations.  The individual, not the State, prevailed and the Charter 
																																																								
171 United Nations, General Assembly, “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly.  Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States,” Twenty-ninth session, A/RES/29/3281, 12 December 1974. 
	 125 
became another UN edict archived away.  Meanwhile, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which had been largely forgotten and systematically violated since 1948, 
took on a more central role when utilized by a transnational network of activist working 
on behalf of political dissidents; thus, threatening the much guarded state sovereignty of 
previous decades.  In the case of Mexico, the promotion of the Charter stood as one of 
the isolated instances of usage of the term human rights, and of a project that placed 
economic rights of States above civil and political rights of the individual.   
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Part II: 
Nationalizing Human Rights and the Rise of Civil Society 
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ILLUS. 3.1.  “Mrs. Patricia Hutar, Representative of the United States, making a statement [at the 
opening of the World Conference of the International Women’s Year],” 19 June 1975, Juan de la Barrera 
Gymnasium, Mexico City. Photo from the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, United 
Nations Photo Archive, Photo #122985 <http://www.unmultimedia.org>. (Reproduced without 
permission) 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
Women’s Rights, NOT Human Rights:  
The 1975 United Nations International Women’s Year (IWY) and Conference in 
Mexico City 
 
 
“She and the air are alive with possibilities.  
It’s our world. 
 It’s our year.  
But where is our voice?”1 
 
Introduction: Nationalizing Human Rights  
The term “human rights” reappeared in the Mexican press with the 1975 
United Nations International Women’s Year Conference (IWY). From June 19 thru July 
2, thousands of women from across the globe convened in Mexico City for the UN-
sponsored event.  The gathering served as a platform for divergent currents of 
nationalist and internationalist feminist thought.  Official and unofficial print coverage 
linked many, at home and abroad, to the first gender-specific and internationalist 
gathering of its kind with the “presence of 1,600 newspeople” making the “IWY 
Conference the most widely covered U.N. meeting ever held.”2  Characterized by the 
wave of decolonization, civil rights, and other such movements, the 1970s had also 
proved a tumultuous yet exciting decade for women.  For example, activists in the 
United States witnessed the historic 1973 Supreme Court case of Roe vs. Wade that 																																																								
1 “Birds are eternal optimists, and the traditional symbol of peace is the dove. Look at that beak, 
so proudly and expectantly raised. One can almost feel the tension, the listening, the stirring going on 
within her. One can almost sense her anxiousness to soar aloft, to get started on her mission of 
development and equality, so that true peace can come to our fretful and anxious world. She and the air 
are alive with possibilities. It’s our world. It’s our year. But where is our voice?” Marie Whitesell Balboa, 
NAWL United Nations Representative, on the “stylized dove” and official emblem for the 1975 United 
Nations International Women’s Year and icon of the Women’s Rights Movement, “Annual Conference 
for the Non-Governmental Organizations,” Women Layers Journal 61:2 (Spring 1975), 79.  
2 United Nations, Meeting in Mexico: The Story of the World Conference of the International Women’s Year 
(Mexico City, 19 June-2 July 1975). New York: United Nations, 1975. Jocelyn Olcott, “Empires of 
Information: Media Strategies for the 1975 International Women’s Year,” Journal of Women’s History 24:4 
(Winter 2012), 25. 
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broadened control over reproductive rights by providing legal access to abortion.  As 
women continued to gain ground within their home countries, the 1975 UN 
International Women’s Year helped launch various strands of women’s rights demands 
onto international politics.  The IWY Conference thus offered the space for different 
conceptions of feminism to converge and debate, and for the institutionalization of a 
space for subsequent global discussions within the United Nations.  At a national level, 
however, print coverage of the 1975 IWY Conference proved another key moment 
wherein Mexican activists, intellectuals, and government officials engaged with 
internationalist conceptions of rights.  
Mexico’s host of the first international women’s conference reveals varied 
meanings of the emerging lexis of “human rights.”  First World organizers attempted to 
disassociate human rights from women’s rights.  According to Jocelyn Olcott, “In the 
1975 context, the New York group [of organizers] saw the introduction of human rights 
as raising the specter not only of the NIEO (New International Economic Order) but 
also of fraught UN debates over Zionism and apartheid—political issues that they feared 
would eclipse debates about women’s rights.”3   Meanwhile, Third World participants 
placed the advancement of women within the larger framework of socioeconomic 
development of their home countries.  At least for the outspoken Bolivian activist 
Domitila Barrios de Chugara, the Mexico City conference displayed “two types of 
liberation—one for ‘moneyed women who wanted to imitate the vices of men’ and the 
other for ‘our class condition.’”4  For that reason, Olcott described the Conference as a 																																																								
3 Olcott, “Empires of Information: Media Strategies for the 1975 International Women’s Year,” 
31-32. 
4 Domitila Barrios de Chugara is often quoted as the representative voice of dissenting Latin 
American women clashing over American or European feminists’ gender-specific rights demands.  For 
more on Barrios de Chungara see her autobiographical work La mujer y la organización (La Paz, Bolivia: 
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“petri dish for the conflicts that roiled the global 1970s.”5  In the context of the 1970s, 
Latin American women gravitated to human rights precisely because these rights 
encompassed political and economic issues, such as prisoners of Pinochet’s Chile or 
discussions regarding the NIEO—rights themes pertinent to the regional context.   
While most accounts on the IWY event examine the divergent feminist currents 
voiced at the gathering, this chapter will explore how the UN event prompted greater 
engagement with internationalist and individualistic conceptions of rights in Mexico.6  
Press coverage of the IWY Conference demonstrates the dawning of human rights 
nationalization in the 1970s, which proved both a product of international reform 
currents as well as Mexico-specific contingencies.  
 
 “We pressed for our women’s year”: IWY and the Internationalizing of Women’s Rights7 
The idea for an International Women’s Year (IWY) originated from a group of 
NGOs closely connected within the United Nations.  According to Arvonne Fraser, “a 
group of traditional women’s organizations who had consultative status within the UN 
																																																																																																																																																																		
UNITAS; CIDOP; CIPCA, 1980).  Domitila Barrios de Chugara cited in Olcott, “Empires of 
Information: Media Strategies for the 1975 International Women’s Year,” 42. 
5 Jocelyn Olcott, “Globalizing Sisterhood: International Women’s Year and the Limits of 
Identity Politics,” in The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, edited by Niall Ferguson, Charles 
Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2010), 286. 
6 Most accounts of the 1975 International Women’s Year Conference, in some form or another, 
describe the gender discourses between First World and Third World attendees regarding what 
encompassed “women’s rights.”  The most extensive coverage of the event has been done by Jocelyn 
Olcott.  Also see, Pamela Jeniffer Fuentes Peralta, “La Conferencia Mundial del Año Internacional de la 
Mujer y la Tribuna de las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de 1975. Una aproximación a las 
discusiones en torno al género” (Masters thesis, History, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM, 2008) 
and Pamela Fuentes, “Entre reivindicaciones sexuales y reclamos de justicia económica: divisiones 
políticas e ideológicas durante la Conferencia Mundial del Año Internacional de la Mujer. México, 
1975  ,” Secuencia. Revista de historia y ciencias sociales 89 (May-August 2014): 163-192. 
7 Mildred Emory Persinger, “Unfinished Agenda,” Journal of Women’s History 24:4 (Winter 2012), 
188. 
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Commission on the Status of Women [CSW]” proposed a women’s year.8  Fraser, 
spouse to Congressman Donald M. Fraser from Minnesota and key player in human 
rights trials limiting foreign aid to military regimes, served on a number of academic 
and governmental posts dedicated to the advocacy of women’s rights, and participated 
in the IWY Conference in Mexico City as a US delegate.9  By the 1970s, women’s 
influence within the UN system had grown considerably.  Historical accounts focusing 
on influential American and European female figures in the making of the IWY 
underscore the role of Mildred Persinger and other NGO participants.  Persinger 
represented the World Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), a London-
based organization created in 1894 “by women from seven western nations to develop 
social services for women, girls and families and to promote women’s rights in the 
workplace.”  The YWCA held consultative status, or official clearance by the United 
Nations, Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in part due to their work with 
“displaced persons in Austria during World War II through the UN Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration.”10  Persinger details how “For some time the UN had 
been declaring special ‘Years’ to publicize world problems in urgent need of resolution 
on issues ranging from tourism to human rights.”11  Although prior events like the 
International Women’s Day gained attention and were celebrated in nations such as 
Russia and Germany, Persinger and others clearly understood what an official year of 
																																																								
8 Karen Garner, “World YWCA Leaders and the UN Decade for Women,” Journal of International 
Women’s Studies 9:1 (September 2007), 212-216. 
9 Challen Nicklen, Rhetorics of Connection in the United Nations Conferences on Women, 1975-1995 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2008), 16.  
10 Garner, “World YWCA Leaders and the UN Decade for Women,” 217-218. 
11 Mildred Emory Persinger, “Unfinished Agenda,” Journal of Women’s History 24:4 (Winter 2012), 
188. 
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advocacy and research entailed.  “We pressed for our women’s year,” wrote Persinger.12  
“In 1972, on the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary session, the Commission on the 
Status of Women decided that since 1975 was the midpoint of the Second UN 
Development Decade,” it was the right time to request a year.  The UN General 
Assembly consequently approved the CSW resolution for an International Women’s 
Year (IWY): 1975.13 
Interestingly enough, some of the ideas for the IWY programming grew from 
the blatant absence of gender in development forums.  The 1974 World Population 
Conference held in Bucharest, Romania was one such instance of prominent CSW 
members seeking to incorporate women into global discussions.  “I was representing the 
World YWCA at the UN Population [Conference Planning] Commission.  The 
delegates, mostly men except for a couple of female demographers, were debating the 
draft of the World Population Plan of Action to be adopted (they assumed) the following 
year at the Bucharest World Population Conference,” chronicled delegate Mildred 
Persinger.  According to Persinger the participants “did not seem to know that women 
had anything to do with fertility rates.”14  John R. Mathiason, Deputy Director of the 
Division for the Advancement of Women in the UN Secretariat (1987-1996), explained 
that gender did not factor into the 1970s population debates “because demographers 
were the intellectuals behind the issue and population was considered a technical 
subject,” meaning that women were thus excluded from population policy debates.15  
Taking lessons from the preparation discussions, the CSW authored a “Statement for 
																																																								
12 Ibid., 188-189. 
13 Garner, “World YWCA Leaders and the UN Decade for Women,” 215-216. 
14 Ibid., 215. 
15 Ibid., 214. 
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the Commission on the Status of Women, Study of the Interrelationship of the Status of 
Women and Family Planning” for the Bucharest forum.16  Fraser credits the Finnish 
diplomat Helvi Sipilä for the landmark study that challenged “the UN to include 
women participants and to consider women’s concerns in population policy debates.”  
Sipilä, head of the Girl Scouts of Finland and long-time member of the CSW, also went 
on to serve as the Secretary-General for the UN Social Development and Humanitarian 
Affairs and the 1975 IWY Conference in Mexico City.17  By the 1970s, NGOs helped 
“counter patriarchal structures and attitudes that inhibited consideration of women’s 
needs,” thus launching a new wave of international women’s movement and instigating 
national debates on gender rights through the designation of International Women’s 
Year.18 
Upon the announcement of the IWY, the Commission on the Status of Women 
designed the year’s agenda.  With the primary goal being “the encouragement of the full 
integration of women in the total development effort,” the CSW decided upon an 
international conference, and eventually the launching of the UN Decade for Women 
(1976-1985).19  Margaret K. Bruce of Great Britain and Helvi L. Sipilä led the IWY 
programming. Sipilä, a lawyer and a Finn representative to the General Assembly since 
1966, also served as the Secretary General the IWY Conference in Mexico City.20  Yet, 																																																								
16 Ibid., 215. 
17 Arvonne Fraser, “UN Decade for Women: The Power of Words and Organizations,” Women 
and Social Movements, International—1840 to Present, <http://wasi.alexanderstreet.com>; Karen Garner, 
“World YWCA Leaders and the UN Decade for Women,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 9:1 
(September 2007), 215-216; Helvi L. Sipilä, “Women’s LIB: 30 years of progress,” in The UNESCO Courier 
[issued devoted to International Women’s Year], March 1975, 4. 
18 Garner, “World YWCA Leaders and the UN Decade for Women,” 215. 
19 Fraser, “UN Decade for Women: The Power of Words and Organizations.” 
20 Bruce served as the Deputy Director of the UN Branch for the Promotion of Equality of Men 
and Women, Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs.  Sipilä, in September 1972, 
became the first women Assistant Secretary General for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs. 
Garner, “World YWCA Leaders and the UN Decade for Women,” 216. 
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the idea for the conference seems to have arisen from Commission on the Status of 
Women’s consultative representatives from communist countries, for much of the 
organizing followed the 1972 announcement of the IWY Warsaw Pact countries 
planning a conference in East Berlin for October 1975.21  Some scholars also credit the 
Romanian representatives, who were particularly influenced by the Women’s 
International Democratic Federation (WIDF), for introducing the idea for an 
International Women’s Year to the Commission on the Status of Women.  The WIDF, 
“an Eastern-bloc-headquartered organization,” held important sway within ECOSOC, 
and had been among one of the oldest women’s organization given UN consultative 
status (lost in 1954 and regained in 1967).  According to Carolyn M. Stephenson, “It 
was the work of women’s NGOs, particularly the International Council of Women and 
WIDF, consistently lobbying governments on the subject which ensured that the 
proposal did not get dropped at any stage.”22  As such, the venue designation for the 
IWY Conference in East Berlin could also have been a by-product of the Eastern 
European NGOs within the CSW.  As one of the year’s key events, “[c]arefully planned 
and well funded, it was scheduled for October and had already attracted registration by 
thousands of women from all world regions,” the setting for the IWY Conference did 
not suit all involved.23  
 
Saving the Conference: From East Berlin to Mexico City 																																																								
21 Olcott, “Globalizing Sisterhood: International Women’s Year and the Limits of Identity 
Politics,” 283. 
22 Carolyn M. Stephenson, “Women’s Organizations and the United Nations,” in Multilateral 
Diplomacy and the United Nations Today, edited by James P. Muldoon, Jr., JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard 
Reitano, and Earl Sullivan (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2005), 209-210; Olcott, “Globalizing 
Sisterhood: International Women’s Year and the Limits of Identity Politics,” 283. 
23 Persinger, “Unfinished Agenda,” 189. 
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Given the many conflicts, the organizers decided upon an alternative location 
for the conference.  Mildred Persinger detailed how the preparations had successfully 
begun—“The bad news: the venue was to be in East Berlin.”24  At least the U.S. State 
Department objected, until “CSW delegate Patricia Hutar pointed out that the only 
major IWY event would take place behind the Iron Curtain.”25  Hutar, a former model, 
worked with the Girl Scouts of America but also held important precedents within the 
Republican Party as a campaigner for Eisenhower in San Diego, as co-chairwoman of 
the 1964 Illinois Goldwater for President, and as volunteer director for the Committee 
for the Re-election of the President, CRP (Nixon), and later nicknamed “CREEP.”26  
Alongside her role as the assistant chairwomen of the Republic National Committee 
(1964 and 1965), Hutar has been described as a skilled negotiator in the drafting of the 
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).27  
Even while U.S. opposition to the location subsided, Hutar approached the Colombian 
delegate Aurelio Caicedo Ayerbe and managed to move the conference to Bogotá.  
Even with a new location and approved budget, organizers sought an alternate host 
once more due to “political uncertainty in Colombia.”28  Indeed, Colombians had lived 
through their share of political violence from the mid-1940s up to 1958, a prolonged 
																																																								
24 Ibid. 
25 Olcott, “Empires of Information: Media Strategies for the 1975 International Women’s Year,” 
27; Olcott, “Globalizing Sisterhood: International Women’s Year and the Limits of Identity Politics,” 
283.  
26 Trevor Jensen, “Republican activist Patricia Hutar dies at 84,” Chicago Tribune, 13 May 2010 
<http://articles.chicagotribune.com>; Michael Winship, “Nixon, CREEP, and Watergate: They’re 
Baaacck!,” Moyers & Company, 13 April 2012 <http://billmoyers.com/2012/04/13/nixon-creep-and-
watergate-they’re-baaacck/>. 
27 Jensen, “Republican activist Patricia Hutar dies at 84”; Lisa Baldez, “What U.S., Iran share 
on women’s rights,” CNN Wire, 8 March 2013.  
28 Olcott, “Empires of Information: Media Strategies for the 1975 International Women’s Year,” 
27; Olcott, “Globalizing Sisterhood: International Women’s Year and the Limits of Identity Politics,” 
283.  
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period of clashes between Liberal and Conservative factions also known as La Violencia.29  
In 1974 President Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970-1974) led a National Front 
government, “Colombia’s attempt to end intense fighting between Liberals and 
Conservatives” started in 1958, agonized by armed attacks from the M-19 guerilla 
movement in response to the president’s supposed fraudulent election.30  The violence 
in the 1970s; however, by no means reached the level of La Violencia.  Nevertheless, 1974 
marked the end of the National Front coalition governments with the election of centrist 
Liberal Party candidate Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978), and a critical transition 
period that could have contributed to Colombia’s withdrawal from the UN event.31  
According to Persinger, from the outset “Colombia was pressed to host it.”  As such, the 
government announced its inability to accommodate the NGO segment of the 
conference that ran parallel to the official IWY Conference.  Once López Michelsen 
took office, “Colombia withdrew the invitation” as host altogether.  After being moved 
from East Berlin to the Western Hemisphere, and succeeding Colombia’s withdrawal, 
the conference faced threat of cancelation—that is, until Mexico City became the final 
selectee for the IWY meeting.32 
“For reasons of its own, Mexico came to the rescue,” noted Persinger.33  
Mexico’s appointment as host of the IWY Conference likely ensued from President Luis 
Echeverría’s rapprochement to the United Nations, especially to UN Secretary-General 																																																								
  29 For more on La Violencia see Mary Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 
1946-1953 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
30 Diana Jean Schemo, “Misael Pastrana Borrero, 74, President of Colombia in the 70’s,” The 
New York Times [Saturday, Late Edition], 23 August 1997, Section 1, 10.  
31 In 1977, under the Alfonso López Michelsen administration, “a national strike gripped the 
country and rioting in Bogota, the capital, left dozens dead. He left office with little popular support, 
having failed to improve the economy, and he was hounded by persistent accusations of corruption from 
his opponents,” The Associated Press, “Alfonso López Michelsen Dies at 94; Led Colombia in Unstable 
1970s,” The New York Times [Friday, Late Edition], 13 July 2007, Section C, 10. 
32 Persinger, “Unfinished Agenda,” 189. 
33 Ibid. 
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Kurt Waldheim (1972-1981).  Since Luis Echeverría proposed the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, Mexico’s profile within the United Nations had risen 
significantly.  On January 4, 1974 Waldheim even traveled to Mexico and personally 
awarded Echeverría with the UN Peace Medal, “awarded to heads of state and eminent 
personalities for their special contribution to the work of the United Nations in the 
advancement of peace.”  In his address, Waldheim paid tribute to Echeverría’s 
contribution to the Charter but also the “humanitarian aid,” the asylum given to more 
than five hundred political refugees from General Augusto Pinochet’s Chile.  As both 
leaders discussed international politics, the UN Secretary-General found that he and 
Echeverría shared viewpoints on the solutions to global conflicts.  Before presenting the 
medal to the Mexican head of state, Waldheim offered his gratitude to Echeverría for 
the invitation, evidence of Mexico’s desire to be an active player in international 
undertakings, and for his contribution, through concrete actions, to the efforts of the 
United Nations.  Waldheim also noted the efforts of prominent Mexicans to the UN 
cause, individuals such as Ambassador Antonio Carrillo Flores, serving as secretary 
general to matters of population, and Spanish exile living in Mexico Bibiano Fernández 
Osorio y Tafall, the UN representative in the conflict in Cyprus.  “I am also extremely 
grateful to Mr. President for giving me the opportunity to visit parts of this beautiful 
country, I mean Yucatán. Yesterday I spent the day there and was deeply impressed by 
what I saw in this historic land.”  Waldheim also expressed his confidence that the 
General Assembly would approve the Charter in the upcoming fall elections.34  On 
December 10, 1974 (Human Rights Days), two days before the UN passed the Charter 
																																																								
34 “Entregó el Secretario Kurt Waldheim la Medalla de la Paz de la ONU, Ayer, al Presidente 
Luis Echeverría,” Excélsior, 5 January 1974, 4, 13.   
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of Economic Rights and Duties of States resolution, the General Assembly made the 
official invitation for the World Conference of the IWY in Mexico.35  Although, 
Echeverría sought the UN Secretary General post, in addition to a Nobel Peace Prize as 
his critics jested, Mexico’s rescuing of the IWY Conference stemmed from Echeverría’s 
voracious efforts to buff his international persona and to elevate Mexico’s position in 
world politics.36  
 
1975: “Equality, Development, and Peace” 37 
 Aware of the opportunities the IWY offered, leaders deliberated on ways of 
making the year transformative for women across class, social, and national lines.  Helvi 
Sipilä, Secretary-General of the IWY Conference, “understood that in 1975 a majority 
of the world’s women lived in rural areas and a high percentage were illiterate.”  In 
preparation for this worldwide observance Sipilä had an emblem designed.38  The 
“stylized dove” with a “biological symbol for women, and mathematical sign for 
equality,” became the 1970s global icon for women’s rights (see Illustration 3.2).39  
Graphic artist Valerie Pettis created the famed image found in official UN 
paraphernalia or plastered in buttons and t-shirts, at that time a designer for the Henry 
Dreyfuss Associates studio in New York.  Known as “one of the ‘big four’ godfathers of 
US industrial design,” Dreyfuss worked on iconic projects from the Bell 300 telephone 																																																								
35 Persinger, “Unfinished Agenda,” 189. 
  36 Vicente Leñero, Los periodistas (México: Joaquín Mortiz, ©1978, 1994), 129.  The following 
sources also note Echeverría’s desire to serve as Secretary-General of the United Nations: Agustín, 
Tragicomedia mexicana 2, X; Sara Sefchovich, La suerte de la consorte: las esposas de los gobernantes de México: 
historia de un olvido y relato de un fracaso (Océano exprés; 1 edition, 2014), Kindle Electronic Edition, 8534; 
Olcott, “Empires of Information: Media Strategies for the 1975 International Women’s Year,” 27; Olcott, 
“Globalizing Sisterhood: International Women’s Year and the Limits of Identity Politics,” 283.  
37 Fraser, “UN Decade for Women: The Power of Words and Organizations.” 
38 Ibid. 
39 Marie Whitesell Balboa, “Annual Conference for the Non-Governmental Organizations,” 
Women Layers Journal 61:2 (Spring 1975), 79.  
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(1937) to the redesign of Time magazine (1943), making him part of the emerging world 
of “modern design business, complete with pitches, retainers, press releases, hyperbole 
and hordes of itinerant freelance design staff following the work around town.”40  Pettis 
recounts that in 1974, at the age of 28, one the managing partners (Niels Diffrient) 
assigned the design task to her.  “I was a very young designer working for Henry 
Dreyfuss Associates…had worked on projects like the Princess Phone, American 
Airlines and Polaroid Cameras.”  It had been UN Officer Sally Swing Shelley who 
contacted the design firm to request a symbol for IWY.41  The official mandate was for 
the symbol to “promote equality between men and women, ensure integration of 
women in economic development efforts and promote the contribution of women to the 
strengthening of world peace.”  The broad criteria did not prove a problem, the task, 
however, was not an easy one.  “The biggest problem was that the symbol had to utilize 
imagery that would be broadly understood across many cultures, languages, and 
continents. Owing to the very nature of the UN, universality was fundamental,” details 
Pettis.  The three elements (peace, equality, and development) came together into a 
“single iconographic” image, one that traveled across the global and became a key 
symbol for women’s liberation movements of the 1970s, and quite fitting that it was a 
																																																								
40 Helvi L. Sipilä, “Women’s LIB: 30 years of progress,” in The UNESCO Courier [issue devoted to 
International Women’s Year], March 1975, 6; “4 HENRY DREYFUSS 1904-1972,” Design Week, 17 
December 1999, 23.   
41 Sally Swing Shelley had served as the Chief Information Officer for the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.  In 1972, she became the Chief of Education 
Information Programs for the UN Secretariat.  Michael A. Scarcella, “Shelley by the shore,” Sarasora 
Herald-Tribune, 7 August 2003, 11-12; Valerie Pettis, “Re: My role in International Women’s Year Logo,” 
Message from Ariana Quezada, 9 September 2014, E-mail.  It is also likely that Shelley served as Chief of 
Information for International Women’s Year (1972-1986), see “Sally Swing Shelley,” Prabook.com, 
<http://prabook.org/web/person-view.html?profileId=513701>. 
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woman that gave life to the icon that embodied such hearty aspirations for their 
advancement.42 
The symbol served precisely the role the IWY Secretary-General had 
envisioned.   Sipilä understood the value of images, especially for the millions of women 
who “would be unable to either attend the conference or read any document produced 
by it.”43  As “the highest-ranking woman staff member of the U.N. Secretariat,” Sipilä 
had extensive experience in UN policy making, as well as in passing legislation in her 
own home country.44  The Finnish delegate had a strong desire to empower women 
through the 1975 IWY efforts, believing that “[t]he significance of the Year will be what 
we make of it.  It could be a truly historic year—a landmark not only in the history of 
women’s advancement but also in the advancement of humanity as a whole.”45  The 
historical remnants of the IWY logo speak volumes to the legacy of the year, conference, 
and decade.  In reminiscing on the creation of the symbol, Pettis remembers “picking up 
Ms. magazine and seeing page after page of my emblem on everything.”  She added, “It 
has been on the cover of Time Magazine, been made into a commemorative pin by 
Tiffany, and appeared on countless coins and stamps from many countries.  I found it 
being used as the pattern on material in an African bazaar.”  Like the symbol Valerie 
saw “had taken on a life of its own…truly owned by the world,” the international 
women’s movement too gained momentum through the efforts of thousands 																																																								
42 “Ultimately, I used the dove of peace as the gestalt for the symbol. From mathematics, I chose 
the equal mark, assigning it to the negative space of the dove’s wing.  In the interior space of the dove’s 
body, I used the ancient symbol for Woman. The idea of development was expressed by the color which 
was originally green.” Valerie Pettis, “Re: My role in International Women’s Year Logo,” Message from 
Ariana Quezada, 9 September 2014, E-mail 
43 Fraser, “UN Decade for Women: The Power of Words and Organizations.” 
44 Helvi L. Sipilä, “Women’s LIB: 30 years of progress,” in The UNESCO Courier [issue devoted to 
International Women’s Year], March 1975, 4; Arvonne S. Fraser, The U.N. Decade for Women: Documents 
and Dialogue (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 18. 
45 Sipilä, “Women’s LIB: 30 years of progress,” 7. 
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representing official UN institutions, governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, and the thousands of women who engaged the language of women’s 
rights from that point forward.46 
Keeping with the theme of equality, development and peace, the U.S. 
government too made preparations for the IWY at home.47  On January 4, 1975 
President Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977) signed an executive order creating the National 
Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year (NCOIWY).  
“Americans must now deal with those inequities that still linger as barriers to the full 
participation of women in our Nation’s life,” read Executive Order 11832.  A year 
earlier, on January 30, 1974, through a Presidential Proclamation, the president had 
called upon all members of society—from NGOs to government officials—to observe 
IWY “with practical and constructive measures for the advancement of women in the 
United States.”  President Ford credited the United Nations’ proclamation of 
International Women’s Years with offering “an exceptional opportunity” to bring 
attention to the “rights and responsibilities” of women.  Set to disband after 1975, the 
NCOIWY became responsible for organizing the 1977 National Women’s Conference 
in Houston after an amendment extended the commission’s tenure.48  The conference, 
																																																								
46 Pettis has spent much of her career developing visual communications for social issues and for 
organizations like the United Nations, Amnesty International, and UNICEF (Children’s Rights & 
Emergency Relief Organization).  Her dedication to the cause continues to this day.  Pettis is currently 
working on designing human rights posters for the organization Posters for Tomorrow.  She has worked 
closely with young designers in Bolivia, individuals directly engaged in human rights causes.  For more on 
the current project, visit http://www.pettisdesign.com/founder.html. Valerie Pettis, “Re: My role in 
International Women’s Year Logo,” Message from Ariana Quezada, 9 September 2014, E-mail. 
47 Fraser argues the themes of ‘equality, development, and peace’ of the IWY (Conference and 
Decade) had been “longstanding themes” of the International Alliance for Women (IAW), an NGO with 
historic links to the League of Nations, Fraser, “UN Decade for Women: The Power of Words and 
Organizations.” 
48 Document 1: “Executive Order Establishing a National Commission on the Observance of 
International Women’s Year, 1975,” Executive Order 11832 signed by President Ford, 9 January 1975, 
reprinted in National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, “… To Form a More 
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“The Spirit of Houston,” an outgrowth of the United Nations IWY “marked a historic 
moment in women’s political history.”  In the height of the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA) discussions, with some twenty thousand attendees and a $5 million in 
Congressional appropriation, the goal of the meeting included the drafting of official 
recommendations to enact legislation in an effort to bring women into equal partnership 
with men.49  Former U.S. House Representative Bella Abzug headed the event and the 
voting process on twenty-six propositions that eventually made it into the National Plan 
of Action presented to President Jimmy Carter.  Among the polemic discussion on 
lesbian rights and the passage of the “sexual preference resolution,” keynote feminists 
made impressible deliberations, “foremothers” like Betty Friedan (The Feminine Mystique, 
1963) and Kate Millet (Sexual Politics, 1970).  In a Hyatt cocktail reception, First Lady 
Rosalynn Carter alongside Betty Ford and Lady Bird Johnson also made an 
appearance.50  The creation of the National Commission on the Observance of 
International Women’s Year (NCOIWY) and the subsequent 1977 National Women’s 
Conference in Houston provided activists with an avenue by which to affect public 
policy signaling a concrete effort on the part of the US government toward greater 
incorporation of women into society, while emphasizing “women’s responsibilities.” 
 
“Programa de México”: International Women’s Year Programming in Mexico 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Perfect Union…”: Justice for American Women (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 
117-20, included in How Did the National Women’s Conference in Houston in 1977 Shape a Feminist Agenda for the 
Future?, edited by Thomas Dublin, Stephanie Gilmore, and Kathryn Kish Sklar. How Did the National 
Women’s Conference in Houston in 1977 Shape a Feminist Agenda for the Future? (Binghamton, NY: State 
University of New York, 2004)  
  49 Danelle Moon, Daily Life of Women during the Civil Rights Era (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 
2011), 184; Anne Taylor Fleming, “That Week in Houston,” New York Times Magazine, 25 December 
1977, 10-13, 33.  
50 Ibid. 
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Given this extraordinary mobilization, it is perhaps not surprising that President 
Echeverría endorsed International Women’s Year programming in Mexico.  Gloria 
Brasdefer Hernández served as one of the coordinators for the “Programa de México para el 
Año Internacional de la Mujer” (Mexico’s Program for International Women’s Year, 
PMAIM).  Brasdefer Hernández explained that the Mexican government conjoined 
with the United Nations in the preparations for international events for the IWY, while 
at a national level leaders organized a series of programs in order encourage the 
integration of women into public life.  “A new era for women has begun,” one in which 
“more and more women prove their unwillingness to accept the role of subordination,” 
added the law graduate from the UNAM with a long trajectory in public service for the 
PRI in posts within the Secretariats of the Presidency and Labor prior to her IWY 
work.51   “Strong foundations are being forged so that each time, in a greater 
proportion, women can be agents of development.”52  Brasdefer and the Mexican 
government alike deliberated the advancement of women’s rights in contingency with 
economic development, characteristic of many gender discussions in Third World 
countries, whereby leaders focused on the structural mechanisms that stymied women’s 
participation in economic expansion.  
Mexico’s IWY programming committee also published a monthly newspaper in 
form of a magazine.  The “glossy monthly tabloid,” as Olcott describes, served as the 
official publication by the IWY Programa de México titled “México 75: año internacional de la 
																																																								
  51 “15 mil de las más destacadas mujeres se congregarán en México,” 6 June 1975, Respuestas de 
prensa, Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, 17, CENCOS; “Brasdefer Hernández, Gloria,” in Roderic 
A Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1993 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 87. 
52 “15 mil de las más Destacadas Mujeres se Congregarán en México,” 6 June 1975, Respuestas de 
prensa, Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, 17, CENCOS 
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mujer” (Mexico 75: International Women’s Year).53  Its logo México 75 incorporated the 
United Nations IWY dove (see Illustration 3.2).  Alongside Gloria Brasdefer, Pedro 
Ojeda Paullada served as the General Coordinator of Mexico’s programming.  
Appointed as Procurador General de la República (Attorney General, PGR) by President 
Echeverría, Ojeda a modest but experienced lawyer, known for his ability to “form 
teams of capable people, leaders and clearly indicate the course of action to achieve set 
objectives.”54  Ojeda has been credited with incorporating capable women into key 
posts, including Gloria Brasdefer into IWY Programa de México as Executive 
Coordinator.55  María Eugenia Moreno, or better known as “Kena,” served as director 
of the México 75 publication.56  In 1963 Moreno, a pioneer in women’s editorial work, 
founded the women’s magazine Kena, “the first of its kind made by and for Mexican 
women.”  Kena included content on fashion and beauty alongside writings by key 
Mexican authors like Dolores Castro Varela, Rosario Castellanos, Guadalupe Dueñas, 
Emma Godoy, Margarita Michelena, as well contributions by Griselda Álvarez (1979-
1985), and journalist María Luisa “La china” Mendoza.  In January 1973, María 
Eugenia Moreno became the first businesswoman to appear in the cover of Expansión 
magazine.  As an entrepreneur and founder of Armonía publishing house, Moreno’s work 
encouraged women to prepare themselves academically and enter the workforce, 																																																								
53 Olcott, “Empires of Information: Media Strategies for the 1975 International Women’s Year,” 
30; Programa de México, México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 1 (January 1974), Front matter 
(México, D.F.: Juventud, S.A., 1975).  All copies of México 75: año internacional de la mujer were shared by 
Jocelyn Olcott.  
  54 Fundación Miguel Alemán, “Preface,” Ochenta y más: Pedro Ojeda Paullada: visión de Estado 
(Puebla, México: Editorial Las Ánimas, 2014), cited in Juan Arvizu Arrioja, “Rinden homenaje póstumo 
a Pedro Ojeda Paullada,” El Universal, 6 February 2014 <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx>. 
55 Clara Jusidman, “Opinión: Pedro Ojeda Paullada,” Cimacnoticias, 15 January 2013 
<http://www.cimacnoticias.com.mx/node/62378>; Programa de México, México 75: año internacional de la 
mujer, no. 1 (January 1974), Front matter. 
56 For nick name “Kena” see, Alejandra Mendoza de Lira, “Kena, el altruismo, su bandera,” El 
Universal, 12 April 2002 <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estilos/22192.html>. 
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making her a fitting candidate to head International Women’s Year Programa de México’s 
official publication.57  Since 1973, Moreno had a joint effort with the Juventud 
lithographer and press, which happened to be the publisher of México 75.58  In the 
editorial council served three intellectuals: María del Carmen Millán, Ricardo Garibay 
and Griselda Álverez, the latter served as a senator from Jalisco and eventually governor 
of Colima.59  Mexico’s government publication for International Women’s Year echoed 
Echeverría’s public policies regarding population control and women’s incorporation 
into the national economy, while serving as an official promoter of his Presidency and 
the volunteer work of his wife Esther Zuno. 
 
Programa de México Locally  
At a local level, the Programa de México coordinators assisted government and civil 
organizations with IWY programming.  Pedro Ojeda Paullada and Gloria Brasdefer 
worked from the Centro de Orientación, Información y Documentación (Training, Information 
and Documentation Center), the official headquarters for the year’s programming 
designated by President Echeverría, located on Minerva 63, in the Benito Juárez 
Delegation of Mexico City—one of the sixteen boroughs, or administrative units, that 
make-up the Federal District.  The Center offered information for collaborating in the 
IWY programming and housed a documentation center for individuals interested in 																																																								
57 After more than 30 years of editorial work, Armonía announced its closing in the summer of 
2014 due to financial troubles, Lorena Martínez Rodríguez, “Kena,” Crisol Plural, 18 February 2011 
<http://crisolplural.com/2011/02/18/kena/>; “Cierra por Quiebra Editorial Armonía,” El Publicista 
<http://elpublicista.info/cierra-por-quiebra-editorial-armonia/>. 
58 Patricia Ruvalcaba, “Kena Moreno, pionera editorial,” CNN Expansión, 28 January 2009 
<http://www.cnnexpansion.com/expansion/2009/01/27/kena-moreno-pionera-editorial>. 
59 Programa de México, México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 1 (January 1974), Front matter; 
William Stockton, “For Women of Mexico, A New Political Beacon,” New York Times, 6 November 1986, 
Section C, 1.  
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general information regarding the “economic, social, and cultural” condition of women.  
Pedro Ojeda Paullada’s job included managing every federal agency’s programming for 
International Women’s Year.  “We talk with the people who have been designated by 
each of the various government and private branches.”  According to Ojeda, the Center 
did not promote anything in specific; rather, public and private entities at a federal, state 
and municipal level carried “out the Programa de México.”  By January, the coordinating 
office had sent out over five thousand invitations with basic information regarding 
International Women’s Year and its objectives of judicial equality and greater 
participation of women in the development and peace process, of which only five 
hundred went to government entities and the rest of civil organizations.  As the Programa 
de México’s key leader, Ojeda and his team carried out the nation’s International 
Women’s Year in Mexico in line with President Echeverría’s national and foreign 
agendas.60 
Moreover, other governmental organizations observed International Women’s 
Year through commemorative events or programs for women.  In the case of Mexico 
City, Angela Alessio Robles distributed a general agenda for the sixteen delegations of 
the Federal District, which included evaluating changes already in place and 
formulating and carrying out programs for the advancement of women.  As coordinator 
for the city, Alessio Robles explained that each delegation had the freedom to carry out 
the IWY program as desired, yet each had to provide a monthly report for programmed 
and past.61  The events truly varied across the city.  For example, the Benito Juárez 																																																								
60 “Hay que hacer énfasis en que el trabajo del Año consistirá en seguir la línea que el Presidente 
Echeverría ha marcado…” Blanca Haro, “Esto es un movimiento de solidaridad humana: dijo el 
Licenciado Pedro Ojeda Paullada,” México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 1 (January 1975), 3.  
61 “El Departamento del Distrito Federal nos contesta…Esto es lo que se está haciendo a favor 
de la mujer,” México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 4 (April 1975), 8-9.  
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Delegation, in conjunction with Parents Association of the Centro Urbano Presidente Miguel 
Alemán school, the latter a tower block housing unit designed by the renowned architect 
Mario Pani (1911-1993) and emblematic of the urban designs of the Mexican Miracle, 
unveiled plaques in remembrance of outstanding women.62  Among these honored were 
Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Josefa Ortiz de Domínguez, Rosario Castellanos, and María 
Lavalle Urbina, the latter the only female diplomat present in John P. Humphrey’s 
human rights seminar in Mexico City in 1961 and also a prominent leader of IWY in 
Mexico.63  Similarly, the Comisión Nacional de Fruticultura (National Commission of 
Pomology, CONAFRUT) set up a course for thirteen peasant women.  CONAFRUT 
hoped to encourage rural homemakers to make use of fruit grown domestically, 
including those of their home patios.  CONAFRUT believed that after the harvest 
season, agricultural workers could engage in the industrialization of fruit in order to 
supplement their income and also contribute to the national economy through the 
production, elaboration, and conservation of marmalades, jellies, and ice cream.  After 
the course, CONAFRUT predicted women would return home with practical 
																																																								
62 “‘Tower Block Housing Estate ‘Presidente Miguel Alemán,’ Mexico’s first large housing estate 
was commissioned in 1948 and consists of nine buildings, each with 13 stories, and six buildings each with 
three stories. Seven of the 13-storey buildings are linked in a zigzag to form a large structure that runs 
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is used for buildings. This leaves a great deal of space for communal areas, parks and playgrounds. The 
ground floors house all manner of services for the inhabitants. Moreover, the ground floor areas function 
as the pedestrian link between the various buildings on the estate, which is otherwise free of cars. There 
are only pedestrian walkways, and the cars are parked outside the estate,” Von Sophia Walk, “10 OF 
THE OVER-40S,” Stylepark, 21 March 2014 <http://www.stylepark.com/en/news/10-of-the-over-
40s/349324>; “Homenaje a Mujeres Ilustres en la Delegación B. Juárez,” 2 June 1975, Respuestas de 
prensa, Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, 11, Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social, CENCOS 
[hereafter “CENCOS”]. 
63 Others included: Margarita Maza de Juárez, Carmen Serdán, Leona Vicario, María 
Hernández Zarco, Amalia G. de Castillo Ledón, María Caso, Eulalia Guzmán and Celia Espinosa 
Jiménez. “Homenaje a Mujeres Ilustres en la Delegación B. Juárez,” 2 June 1975, Respuestas de prensa, Año 
Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, 11, CENCOS. 
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knowledge of conservation and nutrition that they would share with their neighbors.64  
Even if on small scale, government institutions, often times in collaboration with private 
organizations, mobilized their local communities toward the intended efforts of 
International Women’s Year of incorporating and commemorating women.  
Similarly, state and city governments honored IWY.  Documentation exists on 
the states of Nuevo León, Sinaloa, and Tlaxcala observing International Women’s Year 
as early as January 1975.  The three Mexican states published “International Women’s 
Year” in official documents, text usually found at the bottom of the page in large font.65  
In Mexico City, the Coyoacán Delegation carried out a series of lectures in occasion of 
the year.  The conference’s theme centered on Mexico’s democratic institutions as an 
outgrowth of its nationalist past, including the Revolution.  According to some of the 
speakers, many structural inequalities disappeared with the Revolution, while those 
remaining tended to be byproducts of a recent past.  The debates on Mexico’s 
democratic shed positive light on the work of President Echeverría, particularly “tireless 
efforts to end inequalities and social imbalances that many Mexicans still endure.”  
While matters on the status of women seemed the primary themes of these events, often 
the speakers regressed to general themes about Mexico’s historical past or the praising of 
the Echeverría administration.66  However, the events at a state and local level reveal 
the coordinating efforts of the Programa de México leaders toward integrating public 
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institutions into the wider IWY programming, which fomented additional coverage in 
the press on women’s issues.   
Yet, Mexico’s programming for IWY also met criticism.  “Feria de Vanidades en el 
Año de la Mujer” (Vanity Fair on Women’s Year) wrote Yolanda Cabello about the 
Programa de México.  Cabello reported on a meeting for women organized in Colonia 
Florida of the Álvaro Obregón Delegation by coordinator Pedro Ojeda Paullada.  First, 
the street Minerva did not meet the parking demand required for those driving to the 
event, implying those invited were well-to-do women.  “There was a bit of everything: 
the ‘early birds’ who arrived promptly at 9 in the morning and those who arrived on the 
scene more than an hour late…sporting the latest hat in style or trendy makeup.”  After 
two discussions, Aída González followed by Ojeda Paullada, the crowd’s attention 
dispersed, those sitting comfortably inside the building, with some of their counterparts 
outside in the garden, “talked a little of everything, and occasionally listened to their 
speakers.”  Cabello found the women’s lack of attention deplorable given their 
attendance of an event themed on a matter one would think concerned them, 
“otherwise they wouldn’t have attended the engagement.”67  Meanwhile, the following 
day Clara Elena Molina Enriquez, adviser for the Programa de México, gave an interview 
detailing women were not yet trained for full participation in society.  Molina Enriquez 
also rejected the notion of IWY as a “vanity fair,” arguing that while some women 
“flaunt their eccentricities” one must consider, reported the journalist, they are 
familiarized with social events and “are not accustomed to participating in conferences 
																																																								
67 Yolanda Cabello, “Feria de vanidades en el Año de la Mujer,” 7 June 1975, Respuestas de prensa, 
Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, CENCOS. 
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of such importance,” noting the unfairness of the generalization.68  While Molina’s 
comment belied women’s capability or readiness to engage in Mexico’s political life, 
North American feminists too noticed Latin American women’s fashion opulence.  
Meanwhile, for some non-governmental organizations IWY proved key for 
making legal demands.  The Movimiento Nacional de Mujeres, MNM (National Women’s 
Movement, MNM) assembled a petition for the removal of the civil marriage epistle 
authored by nineteenth-century legal reformer Melchor Ocampo (1814-1861) and 
traditionally read to couples during civil ceremonies.  MNM President Esperanza Brito 
de Martí indicated “The epistle is an unnecessary aggregate to the marriage contract, 
urging its suppression because, if it its original intent was good, today it proves offensive 
to the feminine sex.”69  A journalist and feminist writing for national publications like 
Novedades, El Universal, magazines Siempre and Fem, the latter she edited for some time, 
Brito along with twenty-three other women formed the Movimiento Nacional de Mujeres in 
1972, an organization that during 1975 IWY served as key promoter of women’s 
rights.70  Among the clauses from the epistle noted by the feminist group, one 
particularly targeted asked that women “should give and will give her husband 
obedience, pleasantness, support, comfort and advice, always treating him with the 
veneration that is due to the person who supports and defends.”71  For the MNM, and 																																																								
68 “Clara Elena Molina: la mujer no está capacitada aún para participar en la vida activa del 
país,” 8 June 1975, Respuestas de prensa, Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, CENCOS. 
69 “Las feministas pedirán a LE que se suprima la epístola de Melchor Ocampo. Ofensiva e 
innecesaria, aseguran,” 3 June 1975, Respuestas de prensa, Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, 11, 
CENCOS.  
70 “Falleció Esperanza Brito, periodista y feminista,” El Universal, 17 August 2007 
<http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/153389.html>. 
71 For more on the Melchor Ocampo Epistle, see Article 15 of the Civil Marriage Law (1859). 
“Que el hombre cuyas dotes sexuales son principalmente el valor fuerza, debe dar, y dará a la mujer, 
protección, alimento y dirección, tratándola siempre como a la parte más delicada, sensible y fina de sí 
mismo, y con la magnanimidad y benevolencia generosa que el fuerte debe al débil, esencialmente 
cuando este débil se entrega a él, y cuando por la sociedad se le ha confiado.  
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other groups in support of the proposed petition to President Echeverría, the reading of 
Ocampo’s words “[a]ssigns women a position of inferiority, of submissiveness, and 
supports the idea that being a women means being weak,” added Brito.  Given the 
year’s theme on women, the organization asked that the president draft a new 
document for the betrothal making it clear that no one sex is superior to the other, but 
rather they both hold equal status upon the law.72  While the Ocampo text may have 
not been removed in 1975, in March 2013 on the eve of International Women’s Day, 
the Mexico City government announced the upcoming removal of the 1859 nuptial 
epistle.73 
 
María Esther Zuno Arce and IWY  
 Perhaps more than anyone else, it was First Lady María Esther Zuno Arce who 
served as one of the country’s key icon of IWY.  Zuno Arce came from a Jalisco political 
family, her father having been governor of the state from 1923 to 1926.  She was also a 
woman of professional experience, for before serving as First Lady she had managed a 
poultry farm.  Her love for indigenous culture also led her to create “Las Palomas” (the 
Doves) dancing group in order to preserve and display Mexico’s indigenous dances.  
She was also popularly known and criticized for her use of indigenous wear.  While at 
the home of Frida Kahlo and Diego Rivera, Esther met the then law student and future 																																																																																																																																																																		
Que la mujer cuyas principales dotes son la abnegación, la belleza, la compasión, la perspicacia y 
la ternura, debe dar y dará al marido obediencia, agrado, asistencia, consuelo y consejo, tratándolo 
siempre con la veneración que se debe a la persona que nos apoya y defiende, y con la delicadeza de 
quien no quiere exasperar la parte brusca, irritable y dura de sí mismo.” “Ley de matrimonio civil. Julio 
23, 1859,” 500 Años de México en Documentos 
<http://www.biblioteca.tv/artman2/publish/1859_146/Ley_de_matrimonio_civil_258.shtml>. 
72 “Las feministas pedirán a LE que se suprima la epístola de Melchor Ocampo. Ofensiva e 
innecesaria, aseguran,” 3 June 1975, Respuestas de prensa, Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, 11, 
CENCOS.  
73 “Epístola de Melchor Ocampo ya no se leerá en bodas civiles del DF,” Vértigo Político, 7 March 
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president of Mexico, Luis Echeverría.74  Once in the presidency, Zuno Arce preferred 
being called “compañera,” which translates to ‘companion’ and a term with socialist 
connotation, as opposed to “First Lady,” which she deemed a cultural derivation from 
the United States equivalent to Coca-Cola.75  As the president’s wife, and mother of 
eight, she made appearances at a number of IWY public and private events leaving an 
extensive paper trail of press reportage of positive notes.76 
Like her husband, Esther Zuno reveled in nationalist orotundity on 
development.  For many public officials, the betterment of women’s position in society 
went hand-in-hand with overall advancement of the economy.  In the same sense, Zuno 
believed the oppressive circumstances that kept women from advancing were intimately 
linked with the country’s internal and external constraints to development.  Her 
proposals; therefore echoed the ideas of President Echeverría, especially those imbedded 
in the Charter of Economic Rights of Duties of States.  In the seminar “Orientación Política 
Femenil” (Female Political Orientation) organized and hosted at the PRI’s headquarters, 
Esther argued, “Mexico needs decisive and courageous women.”  The ceremony began 
at 10:30 a.m. in the Plutarco Elías Calles Auditorium filled, with key party functionaries 
and congressmen, as well as the PRI’s party president, Jesús Reyes Heroles, his wife 
Gloria González de Reyes Heroles, and Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada.  In 
the event commemorating IWY, Esther emphasized women’s path to full citizenship 
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would be determined by her contribution to the “service of collective enterprises of 
social change, guided toward the structuring of an economic system, whereby justice, 
democracy, and national independence and peace reign.”77  Meanwhile, the keynote 
presenters added to the discussions on development.  Congressional delegate Demetrio 
Ruiz Malerva presented a 20-page paper on “Historical Development of Institutional 
Revolutionary Party,” and Jorge Pinto Mazal an even longer paper on Mexico’s 
political economy and international politics.78  Official leaders like Zuno and 
functionaries kept their discussions regarding women well within revolutionary and 
developmentalist rhetoric.   
While the official PRI event did not discuss gender issues exclusively, it opened a 
forum to prominent women within politics.  Hilda Anderson Nevárez, leader of the 
women’s division of the PRI applauded the party’s struggle “for the incorporation of 
women had been fruitful.”79  Anderson served as the secretary for the women’s section 
of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM), 
founded the Agrupación Nacional Femenil Revolucionaria of the PRI, served as senator, and in 
1984 became the first coordinator of the Secretariat of Gobernación women’s 
program.80  “I think that without neglecting the home, women can engage in the 
creative task of politics.”  As a prominent female voice within the party, Anderson 
reminded the audience that “In our country, women’s suffrage was not gracefully 																																																								
77 “La Mujer debe eliminar las tendencia conservadoras que la ven como un refuerzo a la 
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obtained: it was a tenacious struggle of revolutionary women.”81  Although Zuno and 
Anderson were not the keynote speakers, the press gave greater coverage to their 
discussions, and in the case of the first lady, one newspaper piece applauded her 
participation in the event, having stayed at the PRI headquarters “over eight hours.”82 
Alongside the many duties that call on first ladies, Esther Zuno also headed a key 
welfare institution.  Her work in this regard was more evolutionary than radical, for by 
the late nineteenth century the Mexican government had begun to fill the care-giving 
role hitherto occupied by the Catholic Church and private organizations.  By 1910 
women presided over institutions like “shelters to reform prostitutes, networks of 
mothers’ clubs to train poor women in hygiene and child care, and child care centers 
and orphanages.”  Likewise, after the Revolution, women played key roles in carrying 
out state projects, especially in health and education.  As such, Esther Zuno’s own 
public work can also be placed within the post-1960s “reorganization” or 
institutionalization of welfare services.  Zuno Arce, like her predecessors Eva Samano de 
López Mateos and Guadalupe Borja de Díaz Ordaz, broadened and in some cases 
simply re-named existing post-revolutionary organizations.  In the case of Esther Zuno, 
while presiding over the Instituto Nacional de Protección a la Infancia (National Institute for 
Child Protection, INPI)—a state-funded school breakfast institution dating to 1929—she 
also headed the INPI’s 1976 transition to the Instituto Mexicano para la Infancia y Familia 
(Mexican Institute for Children and Family, IMPI).  The institution’s renaming reflected 																																																								
81 “Creo que sin descuidar el hogar, la mujer puede realizar esa tarea creadora que es la política.”  “En nuestro 
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“her view that it was impossible to attend to children without addressing entire families, 
including their main pillar: women.”  In 1977, the INPI merged with the Institución 
Mexicana de Asistencia a la Niñez (National Institute for the Attention of Children, IMAN), 
becoming the present-day premier family welfare institute, Sistema para el Desarrollo 
Integral de la Familia, (National System for the Integral Development of the Family, DIF), 
an amalgam prompted by her successor Carmen Romano de López Portillo.83  Esther’s 
work with the INPI and other social organizations gained special attention in 1975 as 
the press sought to profile the country’s prominent women, while the DIF functions as a 
central component of Mexico’s social safety net to the present day.  
México 75 especially lauded Zuno’s volunteer work.  The author Lorenza 
Martínez Sotomayor showcased Esther Zuno’s work as exemplary model for emulation, 
the “story of a gigantic labor of love by a woman, and many other women who follow 
her.”  Sotomayor noted that although INPI dated to 1929, the organizations philosophy 
had certainly broadened beyond the care of the child to one that included the family 
and the community, whereby “[t]he family receives, in that form, responsible 
parenthood programs and, society, responsible community programs.”  An integrated 
family would function as a “unit capable” of solving the problems of all its members.  
According to the author, INPI’s new philosophy sought to eliminate paternalistic ideas 
regarding the caring of the child and instead proposed that “it be society as a whole that 
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affords protection.”84  The over seventy social service programs carried out by INPI 
held legal basis under the Echeverría Decree for the Protection of Children, as well as 
local legislation, although she did not identify the actual decrees.  In the countryside, 
Sotomayor underlined the work of over 178,000 rural women promoting health 
through the Programa de Orientación Familiar (Family Enrichment Program), also part of 
INPI.  As the “moral authority of volunteerism,” Esther Zuno served as a key 
governmental persona for the promotion of International Women’s Year and President 
Echeverría’s national projects, including population control.85 
 
“La familia pequeña vive mejor”: IWY and Echeverría’s Population Control Program86 
For President Echeverría population control proved a key national objective 
lauded during IWY.  The Mexican government’s concern over the population explosion 
most likely derived from the rapid urbanization, itself a consequence of rural hardships, 
with Mexico City’s population almost doubling from “nearly 7 million in 1970 to 13 
million by 1977” being the most stark example.87  However, given Echeverría’s overt 
commitment to world politics it is also likely that the population control programs he 
implemented grew directly from Mexico’s participation in the 1974 UN World 
Population Forum in Bucharest, Romania, in which Mexican delegate Antonio Carrillo 
Flores served as the conference’s secretary-general.  The population forum proved an 																																																								
84 Lorenza Martínez Sotomayor, Programa de México, “Actividad femenina: un ejemplo y un 
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outgrowth of a series of issues the United Nations globalized in the 1970s.  In a General 
Assembly meeting in April 1974, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim outlined the 
following as the most pertinent matters:  “mass poverty, food supplies, the utilization of 
energy, military expenditures, the world monetary system and the unprecedented rate of 
population growth.”  In the closing ceremony of the population meeting, Waldheim 
described the matter of demographics as one having “intruded roughly on our 
attention.”  Thereafter, Carrillo Flores described the Mexican government’s “family-
planning” initiatives begun in 1972 as a “programme developed in support of human 
rights” and ones that could “moderate Mexico’s population and bring it more into line 
with the number of new jobs which the country’s favourable rate of economic growth 
can be expected to assure.”88  Carrillo Flores’ association of human rights to population 
control exemplifies the Mexican government’s observance of UN initiatives, often in 
attempts to project upon the international community an image of compliance, and a 
model Third World country for its Latin American counterparts.   
As such, the Mexican government gracefully implemented the conference’s plan 
of action.  According to Soto Laveaga “Mexico had so successfully modeled its 
population policy on the 1974 World Population Plan of Action that it was often cited as 
an example for other countries to follow.”89  During IWY, UN Secretary-General Kurt 
Waldheim announced his satisfaction that Mexico, as a UN member state, acted so 
quickly in adopting the Bucharest population plan of action.90  Given Mexico’s key 
position in Latin America, some world leaders hoped that Carrillo Flores’ selection as 																																																								
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secretary-general of the population forum would render other countries to implement 
the plan of action: “Carrillo-Flores’ position as a Mexican . . . might be expected to 
encourage certain Latin nations to adopt a warmer attitude towards the Conference and 
its deliberations, than they might otherwise have done.”91  But for years some 
intellectuals had questioned these global initiatives.  Like many leftists of the time, 
individuals living in the midst of military dictatorships in South America, Uruguayan 
Eduardo Galeano criticized the World Bank, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, as 
well as the Johnson and Eisenhower administrations’ efforts to curb birth rates.  In the 
“120 Million Children in the Eye of the Hurricane” introduction to Open Veins of Latin 
America (1971), Galeano described the imperialist nature of population control and noted 
no country in the region had a “real surplus of people,” rather the “global offensive 
plays a well-defined role.” According to the author “Its aim is to justify the very unequal 
income distribution between countries and social elites, to convince the poor that 
poverty is the result of the children they don’t avoid having, and to dam the rebellious 
advocate of the masses.”  Given the revolutionary context in the continent, Galeano 
probed family planning initiatives through a Cold War prism—as a 
counterrevolutionary measure—whereby “in Latin America it is more hygienic and 
effective to kill guerrilleros in the womb than in the mountains or the streets.”92  Likewise, 
the Catholic Church, traditionally an opponent to birth control, also opposed such 
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initiatives—especially by disseminating didactical material on natural family initiatives 
through the Billings Ovulation Method (BOM) where women learn to monitor their 
fertility.93  While some questioned demographic explosion fears, others like President 
Echeverría, responded precisely the way international organizations hoped, by 
promoting public policies on population control, or better known by the precept of 
“family planning.”   
By seeking to manage demographic growth, Echeverría departed from his 
predecessors’ attempts to populate Mexico.  President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) 
enacted the very first Ley General de Población (General Population Law) in 1936, which 
built on previous regulatory measures dealing with citizenship, migration, and general 
matters of nationality.  Regarding population, the law encouraged natural demographic 
growth and the general uplifting of the population through measures like better health 
services or —which it deemed as a way of advancing development.  The law primarily 
responded to the internal realities of the country, like a child mortality rate of over 20 
percent and an average life expectancy of less than 38 years in a country of 
approximately 16 million inhabitants in 1930.  The Ley General also sought to manage 
migration and encourage the repatriation of Mexicans abroad, especially after the 
Revolution’s “demographic cost of 2.1 million” in deaths, lost births, and emigration.94  
The second population law of 1947 also encouraged demographic growth, “created 
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regulations prohibiting the sale and use of contraceptives and criminalizing abortion.”95  
President Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952) focused on limiting child mortality, for 
which his successor, Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) paved the way though the 
creation of health institutions like the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (Mexican Social 
Security Institute, IMSS), the Instituto Nacional de Cardiología (National Institute of 
Cardiology), and the Hospital Infantil (Children’s Hospital).  By 1960, the country had 
fully recovered from its revolutionary decline by reaching an estimated 35 million, and 
about 58 million by 1974, a 3.5 percent increase that frightened the Echeverría 
administration.96  “The country needs to rationalize the population increase for the 
benefit of present and future generations,” declared the President.97  President 
Echeverría’s population policies echoed global discussions on population as a menace 
for development, thus departing from the revolutionary government’s traditional stance 
on demographics. 
In 1974 Echeverría passed the third Ley General de Población, one of his 
administration’s key population initiatives.  In the Ley General’s promulgation remarks, 
Secretary of Gobernación Mario Moya Palencia outlined the country’s gloomy situation, 
echoing the 1970s American and international stance toward demographics.  “Mexico 
has one of the highest population growth rates in the world,” explained Palencia.  Like 
Echeverría, the Secretariat exemplified the dire need for family planning by employing 
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statistical figures in his discourse.  Palencia presented startling numbers, digits repeated 
during the International Women’s Year.  According to Palencia, with 2.5 million 
Mexicans being born each year, the “equivalent of all the inhabitants of the States of 
Nuevo León, Morelos and Colima combined,” by the year 2000 the population would 
reach 155 million, or 135 million if the country took action.  While after the Revolution 
“a pro-natality policy was indispensable” to sow progress and for Mexico to “regain its 
geography,” that was no longer the case—“Today we are, I repeat 56 million 
Mexicans.”98  A decrease of birth rates by one percent by the year 2000; thereby, 
became one of the bedrocks of the Ley General de Población, along with the creation of the 
federal entity Consejo Nacional de Población (National Population Council, CONAPO).99  
By the inauguration of 1975 as International Women’s Year, the government full-
heartedly endorsed family planning initiatives and widely publicized CONAPO as 
fulfilling not only a couple’s right to decide, but most importantly the rescuing of 
“women from compulsory fecundity.”100 
To manage population, the government had to battle traditional ideas regarding 
the family.  Article Five of the Ley General, which created the institution, noted the 
CONAPO would “be responsible for managing the country’s demographic planning,” 
as well as incorporating the general population into government formulated programs of 
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social and economic development with the goal of managing demographics.101  With 
women having an average of six children in 1974, the CONAPO focused on 
disseminating information regarding contraceptives and reformulating the duties of men 
and women within the family; in other words, by underscoring the couples “rights” in 
reproductive matters and their “responsibilities” toward the state through responsible 
parenting.102  In his remarks on the Ley General, Mario Moya Palencia explained the 
“Mexican couple consisting of free citizens,” were the “only capable of regulating its 
own fertility,” not the state.103  As such, the CONAPO, in conjunction with other health 
institutions, would primarily provide the resources and the information, but the rights of 
decision lay with the man and woman, a right over family planning garnered by the 
government and one challenging the cultural Catholic ethos of accepting all the children 
God sent.104  The various CONAPO campaigns on family planning, which included 
Telenovelas (soap operas), according to Gabriela Soto Laveaga, “redefined the role of 
active mothers and fathers and chose to break with the stereotype of a large, fertile 
citizenry.”105  The Ley General went even further, suggesting family planning initiatives 
improve the quality of life and “enrich the existence of all Mexicans.”106  Moreover, the 
Mexican government ratified Article 4 of the Constitution in December 1974, deeming 																																																								
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that “Men and women are equal under the law.”  The couple’s right to decide was also 
enshrined in the article, which stated, “Every person has the right to decide in a free, 
mature and informed way, the number and spacing of their children,” making Mexico 
the second in the world and the first in Latin America to legally constitute such right.107  
Echeverría’s population initiatives placed the couple at the forefront of family planning, 
while simultaneously arguing demographic control as eminent to the country’s 
development process, and as initiatives that broadened the rights of men, women, and 
children.  
During IWY, Echeverría extolled the reforms as representative of Mexico’s 
dedication to women’s rights.  On January 3 at the National Palace, the President 
inaugurated International Women’s Year.  In his Friday night speech, Echeverría 
explained Mexico’s selection for the IWY Conference, and key UN event for 1975, as 
recognitions of the “salient interest of our country for collaborating in the maximum 
global forums to fulfill the yearnings of humanity.”  The introductory paragraph to the 
official speech featured in the cover page of Mexico75 listed Echeverría’s various aid 
organisms for women, such as CONAPO, which rescued “women from compulsory 
fertility,” and the constitutional reforms opening “for women the doors to judicial 
freedom.”108  Regarding the treatment of women, the president argued, “In Mexico you 
can no longer encourage complacency nor, still less, tolerate undue physical and mental 
subordination to which some still want to subject women.”109  International Women’s 
Year thus offered the opportunity to further initiatives already undertaken and fortify 																																																								
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the programs already in place, as well as the space for showcasing “the efforts of a 
people and its government that jointly strive to eradicate in justice in the domestic and 
international realms,” Echeverría declared.110   
Moreover, México75 contained a double spread introducing women to the 
CONAPO and the importance behind family planning: “The problem is complex but it 
is very important that we all understand even if simplistically because it is one of the 
most serious of our country,” explained the article.  “But why have family planning? Ah! 
Simply because there is a problem called ‘population explosion.’”  As the article 
describes the duties of the CONAPO, “helping Mexicans make rational use of their 
procreation,” an interview with the Secretary General of the commission followed.111  
Luisa María Leal Duk headed CONAPO and has even been credited with drafting two 
sections of the amendment to Article 4 of the Constitution, as well as the Ley General de 
Población.112 Leal left behind a series of texts on the rights of women, including those 
dealing with reproduction and abortion.113  As a woman heading one of the country’s 
leading commissions in the spotlight given the celebration of International Women’s 
Year, Luisa María Leal Duk exemplified to the international community, attentive on 
México, that the Echeverría administration indeed sought the social and economic 
advancement of women.  
By March 1975, the Echeverría administration spoke of population control as 
part of the national platform on economic development and state sovereignty.  A follow-																																																								
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up article in the March issue of México75 featured a note on the Second Latin American 
Meeting on Population held in Mexico City on March 3-7 in which President 
Echeverría described the problem of being “stuck in old preconceptions and disparaging 
the dangers of a disorderly multiplication of mankind.”114  However, he emphasized, 
programs of population control managing “disorderly” reproduction must “must be 
implemented honoring freedom,” a freedom meaning the “right of all human beings to 
self-actualize in an integral manner”; and not a type of individual sovereignty based on 
the “prerogative of privileged groups.”  For Echeverría, a manageable populace, one 
that did not exceed a country’s economic possibilities, offered a government the 
opportunity equalizing distribution of wealth.  Echeverría also defended population 
control as part of a sovereign state’s freedom of decision, and even that of the individual, 
and not as imposed from groups of states or international organizations upon a 
people.115    
For International Women’s Year, the government particularly resonated the 
state’s efforts in advancing women’s rights through population control.  After 
Echeverría’s remarks to the population forum in Mexico City, Moya Palencia 
announced a major media initiative on matters of “population and development” not 
only geared toward “rationalizing the variable of natality,” but also focused on uplifting 
the overall condition of women in society, including opposing machismo—“Latin 
American women should be considered as a productive being and not just as one that 
reproduces.”  To an audience of prominent male figures, like Norman E. Borlaug, 																																																								
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Noble laureate and key pioneer of the 1960s mechanization of agriculture, and UN 
Assistant Secretary General Raúl Prebisch, the president and others defined women’s 
rights as part of a larger program of national development, one intimately linked with 
demographic control.116  In the same form, activists, intellectuals, and feminists engaged 
in IWY gender discussions placed the needs of women jointly with other oppressed 
classes, including workers.  Because the Mexican government framed women’s rights as 
part of Third World struggles, the 1975 IWY Conference in Mexico City offered a 
space for the Carta de derechos y deberes económicos de los Estados among discussions by 
Mexican diplomats and Latin American women.  The IWY Conference thus involved a 
convergence of different interests and agendas.  The Echeverría administration used it 
to showcase its national policies on population.  The president hoped to frame Mexico 
as a model Third World country, and his government as intimately concerned with 
advancing the UN-IWY objectives of equality, development, and peace.  Meanwhile, 
women from across the world struggled to define not only women’s rights, but also 
human rights.  
 
Mexico City, June 1975  
As the conference opening neared, the press noted the prominent figures 
expected and the overall magnitude of the event.  “15 thousand of the most Prominent 
Women will Gather in Mexico” read the headline announcing the IWY Conference set 
for June 19.  Among those leaders expressing approval for the event were Indira 
Gandhi, at the time Prime Minister of India; Argentine President Isabel Martínez de 
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Perón; and the First Ladies of the Philippines, Imelda Marcos (both of whom were 
complicit in massive human rights abuses that included the torture and disappearance of 
thousands of women); and her counterpart from Egypt, Jehan Sadat.117  Other 
confirmed attendees included Princess Ashraf Pahlavi of Iran, the Shah’s twin sister; Dr. 
Katharina Focke, Germany’s Federal Minister for Youth, Family, and Health; Russian 
Valentina Vladimirovna Nikolayeva Tereshkova, the first woman in space; and 
Françoise Giroud, journalist, imprisoned in France during WWII and later assigned 
French Secretary of State for the Condition of Women.118   An erroneous report 
announced South Vietnam opted for sending a male as its representative; Ma Thi Chu, 
a reported member of the Central Committees of the Women’s Liberation Union of 
Vietnam.119  As it was common for journalists to misspell attendees’ names, in this case, 
it was the gender of Ma Thi Chu that subsequent publications revealed was indeed a 
female delegate.120  Four days before the IWY Conference inauguration, the South 
African delegate Emily O’Meara reported Mexico had yet to authorize her visa.  
O’Meara a prominent journalist and editor of the women’s section of the Star daily, had 
apparently been among others from her country to have been denied a visa, a list that 
included high-profile tennis players Frew McMillan and Bob Hewitt (naturalized citizen 
originally from Australia).121  All the 138 official delegations set to confer in the Foreign 																																																								
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Relations Building were part of the official conference made up principally of 
government representatives.  Separate from the official UN Conference, a tribune of 
non-governmental gathered in the Centro Médico Nacional (National Medical Center).122  
Just days before the inauguration ceremonies, Attorney General Ojeda Paullada 
informed the press that Mexico spent some 1,750,000 pesos, the equivalent to $175,000 
dollars, with the United Nations covering the largest share of the Conference 
expenditures.123  Once more, the Mexican government prepared for an international 
event with a prominent journalist presence, and with specific and divergent expectations 
from attendees, participants, and the government.  
Five days before the conference, the Programa de México organizers made final 
arrangements for the expected ten thousand participants.  Pedro Ojeda Paullada and 
Aída González led the official team.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned González 
as coordinator of the “Oficina de Enlace,” a type of liaison office between Mexican and 
UN officials made up of some 150 individuals working around the clock reserving hotel 
rooms, sending out final invitations, answering unwavering streak of phone calls, testing 
the sound and lighting system, checking Red Cross ambulances in case of an 
emergency, and picking up foreign correspondents from the airport, detailed a 
newspaper piece.  As any major event requires, teams divided between organizing artists 
involved in the cultural activities, from recruiting multilingual hostesses, to managing 
the architects conditioning the conference rooms.  Some tended to the special guests, 
whether from governmental or non-governmental organizations, while others accredited 																																																								
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national journalists before the United Nations.  Given the media presence, the 1,600 
foreign correspondents also received assistance from the Programa de México coordinators.  
At Minerva 63, the headquarters of the IWY Office, another twenty people tended the 
needs of foreign attendees and sent out five thousand invitations for the inauguration 
ceremony.  Six months of preparations culminated in specialized tasks, “From buying a 
‘torta’ to waiting for a functionary.”  Meanwhile, in the Juan de la Barrera gym of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Thirty men laid the vintage-gold colored carpet” while 
others “painted the International Women’s Year logos and set the flags of the 
[participating] 138 UN member states.”  With eight chairs set for the podium, and 
hundreds of others to the right, center, and left for national and international 
functionaries, the gym displayed a humble ambiance devised by architects Mario and 
César Sosa.  As host, Mexican authorities satisfied the structural needs for such a 
singular event, “in short, everything needed to make it into a magnum UN stage,” 
planners accomplished.124  
Public officials too played their part.  At the international airport in Mexico 
City, First Lady Esther Zuno, Secretariat of Foreign Relations Emilio O. Rabasa and 
his wife Socorro Gamboa de Rabasa, as well as Pedro Ojeda Paullada and wife Olga 
Cárdenas de Ojeda, among others, awaited the arrival of the Shah’s twin sister, Ashraf 
Pahlavi and daughter Niloufar Pahlavi.  Pahlavi served as the president of the Women’s 
Organization of Iran and vice-president of the Imperial Organization of Social Services, 
and headed three universities in the country.  Journalist Nidia Marín described the 
Pahlavi’s elegance yet noted the Iranian leader did not travel with as much luggage as 
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one would expect for someone of her stature.  In the official lounge of the international 
airport, Pahlavi also gave an interview in which she spoke on the progress of women’s 
rights in Iran.125  Others welcomed included Margaret Whitlam, spouse of Australian 
First Minister Gough Whitlam, and Elizabeth Reid, the Minister’s advisor on women 
issues and a prominent rights leader.126  Both women discussed the abortion legislation 
in Australia, with Reid elaborating on the limited participation of women in the 
country’s political life and on the marginalization of homosexuals in society.127  
Likewise, Vilma Espín de Castro, a prominent Cuban revolutionary and at the time 
married to Rául Castro, received a warm welcome from Secretariat of Education official 
Rosa Luz Alegría de Echeverría, the president’s daughter-in-law wedded to his eldest 
son Luis Vicente Echeverría Zuno, and the Cuban ambassador to Mexico, Fernando 
López Muiño.128  Dubbed “doncella casadera” by novelist José Agustín for her alleged 
affair with President José López Portillo (1976-1982) during his presidency, Alegría also 
stands as the first woman to head a state ministry.129  Hospitable welcomes by key 
government officials for some of the most prominent international leaders figured into 
the government’s public relations strategy and one that entailed forging a specific image 
of Mexico for both national and foreign consumption.  
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Three days before the IWY Conference, Mexico City also served as the location 
for two pre-conference meetings.  The first being the Women and Development seminar 
organized by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), co-
sponsored by the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), and Mexico’s Conacyt (National Council of Science 
and Technology), ran from June 16 through 18, concluding just a day before the IWY 
meeting.  At the Mexico City Convention Center on the Paseo de la Reforma Avenue, 
Esther Zuno joined the opening ceremony on the evening of June 15.130  The AAAS, a 
non-governmental organization made up of scientific organizations, event invited 
science and engineering organizations to engage on the themes of women and 
development, with a special emphasis on “exchanging documentation on the role of 
women in society, referring to the fields of technology, food processing, health, 
nutrition, housing, cooperative association, education and communication.”131  The 
science-themed event counted with the presence sixty participants, including prominent 
leaders in the country for the IWY meeting, and included a closing event speech by 
Helvi Sipilä in which she engaged matters ranging from education to dispelling rumors 
that the spouses of key mandatories came to Mexico in place of their husbands.132   
The other pre-conference event focused on matters of communications.  The 
journalistic meeting, organized by the United Nations Information Center, ran parallel 
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from June 16-20 in the Conference Unit of the Centro Médico, rallied some four to five 
thousand journalists selected by the United Nations according to one report, yet another 
print source noted only 150 journalists attended the first session.133  Colombian writer 
and diplomat Esmeralda Arboleda Cuevas coordinated the first International 
Journalists’ Meeting, with Ojeda Paullada, Sipilä, Rafael Segovia (Director of Mexico 
International Studies Center of the Colegio de México), and Dr. Hoda Badran (UNESCO 
consultant) presiding over the opening ceremony.134  With the goal of providing the 
press with information about the IWY Conference, the journalists’ seminar sought 
widespread coverage for the conference in order to engage women worldwide with the 
Mexico City meeting and its themes.135   Yet, at least one source noted the lack of 
questions meriting news and described the meeting as the place where “disorganization 
reigned” and “The heat inside the room proved unbearable.”136  Six Latin American 
women were asked not to intervene in the question session given that UN reporters had 
preference, resulting in a narration of personal stories rather than serious questions 
pertinent to the condition of women, complained the Mexican delegates in 
attendance.137  The conclusion of the development and press events gave way to the 
final and key 1975 meeting on women, both for Mexico and the United Nations.  
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June 19, 1975: International Women’s Year Conference  
The inauguration of 1975 International Women’s Year Conference commenced 
at 10:30 a.m.  Named after one of the six cadets killed during the 1847 U.S. invasion of 
the Castle of Chapultepec, the Juan de la Barrera gymnasium of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, seated thousands of women from diverse backgrounds, from activists, 
intellectuals, political leaders, workers, to homemakers.138  The Panamanian delegation, 
led by Carmen Crespo de Pinzón, included—“an ironer, a fried food vendor, 
secretaries, workers, professionals as well as the cook of the general himself,” wrote 
Victoria Azurduy, an Argentine journalist exiled in Mexico.139  “Television cameras 
captured the scene at the opening ceremony held in an enormous indoor arena 
constructed for the Olympic Games of 1968,” a scene full of “faces bearing every 
complexion from the palest shades of pink to the richest and darkest brown.”140  
Arvonne Fraser described the event as “the largest meeting in history to deal with the 
problems and concerns of women,” and where female representatives represented a 
majority, constituting about seventy percent of attendees.141  By 11:05, when President 
Luis Echeverría, Esther Zuno, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Olga Cárdenas 
de Ojeda Paullada, Secretariat of Foreign Affairs Emilio O. Rabasa and Socorro 																																																																																																																																																																		
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Gamboa de Rabasa arrived, between 5,000 and 8,000 spectators filled the seats.  A few 
minutes later, at 11:07 Waldheim opened with a twenty-minute inauguration speech, in 
which he claimed, “Equality of opportunity for men and women is essential, if the 
establishment of a more equitable international economic and social system is truly 
desired.”142  Thereafter, Echeverría took the stage, with his full speech later appearing 
in the press and government publication México75.  He was followed by Assistant 
Secretary-General, Helvi Sipilä.143  Echeverría noted the principles he outlined as being 
the ideological framework of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.  
Meanwhile, Sipilä reminded attendees of the importance of time: “We count on only 
two weeks to devise the appropriate strategy to overcome centuries of oppression and 
discrimination.”144  Finally, Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada expressed his 
confidence in a positive outcome for the event, while also highlighting the contribution 
of the Charter to the creation of a new economic world order.  The ceremony 
concluded at 12:45 p.m., an opening ceremony journalist Luz María T. de Hernández 
described as “solemn and very emotional,” while others deemed Echeverría’s attitude as 
“exquisite male chauvinist insensitivity.”145  Although disagreements and varying 
expectations proliferated, those present understood, to different degrees, the importance 
and the high stakes hinging on the IWY gathering in Mexico City.   
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Two days after the IWY Conference inauguration, NGO opened a parallel 
meeting referred to as the “Tribune.”  From the UN sponsored “conscious raising” 
conferences of the 1970s—such as those on the environment, women, and population—
originated non-governmental section to the official meetings, evidence of the growing 
influence of NGOs in global forums.146  According to Judith Zinsser the first non-
governmental meeting alongside a major UN summit took place in 1974 at the 
Population Conference.  The attending non-governmental associations; however, 
required official authorization from the United Nations, or “consultative status,” 
meaning “these organizations could attend UN meetings with properly accredited 
representatives and could submit information on topics being discussed.”147  These 
citizen-based meetings “were freer bodies, unconstrained by official government policy,” 
given that they are independently funded, and attendees do not officially represent their 
home countries.148  In the case of IWY Tribune, Mildred Persinger argues the Mexican 
government agreed to the NGO forum in anticipation to protests.149  The General 
Assembly approved the proposal for the NGO portion of the event separately from the 
IWY Conference.150  Five months prior to the inauguration of the IWY meeting, 
President Echeverría invited the organizer of the Population NGO meeting, Rosalind 
Harris, along with Persinger to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he instructed both 
to “write down a detailed description of the tribune program.”  Although the planning 
committee did not yet count with a program draft, Persinger remembers keeping that 																																																								
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information from the president.151  The organizers, however, eventually completed their 
task for the opening of the NGO meeting on July 19.  The Mexico City Tribune took 
place in the auditorium of the Centro Médico, the national hospital, about five miles from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.152  Persinger, Rosalind Harris, and Marcia Bravo 
planned the Tribune program for an audience of a reported six thousand attendants, 
including participants.153  Bravo joined the group in March as director.154  About 670 
NGOs participated, the majority from the Western Hemisphere.155  A key outcome of 
the non-governmental IWY meeting was the International Women’s Tribune Centre 
(IWTC), presided by Persinger from 1976-1982, a non-profit “keeping the 6,000 
Tribune participants in communication with one another” and archiving the Decade for 
Women records of the forum designs.156  While many journalists dedicated their 
attention to the Tribune meeting, the Mexican government focused on the official 
Conference.  The government newspaper, México75, dedicated only one spread to the 
Tribune, evidence of the government’s disregard and indifference to the parallel 
meeting.157 
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Press coverage proved another key component of the Conference.  The IWY 
organizers from all sectors understood the importance of communications for the 
transcendence of women’s issues during International Women’s Year.  The United 
Nations, for instance, employed the Antiguo Convento de Santiago Tlatelolco as their 
communications headquarters, an old convent across from the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations.  The entire building served as a Press Center for the Conference, with 
journalists reporting for print media, radio, and television in five distinct languages—
Spanish, English, French, Russian, and Chinese—with Noreen Maxwell heading the 
UN Information Department for the IWY Conference, and Gloria Peniché presiding as 
the Mexican official.  According to Ángel Gómez Granados, the U.S. delegation 
reported from a press center in the María Isabel Sheraton Hotel located in the Mexico 
City business district on Paseo de la Reforma, and about three miles from the Conference 
location.158  The latter could have been the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
press office, sponsored by the State Department, in response to a possible “public 
relations challenge” according to Mildred Marcy, “an old USIA hand who coordinated 
IWY efforts,” according to Olcott’s publication specifically on the Conference’s media 
politics.159  Evidence of the growing consciousness of the role of communication, NGOs 
and official institutions capitalized on emerging media tactics for globalizing the event 
and its themes, whereby even “Some groups deliberately created media events to get 
their points across to a worldwide audience,” explained Arvonne Fraser.160 																																																								
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Pedro Ojeda Paullada is a Man: Third World ‘economic justice’ vs. Western World ‘liberation’161 
Most importantly; however, the Mexico City event served as a platform for 
defining women’s rights.  While some participants deemed international politics as 
intimately linked with women’s liberation, others regarded global concerns as diverging 
from gender specific matters.  Or what Olcott describes as, “‘Third World women,’ who 
tended to focus on structural problems of economic inequality, and ‘western feminists,’ 
who concentrated their energies on sex-specific issues such as reproductive freedom, 
wage equity, and women’s educational and professional opportunities.”162   For 
Arvonne Fraser, the context of the conference predisposed the event to divisions: “The 
fact that this conference was held in the developing world, in a country contiguous to 
one of the mostly highly industrialized nations of the world, graphically illustrated and 
symbolized the divisions that would be felt and discussed at this conference.”163  Because 
most studies underscore the ideological rifts at the conference, the voice of Latin 
American women emerge in juxtaposition to that of fervent feminists.  However, when 
analyzed independently their demands reveal a desire to define their own needs, rather 
than echoing those of their counterparts: pioneers of the 1970s women’s movement, or 
second-wave feminists.  For example, Lita Paniagua wrote in México75, “Up until now in 
the movement to create awareness and improve the condition of women, ideas arising 
from highly industrialized Western countries have taken the lead.”  Moreover, Paniagua 
argued that if indeed women from across the world shared certain “aspirations and 																																																								
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concerns” that these were manifested differently.  “The leaders of the feminist 
movements in other regions do not always express our yearnings, nor our reality.”164 
Unlike other México75 reports, Paniagua featured IWY expectations of women from 
across the region, including that of indigenous women.165   Her daughter, Alma 
Guillermoprieto, followed her journalistic footsteps.166  Finally, she added: “It is time for 
women of Latin America to direct ourselves toward our own truth, that we listen, and 
together define who we are and what we can do to create a world of peace, development 
and equality.”167  Thereby, the demands voiced at the IWY Conference reveal a history 
of temporal and region-specific attempts to define women’s rights.  The convergence of 
dissenting voices reveals a struggle for appropriating the mediums of discussion, between 
women’s rights as individuals or groups, between those making demands restricted in 
their home countries, or those simply utilizing the meeting as a medium for 
internationalizing nationalist politics. 
In these discussions, the first matter of disagreement arose from the choice of a 
man for the presidency of the conference.  Just before the inauguration’s concluding 
remarks, Waldheim explained Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada’s anonymous 
selection.168  Ojeda Paullada also presided over Mexico’s IWY Program and the 
country’s delegation at the conference.  Waldheim’s statement seemed to respond to the 																																																								
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widespread objection over the selection.  Yet, for some, Ojeda’s selection only verified 
that the meeting focused on mere politics and not on women-specific issues.  “Next time 
there won’t be a man in charge.  Next time women won’t allow themselves to be used 
for political ends that have nothing to do with women’s rights,” exclaimed “angry 
feminists” according to the Sarasota Herald-Tribune.  Even Ojeda’s pick factored into the 
list of the so-called conference’s shortcomings: “In retrospect, it seemed to many 
observers that the International Women’s Year Conference…was always meant to be a 
political exercise in power politics manipulated by men—from the conference president, 
Mexican Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada, to the men running the governments 
back home.”169  Chicana attendee Yolanda M. López witnessed how “…Mexican 
feminists boycotted the conference.  Many delegates from other nations were visibly 
dismayed when Señor Paullada was also selected as president of the IWY 
Conference.”170  In the Chicago Tribune, Joan Beck argued that the steering committee’s 
selection of Ojeda meant “The United Nations thinks there isn’t a woman in the world 
capable of running a big international gathering.”171  Perhaps the brassiest dissenting 
voice came from North American feminist Betty Friedan: “Only two weeks before this 
conference, two students had been shot in the back of the head; the police involved were 
under the direction of the Attorney General of Mexico.  And now this Attorney 
General, Pedro Ojeda Paullada, had just been named president of the conference, 
without a dissenting vote.”  In her first day in Mexico City, Friedan claimed at least a 																																																								
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dozen women approached her about their displeasure over a man’s selection, “and a 
policeman at that!”172  The choice of Ojeda as head of the women’s conference 
outraged many women—most aversions coming from First World representatives from 
the United States and Australia—and previewed the ideological rifts between divergent 
expectations for the two-week meeting in Mexico City.  
 Those deeming the conference a failure placed the blame on men and politics.  
According to some North American feminists the politicization of the conference 
derived from men’s co-optation of the event through attendees that simply paid lip 
service to their governments.  In some cases, that proved precisely the case, especially 
when their governments devised the agendas for discussions.173  In an interview 
journalist Elena Poniatowska conducted with Pedro Ojeda, he commented that: “First 
of all, in the World Conference women did not speak, countries spoke and countries are 
asexual.”174  For those attendees concerned with debating more women-specific issues, 
Ojeda confirmed their anxieties that “The delegations are representative of 
governments, not of women, because governments are not representative of women,” as 
Australian feminist Germaine Greer claimed.175  As such, North American attendees 
like Friedan protested actions like Ojeda’s selection, “I think it’s very sad.  It’s pitiful that 																																																								
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no government delegation raised hell about it,” adding “It’s an insult to all the women 
in the world that no Mexican woman could head the conference,” most Third World 
delegates dissented on other matters.176  Moreover, American feminists seemed ever 
more disturbed by the issues that gained notoriety in the conference, which they deemed 
too distant from women-specific matters or too politicized.  Journalist Joan Beck noted 
the conference focused on “what one U.S. woman called ‘political issues that represent 
the male mentality,’ on arms limitations, neocolonialism, economic development, and 
national boundary disputes, rather than on the stated aim of the meeting—to improve 
the status of women.”  Beck included Friedan quoting a woman describing the event as 
a “paternalistic affair which has nothing to do with what women really think.”  She 
concluded her article by expressing disappointment that “not even a single conference 
can be devoted wholeheartedly to that subject without men trying to coopt it for their 
own purposes.”177  However, bungled representations of the conference—deeming 
political issues discussed at the IWY event as evidence of “callous manipulation of 
women by their governments”—undermine Third World representatives’ ability to 
engage global issues independently of official indoctrination and discount the urgency of 
what some Latin American women deemed as categorically “women’s rights” in the 
1970s.178  
Foreseeing ideological clashes, many ‘Third World’ women prepared to face 
what they deemed radical, ‘First World’ feminists’ demands.  For instance, the Mexican 
daily Excélsior quoted Guissoh Josephine, delegate and researcher for the African 																																																								
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Development Studies Association, saying “The III World needs a terrible force of 
willpower not to be swayed by industrial countries, by the great powers that always have 
decided their path.”179  Josephine embodied many of the official delegates’ standpoints 
on what they deemed distant and radical issues like “abortion, rape, women’s right to 
vote, job equality and so on,” key concerns a Native American newsletter, AKWESASNE 
News, noted for U.S members of the National Organization for Women (NOW), an 
association Friedan co-founded in 1966.180  The same article described the absence of 
opportunity for Native Americans to voice their demands, and explained that those 
attended the Tribune “were denied any voice at the official UN conference.”  
Moreover, they argued that “well-known and media savvy Western feminist 
organizations [like NOW]…represented primarily white Western women narrowly 
defined women’s issues to include only issues of gender power inequalities and to 
exclude discussions of global misappropriations of power based on colonial legacies.”181  
Ideologically speaking, minority groups from the United States were more likely hinged 
to global concerns of Third World women.  Meanwhile, women like Ma Thi Chu of 
South Vietnam, for example, noted imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism as 
threats to not only women’s rights, but also national rights.182  Coming from South 
Vietnam, Thi Chu noted the harmful effects of war on women.183  These ideological 
divisions, explains Challen Nicklen, of First World activists framing women’s rights as 																																																								
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“universal concerns” while “Southern women and women of color argued that women’s 
concerns must be understood in the context of their particular circumstances and 
experiences.”184  Many global activists; thereby, claimed “women’s issues were 
continually submerged by international politicizing...Mexico wanted to promote a new 
world economic order.  Panama reasserted its rights to the Canal Zone.  The Arabs 
wanted to fight the Jews,” etc.185  On the other hand, women from developing countries 
framed discussions in statist terms, often in Marxist, and were more likely to appeal to 
their country’s “particular” circumstances, especially calling for economic and political 
structural changes deemed necessary for substantial social change—of which included 
women’s rights—unlike the gender-derivative universalist claims of representatives from 
Western industrialized countries.   
 
Universal vs. Particular: Latin American Women and Human Rights   
 Despite the frequent emphasis on nationalist and developmentalist themes, Latin 
Americans also engaged in universalities when it came to political and economic 
matters, especially that of human rights.  Although deemed “political,” the demands of 
women from the region reflected their realities of political repression, economic 
disparity, and social inequalities; in other words, their appeals reflected those of wider 
social movements seeking democratization in an era of state terror.  The case of Chilean 
political repression as a violation of women’s rights emerged as a key subject on various 
instances.  Just a day before the inauguration of IWY Conference and during the 
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International Journalists Meeting in Auditorium No. 5 of the Centro Médico, Chilean 
journalist and radio personality exiled in Mexico Ximena Ortuzar decried the Military 
Junta’s “concentration camps” that held forty-nine journalists, five of whom were 
women, two already dead due to the ‘inhumane system,’ and all subject to torture.  
Ortuzar, working for Channel 13 in Mexico, denounced the yelled out from her seat the 
names of Diana Aarón and Gladys Díaz Armijo who died at the hands of the Junta’s 
Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence Directorate, DINA) in the Tres 
Álamos camp.186  “The Chilean Military Junta has closed all media that does not tally to 
the junta’s interests,” concluded the news piece.187  Women from Latin American 
countries under military dictatorships often framed women’s rights within nationalistic 
debates, often in terms of democratization; conversely, when cases of political violence, 
they more typically appealed to the universalist language of human rights.  
 Lending importance to these issues was the fact that Chile’s former First Lady, 
Hortensia Bussi de Allende, served as a key IWY spokesperson against her country’s 
military Junta.  As the widow of Socialist President Salvador Allende (1970-1973), Bussi 
participated as an unofficial representative of the Mexican government, often attending 
events alongside Esther Zuno.  Bussi, for instance, welcomed the Russian delegate at the 
Mexico City airport.  There the Chilean exile told reporters she did not wish to answer 
any questions, but ended up giving a speech in the traffic room in which she noted the 
condition of women under the Pinochet regime, a government where women have been 
incarcerated and forced into prostitution.  As long the “yoke of imperialism” prevailed, 																																																								
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no one, in any country could live at peace.  She added, “The Chilean woman repudiates 
the fascist military junta.”188  In a Tribute session dedicated to the application of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Bussi spoke of the need of not only 
gender but also class equality, and for a people’s right to self-determination.  At this 
event, she also denounced the Chilean Junta’s torture of women, claiming it often 
occurred in front of their children, and added with a note of irony, “the only aspect 
where women are equal to men, is in that of persecution and torture.”189  Both Bussi de 
Allende and Russian delegate Valentina Tershkova suggested women lived better under 
socialist systems.  Bussi claimed that under Salvador Allende, women factored into the 
workforce in a dignified and just manner, and with a spirit of spirit of fellowship.190  
Cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova “declared that women’s real and informal equality 
depends on the socioeconomic system of each country,” and the Soviet Union 
incorporated women into the development process since the October Socialist 
Revolution.  Argentine attendee, Fanny Edelman, argued that socialist countries had 
achieved greater appreciation for women’s potential and had incorporated rights into 
the revolutionary social process.191  Gustavo G. Velázquez, candidate to the Partido 
Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party, PPS) to the governorship of the State of Mexico 
too made the case that in countries where private property has been suppressed men 
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and women live on more equal grounds.192  It was in the voices of protest that lay Latin 
American women’s contribution to the construction of women’s rights as interconnected 
to the emerging universalist language of human rights, which in the context of Latin 
American in the 1970s had principally come to signify principally political, and secondly 
economic, rights.  
Moreover, international organizations with local chapters served as key players 
in globalizing discussion of political violence, especially torture, as human rights 
violations.  The Mexican section of Amnesty International (AI) tackled the themes of 
torture and unjust imprisonment.  Two of the organization’s key members, Alicia 
Escalante de Zama and Marieclaire Acosta, gave a press conference days before the 
IWY Conference in which they discussed the need to use the forum to bring attention to 
the women imprisoned on alleged political crimes, and tortured for that matter.  Acosta 
explained that “For women, sexual atrocities comprised an important part of the catalog 
of torture and we have many examples of these in Chile, where it has been abused.”  
Escalante de Zama added that AI would intervene so that the declaration of human 
rights could serve as a compliment to the enunciated denunciation of sexual torture.193  
Although claims on behalf of women political prisoners fell on deaf ears, many 
journalists went on to press their own governments about political prisoners. For 
example, in Elena Poniatowska’s interview with Ojeda Paullada, she inquired about the 
numerous mentions of political prisoners during the conference.  She proceeded to ask 
him why nothing had been done on behalf of Mexican female prisoners, “Why you, as 																																																								
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Attorney General, haven’t released them?”  Ojeda allured to the discriminatory nature 
of freeing a woman simply on matter of her gender, and thereby would place her above 
the law.  Ojeda Paullada added that “Precisely one of the issues for which women are 
fighting to achieve equality in all fields,” thus evading Poniatowska’s allusion to political 
repression in Mexico.194  Of all the Latin American demands placed upon the IWY 
forum, those related to political violence and torture activists were more often linked to 
universalist language of rights, and especially the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  Moreover, while some women complained about discussions on torture or 
economic disparity not being feminist enough, those themes drew press coverage to the 
little known and rarely utilized terms of ‘human rights.’ 
 
Human Rights in the Mexican Press 
References to human rights in the Mexican press during the IWY Conference 
emerged in relation to repression in Chile.  An article dedicated to the changing role of 
women in society noted the development of science and technology as spurring greater 
rights, as well as the “universal recognition of human rights,” the journalist quoted 
Chilean participant at the First Seminar on Women and Development, Teresa Orrego 
de Figueroa.195  Moreover, the Popular Socialist Party, PPS, launched the “Manifiesto a 
las Mujeres Mexicanas” (Manifesto to Mexican Women) in occasion of the IWY, where it 
demanded the full integration for women into the “economic, political, social and 
cultural” life of the country—until she enjoys the same rights as men.  The PPS also 																																																								
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called for support toward the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
claiming it garnered countries the right to benefit over their own natural wealth.  
Among the many bulleted points, the party demanded the United Nations exclude the 
Chilean military junta from international forums, especially during IWY.  And “Also, to 
intervene in order to obtain the release of all political prisoners, the respect for human 
rights and the end of repression.”196  In other instances, the term was linked to 
international organizations working to advance ‘human right,’ like the Women’s 
International Democratic Federation (WIDF), of which two Mexican organizations 
were members of, the El Comité Coordinador Femenino para defensa de la Patria, and the Unión 
Nacional de Mujeres Mexicanas (UNMM).197  Although the term human rights did not 
exclusively denote violations in Chile, often times the press employed the words 
explicitly in reference to the state terror in South America, where exiles and activists 
there commonly appealed to international organizations and forums for protection; 
thereby, more familiarized with the universalist language of human rights, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
 Other journalists made additional references to human rights when writing 
about the UDHR.  Gloria Brasdefer, coordinator for Programa de México, gave an 
interview where the reporter concluded her note on IWY with: “Now governments, at a 
national and international level, by endorsement of the United Nations have solemnly 
committed to the goal of equal rights for all, men and women, as proclaimed by the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”198  In México75, the IWY government’s 
official newspaper, the poet, one-time senator of Jalisco, and first governor in Mexico 
for the state of Colima (see Illustration 3.3), Griselda Álvarez wrote an article about the 
future of women where she drew attention to the UDHR, which “prohibits 
discrimination and proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights.”  With the hope of the Declaration’s fulfillment, Álvarez then quoted the 
Argentine screenwriter Ulyses Petit de Murat (1907-1983) on the difficult condition of 
women in Argentina and Uruguay.199  The last page of the first issue of México75 
included a one-page explanation of the United Nations and its goal of promoting 
universal respect and observance of human rights, and made reference to the rights 
embedded in the UDHR with several uses of the term.200  In an interview with Clara 
Elena Molina Enriquez, adviser for Programa de México, the reporter noted the IWY event 
was “the beginning of a joint effort that will eliminate discrimination and will link 
together human rights within and without each country.”201  It is difficult to discern 
whether the journalist appropriated the terms from their interviewees—who were very 
likely more familiarized with internationalist terms given their connection to the IWY 
planning and by default the United Nations—or if the subject matter of their interviews 
predisposed them to such vocabulary.  Nevertheless, press reports show that women 
from the United Nations or IWY event ranks were more likely to employ the terms 
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human rights, as Helvi Sipilä so frequently did.202  Thereby, the rise of human rights in 
the press during IWY and its Conference reveals greater national awareness toward 
rights embedded in international rights documents during the 1970s, and especially 
those associated with the United Nations system.  
 
Betty Friedan was Right: The Case of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
Nevertheless, the IWY Conference also served as an official forum for 
government- propagated politics.  Certainly, as Sipilä explains “There are political 
issues which women have to deal with. If it had been only a question of women and 
women’s problems, then the conference would not have fulfilled its purpose.”203  
However, at other moments ‘bourgeois’ women reflected their class ideology, which at 
times predisposed them to serve as official mouthpieces for their governments, and such 
proved the case for a number of Mexican official delegates to the conference.  The class 
standing of many of the attendees seemed strikingly noticeable, to where a British 
woman bore the following questions: “You realize that 90 percent of us here are 
obviously bourgeois?  Apart from some of the rural Mexican women, where are the 
proletarians of the world?  Is this to represent women?”204  Indeed, the women most 
featured in the press during IWY in Mexico were seldom representative of the general 
population, such as First Lady Esther Zuno, María Lavalle Urbina, and other women in 
public posts.  Attorney General Pedro Ojeda, the head leader for the Programa de México 
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and the IWY Conference, proved the most overt representative and promoter of 
President Echeverría’s Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, more so as the 
conference neared.205  Leaders from around the globe anticipated Echeverría’s use of 
the IWY Conference to further his political agenda.  Olcott details how “The U.S. 
delegation to the UN reported with alarm from a Caracas planning session that the 
Mexican delegation planned to rally support for an IWY conference endorsement of the 
NIEO.”206  At least at a national level, organizations and public figures linked to the 
government, from the Confederación de Jóvenes Mexicanos (Confederation of Mexican 
Youth, CJM) to Mexico’s ambassador to Finland, Bernardo Reyes—endorsed the 
Charter.207  In what seemed like a prep meeting for the Mexican delegation to the 
Conference, warned about possible voices that would stir the debates toward scandalous 
and extravagant themes—and away from the social and economic condition of women.  
“We have to think about the need to create, to fight to install—to the extent of our 
possibilities—, an international economic and social order a bit closer to what we 
consider convenient and fair, but also feasible.”208  Echeverría encapsulated his idea 
regarding the condition of women and how the Charter responded to such needs: 
“There is no woman in the world more discriminated against than one who has no 
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bread, school, or medicines for her children.”209  As the host, and with Pedro Ojeda as 
the president of the Conference, the Mexican government held enough sway to place 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties on the IWY agenda.  
As early as the preliminary meetings for the Conference, the Mexican delegation 
endorsed the Charter.  In a March session in the UN headquarters in New York, the 
representative countries analyzed proposals for the World Plan of Action for the next 
ten years and a cornerstone of the 1975 Conference.210  Another advisory committee 
followed in Venezuela the next month, sponsored by the CEPAL (Economic 
Commission for Latin America, ECLA).211  In the New York meeting, and while 
working on the World Plan of Action, the president of the Mexican delegation Pedro 
Ojeda Paullada proposed the Carta de derechos y deberes de los Estados as a document for 
analysis, and the committee accepted.212  Thereafter, Ojeda, his assistant Raúl Ortiz 
and Ambassador Sergio González Gálvez met in Kurt Waldheim’s office.  The UN 
Secretary General too expressed his gratitude toward the government but especially for 
President Echeverría.  Journalist reporting on the UN meeting noted Ojeda argued 
obstacles women faced in developing countries often derived from unjust global politics; 
such that, “the problem of equality cannot be separated from the problem of 
development” wrote González Muñoz.  Ojeda also quoted Echeverría from a speech he 																																																								
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gave a month earlier: “we must ensure that the International Women’s Year 
Conference does not become a forum for enumerating economic and social problems 
women suffer.” Ambassador González Gálvez spoke about international cooperation 
and concluded with a reference to a new international economic order—“the basic 
purpose of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.”213  Though, for most 
IWY attendees, Echeverría’s speech at the inaugurating ceremony crystalized the 
Mexican government’s key posture toward women’s rights.  
However, the Charter’s endorsement garnered President Echeverría fierce 
criticism.  Joan Beck wrote in the Chicago Tribune “It isn’t that Echeverria gives women’s 
liberation such low priority”; rather, what proved most infuriating was “his machismo 
message that women are so stupid and inferior that they can contribute nothing to help 
in achieving economic and political goals except to sit passively on the sidelines until 
men get the world changed to their liking.”214  Meanwhile, Australian feminists believed 
that women could not wait for a new economic world order to better their lives, nor 
could women continue tolerating paternalism that “deprives us of our identity.”215  
Helen McCarthy, a British participant, deemed Mexico a “land of machismo,” a place 
“where millions of women lived in dire poverty, trapped by illiteracy, repeated 
childbearing and errant husbands.”216  The context for the event as well as President 
Echeverría’s own insistence on the Charter, made him exemplary of “male chauvinistic 
insensitivity,” where women, again, must wait “until worldwide redistribution of wealth 																																																								
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and power wipes out imbalances between rich and poor nations”—a proposal 
compared to African Americans’ having to wait for their full citizenship dispensation 
after global problems have been addressed.217  Nevertheless, UN Secretary-General, 
Kurt Waldheim seemed sympathetic toward the Mexican government’s stance in the 
conference and admitted it was difficult to determine priority between two matters that 
are interlined, that of the rights of women and the transformations to the global 
socioeconomic system.218  Although to the displeasure of many feminists, the Mexican 
government converted women’s rights into a Third Worldism issue, prioritizing the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties as a structural reform alternative for ensuing 
gender guarantees.  
Moreover, Third World women endorsing the Charter reflected their own 
suspicions toward the First World, and vice-versa.  Judy Klemesrud, reporting for the 
New York Times, wrote on First World women’s concern over NIEO, being that “Many 
Western women here are afraid that the third world women will want to concentrate on 
the ‘new economic order’—the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources…”219 
On the other hand, Venezuelan journalist Evangelina García Prince, lauding the 
Charter and proposals for a NEIO, regarded Echeverría as one of the most outstanding 
leaders of Latin America.  In response to the rumors of Echeverría succeeding 
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Waldheim as Secretary-General, García Prince added the Mexican leader would 
adequately represent the Third World.220   
The ideological divisions between those who supported and those who 
repudiated the Charter embodied the contending strands of feminism of the 1970s.  In 
ideological terms, demands from representatives of industrialized nations exemplified a 
type of liberal feminism, which Mexican scholar Alma Rosa Sánchez Olvera argues did 
not promote major structural changes, nor does it study women’s position within the 
larger capitalist system.221  However, representatives concerned with what western 
women deemed “political” issues could be placed within the strands of radical or socialist 
feminism, ideological frameworks influenced by the militant left, working class struggles, 
or other leftist organizations seeking major transformation to the capitalist system as a 
form of social redemption.222  Antagonisms engulfing the IWY Conference not only 
represented a rift between feminist ideologies between First and Third World women, 
but also from class or even cultural divisions at a national level.  The shocks at the 
Mexico City meeting displayed a microcosm of the struggles between the various 
strands of feminism that would prevail through most of the century and to some extent 
to this day, and one with a certain type of rejection towards foreign or First World 
attempts at imposing a singular definition of feminism.  
Nevertheless, by 1975 liberal feminist writings from Europe and the United 
States undoubtedly reached activists everywhere engaged in movements for women’s 
rights.  México75, for example, ran articles contextualizing what many deemed the lobal 																																																								
220 “Venezuela se adhiere a la candidatura de LE a la ONU,” 18 June 1975, Respuestas de prensa, 
Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, CENCOS. 
221 Alma Rosa Sánchez Olvera, El feminismo mexicano ante el movimiento urbano popular: dos expresiones 
de la lucha de género (1970-1985), 21. 
222 Ibid., 22-24.  
	 197 
feminist movement.  The prominent Spanish-born Guatemalan intellectual Alaíde 
Foppa wrote an article titled “What is feminism?” in which she dates the liberation 
movements to the 1960s, and deriving from the United States where women could vote 
and attend higher education institutions, yet had been relegated to their homes.  Foppa 
credited Betty Friedan’s Feminine Mystique (1963) and Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second 
Sex (1949) as two key texts that radicalized demands for women’s liberation.223  Sadly, 
Foppa’s prominent voice in Mexico came to an abrupt end with her kidnapping and 
murder in Guatemala City on December 19, 1980, in the midst of Romeo Lucas 
García’s (1978-1982) repressive military rule.224  While Friedan and kindred writers 
influenced the Latin American social milieu, exclusive focus on their movements 
undermined the Latin American women’s movements, which existed and were well on 
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their way in 1975, although unique and reflective of their national realities—yet with 
links to other global liberationist movements.  
Nevertheless, national histories on women’s rights surfaced in the press during 
IWY and days leading up to the Conference.  Javier López Moreno, for instance, wrote 
an article on Mexican feminism listing many of the “firsts” in the country’s history, from 
the first female surgeon to obtain a medical degree, Matilde de P. Montoya, to activist 
Juana B. Gutiérrez de Mendoza—“defender of the Indians,” or the contemporaneous 
writer Rosario Castellanos, who died in Tel Aviv only a year before the IWY event.  
The list of Mexico’s illustrious women continued.  Moreno concluded with: “On this 
International Women’s Year, Mexico can participate with decorum.  With the 
endorsement of the women who made possible the current countenance, less iniquitous 
than yesterday but still streaked with concerns.”225  Although Moreno showcased 
prominent women of Mexico, his writings excluded any mention of a women’s 
movement in Mexico or as women contributing to the countries historical narrative.  
However, journalist Adelina Zendejas wrote on Mexico’s feminist movement, while 
clearly noting she summarized from an upcoming book titled Las Luchas de la Mujer 
Mexicana (“The Struggles of Mexican Women”).226  In a two-part piece, Zendejas linked 
prominent women to the nation’s movements, including working class movements, 
political parties, and other organizations, secular and religious—she herself involved in 
the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), and founder of the Frente Único Pro Derechos de la 																																																								
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Mujer (United Front for Women’s Rights).227  Zendejas’ historical narrative of women as 
protagonists and historical movers did not go beyond the 1920s and only listed a few key 
female leaders for the 1940s and 1950s.228  Therefore, when journalists attempted to 
historicize Mexico’s feminist movement in celebration of IWY, and beyond the 
influence of the U.S. women’s movement, many gaps surfaced regarding the 1950s, 
1960s, and beyond, precisely because such a movement —or at least one akin or 
comparable to its North American or European counterparts—was still in the making 
well iunto the 1970s—and Zendejas herself part of that movement. In other words, 
Internal Women’s Years commemorations transpired just as Mexico’s own feminist 
movement unraveled.  
 Particularly during the IWY, Mexican intellectuals, activists, and even political 
leaders contributed to the national debate on feminism.  In these varying stabs at 
forging, defining, and documenting Mexico’s own women’s movement, abortion 
seemed one of the consistent issues projected onto a national platform, although not the 
only one.  In a New York Times article on Beatriz Paredes Rangel from Tlaxcala, the 
second woman to hold a Mexican governorship (1987-1992) William Stockton dated the 
“fledgling feminist movement” in the country to the 1970s, “it was class conscious.”  
The women spearheading the movement, Stockton noted, “were of the upper and 
middle classes” and their concerns “were focused on [the right to] abortion, which is 
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illegal in Mexico, rape, pornography and lesbianism.”229  In the Casa de Coahuila, a 
civil society organization in Mexico City seeking to keep people connected to the 
northern state, held an event in commemoration of IWY.  The organization’s president, 
Atanasio González Martínez invited Planning Director for the Secretariat of Gobernación, 
Luisa María Leal to give a speech titled “Family Planning.” Leal allured to the 600,000 
annual abortions in Mexico, a number only documenting women who received medical 
care for complications, suggesting the actual number exceeded official estimates.230  
Abortion also factored into the governments family planning campaigns, although 
indirectly and sanctioning CONAPO initiatives encouraging responsible parenting.  
However, for activists, the criminalization of abortion became a matter of importance, 
and one with a national forum in 1975, and one intimately linked to Mexico’s 1970s 
women’s movement.  
As in most countries, public debates on abortion proved polemical.  A 
prominent scholar at the Centro de Estudios Internacionales (Center for International Studies) 
at the Colegio de México (COLMEX), Rafael Segovia spoke openly on the matter of 
abortion.  Religion became one of Segovia’s key targets in this predominantly Catholic 
country; indeed, he deemed Catholic influence as one of the gravest problem women 
faced in developing countries.  Segovia questioned the moral justification for Mexico’s 
ban on abortions; a service that he argued liberated women from the hazards of 
childbearing.  Alongside religion, he also noted “machismo” as a detriment to women’s 
liberation—a problem inherited from Europeans countries when they colonized 
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America.  Finally, Segovia, true to his role as scholar, deemed a legal study necessary in 
order to solve the questions surrounding the polemic matter of abortion, which along 
with other problems facing women would not be resolved by the International Women’s 
Year.231  Similarly, general coordinator of auxiliary prosecutors from the District 
Attorney’s Office, Dr. Olga Islas de González Mariscal presented the talk “Women 
Against the Mexican Penal Law,” and from a criminal stance point, called for the 
clarification of the law that criminalizes abortion.  The longtime professor at the 
UNAM suggested a norm that standardized the scope of limitations for prohibited and 
non-prohibited abortions, one that clearly determined an abortion is not punishable if 
procured for therapeutic or accidental loss of pregnancy, or one for women who have 
been sexually assaulted—so the criminalization is not left to the “subjective speculation” 
of the judge.232  At a governmental level, however, discussions of family planning 
overshadowed those on decriminalizing abortion, where government officials 
optimistically insisted that “the discussion over legalization of abortion will not even be a 
topic in twenty years if family planning programs have their desired results, because 
each woman will exercise absolute and perfect control over her fecundity.”233  In April 
2007 the Mexico City government legalized “elective” abortion in the first twelve weeks 
of the pregnancy; a service to woman originally implemented in fourteen hospitals.  By 
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October 31, 2012 close to 90,000 legal abortions has been conducted.234  Although no 
major legal updates to law took place in 1975 or thereafter, the IWY discussions and 
press coverage on abortion led to further research on the subject and mobilizations for 
its decriminalization in the succeeding years—and illegal and unsafe abortions still a key 
women’s issue to this day.235  
Mexican intellectuals also opined on the IWY and the women’s liberation 
movement.  “The status of women in society cannot be understood without considering 
the structure of the family,” wrote prominent sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen.  The 
longstanding Colegio de México academic examined women in peasant communities, 
where the family serves as a “unit of production and consumption, permanent 
institution that brings together several generations,” fulfilling important social functions, 
like providing education, caring for the elderly and the sick, just to name a few.  
Common for Latin American scholars at the time, Stavenhagen placed women’s shifting 
role in society as deriving from the changing role of peasant households as a result of 
structural transformations, especially those affecting subsistence agriculture, a 
phenomenon affecting the family structure in most Third World countries.  “[I]n the 
process of economic development peasant family units tend to disintegrate and the roles 
of men and women tend to differ more and more,” and thereby the family structure 																																																								
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changes and some of its previous social functions relegated to urban and specialized 
social institutions.  “The monetary economy, migration, wage labor generates strong 
tensions in the traditional family institution, which is linked to subsistence farming,” 
resulting in the shift of women’s role in society—thus necessitating “new social 
institutions and new ways of connivance” yet to be devised.  “It is unlikely that the 
International Conference of Women will devote itself to such creative activity, but it 
would be a great opportunity.”236  In the press, cartoonist Naranjo captured the realities 
of gender inequality deeply imbedded in Mexican culture (see Illustration 3.4).  It would 
not be the last time that Stavenhagen’s writings would serve as the lonely voice for the 
needs not only of the peasant, but also of the indigenous woman, a voice consistently 
calling for substantial changes.   
Although the indigenous voice remained largely absent, when present it differed 
from that of urban or middle class women.  Lita Paniagua, for example, seemed to have 
specifically looked for the indigenous woman during IWY.  In México75 she featured 
their voice and expectations for IWY, their discussion regarding cultural preservation as 
well as their desire to manage their fertility, discussions particular to their context and 
largely absent from the official IWY forums.  “The indigenous woman must break free 
of prejudice toward herself that she has internalized from ladinos,” detailed Modesta 
Miza Bal, and described how when young women left her community for the cities and 
then returned they felt ashamed of their native language and no longer wished to speak 
in Cakchiquel, nor did they want to wear their traditional wear.237  “They have 
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accepted the idea that being indigenous is to be inferior.  I wish IWY would value the 
equality between men and women, but also between women.”  Modesta Mza Bal also 
added to the discussion of population control by saying “indigenous women want and 
should have access to family planning,” and that the campaign need not wait for the 
indigenous woman to come for instruction, as proved the case for the majority in 
1975.238  While neither the government nor feminists groups took on the needs of 
indigenous women in a large way, they were nevertheless sporadically represented; still, 
they remain among the most vulnerable peoples in the country, and one of the three 
groups with the highest risk of having an unsafe abortion.239  
Finally, in a section dedicated to men’s opinion of IWY for México75, Octavio 
Paz proved critical of the women’s movement approach to equality.  When asked his 
opinion about the women’s liberation undertakings, Paz expressed his ideas regarding 
two parallel movements: “There is a feminine and masculine erotic rebellion; moreover 
and independent, there is a political rebellion of women.”  According to Paz, the two 
should not be confused.  “I have read that the leaders of the women’s movement think 
that the sexual act is an act in essence political.”  Yet, he maintained that as a theory, 
given that “[a]ll social acts, all human actions are tinted with politics, everything is 
contaminated by history, but what defines the sexual act are not relations of domination 
but biological relationships.”  The sexual act was defined not by “history but nature: the 
body.”  On a second note, Paz believed women’s enslavement ran parallel to that of all 
of humanity, and that position shouldn’t be compared to that of the proletariat or 																																																								
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blacks, like North American leaders of the women’s movement did—because women 
were neither “a class nor a race.”  Paz believed the placement of women within distant 
historical or political categorizations served as a “new form of alienation.”  Moreover, 
he expressed disbelief in an equality that meant identity or homogeneity.  Like many 
other intellectuals, Paz claimed the liberation of women rested alongside that of the 
working class, and one linked to structural problems.  He concluded with his own idea 
regarding the feminization of eroticism.  “I mean, also another liberation, a liberation that 
only women can carry out: transform western eroticism, feminize our aggressive 
civilization, provide us with different erotic archetypes different from those of modern 
industrial society, on its two fronts: the capitalist and the communist, has imposed on 
the planet…” Paz’s criticism of western ideas regarding liberation, femininity, and love 
reflected a questioning of incoming ideas from abroad, borrowed and tossed out at a 
national level—often in a different context—and one that for him, at least, further 
constrained women.240 
Although the struggle to define feminism continued, the IWY proved critical for 
the women’s movement in Mexico.  The year 1975 remains a watershed moment for 
women’s rights in Mexico, even if limited to urban centers—principally Mexico City—
and middle class women.241  The countryside, for the most part, remained isolated from 
the event’s themes and discussions.  However, even if the IWY debates had reached the 
																																																								
240 “Pero yo me refiero, además a otra liberación, una liberación que sólo la mujer puede realizar: 
cambiar el erotismo occidental, feminizar nuestra agresiva civilización, darnos arquetipos eróticos 
distintos a los que la sociedad industrial moderna, en sus dos vertientes: la capitalista y la comunista, ha 
impuesto en todo el planeta…” “Los hombres opinan: Octavio Paz,” México 75: año internacional de la mujer, 
no. 5 (May 1975), 1, 10.  
241 Alma Rosa Sánchez Olvera, El feminismo mexicano ante el movimiento urbano popular: dos expresiones 
de lucha de género (1970-1985) (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Campus Acatlán, 
2002), 114; Adriana Ortiz-Ortega and Mercedes Barquet, “Gendering Transition to Democracy in 
Mexico,” Latin American Research Review (Special Issue, 2010), 109. 
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rural sector, the needs of women from agricultural communities differed significantly 
from those of the city.  In the states of Jalisco and Zacatecas, for example, young women 
from large households engaged in outdoor activities traditionally intended for men.  
Husbands, sons, and brothers migrated to the United States and the women remained 
to take care of the farms and crops.  The women left behind not only remained isolated 
from national events, due to the absence of communications or social programs, but also 
proved far more aware of their immediate municipal context and that of their siblings in 
the United Sates.  Family planning or women’s rights discussions circulating in Mexico 
City during IWY remained spatially remote; of equal importance, it was culturally 
foreign, for many rural women lived in fervently Catholic cultures.  For twenty-year old 
Antonia and ten-year old Aurora Covarrubias Covarrubias, sisters from a family of 
eleven siblings from the municipality of Atolinga, Zacatecas—harvesting crops and 
tending the cattle after their four eldest brothers migrated to California became a norm 
in the region.  Although oblivious to the changing gender roles, they too lived through a 
transformative period in Mexico, one that witnessed the migration of large portions of 
the population from central states, and especially those based predominantly around 
agricultural production.  Many of the women in these isolated communities often 
married men laboring north of the U.S.-Mexico border.242  While their liberation, or 
more precisely “awareness of rights,” derived from living in US soil, they too were part 
of a women’s movement as they entered the North American labor force—although a 																																																								
242 Discussions with Aurora and Antonia Covarrubias Covarrubias, and Elpido Quezada Gaeta 
in Romita and Totolco, Municipio de Totatiche, Jalisco, December 2014.  Aurora Covarrubias 
Covarrubias (my mother) married José Nicandro Quezada from Jalisco (my father), who had been 
working in California and periodically traveled back to his community.  After marrying Aurora, both 
made their home California, and eventually moved back to Mexico.  In September 1994, they again 
migrated to the United States, this time to Oklahoma.  Antonia Covarrubias Covarrubias, on the other 
hand, married and stayed in Mexico.  However, one of her children settled in California and two others 
have since migrated to Oklahoma.    
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different process of rights cognizance than that of their urban counterparts.243  Finally, 
although not all-inclusive or all encompassing, the IWY and Conference provided a 
national platform for nascent women’s groups in Mexico.  The event drew even more 
women toward feminist and human rights themes; many of the event’s official 
representatives and attendees subsequently went on to serve long careers, often in public 
posts, advancing women’s rights.   
 
Conclusion: The Conference Failed Us  
 By the conference’s conclusion, the coverage on the IWY meeting reflected 
mixed feelings about the overall accomplishment.  The event concluded on July 2, 1975 
with a World Plan of Action “on what should be done to deal with the many problems 
of women.”   Prior to the Conference a draft had been articulated by a committee in 
New York, headed Princess Ashraf Pahlavi of Iran, with intention of amending during 
the IWY Conference.244  The Plan of Actions provided guidelines for advancing 
women’s rights through governmental, NGOs, political parties, unions, and other 
organizations and for the duration of the Decade of Women, running from 1975 
																																																								
  243 While presenting his book Mañana is Forever? in the talk show Ventaneando (TV Azteca) with 
Paty Chapoy on August 19, 2011, Jorge G. Castañeda discussed positive outcomes of Mexican women 
entering the labor force in the United States, especially regarding their independence as a result of having 
their own money.  “La mujer mexicana, cuando llega a trabajar a los Estados Unidos, y son muchas, ya 
son 5 o 6 millones mujeres llegadas en los últimos 15 años, se transforman en una manera extraordinaria. 
Tiene su ingreso, su lana, su casa, su entorno, sus amigas.  Y hay de aquel, que la empiece a fastidiar: el 
marido, el novio, el papá [Paty-De patitas en la calle]—te me vas…La mujer mexicana en Estados Unidos, 
incluso la indocumentada, le tiene confianza a una policía racista, represiva, mala onda, pero le tiene 
suficiente confianza para hablarle a la policía—oye este inbécil novio me golpeó ayer, llévenselo.  Y no se lo llevan 
al bote, lo mandan directo a Michoacán.  Entonces son cosas, una experiencia libertadora que viven las 
mujeres mexicanas en Estados Unidos, que nos muestra que también podemos cambiar nosotros aquí.”  
Full video available in Jorge Castañeda’s web page. <http://jorgecastaneda.org>.  See: Mañana Forever?: 
Mexico and the Mexicans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), and Ex Mex: From Migrants to Immigrants (New 
York: New Press, 2007).  
244 United Nations, Meeting in Mexico: The Story of the World Conference of the International Women’s Year 
(Mexico City, 19 June-2 July 1975) (New York: United Nations, 1975), 28-29.  
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through 1985.245  While the intent had been for women to return to their home 
countries “motivated” and “empowered,” and to a large extent that proved the case, 
though many returned angry and disappointed.246  The expectations hinged on a 
singular event seemed somewhat paramount and reaching a consensus on women’s 
needs was not an easy task.  For instance, U.S. Representative Patricia Hutar recapped 
on the event with the following remarks: “The U.S. delegation regrets that this 
conference must conclude with a declaration which remains unacceptable to a number 
of countries.”  Hutar, headed the U.S. delegation in Mexico City along with Daniel 
Parker from the Agency for International Development, expressed her dismay at the 
inability negotiate the language in the World Plan—which the U.S. delegation along 
with United Kingdom and Germany  “made repeated efforts to enter into serious 
negotiations about other political and economic points in the Group of 77’s draft…”247 
Elena Poniatowska, in a 1976 discussion on abortion, noted “International Women’s 
Year did not respond to any real women’s problems. How many nurseries have been 
built in the Federal District?  How many family diners?” Poniatowska illustrated how 
little of the Plan of Action—which included concrete proposals for improving women’s 
condition in areas like education or health—had been fulfilled in Mexico, and the 
deficiencies in the government-sponsored family planning initiatives.248  Others, like 
British delegate John Macrae held a more realistic outlook on the conference.  “I did 																																																								
245 “A World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of International Women’s 
Year,” in The U.N. Decade for Women: Documents and Dialogue, edited by Arvonne S. Fraser (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1987), 37.  
246 Karen Garner, “World YWCA Leaders and the UN Decade for Women,” Journal of 
International Women’s Studies 9:1 (September 2007), 217. 
247 U.S. Department of State, “U.N. World Conference of the International Women’s Year Held 
at Mexico City,” The Department of State Bulletin, Vo. LXXIII, No. 1886 (18 August 1975), 237.  
248 “Opiniones,” in El aborto en México, edited by Mariclaire Acosta, Flora Botton-Burlá, Lilia 
Domínguez, Isabel Molina, Adriana Novelo and Kyra Núñez (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1976), 40-41.  
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not leave Mexico City in a deep state of depression at the outcome,” he wrote, “[t]he 
world is a very large and complicated place and the aspirations of women in different 
parts of it differ to a marked degree.”249   
Despite all the flaring disappointments, the positive outcomes of International 
Women’s Year and Conference must not be minimized by the negative press coverage, 
especially that of women from the First World.   For the Mexico the UN call for a 
women’s year and the conference proved critical, especially for the country’s feminists.  
For one, Mexico’s engagement as host pressured the government to act on matters of 
gender.  President Luis Echeverría’s administration carried out public policies on behalf 
of women’s rights and proudly showcased its legislative changes during IWY and after.  
Since the suffragist movements of the first half of the twentieth-century, civil 
organizations nor the government had engaged little with gender issues—that is until 
1975 by providing forums for controversial thus allowing for the flourishing of Mexico’s 
feminist movement.  Women’s organizations, like Coalición de Mujeres and the Frente 
Nacional de Lucha por la Liberación y Derechos de las Mujeres, came to the forefront voicing key 
demands.  Meanwhile, the government passed constitutional amendments making men 
and women equal under the law.  The creation of CONAPO and its family planning 
campaigns proved the most marketed government initiative designed to improve 
women’s lives.  Although Mexico came short of fulfilling its goal of less than 100 million 
Mexicans by the year 2000—making the Echeverría a Third World model country for 
its commitment to UN population control initiatives and hosting the Second Decennial 
																																																								
249 Helen McCarthy, Women of the World: The Rise of the Female Diplomat, 253.  
	 210 
International Conference on Population in 1984—the official endorsement of women’s 
issues invigorated activism, particularly in cities.250  
Mexico75, the country’s official IWY publication, not only opened a space for 
female journalists, photographers, but also for artists.  The publication featured 
prominent artists in the country with brief biographies and samples of their work.  The 
list features such luminaries as Pilar Castañeda, Beatriz Caso, Elvira Gascón, Martha 
Chapa, Fanny Rabel, Consuelo Revueltas, Leticia Arroyo, and Helen Escobedo.251  In a 
two-page spread of the August issue of México75, Argentine art critic exiled in Mexico, 
Raquel Tibol wrote on an art exposition at the Museum of Modern Art in Mexico City.  
In commemoration of IWY, the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes (National Institute of Fine 
Arts), institute responsible for the arts in the country, presented “La mujer como creadora y 
tema del arte” (Women as maker and subject of art) featuring eighty-three pieces by 
thirteen female painters and sculptors—Frida Kahlo, Leonora Carrington, Remedios 
Varo, and Olga Costa amongst the group.252  During the IWY Conference the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs provided a space for the exposition “Veinticuatro mujeres en la plástica 																																																								
250 Raúl Romo Viramontes and Miguel Sánchez Castillo, “El descenso de la fecundidad en 
México, 1974-2009: a 35 años de la puesta en marcha de la nueva política de población,” in La situación 
demográfica de México 2009, edited by CONAPO (México, D.F.; Consejo Nacional de Población, 2009), 23; 
see footnote on page 20 of Soto Laveaga, “‘Let’s Become Fewer,’” 20. 
251 Isabel de la Mora, “La pintura de Pilar Castañeda: artista mexicana,” México 75: año 
internacional de la mujer, no 2 (February 1975), 11; Olga Harmony, “Las raíces de Beatriz Caso,” México 75: 
año internacional de la mujer, no. 3 (March 1975), 7; Olga Harmony, “Elvira Gascón,” México 75: año 
internacional de la mujer, no. 4 (April 1975), 11; Olga Harmony, “El realism de Martha Chapa,” México 75: 
año internacional de la mujer, no. 5 (May 1975), 11; Raquel Tibol, “Fanny Rabel a treinta años de su primera 
exposición,” México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 9 (September 1975), 14-15; Raquel Tibol, 
“Consuelo, de los Revueltas,” México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 10 (October 1975), 6-9; “Las 
formas en material textil de Leticia Arroyo,” México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 11 (November 
1975), 8-9; Raquel Tibol, “La escultora Helen Escobedo y su conflicto arquitectónico,” México 75: año 
internacional de la mujer, no. 12 (December 1975), 8-9. 
252 The thirteen featured artists included: Frida Kahlo (13 pieces); Leonora Carrington (11 
pieces); María Izquierdo (9 pieces); Remedios Varo (8 pieces); Alice Rahon, Cordelia Urueta, Lilia 
Carrillo and Olga Costa (together 7 pieces); Marysole Worner Baz and María Lagunes (together 4 pieces); 
Helen Escobedo, Geles Cabrera and Angela Gurría (together 2 pieces). Raquel Tibol, “la mujer como 
creadora y tema del arte,” México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 8 (August 1975), 8-9.  
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mexicana” (Twenty-four Women in Mexican Plastic Art) funded by the Instituto Mexicano 
del Café (Mexican Coffee Institute, INMECAFE), and coordinated by Tómas Gandy and 
Elia Carnabal as part of the Fausto Cantú Peña program of “Café y Arte,” which 
sought foment interest for Mexican art.  “IWY has helped me, as well as other artists, 
diffuse my work, and to exchange ideas with other compañeras,” said painter Nieves 
Moreno.  Yvette Boulet believed it was about time for an IWY, which for her proved “a 
very effective way to promote art and women artists.”253  With a distribution of 30,000 
copies, México75 proved a governmental publication for International Women’s Year 
largely written and edited by women—and one that opened its pages to Mexican artists, 
many of which were little known, and to other professionals.254  
Most importantly; however, IWY and Conference powered discussions on 
gender, both nationally and internationally.  The event presenters, like many other 
actors at the time—activists, journalists, diplomats, intellectuals, UN institutions, 
NGOs—engaged the emerging mass media, from the print press to radio and televised 
means.  When Arvonne Fraser began representing the United States in international 
forums she realized the importance of the United Nations for the global women’s 
movement.  Fraser had been active in US feminist activism, but did not realize “there 
was an international cadre of skilled, experienced, and committed women within the 
U.N and within the traditional women’s organizations with consultative status to the 
																																																								
253 Nieves Moreno, Yolanda Quijano, Julia López, Celia Cherter, and Yvette Boulet, Fany 
Rabel, Alicia Saloma, Marie Calire de Souches, Sara Liberman, María Teresa Campos, Magdalena 
Chemali, Esther González, Macrina Krauss, Irma Griza, Olga Dondé, Lourdes R. de Martínez, Elena 
Massad, Ma. Luisa Parraguirre, Lorraine Pinto, Herminia Euffo, María Teresa Vieyra y Tina Villanueva 
were the artists exposing their work at the Ministry of Foreign AffairsPerla Schwartz, “Mujeres en la 
plástica mexicana,” México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 6 (June 1975), 14.  
254 The front matter page of the January issue of México75, of a bound edition, notes the 
collection is made up twelve issues of the newspaper.  The edition consists of 2,000 regular and 1,000 luxe 
copies. México 75: año internacional de la mujer, no. 1 (January 1975), Front Matter.  
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U.N….”255  She not only participated in global women’s efforts, but also witnessed what 
she described as a “burgeoning worldwide feminist movement.”256  By 1975, not only 
did governments make use of nascent means of global communications, but also the 
burgeoning group of international feminists.  From Helvi Sipilä to the women 
representatives and participants showed their awareness in the importance of mass 
media to push their cause worldwide.  Fraser described some of the women as “highly 
sophisticated lobby[ists], aimed, in the short term, at influencing the conference and the 
world’s media, and, longer term, at influencing national governments.”257  The 
disparaging press coverage, even after the conference concluded and written by 
participants themselves, embodies the empowerment of women engaged in the forging 
of an international agenda for the betterment of half of the world’s population and for 
one of its most vulnerable group.  The 1970s, and in particular 1975, energized national 
feminist movements and also internationalized women’s movements.  The “global 
feminists,” often working through UN networks, catapulted a rights crusade distinct 
from its suffragist predecessors, one with activists voracious for change, but one with 
divergent conceptions of feminism and women’s needs.  Nevertheless, in the case of the 
IWY Conference, governments like Mexico’s provided forums for debating women’s 
issues, forums with national and international audiences, which proved unprecedented. 
The IWY and Conference; however, has thus far remained absent from the 
history of the globalization of human rights in the 1970s—even while the women and 
the event served as a catalyst for its national and international diffusion.  This silence 
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does little justice to the event’s real importance in the rights sphere.  Even while many 
feminists hoped to avoid Third World issues or human rights, Latin American women 
embraced human rights concepts and by default contributed to their diffusion. The 
IWY Conference reveals attempts to disassociate women’s movements from Third 
Worldism or human rights issues.  Fear that “men’s issues” sidetracked from women-
specific needs postponed the association of women’s rights as human rights to the 1990s, 
that is, after the conclusion of the Decade of Women, 1976-1985, and two subsequent 
conferences: one in Copenhagen, Denmark (1980) and the other in Nairobi, Kenya 
(1985).258  Several authors also note the importance of the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights Conference in Austria.  Ara Wilson, for instance, argues that “The 
interpretation of sexual rights as a form of human rights consolidated in the 1990s over 
a span of UN conferences.”  Wilson lists the 1993 Vienna Conference, along with the 
1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, the 1995 
Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development, and like other authors, also lists 
the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women.259  The latter event 
consolidated debates regarding the recognition of ‘women’s rights as human rights’, a 
phrase popularized by a speech First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton gave at the event.  
“If there is one message that echoes forth from this conference, let it be that human 
rights are women’s rights and women’s rights are human rights once and for all.”260  
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However, at a regional level many Third World, and in this case Latin American 
activists, proved more accepting of human rights concepts and embraced them in 
response to state repression in their home countries, especially Chilean women.  The 
timing of the IWY Conference offered Latin American women a national, regional, and 
international forum to voice their demands, which in the case of Chile tended to be 
about political violence given that the event occurred just as the realities of Pinochet’s 
regime came to light.  The IWY Conference thus reveals Latin American women 
forging their own definitions of human rights, one meaning political and economic 
rights, rather than gender-specific rights as espoused by First World women, thus 
contributing to the forging of human rights definition and practice.  Latin American 
women’s demands reflect their contribution to the construction of human rights 
meanings in the 1970s. 
The IWY and Conference, for Mexico, reveals the initial appropriation and 
usage of the term human rights in the press.  Unlike other women’s conferences in the 
country’s history, the IWY event brought women from across the globe and allowed 
them to engage in defining what constituted women’s rights.  In the process, the 
appearances of human rights in the press reveal their usage and meaning prior to their 
full-flung dissemination into mainstream society by the late 1970s.  The PPS utilized the 
expression in reference to Chilean violations, and cried out “Sin mujeres no hay democracia” 
(Without women there is no democracy).261 Antonio Carrillo Flores, Secretary-General 
of the 1974 World Population Forum, also used the phrase, more likely due to his links 																																																																																																																																																																		
Nations’ Women’s Conference in Beijing, China, 09/05/1999,” Series: Off - The - Air Broadcast 
Network Video Recordings Relating to the Clinton Administration, 01/20/1993 - 01/20/2001. 
Collection WJC-WHCA:   Video Recordings of the White House Communications Agency (Clinton 
Administration), 01/20/1993 - 01/20/2001. National Security Archive. 
261 “Incorporación plena de la mujer a la vida del país, demanda el PPS,” 6 June 1975, Respuestas 
de prensa, Año Inter. de la Mujer, Vol. Junio I, 1975, 11, CENCOS. 
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with the United Nations and participation in international discussions where it was 
likely to engage universalist language of rights, especially that of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).  Chilean journalists exiled in Mexico yelled out 
the names of their comrades incarcerated in Pinochet’s prisons and called for human 
rights protections.  The Mexican section of Amnesty International followed suit and 
demanded protections for political prisoners by reminding their audiences of 
international rights.  Female journalists writing for the nation’s newspapers or for 
México75 wrote about the United Nations and its various functions, they explained the 
rights of women as guaranteed in the UDHR, and went as far as adding a few notes 
about the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.  For Latin Americans, 
women’s rights were to be demanded any way possible, by utilizing the emerging 
international system to push for basic needs—from housing to labor rights—and in their 
demands laid the sanctification of human rights as a modern tool for demanding 
change, and one that did not require using the political system nor taking up arms.  
Latin American women, and journalists working in national print sources, should be 
remembered as constructors and disseminators of the global concept of human rights.
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ILLUS. 4.1.  “The Sacking.”  Police raid the offices of CENCOS.  Photo from CENCOS Archive. 
(Reproduced without permission) 
 
 
ILLUS. 4.2.  “The Return.”  CENCOS staff unloads files previously taken by police and returned, 7 July 
1977, Mexico City.  Photo from CENCOS Archive. (Reproduced without permission) 
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CHAPTER 4: 
From Liberation Theology to Human Rights:  
José Álvarez Icaza, the Catholic Church, and CENCOS’ Propagation of Human 
Rights in Mexico 
 
“The press remained almost totally servile;  
the Church was for the first time publicly 
 and steadily in favor of the Mexican Revolution  
that under Díaz Ordaz gave their educational,  
charitable, and pastoral work considerable room to grow;  
and the businessmen confidently rode in ‘the same boat’  
with their explicitly ‘anti-Communist’ president.”1 
--Enrique Krauze 
 
Introduction: Localizing Universalities  
 In the 1970s, the non-governmental organization CENCOS became one of the 
first in the country to actively engage the language of human rights.  The press 
organization originated in 1964 as a Catholic institution and official communications 
organ for the Mexican Episcopate, that is until it broke with the Church hierarchy in 
1969.  Thereafter, Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social (National Center for Social 
Communication; CENCOS), its founder and president engineer José Álvarez Icaza, and 
a team of journalists offered an alternative source of secular and ecumenical source of 
news for the Mexican populace.  CENCOS opened its doors to student mobilizers, 
South American exiles, indigenous peoples, and just about any group that needed an 
outlet to voice their sufferings.  As a result, CENCOS contributed to the localization of 
the 1970s emerging universalities, that of human rights.  
 It was through the transformations in the Church after Vatican II that 
organizations like CENCOS emerged.  During the meetings between 1962 and 1965, 
some “2,000 and 2,500 bishops and thousands of observers, auditors, sisters, laymen 																																																								
1 Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, 734. 
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and laywomen” gathered in four different sessions, and produced sixteen documents.2  
José and his wife also attended.  In these meetings, the Church sought renovation, a sort 
of modernization, in order to bring the institution closer to the people.  As a result, the 
Vatican came to endorse “the political rights tradition, freedom of religion, freedom of 
expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of organization,” however, it did 
not directly engage in the growing vernacular of human rights—like some scholars 
retroactively apply to encompass all the rights mentioned.3  The Vatican II meetings; 
however, did place particular emphasis on economic rights, unlike the promoters of 
human rights in the 1970s that compacted their definition to mean civil and political 
guarantees as delineated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The Vatican 
did however seek to advance its engagement with social communications, and from that 
compromise CENCOS came to fruition.  
 While the Vatican may not have directly engaged the language of human rights, 
CENCOS and adherents of Liberation theology did.  Liberation theology promotes a 
more radical reading of the gospel so as to focus more acutely on the needs of the poor 
and originated in Latin America.4  While some scholars contend that Liberation 
theology initially avoided the concept, the work of José and CENCOS on behalf of 
political prisoners in the 1970s proves otherwise.5  The brutal repression brought on to 																																																								
2 Jordan G. Teicher, “Why Is Vatican II So Important?” NPR, 10 October 2012 
<http://www.npr.org/2012/10/10/162573716/why-is-vatican-ii-so-important>. 
3 Gregory Baum, “Human Rights and Liberation Theology,” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, 
no. 6 (1986), 328.    
  4 For more on Liberation theology see: David Tombs, “Latin American Liberation Theology: 
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Catholics in South and Central America drew individuals like Pepe to the human rights 
cause, this because of its association with international organizations working on behalf 
of political prisoners and the arrival of exiles in Mexico, many of which passed through 
the Álvarez Icaza home and through CENCOS.   
 Moreover, Liberation theology adherents possessed the necessary international 
networks to transition effectively to the human rights cause.  As the socialist path toward 
justice wavered, human rights became a middle ground between armed struggle and a 
non-violent approach to local needs.  Rights scholar Ariadna Estévez López argues “the 
Mexican human rights discourse emerges in the eighties as a result of an eclectic fusion 
of the discourses regarding the democratic transition and liberation theology.”6  Yet, the 
Church spurred by the Second Vatican Council and Liberation theology contributed to 
the dissemination and nationalization of the global language of human rights in the 
1970s, a decade prior to the proliferation of non-governmental organizations in the 
1980s.   
 Initiated as an informational gateway between the Catholic hierarchy and the 
Mexican populace, CENCOS served as an official proxy for the Mexican Episcopate in 
Mexico City until 1969, when the organization condemned the massacre of students in 
the Plaza of Tlatelolco.  Its founder broke with the Church hierarchy but engaged with 
numerous regional and international conferences that advanced Liberation theology 																																																																																																																																																																		
in 1971, eight years after the Catholic church endorsed human rights with Pacem in terris, an encyclical in 
which Pope John XXIII gave theological justification to a long list of rights that virtually mirrors those set 
forth in 1948 in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Mark Engler, “Toward the 
‘Rights of the Poor’: Human Rights in Liberation Theology,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 28:3 (2000), 339-
341. 
6 “[E]l discurso de derechos humanos en México surge en la década de los ochenta como 
resultado de una fusión ecléctica de los discursos de la transición a la democracia y la teología de la 
liberación,” Ariadna Estévez López, “Transición a la democracia y derechos humanos en México: la 
pérdida de integralidad en el discurso,” Andamios 3:6 (June 2007), 7.  Dr. Estévez López is also the author 
of Human Rights and Free Trade in Mexico: A Discursive and Sociopolitical Perspective (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008).  
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and that established the international networks that fostered human rights debates in the 
1970s.  Álvarez Icaza’s CENCOS stands as one of Mexico’s first non-governmental 
organizations and human rights centers, and the very first institution to engage actively 
the universalist language of human rights in Mexico.  CENCOS thus contributed to the 
process of localization and nationalization of an internationalist concept that was 
initially associated with violations in South and Central America, and eventually came 
to mean repression in Mexico as well.7 
 
José Álvarez Icaza  
 Located on Medellín #33 of Colonia Roma, a mixed district of newly renovated 
and dilapidated colonial buildings, the National Center of Social Communication 
(CENCOS) has persisted through the decades as one of the country’s original non-
governmental human rights social press organization.  Far removed from the early 
tradition of newspaper clippings, CENCOS is virtually a paperless organization that 
works primarily through social and news media networks.  José “Pepe” Álvarez Icaza, 
its founder, inherited the three-story building in 1964 from his aunt, whose framed 
picture still hangs above an idle fireplace.  What used to be a residential home, today 
provides offices for national and international NGOs.  Press conferences take place in 
an old dining room, with a colonial double door to the noisy street.  If a large crowd of 
reporters appears, the staff sets out long tables with green cloths in an old auditorium 
space towards the back of the building, now converted into a pastured backyard.  
																																																								
7 See Raquel Pastor Escobar’s José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano 
II en el laicado mexicano (Ph.D. dissertation, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales con orientación en 
Sociología, UNAM, 2004), 394.  
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Cameras and reporters disappear in a moment’s notice from the squeaky wooded-floor 
building, and off to the next press conference.   
 While serving the human rights cause through a modern approach, the building 
still holds links to its early foundation.  Francisco Barrón Trejo, the assistant director, 
has worked there for more than two decades and personally knows many of the people 
that come to see him.  Barrón activism dates to his youth participation in the Catholic 
grassroots movement of Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs), which encouraged local 
and faith-based organizing.8  Clara Ruíz Juárez, one of the oldest of the CENCOS 
members and devout swimmer, screens calls and signs people in, familiar with the 
protocol for safeguarding information.  She lived through police raids of the building, 
and now sits in a desk a level above the main entrance door that is opened only after 
visitors identify themselves through an intercom system.  A mix of technology-savvy 
generation of young professionals dedicated to the human rights cause walk, and at 
times sprint, up and down the various sets of staircases.  Then director, Brisa Maya Solis 
Ventura, in a permanent state of haste common to the territory, tends to the many 
obligations necessary for keeping up with the minute-to-minute issues of the day and 
maintaining a building and staff with a tight budget.  The office spaces rented out to 
other organizations include rights activists of all ages and diverse professional 
backgrounds.  The Europeans and Americans in the building work for international 
organizations, and in some cases cooperate with other NGOs housed there.  From time 
to time, Clara and Francisco work with undergraduate and graduate students looking to 
use CENCOS material to write their bachelor’s thesis, a graduation requirement for 
many enrolled in public universities.  These students consult what is left of the 																																																								
8 Interview with Francisco Barrón Trejo, 18 May 2012 (Mexico City).  
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organization’s archive after some ten tons of material were donated to the Escuela 
Nacional de Antropología e Historia (The National School of Anthropology and History, 
ENAH) archive in Mexico City, which also houses other Catholic collections.  Ample 
material remains in bound texts, including original newsletters up to the early 1990s, 
many with the personal imprint of its founder José Álvarez Icaza and his team.   
 Born a year after the armed phase of the Revolution (1910-1920), José Álvarez 
Icaza Manero lived a lifelong struggle for human rights in Mexico.  “Pepe,” as his close 
friends called him and a common nickname for those named José, was born the 21 of 
March 1921 in Mexico City, and died in the same city where he labored so hard to 
publicize injustices.  The religious persecution his family endured during the Church-
State armed struggle, better known as the cristiada or the Cristero War (1926-1929), 
shaped his ideological outlook toward destitute populations.9  For some, the cause of the 
conflict lay in an incessant State seeking “to legislate in matters” of the Church.10  Since 
independence, the government sought to reduce the Church’s intrinsic role in society.  
After the Revolution, leaders included a number of articles in the 1917 Constitution 
curtailing the power of the church, one of which secularized education.  While the 
articles were not immediately implemented, they caused great havoc when President 
Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) attempted to do so.  Historians continue to debate the 
degree of pious inspiration behind the Cristero conflict and to what extent the rural 
armed struggle reflected the Church’s response to federal encroachment, particularly 
the land reform policies that pitted landowners and the clergy against the receptors of 
																																																								
9 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 103.  
10 Matthew Butler, “The Church in ‘Red Mexico’: Michoacán Catholics and the Mexican 
Revolution, 1920-1929,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 55:3 (July 2004), 520-521.  
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the ejidos, the agraristas.  Yet, to Catholics the State was undoubtedly in violation of their 
rights and overextending its power—such was Icaza’s stance on the conflict.11  
 Álvarez Icaza’s account provides an intriguing insight into the lived experience of 
practicing Catholics in the city.  “Our family lived the cristero war intensely…we were 
with the cristeros, wholly,”12 said Álvarez Icaza in a 1999 interview with his daughter-
in-law, whose work remains the most in-depth on CENCOS.  When people from their 
homes in the countryside, or as he called them rancherones, fleeing the violence arrived in 
his parents’ home, his family opened their doors to them.  The Álvarez Icaza’s home 
must have been a known shelter, either self-established or designated by the Mexico 
City Church hierarchy, especially since his home served as a type of provisional chapel 
for mass, baptisms, and weddings.  He tells the anecdote of a guest who when attending 
his aunt’s wedding accidently knocked on the door of a general, a potentially fatal 
mistake given the fact that the war was underway.  But the official responded, “No, the 
wedding’s not here, it’s next door.”  Since churches remained closed, priests performed 
religious services in private, probably in similar manner to Álvarez Icaza’s home, where 
his family sheltered at least one priest throughout the conflict.  “We lived in a constant 
state of tension,” explained Álvarez Icaza, and “Every evening, immediately after mass, 
we would put away ornaments and sacred glasses and everything in the basement of the 																																																								
  11 For more on the Cristero War see: Jean A. Meyer, La cristiada (México: Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores, 1973-1974); David C. Bailey, ¡Viva Crísto Rey! The Cristero Rebellion and the Church-State Conflict in 
Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974); Jim Tuck, The Holy War in Los Altos: A Regional Analysis of 
Mexico's Cristero Rebellion (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1982); Barbara Miller, “The Role of 
Women in the Mexican Cristero Rebellion: Las Señoras y las Religiosas,” The Americas 40:3 (Jan. 1984): 303-
323; Jennie Purnell, Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of 
Michoacán (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Matthew Butler, Popular Piety and Political Identity in 
Mexico's Cristero Rebellion: Michoacán, 1927-29 (Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Matthew Butler, ed., Faith and Impiety in Revolutionary Mexico (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). 
12 “En mi familia vivimos intensamente la guerra cristera.  Mi familia era muy mochilona, por supuesto que 
estábamos con los cristeros, pero así, totalmente.”  José Álvarez Icaza interview cited in Pastor Escobar’s José 
Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado mexicano, 110.  
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house, in an inaccessible place, so that we wouldn’t get caught.”  They took precautions 
since it was common for the authorities to search suspected Catholics in the colonia Santa 
María, where the family lived, just northwest of the historic center.13 
While there may have been a certain level of tolerance, the overall climate pushed 
devout Catholics to worship in private.  One of his aunts worked for the Secretary of 
Public Education (SEP) and disguised her missal readings.  She “had copied the book of 
mass in SEP official paper and she would go to mass with her public education file,” to 
avoid getting caught.14  The authorities sent those suspected of worshiping to El Moro, 
one of Mexico City’s first skyscrapers, today the Lottery building located on Paseo de la 
Reforma, a main boulevard begun during the reign of Maximilian (1864-1867) in order to 
link his Chapultepec Castle residence to the National Palace, and to give the city a more 
modern, European look.  Originally called Calzada de la Emperatriz, in honor of his wife 
Carlota, a group of Juárez’s “francophile progressives” renamed the calzada after 
Sebastían Lerdo de Tejada took office in 1872.15  Respectable people, Álvarez Icaza 
recounted, ended up in this inundated building, an experience they remembered with 
considerable disdain.16 
From an early age, Pepe’s parents encouraged social participation.  Although his 
parents may have been disengaged or “cowardly” as he put it, when it came to matters 																																																								
13 “Constantemente vivíamos con una tensión horrible.  Todos los días en la noche, 
inmediatamente después de la misa, a guardar los ornamentos y los vasos sagrados y todo en el sótano de 
la casa, en un lugar que era inaccesible, para que no fueran a pescarnos,” Ibid. 
14 “había copiado el libro de misa en hojas de oficio de la SEP e iba a misa con su expediente de 
educación pública,” Ibid. 
15 Barbara A. Tenenbaum, “Streetwise history: the Paseo de la Reforma and the Porfirian State, 
1876-1910,” Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico, edited by 
William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French (Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 1994), 
129-130.  Also see Carlos R. Martínez Assad, La patria en el Paseo de la Reforma (México, D.F.: Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, 2005).  
16 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 110. 
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of the faith they were “very courageous” and saw their children’s participation as a duty.  
On one occasion, Icaza’s mother told him, “Look, José, there will be a demonstration of 
Catholics, you have to go there because it is an obligation, but if you hear a shot, run 
like a greyhound.”17  A certain expectation of violent confrontations lurked in the back 
of Catholic dissenters.  Pepe’s accounts of urban skirmishes borderline caricatured acts 
of wily Catholics outsmarting dopey police.  When the “very witty people” saw the 
horse-riding police coming their way they would roll out pallets or marbles skidding the 
horses and the officials along with them.  As for the firefighters breaking up the crowds, 
those targeted would cut their hoses.  In one instance of heightened persecution, Álvarez 
Icaza remembers his family participating in a peaceful protest where they released 
balloons the same day at the same time.  For him, the balloons hovering over the city 
displayed “a formidable manifestation of strength.”  Given the prolonged persecution of 
faith-based groups during the cristiada, Pepe’s account in some ways represent eulogies 
formulated through oral histories and born out of persecution.18 
 The long-term consequences of the conflict were many.  At least for Icaza, the 
country’s faith increased due to the persecution.  “Don’t think that we were so religious 
in Mexico, no.  The persecution shock things up.”19  This was certainly the case for 
many parts of Mexico, especially in the rural countryside, places like Jalisco, 
Michoacán, and Guanajuato, where martyred cristeros and priest reconditioned local 
religiosity.  The Church as an institution did not wither away after the cristiada, but 
instead negotiated its survival, at times co-existed and in others legitimized the ruling 
																																																								
17 “Mira José, va a haber una manifestación de católicos, tú tienes que ir allí porque es una 
obligación, pero si oyes un tiro, corres como galgo,” Ibid.  
18 Ibid., 111.  
19 Ibid. 
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party.  Yet, the long-term effects of the relationship built between urban and rural 
Catholics during the conflict remains largely unexplored.  Álvarez Icaza explains this 
connectedness made the struggle possible.  Although not always the case, according to 
Icaza, those in the city worked on the logistics, organization, propaganda, and 
provisions: “[c]ities and the countryside were constantly intertwined, constantly 
communicated and mutually supported the action of the cristeros.”  After the conflict 
ceased, the brief association between these two groups could not survive.  Over time, the 
legacy of the cristiada was confined to the countryside, where the conflict endured in the 
rural populace’s imagination, and where most of the fighting took place.  In urban 
spaces, the memory of the rebellion withered away and a less folksy brand of 
Catholicism prevailed.  Many of the urban Catholic groups, like the right-wing 
Sinarquista movement, grew out of the discontent with the Bishops’ negotiations with the 
government to end the conflict.20 
 Meanwhile, in 1929 the Álvarez Icaza family finances took a turn for the worse, as 
was the case for many landowning families.  Pepe’s father lost an hacienda to the 
government, expropriated for land reform purposes.  With this, the family was placed in 
a difficult situation . . . suddenly there was no more income,” remembered Pepe.  Until 
then the family had lived in comfortable home in Mexico City’s center.  Thereafter, 
Álvarez Icaza explains, they moved to a large but ugly house, and their residences 
progressively worsened.  His father ended up suffering from liver problems as a result of 
the expropriation, but once he dedicated himself to selling onions the family’s income 
improved.  “I have sad memories of the house on Pino #120 where we lived with a lot 
																																																								
20 “Ciudades y campo estaban constantemente enlazadas, constantemente comunicadas y 
mutuamente apoyada la acción de los cristeros,” Ibid.  
	 227 
of poverty,” said Pepe regarding that time period.  From that lived experienced surged 
the family’s governing principles, two of which related to the government and the 
United States.  “Everything that comes from the government is bad and politics is a 
dirty thing that you should not be polluted by.”  Moreover, “Everything that comes 
from the United States is bad,” given that it is “the land of flavorless fruit, odorless 
flowers, men without honor and women without shame.”  The latter further 
substantiated, in his parents’ minds, by the shameful films that derived from the country, 
and the “invasion of Protestants,” among other things.  As the devout Catholics that 
they were, Álvarez Icaza remembers his father celebrating the assassination of General 
Álvaro Obregón in 1928, which Pepe recognized was not a very Christian thing to do.  
But for their family the Catholic assassin José de León Toral was a hero.21 
 
From Engineer to Catholic Social Activist  
 Pepe’s faith-based upbringing unquestionably shaped his ideological outlook.  But 
it was not until his adult life as an engineer that he was shaken by the social realities of 
his workers, an episode that changed the course of his life.  His wife, Luz María (Luzma) 
Longoria Gama explained, that her husband went from being a civil to a sort of human 
engineering “concerned more about people than things.”  At the time Pepe started a 
contracting company with his brother in-law Eduardo Saucedo Siller.  All of her 
brothers-in-law attained degrees; one was a doctor, the other a lawyer, and Pepe an 
engineer.  The company had been quite successful through the 1940s and 1950s, 
characteristic of the economic growth of the country.  On one particular occasion José 
took on an excavation project.  Given the time limitations, he could not gather the 																																																								
21 Ibid., 116; Interview with Luz María Longoria, 28 March 2012 (Mexico City).  
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required machinery for the work.  He asked one of his workers if he could assemble a 
team of some thirty or more workers to complete the project.  “Of course, I will take 
you to my town,” responded his laborer.  According to Luz María, he brought all the 
working-age men from a town in Veracruz.22  “All brought with them bags or morrales 
carrying, each one, their food for fifteen days.  This consisted of corn and chile gordas23 
they heated with firewood and wasted scrap wood from the construction projects,” 
recounted José.  None of these men spoke Spanish fluently.  As time passed, Pepe 
noticed they had left and confessed he asked his foreman, “What happened to your 
Indians, they don’t last, they have abandoned the project…[this] is going to delay us.”  
The workers left without notice and without their salaries, embarrassed for not having 
been able to complete the project, said Pepe.24  His foreman responded, “Oh, boss, let 
me tell you there almost none left.  They were not eating well, they did not have 
anywhere to sleep, and they were just in bad shape.”  According to Pepe, this opened his 
eyes to some of the country’s realities, so he renounced his post as a contractor and 
abandoned the culture of exploitation he believed characteristic of construction 
companies at the time.25   
 From that point forward, José sought more involvement with disadvantaged 
populations of Mexico.  The episode with his workers left Pepe with a sense of 
remorsefulness.  He believed he had been very inhumane toward the men when he 
focused on finishing the project without regard for the workers’ welfare and he believed 																																																								
22 Interview with Luz María Longoria, 28 March 2012 (Mexico City). 
23 Gordas, or gorditas, are oval-shaped fried or toasted thick tortilla often stuffed with fried beans, 
cheese, or other traditional foods.   
24 In this case Icaza is making reference to a traditionally rural bag, most often made of cloth, worn 
across one shoulder.  Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II 
en el laicado mexicano, 138. 
25 Interview with Luz María Longoria, 28 March 2012 (Mexico City). 
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he had to change completely.26  He did so by increasing his involvement in the religious 
organizations of which he was already a member.  One of these was the Congregación 
Mariana (Marian Congregations), a youth association established around 1563 by 
Belgium Jesuit Jean Leunis as an institution of spiritual formation, and dedicated to the 
cult of the Virgin Mary.27  Álvarez Icaza joined the congregation in 1937 through the 
church he regularly attended; at the time Father Benjamín Pérez del Valle led the 
Congregación Mariana.  Initially José had reservations about joining the Marianas: they 
seemed “too devout, too bourgeois,” in part because Father Pérez del Valle tended to 
invite those students that came from well-to-do families.28  
 Despite these early reservations about the organization, José joined.  “We were 
doing charitable works: we taught catechism, we visited juvenile correctional schools, 
prisons and hospitals, we did a number of charities, especially at Christmas,” said José.  
His spirit, however, tended to be a bit more rebellious than father Pérez del Valle would 
have liked.  Pepe recognized that he never excelled within the Marianas, and that in 
some way they lacked political fervor characteristic of other religious-based 
organizations for the youth.  He did acknowledge that the Congregación Mariana kept 
his generation “out of trouble.”29  And he excelled within the ranks of an organization 
known as Los Conejos (The Rabbits).  Initially he served as the university section of Los 
Conejos, and eventually held the presidency.  Just before enrolling in a five-year 
engineering program in 1939, Pepe joined the organization, one that sought 
independence from other university organizations linked to the church hierarchy.  Due 																																																								
26 Ibid.  
27 Alfredo Verdoy, SJ, “La confederación nacional española de las Congregaciones Marianas o la 
movilización de la juventud de la Virgen (1919-1923),” Estudios Eclesiásticos 85:334 (June 2010), 550.   
28 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 123-125.  
29 Ibid.  
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to their mysterious and mute nature, other students dubbed them the “rabbits.”  
According to Pepe, “It was a group that participated in student elections and to be more 
effective we went underground, no one knew who was a rabbit, we did not have any 
particular appearance or a public front, everything was kept between us, which allowed 
us to make alliances with a lot of people and cause a lot of mischief.”30  Nevertheless, 
they still functioned as a religious-based student organization, but with a tint of political 
militancy.  
 In some cases, Los Conejos operated contrary to the goals of other Catholic 
organizations on campus.  For instance, the Jesuit-led National Catholic Student 
Coalition (Unión Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos, UNEC) sought to forge a “class of leaders 
made up of Catholic intellectuals with cultural and political weight,” according to 
Raquel Pastor Escobar, scholar on the Church in Mexico.31  A generation of leaders 
pushing Christian democracy principles throughout Latin America proved a key goal of 
this institution and their efforts bore fruit, high profile political representatives included 
Eduardo Frei and Manuel Garretón of Chile.32  Los Conejos on the other hand sought to 
combat communism within the University, while the UNEC proved far less interested in 
the anticommunist crusade and instead pushed the objectives of the Mexican 
Revolution, unlike other groups that “satanized” the revolution.  While labeled as part 
of the extreme right by leftists groups, the UNEC students tended to defend social 
Christian movements and often found themselves in controversial positions with the 
church hierarchy and with traditional postures of the Catholic right.  Just before their 																																																								
30 Ibid., 126-127. 
31 Ibid., 127.  
32 Bernardo Barranco, “La iberoamericanidad de la Unión Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos 
(UNEC) en los años treinta,” Cultura e identidad nacional, edited by Roberto Blancarte (México: Consejo 
Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1994), 188-189, also cited in Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la 
puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado mexicano, 127. 
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dissolution in 1945, many of the UNEC militants became founders of the Partido Acción 
Nacional (National Action Party, PAN), right wing and one of main oppositional party of 
the PRI during its 71-year reign.33  Icaza’s distance from the Christian democratic 
movements in Mexico and Latin America remained; yet, he expressed greater affinity 
for religious organizations with a social and activist tint.34 
 His wife Luzma’s social development had too been shaped by the Catholic faith.  
According to José, Father Pedro Velázquez had been key in her spiritual formation, 
particularly in fostering a sense of social responsibility.  Father Velázquez was part of 
the Catholic movement commonly associated with the work of Jesuit Alfredo Méndez 
Medina who led the Secretariado Social Mexicana (Mexican Social Secretariat, SSM) since 
its inception in 1920 until his removed in 1925.  This Mexican Episcopate created this 
institution to coordinate social action organizations reinstituted after the Mexican 
Revolution.  Méndez Medina “helped mobilize thousands of workers in competition 
with the state-directed unionization drives,” following “a third or middle way between 
capitalism and socialism,” in which he applied medieval Catholic corporatism to the 
SSM.  Méndez Medina seemed particularly preoccupied with the conditions workers 
lived in Mexico, and focused on easing the effects of capitalist expansion on labor.  This 
happened through a number of programs, one included a lending system for workers 
called Cajas de Ahorro León XIII.  Father Velázquez also concerned himself with the 
working classes and their needs, even when the episcopate did not always approve, and 																																																								
33 Bernardo Barranco, “La iberoamericanidad de la Unión Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos 
(UNEC) en los años treinta,” 189.  
34 In 1970, Álvarez Icaza responded to an editorial published by El Sol de México by stating his 
organization CENCOS was not part of the “Democracia Cristina” (Christian Democracy) nor did it possess 
a political agenda or political aspiration—his staff simply wanted to be journalists.  He also clarified that 
CENCOS was a non-profit civil organization. “Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, 21 September 1970, 
19:00 hrs,” AGN, Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales [hereafter DGIPS], 21 April 
1969-30 August 1978, File 6, Box 1779-B, 1-2. 
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he carried a project of small, low-interest small loans accompanied by trainings through 
a system of Cajas Populares while he served as the Mexican Social Secretariat from 1948 
until his death in 1968, with a brief interim in 1957 when he was removed him from the 
position.  The work of these men profoundly shaped Catholics’ stance toward the needs 
of the urban working class.35  Before marrying, Luzma attended a church that belonged 
to the Mexican Social Secretariat where Father Velázquez served.  “In his homilies he 
talked a lot about the social doctrine of the Church and the rights of workers and all of 
that; it caught my interest.”  According to Luzma, in all of this Father Velázquez 
attempted to arouse the consciousness of Catholic businessmen on their obligations as 
Christians and as citizens.36  
 Luzma passed the teachings she learned from Father Velázquez down to José.  
“Through her I realized that I treated construction materials, iron, cement, etc., better 
than the men working them,” recounted Álvarez Icaza, “I fell off my ‘individualist 
horse’ when I discovered the poverty my workers lived, a requirement for inciting my 
social involvement.”  The couple met in 1944 and married a few years later in 1947, 
“we had fifteen children, which is an awful lot,” confessed Álvarez Icaza.  He also 
confessed having lived a long and happy marriage with “an admirable woman, much 
more socially restless than I.”37  After they wed, Luzma and José continued their social 
involvement through the Marian Congregation.  The organization broadened the 																																																								
 35 Stephen J. C. Andes, “A Catholic Alternative to Revolution: The Survival of Social Catholicism 
in Postrevolutionary Mexico,” The Americas 68:4 (April 2012), 530-557; Kristina A. Boylan, “Mexican 
Social Secretariat [Secretariado Social Mexicano],” Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Politics, Volume II, L-Z, 
edited by Roy P. Domenico and Mark Y. Hanley (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 376-377. 
Pedro’s brother, Miguel, also published a type of biography, Pedro Velázquez H.: apóstol de la justicia (Mexico: 
Editorial Jus, 1978).  Pedro wrote a book on the SSM, El Secretario Social Mexicano (25 años de vida) (Mexico: 
Secretario Social Mexicano, 1945).  
36 Interview with Luz María Longoria, 28 March 2012 (Mexico City). 
37 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 130-138. 
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membership to include spouses, since most of the original members in José’s group 
found it difficult to keep attending after they wed.  Traditionally the Marian 
Congregations divided members by gender and age, with the help of Jesuit Father 
Francisco Marín and Luis G. Hernández, the clergy created various groups for couples.  
From that point forward Álvarez Icaza left his career as an engineer, and along with 
Luzma they dedicated themselves to furthering social causes through these Church 
organizations that eventually became the Movimiento Familiar Cristiano (Christian Family 
Movement) in México.38  
 
The Sense of Community and the Christian Family Movement  
 The Movimiento Familiar Cristiano (MFC) grew out the some fifty-five couples 
organized by 1958 under the direction of Father Marín and Hernández.  The 
movement initiated in Uruguay and Argentina in 1948 under the direction of Father 
Pedro Richards CP,39 a central figure of the MFC in Latin America.  After Richards’ 
conjugal spiritual retreat in Mexico, the attending couples created their own section of 
the Christian Family Movement.40  At its centerpiece stood the family.  “The MFC 
hinges upon a notion of service as a form of sanctification; marriage itself is a 
responsibility of mutual sanctification between husband and wife.”41  José liked the focus 
on the family as the motor of social change, “because he thought it was through the 
families that the elements of solidarity and respect for the community and caring for 
others and the social matters in general should be taught.”  The middle and upper class 																																																								
38 Interview with Luz María Longoria, 28 March 2012 (Mexico City). 
39 CP stands for the Congregation of the Passion of Jesus Christ.  
40 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 144-145.   
41 Valentina Napolitano, “Between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ Catholic church religious discourses in 
urban, Western Mexico,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 17:3 (1998), 331.  
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families of the MFC worked through the assembly of married couples, ranging from 
groups of five or six.  Even though the family proved the cornerstone of the MFC, 
Luzma made the point that teachings had a “community projection” and did not simply 
stay within friends and the groups.42  Contact with other Latin American Catholic 
organizations led the couple to establish their own religious-based and grassroots 
movement in Mexico, one that would eventually bring them closer to Mexican 
Episcopate and leaders of the Church hierarchy.   
 The MFC pushed the family to engage ecclesiastically and with civil society.  In 
the case of Mexico, both Luzma and Pepe came in contact with underprivileged 
populations of Mexico, including indigenous peoples; “the Family Catholic Movement 
broadened our outlook,” said Luzma.  In response to an invitation to Huasca, Hidalgo, 
a town about two hours northeast of Mexico City, the Álvarez Icaza couple met with 
rural peasants of indigenous background.  In these travels Luzma  “realized, for 
example, that rural women were truly enslaved.”  This sort of obliviousness of Mexico’s 
social realities was fairly typical attitude of the country’s urban middle class, but at the 
same time did reflect Luzma’s crusading temperament.  Since then the couple worked 
on establishing a group with less affluent members, a unique task given that the MFC 
had been primarily made up of middle to upper class Catholics.  The undertaking 
proved extremely difficult.  Given the traditional social norms, Luzma recounts how 
they struggled to get the women to engage since they were reluctant to sit at the table, 
much less eat or converse alongside their husbands.  For the movement’s leaders, the 
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experience opened their eyes to a Mexico known to them, with Luzma taking particular 
notice of women’s condition.43 
 Soon after, the couple took on important leadership roles within the Movimiento 
Familiar Cristiano.  The Archbishop of Guadalajara and the Episcopal Commission 
president assigned them to the national presidency for two consecutive terms, from 1958 
until 1964.44  By that point, Pepe had resigned from his position on the construction 
firm he led alongside his brother-in-law.  He dedicated himself fully to the designing the 
basic structure of the MFC.  His business partner suggested Pepe focus on the 
movement while still receiving a salary from the company for a couple of years until 
other sources of economic support solidified.  Once they became the regional presidents 
of the MFC, Luzma and Pepe traveled widely.45  “We traveled throughout the world 
promoting the movement,” said Pepe.  They were responsible for expanding the 
movement to Central America: Guatemala, Panamá, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and 
Honduras.  “It was very nice because wherever we arrived, there would be a married 
couple we did not personally know waiting for us at the airport and they would take us 
to their home,” recounted Pepe, “within a week or in a matter of three days we were 
very well-known by a multitude of married couples of that country.”  Their regional 
work in MFC raised the couple’s profile within the religious community in Mexico, and 
set the stage for their participation in international forums—not exclusively Catholic.46  
 
Second Ecumenical Council (Vatican II) and the Media of Social Communications  																																																								
43 Interview with Luz María Longoria, 28 March 2012 (Mexico City). 
44 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
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 As such, the Álvarez Icaza couple rose within the ranks of international religious 
faith-organizations linked to the Catholic hierarchy.  Due to their exposure and 
visibility, Church officials selected them in late 1963 to audit the last session of the 
Second Vatican Council meetings in the fall of 1965, becoming the only lay couple to 
hold such privilege.  This had been by invitation of Monsignor Emilio Abascal y 
Salmerón of Veracruz.  At the time of the invite, in 1963, Abascal served as the head of 
the Episcopal Commission for the Seglar Apostolate when he approached Monsignor 
Luigi Raimondi, Apostolic Delegate to Mexico, suggesting that someone from Mexico 
be chosen as a lay observer for the council sessions.  Raimondi, who up to that point 
had been the only connection between Vatican II and Mexico, accepted the proposal 
but asked that whomever was chosen have some kind of international position.  
According to Pepe, Abascal responded, “I have someone, Engineer Álvarez Icaza who is 
the Latin American president of the Christian Family Movement.”  Monsignor 
Raimondi accepted. Yet Abascal’s invitation did not extend to Luzma.  Pepe then 
explained that he shared the presidency of the MFC with his wife and made his case by 
saying, “curious thing, as you know mothers are the ones that teach the faith to 
children,” and Monsignor Abascal agreed with Pepe.  Although an uncommon practice 
at the time for both husband and wife to attend, Luzma too secured an invitation.47  Just 
before their departure, the Icazas had a going away celebration in Cuernavaca, 
Morelos.  After the mass in the Cathedral, a small picnic took place in the Centro de 
Investigaciones Culturales, with both Monsignor Illicht and Méndez Arceo—prominent 
leaders.48 
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 Once in Rome, José and Luzma recount the social infrastructure that segregated 
attendees by gender.  For instance, they were not allowed to take communion together, 
so Pepe went first and she followed right behind.  Two bar-cafés served as the socializing 
grounds in two chapels of the Vatican . . . for men of course.  The women attended a 
nice café near a Pope’s tomb.49  When Luzma tried to enter the bar alongside Pepe, 
they guards stopped her.  They then tried to enter the women’s café, and initially the 
guards denied him the entrance.  But in one instance when Pepe invited a Protestant 
observer to the women’s bar they managed to get in, “come, lets go to the women’s bar, 
which is smaller and they give out better things . . . we will be more comfortable,” he 
told his companion.  For two or three days the men mingled along with Luzma in the 
women’s bar until the guards denied them the entrance any further.50  When Pepe put 
in a special request to enter together as a couple, the secretary of the council ignored the 
claim on the basis of more important business to tend.  Eventually José made fuss and 
the secretary ceded to the request.  “It was a problem for them for me to drink a coffee 
with my wife, and we are talking about in the Council, at that moment a sign of the 
times.”51  One thing both took away from the Vatican II meetings, regarding the role of 
women, was “that there were many well-educated and capable people, yet with an 
extremely machista mentality.”52  
 Despite some disenchantment, the Vatican trip proved intellectually 
transformative for the Álvarez Icaza couple.  “We had a really good experience at the 																																																								
49 Interview with Luz María Longoria, 28 March 2012 (Mexico City); José Álvarez Icaza interview, 
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Council,” said Luzma.  The Second Vatican Council was convened on January 25, 
1959, yet the meetings did not initiate until October of 1962 and concluded three years 
later in December 1965.  Almost three thousand priests from more than 140 countries 
attended, along hundreds of experts, and about 160 observers, of which 101 were non-
Catholic.53  This international reunification for the purpose of renovation ignited a 
series of transformations for the Catholic Church and its followers.  Particular attention 
was given to the role of lay people and missionary work toward impoverished 
populations, including liturgical and linguistic openness for indigenous populations.  It 
was a type of social update of the Church to the realities of the fast-changing and 
tumultuous world of the 1960s.   
 Within the council, Luzma and José became interlocutors of their own 
experiences.  The Vatican Council sessions comprised of 168 general assemblies held in 
the span of four sessions; one per year since its inauguration in 1962.54  “We were 
invited to work on some commissions to contribute some of our experience as a married 
couple and as the leaders of the Christian Family Movement.”55  In preparation for this 
grand appearance in Rome, Luzma and José, in conjunction with MFC members, 
gathered documentation, conducted research, and essentially studied the Vatican 
process up to that point, given they had missed the first three sessions.  A questionnaire 
survey proved the most exceeding task.  By asking a series of questions regarding family 
life, the couple hoped to capture the most accurate representation of families’ 
expectations for the Vatican meetings.  Data collected from questions such as “What do 																																																								
53 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
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you expect from the Council regarding family life?” to “What do you take to be the best 
aspect of the Church in its current position?” informed the Álvarez Icazas’ on the needs 
of the demographic they represented.56  However, José’s expectations regarding their 
role as auditors seemed removed from reality: “We were so foolish that we did not 
realize we were appointed lay ‘auditors’, meaning our job was to ‘listen,’ and it is clear 
that role offered little opportunity to participate.”57  While the couple hoped for greater 
participation, the realities of the Church’s hierarchy revealed they would have little 
impact in Rome—but a greater role in their home country.     
 Nevertheless, Luzma proved something of a rarity for the Vatican.  Not many 
married women attended in the first place, and probably not many were as outspoken as 
Mrs. Longoria.  José explains that both he and Luzma attended a mixed theological 
commission where everyone went to defend their proposals.  The Mexican couple 
attended that session precisely for that reason, “That is where Luzma became very 
famous.”  Pepe recounts that during a discussion by priests, Luzma jumped in: “I am 
frankly displeased by what you are saying.”  Given the institutional disregard for couples 
up to that point, Luzma grew annoyed at the way the clergy spoke about marriage, and 
their tendency to dismiss the husband and wife relationship for anything beyond mere 
procreation.58  While it is hard to measure the extent of the Álvarez Icaza contribution 
to the conciliar meetings, Luzma’s attendance, nevertheless, offered an audience of men 
a poised voice regarding the needs of women, mothers, and wives.  By the end of the 
Vatican II sessions, Pope John XXIII recognized Luzma as a “representative of the 																																																								
56 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
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mothers of the world,” at the time a mother of twelve children and the first female lay 
observer.59  What a better place to have a female expression, especially when decisions 
made by Church authorities affected the lives of millions of Catholic kin across the 
globe.   
 
Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social (CENCOS) 
 In addition to their contribution to committee work the Icaza couple took on the 
role of publicizing Vatican II sessions through a telex machine.  In a previous Vatican 
meeting, the Church recognized the utility of mass communications for the purpose of 
Christianizing.60  This was a direct outgrowth of the Decree on the Media of Social 
Communication, also known as the Inter Mirifica, promulgated by Pope Paul VI at the 
end of the Second Session of the Council, which ran from September thru December 
1963.  In two chapters, made up of approximately twenty-four points, the articles 
articulate the Church’s relationship with media technologies.  The opening statement 
reads:  
Among the wonderful technological discoveries which men of talent, 
especially in the present era, have made with God’s help, the Church 
welcomes and promotes with special interest those which have a most direct 
relations to men’s minds and which have uncovered new avenues of 
communicating most readily news, views and teachings of every sort.  The 
most important of these inventions are those media which, such as the press, 
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movies, radio, television and the like, can, of their very nature, reach and 
influence, not only individuals, but the very masses and the whole of human 
society, and thus can rightly be called the media of social communications. 
In this rather brief text, in comparison with the various declarations that came out of 
this council, the Vatican leaders also maintained the access to technology and 
information as a right.  In the first chapter, the decree upheld it was “an inherent right 
of the Church to have at its disposal and to employ any of these media insofar as they 
are necessary or useful for the instruction of Christians.”  As far as the populace was 
concerned, “in society men have a right to information…about matters concerning 
individuals or the community.”  Films, art and radio were no entirely constrained to 
pastoral duties, but should also be employed for entertainment purposes as long as this 
media of social communication served “the cultural and moral betterment of 
audiences.”61  From MFC and the Vatican experience, José and Luzma gained social 
media experience, which they immediately applied upon their return to Mexico.   
 With the aid of the Mexican Church hierarchy, José and Luzma launched a 
religious-based press organization in character with the Inter Mirifica.  The decree 
established a role for the laity in “the use of these media,” and the creation of “good 
press,” a “truly Catholic press,” under the “watch” of bishops and managed either by 
the “ecclesiastical authorities or by Catholic laymen.”62  That is precisely what the 
Álvarez Icaza offered the Vatican and its Mexican public.  On June 22, 1964, the 
Mexican Episcopate, with the economic resources of José, created the Centro Nacional de 																																																								
61 See the Introduction, Article 1 and 2; Chapter I, Article 3 and 5, “Decree on the Media of 
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Comunicación Social (CENCOS), the first social communications organization of its kind in 
Latin America.63  With the creation of CENCOS all other Catholic organizations 
previously working in cinema, the press, radio and television ceased their functions to 
the newly formed press organization.64  José recounts the organization’s first assignment, 
which included covering Cardinal Eugène Tisserant’s visit to Mexico.65  At the time of 
his visit in August 1964, the 80-year-old Tisserant ranked “second only to Pope Paul in 
the Catholic hierarchy.”  In this highly publicized event, a California newspaper noted 
Tisserant would stay in México for eighteen days.  Upon his arrival on the airport on 
the 17 of August, the report stated over fifty thousand people welcomed him.  Some 
speculated his presence in the country was to restore diplomatic relations between the 
Mexican government and the Vatican.  Given the tone of the reporting, it is likely that 
this was indeed Tisserant’s mission.  However, the government was not as anti-clerical 
as suggested.  To illustrate the supposed bleak Church-State relations in Mexico, the 
article noted that the country was so anticlerical that the president-elect, Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz (1964-1970), “reportedly a deeply religious man, did not even enter the chapel 
when his daughter was married a few years go.”  Rather, the relationship between the 
Church and the government had been at best ambiguous, with low points during the 
mid-1800s and in the 1920s with the Cristero Rebellion. However, the anti-clerical 
fervor of the post-Revolutionary period had waned by the time of the Second Vatican 
Council—and the government did not have an official stance against the Church—the 																																																								
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relationship rather proved one of duality: distance with a tint of reverence.   
Nevertheless, whatever the purpose of the cardinal’s visit, one of CENCOS’ first tasks as 
an official communications institution of the Mexican Episcopate was to cover this 
event.66 
 CENCOS in many ways grew out of José’s organizational experience with the 
Movimiento Familiar Cristiano.  As leader of the MFC, the Mexican engineer had acquired 
a building on Aristótles No. 279, with a printing press on the very first floor, purchased 
with the help of members.67  Following a similar organizational model as the MFC, 
CENCOS grew out a desire to reach out to more people.  José explains that overtime 
they looked for a more efficient method in fomenting social responsibility, one that 
worked alongside but beyond the family circle.  “And we discovered and ventured into 
the field of social communication, as the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council had just 
approved their respective document and called on all countries to promote, social media 
centers for the apostolate.”68    It is not clear how Pepe learned about this 
communications decree years before his appointment as auditor.  It is likely that 
through his work in the MFC and its press services, he came across the Vatican’s plans 
regarding social media.  
 CENCOS became economically feasible only after Pepe made use of an 
inheritance left to him by his aunt María Elisa Icaza.  Her father, José’s uncle, had been 
a prominent doctor, and she herself a very good manager and austere person.  She 
planned to leave all her possessions to José’s father, for he had been perhaps the only 																																																								
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person who visited her while she was in bed for four years due to a hip injury.  “I 
suddenly found that I was heir to a very important fortune.”  Pepe then sold some of the 
valuables, “with the money I did two very important things,” by instruction of his aunt 
that her possessions be put “for the greater glory, splendor and diffusion of the Christian 
faith”: the expansion of the Christian Family Movement, whose Secretariat’s office for 
Latin America opened where his aunt had lived, and thereafter the establishment of 
CENCOS in a home María’s father had purchased.  “That is how I journeyed across 
the Latin American continent and founded CENCOS,” concluded José.69  CENCOS, 
thereby, grew out of both private funding—that of the Icaza’s—and from resources of 
the Mexican Episcopate.  
 By the time of the fourth session of the Council, CENCOS provided the 
infrastructure for relaying news from Rome to Mexico.  Just before the inauguration, 
José’s CENCOS received the blessing of Monsignor Luigi Raimondi, the Apostolic 
Delegate to Mexico, on September 13, 1965.70  From a home they leased from the 
Italian ambassador to Spain, the Álvarez Icazas’ along with a team of about twenty 
people transmitted weekly updates on the sessions in Rome.71  In turn, those working at 
CENCOS in Mexico City published information in a bulletin titled Esta semana en el 
Concilio (This Week at the Council), and whose first number came out on September 26, 
1965.72  The CENCOS team also translated documents produced during the Council.  
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Any information José or Luzma required, the team would transmit back to Rome.  In 
their limited Latin, the couple also made numerous proposals on the family for the 
Mexican Bishops to present in their committees, but these never successfully made it 
into the discussions, instead it was the “French and African bishops who took it with 
much enthusiasm,” recounted José.  The Chilean Monsignor Manuel Larraín Errázuriz, 
president of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM), also took great interest in 
the Icazas’ work.73  The CENCOS team gained experience in Catholic media 
communications—knowledge they would later apply to their social and political 
activism.      
 CENCOS also transformed the way journalists wrote about the Church in 
Mexico.  According to Álvarez Icaza,  “[a]t the time [CENCOS opened] the 
relationship between journalists and the bishops were fatal.”  José explains that very few 
journalists ventured outside of the traditional coverage of the Catholic Church, often 
characterized as “subjects out of focus,” proving little insight into the progressive and 
social stance of Catholics since Vatican II.  Likewise, the religious realm attracted few 
journalists, those getting the assignments “were those punished, the bad behaved, the 
absent, or those that got drunk, etc. and as punishment they were sent to the religious 
source, it was extremely boring, there was nothing to report, say, a function in the 
Basilica or the seventieth coronation of the Virgin of Tlalpujagua and things of that 
sort.”  Not only that, but “[j]ournalists had a lousy notion of bishops and bishops 
thought that journalists were like Juan Charrasqueado, drunks, rowdy and gamblers.”  
In Mexican folklore Juan, nicknamed Charrasqueado due to a scarred face, exemplifies 
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a horse-riding and daring character commonly the subject of popular ballads.  “In that 
sense CENCOS did work that, I believe, few people appreciate: the Church’s 
rapprochement to media and the media to the Church.”74  CENCOS made links with 
journalists and eventually served as an intermediary between the official Church 
hierarchy and the Mexican mainstream press.   
 From its inception, CENCOS and the Icazas’ filled many roles.  On January 1967 
Monsignor Luigi Raimondi confirmed Pepe to the Pontifical Council for the Laity.75  
The couple also traveled extensively across continents as representatives of the Christian 
Family Movement and for conferences on communications.  Only in the month of April 
the Icazas toured through Chicago, Rome, Madrid, Barcelona, and Brussels.76  In the 
home front, the Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social served as the headquarters for press 
conferences for Catholic personalities, like Pedro Velázquez from the Mexican Social 
Secretariat.77  In other ways CENCOS functioned as an official public relations office 
circulating news and events, but many with José’s personal imprint and especially 
geared toward the fomentation of the media.  In January, CENCOS announced a 
conference “on the importance for the media in Latin America, to be at the service of 
their communities.”78  The following month Pepe’s team organized a meeting on social 
communication.79  On March 4, the organization embarked on a major campaign to 
publicize the “Church and Social Communication: First World Communication Day,” 
instituted by the Pope for May 7, 1967.  In all of this, José strived to present an updated 																																																								
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version of Catholicism to the Mexican population, this while the secret police of the 
Secretary of Gobernación kept tabs on CENCOS and José Álvarez Icaza at least since 
1967.80  
 
1968: Responding to Latin American Political Repression  
 In 1968 social mobilizations and government response took a turn for the worse—
and CENCOS drew closer to news of political repression.  Mexico’s social climate 
tensed alongside that of the United States and other parts of the world.  The widespread 
wave of radicalization drew from increased prosperity, global decolonization pressures, 
a bulging youth population, and clear inconsistencies in the Cold War values and 
policies of western democracies.  In this context, the CENCOS team chronicled the 
major events of the decade.  For the year 1965, CENCOS documented Martin Luther 
King’s march through Montgomery, Alabama with a reported 4,000 people, the United 
States refusal to accept any more braceros, and nationally the doctors mobilizations: 
“Once again doctors, residents and internes stopped working, given that the presidency 
has failed to fulfill its promises.”81  In the early years of its existence, CENCOS proved 
an alternative source of global news for Mexicans—from Malcolm X’s assassination to 
events unfolding in Cuba and Yugoslavia—this a time when other organizations too 
steered away from frontally criticizing the government.82   
 However, by 1968 Pepe seemed to have taken consciousness of dictatorship and 
its excesses in South America.  That year he joined the Pontifical Council of the Laity—																																																								
80 CENCOS, Índices 1967, 17, CENCOS Archive; See AGN, José Álvarez Icaza, DGIPS, 1967-
1981, File 5-8, Box 1779-B. 
81 CENCOS, Índice cronológico clasificado de la información de CENCOS en el año 1965, 12-13, 15, 
CENCOS Archive. 
82 CENCOS, Índice cronológico clasificado de la información de CENCOS en el año 1965, 20, 22, CENCOS 
Archive. 
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designed during the Vatican II meetings but created until 1967—which assists the Pope 
on matters of the lay within the Catholic Church.83  In mid-July the Pope named new 
members to the Council, including Brazilian Branca de Mello Franco Alves, whose 
husband had been one of the delegates at the 1945 San Francisco Conference that led 
to the creation of the United Nations.84  According to Pastor, De Mello served as Pepe’s 
gateway to the political repression in Brazil and in other parts of Latin America—which 
he too noted targeted Catholics.  José had a good Brazilian friend, Marcos Zabuda, 
whose work on the torture technique of “pau-de-arara” (torture technique involving the 
tying of individuals to a pole) informed him about the situation in the country.  
Nevertheless, De Mello’s accounts of the condition of political prisoners presented to the 
Council of the Laity, which she obtained from her son who was a journalist, shock 
Pepe.85  Despite the denunciations made, “the Council did not act with the courage we 
wanted,” believed Pepe.  Within the Council existed a type of censorship coupled with 
accredited diplomats ready to act on any denunciations—as had been the case for Brazil 
and the many condemnations made by De Mello.86  Pepe believed many religious 
authorities kept silence, including a Dominican bishop he had known from the MFC in 
Brazil (Lucas Moreira das Neves).  When he approached Moreira das Neves about the 
torture of Fray Tito de Alencar, he “[d]id not answer.”87  Given the often lack of 																																																								
83 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 211-212; “Pontifical Council of the Laity,” The Roman Curia, Pontifical Councils, La Santa Sede, 
<http://www.laici.va/content/laici/en/profilo.html>. 
84 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 212; Bulletin of The New York School of Social Work: Annual Report (New York: Community Service of 
the City of New York), 11. 
85 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 212-213. 
86 José Álvarez Icaza interview, 24 march 1999, cited in Pastor Escobar’s José Álvarez Icaza y la 
puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado mexicano, 213. 
87 According to Pastor, which cites Enrique D. Dussel, De Medellín a Puebla: una década de sangre y 
esperanza, 1968-1979 (México, D.F.: Edicol, 1979), 202, by 1969 some eleven Dominicans had been 
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denunciation by Vatican officials toward military dictatorships, many priests and lay 
people joined a growing national and international network of individuals far more 
vocal about condemning political repression—as became the case of Pepe.    
 Ideas that shaped and reformed Latin America’s Church toward the 
disadvantaged and the politically repressed—Liberation theology—solidified in 1968.  
Many religious leaders, including Samuel Ruiz García who worked on behalf of 
indigenous in Chiapas, attended the Conference of Latin American Bishops, also 
referred to as CELAM (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano or the Latin American Episcopal 
Council), in Medellín, Colombia.  There, the Latin American Catholic community 
gathered “to discuss the implications of Vatican II for the continent,” a key event 
defining the direction of the Church in the region.  According to David Tombs, 
Gustavo Gutiérrez—who shook the Church with the publication of his text Teología de la 
liberación: perspectivas (1971) or best known as A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and 
Salvation (1973)—served as theological adviser at the conference.  By CELAM, Gutiérrez 
had already presented an embryonic version of his ideas for a Church that looked more 
to the condition of the poor, this in a paper he gave in Chimbote, Perú, titled “Toward 
a Theology of Liberation.”88  For many, including Gutiérrez, CELAM served to 
broaden ideas regarding the Catholic Church’s response to the realities of Latin 
America—as also proved the case for Pepe who attended the Bishops Conference given 
his position in the Laity Council.   																																																																																																																																																																		
arrested, including Tito de Alencar, which was tortured with “pau-de-arara” technique. Pastor Escobar, 
José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado mexicano, 214. 
  88 The first CELAM meeting took place in 1955 (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), the second in 1968 
(Medellín, Colombia), the third in 1979 (Puebla, México), and the fourth in 1992 (Santo Domingo, 
Dominican Republic).  See, David Tombs, “Latin American Liberation Theology: Moment, Movement, 
Legacy,” in Movement or Moment?: Assessing Liberation Theology Forty Years After Medellín, edited by Patrick 
Claffey and Joe Egan (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009), 33-34.  
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 The Medellín gathering coincided with heightened student mobilizations in 
Mexico City. In Colombia, he witnessed first-hand how Father Pedro Velázquez came 
to a meeting where Pepe, the Mexican Bishops and other priests gathered.  Having 
arrived late because the bishops did not invite him, Velázquez brought notice of the 
student mobilizations taking place in the Zócalo (main square) in Mexico City and the 
military’s use of tanks to dismantle the camps and pursue the protestors.  According to 
Pepe, Puebla’s archbishop immediately phoned President Díaz Ordaz letting him know 
that they knew about the “communist” agitators and that they fully supported him.89  
This particular moment, which he narrated to Pastor, helped Pepe see how the Mexican 
Bishops’ stance on the political and social happenings back home—which they did not 
support—eventually led him to distance himself from the Church hierarchy.  Although 
initially removed from the national mobilizations, after CELAM José proved more 
sympathetic of students’ cause that questioned the government.90 
 Upon his return to Mexico, students approached CENCOS about using the 
organization’s printing press.  José feared for his institution’s reputation—he and the 
Episcopate being conservative entities that did not question Mexico’s governing entity.  
Nevertheless, he negotiated with the students and allowed them to print fliers under the 
conditions they be done outside working hours and without leaving a trace that could 
lead to the source—recounted Pepe.  “That is what we agreed, but the next morning 
there was a line of University boys asking, is it true this is where free flyers are made?”91  
Interestingly enough, Pepe believed the student movement proved a watershed moment 																																																								
89 José Álvarez Icaza interview, 14 April 1999, cited in Pastor Escobar’s José Álvarez Icaza y la 
puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado mexicano, 216, 223-224.  
90 Pastor Escobar, José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado 
mexicano, 224. 
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for him, just like it had been for journalist and editor of Excélsior Julio Scherer García.  
The latter told Pepe it had been those arriving at his desk and telling him what they saw 
in 1968 that changed him.92  As such, the rise of student mobilizations awoke in Pepe a 
political consciousness that diverted from the Church’s postures regarding the path 
towards a peaceful world through development, and one that condemned student 
mobilizations and armed revolutionary movements as the means for achieving justice.  
 Nevertheless, the summer mobilizations only served as the prelude to what 
unfolded not long after.  In the fall 1968, Mexicans awaited the opening of the 1968 
Olympic games.  Among the many things at stake during this international event was 
“[n]othing less than the reputation of the ‘Mexican Miracle’ itself.”  Presidential 
oversight of the games fell inadvertently on Díaz Ordaz yet had been the “obsession” of 
his predecessor, Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964).  When the latter, now in declining 
health, resigned his position as the Chairman of the Mexican Organizing Committee of 
the XIX Olympic Games in June 1966, Díaz Ordaz assigned a prominent architect to 
the position, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, celebrated for his 1963 design of the National 
Museum of Anthropology in Mexico City.93  As the first Olympiad held in Latin 
America, Ramírez Vázquez explained that Mexico strived to recover an ancient Greek 
tradition whereby “young participants from developing countries can show their 
culture, take pride and satisfaction and not simply applaud the winners of the more 
developed countries.”94  Given what had been seen as Mexico’s prolonged economic 																																																								
92 José Álvarez Icaza interview, 14 April 1999, cited in Pastor Escobar’s José Álvarez Icaza y la 
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prosperity, the October 1968 games seemed the well-deserved platform to showcase an 
up-and-coming regional force.    
 Nevertheless, the games fell short of their national aim.  The era’s political 
tensions found their way into the event as two black athletes, Tommie Smith and John 
Carlos, made of the games a platform of protest against racial discrimination by wearing 
no shoes and lifting their right hands decked with black gloves.95  Even while a peace 
dove was among the Mexican Olympiad cultural production, the events leading up to 
the inauguration were anything but peaceful.  The dove icon, designed by famed 
Monterrey-born satirist Abel Quezada, was in part rooted in the image Mexico forged 
internationally as a mediator, especially when it refused to break relations with Cuba 
after 1959.  An image paraded “along principal thoroughfares, as well as along wide 
tree-lined avenues, narrow streets, residential areas and in working-class communities.”  
Together with the dove stood the Olympic motto: Todo es posible en la paz (“Everything is 
Possible in Peace”).96  Yet, the summer protests continued in the city.  Urban and 
middle class students questioned the legitimacy of the governing party.  Left out of the 
revolutionary structure of representation, these protesters were in themselves a product 
of the success of the Revolution, one that opened way for a mass project of education 
and industrialization.  However, they symbolized the failure of the system to adequately 
incorporate and represent emergent political groups.  Breaking with its tradition of 
carrot-and-stick, whereby the government alternately rewarded and castigated its way 
through social upheaval, the PRI used military force indiscriminately against student 
protestors in the Plaza of Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968, days before the inauguration of 
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the games.  The violent repression severely fractured the legitimacy of the official party, 
the heir of the Mexican Revolution and the force that for decades had fostered social, 
political, and economic authority.  For many like Pepe, the happenings on October 2, 
1968 served as the first and final straw toward the awakening of a political 
consciousness.   
 
CENCOS Breaks with the Mexican Episcopate  
 Even while 1968 opened a decade of political questioning, the Church hierarchy 
stood still.  Like in many other parts of Latin America, Mexican Church officials did not 
condemn the military assault on student protestors in the Plaza of Tlatelolco in Mexico 
City.  Roderic A. Camp explains, “while this social violence marked a critical departure 
in the evolution of the Mexican political model, affecting an entire generation, it 
produced little reaction from the Mexican episcopate.”  Nevertheless, a small group 
within the Episcopate publicly denounced the Church for it indifference.  Bishop of 
Cuernavaca Sergio Méndez Arceo condemned the 1968 episode and he also called the 
“Mexican Conference of Bishops to explore the affair.”  Not surprisingly, Father 
Velázquez and the Mexican Social Secretariat also went against the general trend of 
apathy.97  In reality, the August before the Tlatelolco massacre, a number of institutions 
and Catholic representatives formed a group to reflect upon the student movement.  
The Mexican Social Secretariat, CENCOS, professors from the Iberoamericana and 
UNAM universities, clergymen, and Sergio Méndez Arceo made up the group.  
Together these representatives drafted a document to educate the diverse Catholic 
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sectors on the meaning and demands of the student movement.  On September 10, 
1968, thirty-seven priests published a spread in the mainstream newspaper Excélsior in 
which they summarized the findings of the Catholic-led group.98  Even so, those willing 
to condemn the governing party proved a small minority, while the hierarchy 
maintained its anti-communist stance and support for the PRI.  
 Nevertheless, the approach taken by the dissenting members of religious groups 
and intellectuals was terribly misunderstood.  The Catholic hierarchy assumed the 
committee’s declarations as officially representing those of the Mexican Social 
Secretariat, and as such, an official Church institution that had been tainted by 
communist ideologies.  This episode pitted various conservative groups against Catholic 
intellectuals who spoke on behalf of the student mobilizers, and who in turn were 
depicted as a “Marxist infiltration” in the Church.  Despite this controversy, after the 
student massacre on October 2, 1968, Monsignor Adalberto Almeida y Merino and 
Pedro Velázquez worked arduously with representatives of the Comité Permanente de la 
Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano (CEM), an organization of Mexican bishops under the 
leadership of Ernesto Corripio y Ahumada, to issue a statement regarding the events of 
1968.  The government interpreted the CEM declaration “as a public censure against 
the government’s” efforts “to impose the official truth.”  As such, conservative bishops 
rightfully presumed that Velázquez and the Mexican Social Secretariat were behind the 
CEM statement regarding Tlatelolco.99  
 1968 had longstanding effects for Catholic organizations in the country.  The 
October events fractured the relationship between the hierarchy and the more 																																																								
 98 Carlos Fazio, Algunos aportes del Secretariado Social Mexicano en la transición a la democracia (México, 
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progressive Catholic leaders and organizations.  In many ways, 1968 radicalized and 
officially opened way for the adherence of a more radical interpretation of Catholic 
doctrine through Liberation theology.  Tlatelolco polarized adherents of the Catholic 
Social Doctrine from those that sympathized with Mexico’s emergent social mobilizers.  
Mendez Arceo, years later dubbed the “Red Bishop,” alongside Pedro Velázquez and 
Bishop Samuel Ruiz García of Chiapas stood as the archetypes of radical Catholicism in 
Mexico and part of the wave of adherents of Liberation theology.  Meanwhile, the 
Mexican Episcopates’ tepid response to ’68 marked CENCOS’ shift toward the left and 
its engagement with Latin American political prisoners.  However, CENCOS initial 
solidarity with student mobilizers most likely initiated a rupture with the Episcopate. 
 After several rumors of estrangement, CENCOS announced it no longer served as 
a spokesman organization for the Episcopate.  On April 21, 1969 Pepe offered a press 
conference in which he officially announced CENCOS ceased the services it rendered.  
Pepe explained the hierarchy determined “unnecessary” the “supplementary” services 
CENCOS had provided the Episcopate, given that a new, more official and appropriate 
organ had been created (Executive Secretary of the Episcopal Conference).  Pepe’s 
declarations came after Mons. Ernesto Corripio Ahumada, President of the Conferencia 
Episcopal (Episcopal Conference), had informed Pepe of the organization’s release from 
its official Church duties on April 9, 1969.  For five years, “CENCOS has been 
providing daily, multiple services to social communications in Mexico, and has been 
broadcasting official messages that for that purpose the Episcopate delivered.”100  																																																								
100 Pepe used the terms “medios de comunicación social,” which could roughly translate into any of 
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During that time period, CENCOS was responsible for tasks like organizing the World 
Day of Social Communications established by Paul VI in 1967, and in accordance with 
Vatican II accords.  CENCOS had also issued “[h]undreds of statements and press 
interviews of personal nature, as has been always explicitly explained.”101  The latter 
statement denotes a diversity in its reporting that drew CENCOS away from being 
exclusively at the service of the Episcopate.  “In recent years we have served as a forum 
of expression to various ministries” and Catholic organs—according to Pepe, as the 
spirit of the Church had called for since the Vatican II meetings.102  While not 
exclusively in service of the Mexican Episcopate in 1969, from that point forward 
CENCOS initiated its second phase of social communications, offering an alternative 
source of news—both secular and ecumenical in nature.  
 Discussions regarding the break placed the cause of the rift on 1968 and on 
financial matters.  “Thus ends, therefore, a first stage of CENCOS’ life,” explained Pepe 
in the press conference, this while he thanked the various leaders of the Church for the 
opportunity and his desire to continue serving the “the Church, its hierarchy, and the 
people and Social Communications mediums in Mexico.”103  Álvarez Icaza also 
recognized differences existed between CENCOS and the Episcopate, and these were 
“often caused by the lack of adequate financial support that could never be fully 																																																								
101 From the press conference, Pepe seemed to indicate CENCOS was involved in the World 
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achieved as anticipated and initially planned”—that is as specified in CENCOS’ 
constitution and in the Decree on the Means of Social Communication (Inter Mirifica, II-
17 & 18).104  Miguel Concha Malo, priest and longtime human rights activist, too noted 
the schism between the Bishops of the Mexican Episcopate and CENCOS first emerged 
over finances.  The Church hierarchy began by demanding an audit and economic 
statements.  Tensions arose as a result of these requests; nevertheless, this did not inhibit 
the “concession of additional loans in 1966.”  Yet, the deep-seated conflict arose in 
1968, and it is no longer economic but an ideological one, when bishops perceived the 
work performed through CENCOS to surpass the limits delineated by the Episcopate.  
When Pepe’s organizations took on issues of broader public interest, meaning secular 
and political, having a bearing on  “public opinion,” the Catholic hierarchy took the 
opportunity to disassociate itself on the basis that the organization compromises the 
episcopate.105 Raquel Pastor denotes the 1968 episode and CENCOS’ official stance 
toward the student movement as the Bishops’ reasoning for ceasing to recognize the 
press organization as official entity of the Episcopate.  Pastor’s analysis and 1999 
interview with Álvarez Icaza, whose work remains the most in-depth on the life of Pepe 
and the work of CENCOS, places all emphasis on the 1968 ideological rift without 
expanding on the matter of funding.106  Nevertheless, both elements seemed to have 
played a key role in the eventual rupture with the Episcopate.  																																																								
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1970s: “Information as a Service” 107 
 From 1969 on, CENCOS diversified its functions, yet the organization’s focus 
remained well within its tradition of social communications.  After much consideration, 
Pepe concluded the Bishops’ had made the right decision in releasing the organization 
of its duties, which allowed CENCOS to delve into a new field of activities.  “It will no 
longer be CENCOS spokesman of the hierarchy…but instead, we will become a 
medium of expression and dialogue of the non-hierarchical Church.”  As lay people, 
there was a message to be disseminated and a people that wanted to hear it, and many 
which also wanted to voice their own—and CENCOS according to José would become 
the channel of expression.  In this second stage in the service of the organization, the 
ideological basis for the work of its staff and journalists would remain Christian in 
essence—following the Papal edict on communication which sought to utilize new 
technologies (cinema, film, press, television, radio) to spread the gospel but also to shape 
“the critical judgment of the reader and spectator.”108   José quoted two Church leaders, 
Pope Pius XII (1939-1958), the first pope to have spoken on television: “Public opinion 
is patrimony of all society…Where there is no expression of public opinion and above 
all, where we must recognize that it does not exist, it must be said that there is a void, a 
frailty, an illness of social life.”  José also built on this argument by including Pius’ 
successor’s message on journalism, John XXIII (1958-1963), in which he argued “The 																																																								
107 Words of José Álvarez Icaza, quoted in Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, 22 de junio de 
1970, 19:00 hrs [possible report by police on a press conference held at CENCOS]. AGN, DGIPS, 21 
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Catholic journalist should be taught to defend truth and justice, and integrity, before 
religion and the Gospel.”109  Pope John XXIII also reminded Catholics that among 
universal guarantees stood the right to “freedom in investigating the truth…to freedom 
of speech and publication…and to be accurately informed of public events.”110  The 
inspiration for CENCOS after its separation from the Bishops, and as explained by 
Pepe, indicated a philosophical and ecumenically supported shift toward a type of 
reporting and journalism for the people—with no regard of religious orientation—and 
one in the service of an audience that grew more critical of its government.  
 The transition from an official Catholic institution-in-origin to a religious and 
socially compromised NGO proved logistically feasible but economically difficult.  The 
building from where CENCOS’ staff worked belonged to José, inherited from his aunt.  
However, the funding had been established as a result of the organization’s links to the 
Church hierarchy.  After the break, the private funding from Catholic individuals 
dwindled.  Pepe’s wife, Luzma, often traveled to pick up the donations, and in one 
particular instance she arrived only to be told by a donor that he would no longer be 
making any other payments.  Luzma explains that funding from private individuals 
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decreased considerably, and many failed to make contributions on the claim the 
organization had taken a leftward turn.111  Nevertheless, CENCOS survived.  Certainly 
there had been a leftist turn considering that reporting on repression in Mexico or in 
Latin American was a subversive act.  While Pepe had adhered to anti-communism 
thought for most of his life, he eventually grew sympathetic of the mobilizations—
particularly as the counterrevolutionary initiatives claimed the lives of many 
Catholics.112   
 Soon after the separation, CENCOS collaborated with international organizations 
in publicizing the repressive realities of military dictatorships.  As early as 1969, 
CENCOS disseminated information on political prisoners, primarily those of South 
America.  On April 23, the Mexican daily El Día reported via CENCOS, in conjunction 
with the Spanish organization Juventud Obrera Católica (JOC, Catholic Workers’ Youth) 
and the Movimiento Obrero de Chile (Chilean Labor Movement), released a clandestine 
notice regarding the arrest of Tibor Sulik, Czech-born Brazilian Catholic labor union 
activist held by the military in Guanabara.113  From 1969 onward, CENCOS reported 
on social justice issues of Mexico and Latin America and joined a growing network of 
organizations dedicated to the cause of political prisoners—all while still adhering to 
Catholic ideology whereby “Information [is] a service,” believed Pepe.114 
 A June 1970 espionage report noted CENCOS’ newfound reporting on political 																																																								
111 Interview with Luz María Longoria, 28 March 2012 (Mexico City).  The same story 
recounted by Luzma can also be found in Pastor Escobar’s José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio 
Ecuménico Vaticano II en el laicado mexicano, 166. 
112 For more on Pepe’s ideological converstion see Francisco Ortiz Pinchetti, “Del ‘Comunismo 
no’ al compromiso con el pueblo,” Proceso 14 April 1980, 10-11. 
  113 “Notas Religiosas: Denuncian la aprehensión de Tibor Sulik,” El Día, 23 April 1969, 2. AGN, 
DGIPS, 21 April 1969-30 August 1978, File 6, Box 1779-B.  For more on JOC, see Angel Smith, 
Historical Dictionary of Spain (Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 372. 
114 Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, 22 de junio de 1970, 19:00 hrs, AGN, DGIPS, 21 April 
1969-30 August 1978, File 6, Box 1779-B. 
	 261 
prisoners.  Álvarez Icaza explained, in a press conference, “we talk about everything 
that concerns the people, even when we have to deal with being attacked.”  Pepe 
explained their reporting was carried out with objectivity and broadened in coverage, 
now they informed “of the serious problem of political prisoners who remain in prison, 
after the student unrest of 1968.”115  The following month, the police documented how 
several groups “from the right and the left,” including CENCOS and the Mexican 
Communist Party (PCM), planned a “Jornada” or week to demand the release of 
political prisoners from July 7-14.116  A few months after, the espionage report quoted 
Álvarez Icaza’s stating, this in response to supposed rumors spread by the daily El Sol de 
México, “From Mexico and publicly CENCOS has said many times—and repeats—that 
such a situation is a national disgrace.”117  At the time few institutions, press 
organizations, or newspapers reported on political prisoners in Mexico nor did the 
challenge or question the governing party—those publications that did so were deemed 
subversive, communist, or merely yellow journalism (“nota roja”).118   
 Pepe and his team also offered corporativism groups linked to the PRI a forum to 
voice their demands.  Such proved the case of workers left out of Mexico’s national 
labor confederation and the bargaining power joining the federation entailed.  Urban 
transportation drivers from the Sindicato Único de Trabajadores del Transporte del Distrito 
Federal (Trade Union of Transport Workers of the Federal District) forced Fidel 
Velázquez, the leader of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexicanos (Confederation of 																																																								
115 Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, 22 de junio de 1970, 19:00 hrs. AGN, DGIPS, 21 April 
1969-30 August 1978, File 6, Box 1779-B. 
116 “Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, 1 July 1970, 18:00 hrs,” AGN, DGIPS, 21 April 1969-30 
August 1978, File 6, Box 1779-B.  
117 “Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, 21 September 1970, 19:00 hrs,” AGN, DGIPS, 21 April 
1969-30 August 1978, File 6, Box 1779-B, 1-2. 
118 See interview statements by journalist Blance Petrich on her experience while working for El 
Día in Elvira García’s Ellas, tecleando su historia (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2012), 169. 
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Mexican Workers; CTM), to respond to their claims of subjugation—accusations made 
by forty-two drivers in the facilities of CENCOS.  The CTM leader, which both he and 
the union had been intimately linked to the ruling party, argued the lack of direct 
relations resulted from the existence of other intermediary bodies that took care of their 
demands, plus he added, “that union does not exist. It’s a ghost union.”  This, according 
to Velázquez, could be verified by looking at the Federal District’s Attorney General’s 
police records.119  In that sense, offering dissident groups (including indigenous) a forum 
of expression proved an act of defiance and a direct assault on the legitimacy of the 
governing party, on its revolutionary pillars (workers, peasants, middle classes, the 
military), and on corporativism.  And while Pepe recognized that CENCOS’ new 
direction to information conflicted “traditional religious approaches,” and while no 
longer official spokesman of the Church, Pepe believed they were serving the people, 
social communication mediums, and the Church like never before—with informing the 
people representing an ecumenical service.120 
 José Álvarez Icaza could not have imagined the stark turn of events for his family 
and CENCOS.  Pepe had been an anti-communist all his life, until he grew sympathetic 
with the leftist cause.121  In 1972, Icaza attended a conference of Christians for socialism 
that took place in Chile and was profoundly moved by President Salvador Allende.  His 
work from that point forward embodied a rhetoric far more removed the official 
Church, but very much rooted in the teachings of Vatican II, Liberation theology, and 																																																								
119 Boletín de CENCOS A/C/No. 4229, 25 June 1970, 15:00 hrs., “Responde Fidel Velázquez 
a las acusaciones lanzadas ayer en CENCOS por 42 operadores del Sindicato Único de Trabajadores del 
Transporte del D.F. AGN, DGIPS, 21 April 1969-30 August 1978, File 6, Box 1779-B, 1-2. 
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Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, 22 de junio de 1970, 19:00 hrs [possible report by police on a press 
conference held at CENCOS]. AGN, DGIPS, 21 April 1969-30 August 1978, File 6, Box 1779-B. 
121 For more on Pepe’s ideological converstion see Francisco Ortiz Pinchetti, “Del ‘Comunismo 
no’ al compromiso con el pueblo,” Proceso 14 April 1980, 10-11. 
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social justice.122   Thereafter, his press organizations embarked on a political journey as 
one of Mexico’s first human rights organizations to engage the language of human 
rights, a journey characterized by economic difficulties and continued police sacking of 
the CENCOS offices.123  In 1975 Clara Ruiz began working for Pepe.  During her 
tenure there CENCOS came to have as many as twenty people working in the building, 
rushing from one floor to the next—this with an entire floor dedicated to international 
news, she and others organized magazines that came in the mail (among many other 
duties), an auditorium in the back where press conferences often took place, a printing 
press in the lower level, as well as space designated for breaks (given the intensity of the 
work) and “light” reading where one could find some of Mexico’s most popular comics 
like “La Familia Burrón”(all donated).124  And thus began CENCOS new trajectory as 
Mexico’s first modern-day non-governmental and human rights organization. 
 So when did CENCOS begin to engage in the work and with the language of 
human rights?  In a commemorative event celebrating fifty years of the UDHR and the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the magazine CENCOS-Iglesias (created to provide coverage 
on the 1979 papal visit to Mexico), Pepe’s son Emilio Álvarez Icaza looked to the 
printed trajectory of the organization.  Emilio explained that the “first publication 
related to our human rights work is a publication from 1966 by the International 
Commission of Jurists [ICJ]” on the European Commission on Human Rights, a 
tribunal that existed between 1954 and 1998.125  As the case of Mexico reveals, early 																																																								
122 Francisco Ortiz Pinchetti, “Del ‘Comunismo no’ al compromiso con el pueblo,” Proceso 14 
April 1980, 10-11, 13.   
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125 Emilio Álvarez Icaza, “Aniversario Revista Cencos-Iglesias,” 9 December 1998, audio 
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references to the term human rights derived primarily from reporting on international 
events or rights organizations and not in association to happenings at home, at least not 
until the latter half of the 1970s.  Emilio also deemed October 2, 1968 a “brutal turning 
point” for the work of CENCOS, whereby the organization gave their support to the 
students and reporters “involved in that process.”  Moreover, added Emilio, October 2 
“also meant an awakening in our work and from there then came the whole process of 
becoming an independent center…”126 Those closest to the repression at home 
sympathized with Latin American movements, drew closer to international 
organizations, and learned the language of human rights from their South American 
counterparts arriving in Mexico. 
 South Americans appropriated the nascent and internationalist language of 
human rights years before activists in Mexico.  For decades, and unlike its South 
American counterparts, Mexico avoided international scrutiny for its internal 
repression, this in part resulting from a “declarative commitment” toward the 
international human rights discourse, from which the country “obtained international 
prestige.”127  Meanwhile, homegrown social movements did not take up the language 
until the latter half of the 1970s when local groups joined the growing international 
network on behalf of political prisoners, this coupled with the arrival of South American 
exiles. Argentines, Chileans, and Uruguayans, for example, appropriated the language 
of human rights and joined international networks denouncing dictatorship as a 																																																																																																																																																																		
International Dispute Settlement (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 262. 
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measure of self-preservation.  Upon the arrival of many exiles to Mexico, activists in the 
country learned the language of human rights from the stories and experiences recount.  
As the case of CENCOS illustrates, the more the organization leaned toward the Latin 
American cause on behalf of the politically repressed, the more they adhered to the 
internationalist language of human rights—eventually applied to the situation of 
prisoners at home.   “[W]e nourished ourselves and at the same time we suffered the 
brutal repression unleashed in Latin America,” said Emilio, and from that point forward 
CENCOS became a “repository of processes of hope but also a call for solidarity and 
support.”128  When he was young, many individuals visited Pepe and Luzma’s home, 
and there he listened to discussions on the “human rights issue,” and shared “their pain, 
the loss of their family, wealth, and all those assaults that entailed brutal dictatorships.”  
Some of the individuals that made their way to his parents’ home included the 
renowned Liberation theology forefather, Gustavo Gutiérrez, and others who found a 
voice and refuge in Mexico.  From Mexico, exiles narrated their stories, in other 
instances they participated in print media disseminating testimonies on the atrocities 
committed; thus, indicting their home governments from outside their countries’ in the 
independent and official press, while engaging the language of human rights.129   
 In March 1977, CENCOS edited a newsletter exclusively on human rights in 
Latin America.  The first issue of the magazine América Latina: Derechos Humanos, edited in 
conjunction with the Comisión Evangélica Latinoamericana de Educación Cristiana (Latin 
American Evangelical Commission for Christian Education; CELADEC), became one 																																																								
128 Emilio Álvarez Icaza, “Aniversario Revista Cencos-Iglesias,” 9 December 1998, audio 
recording CENCOS Archive. 
129 For more on the specific role of Uruguayans in the promotion of human rights in Mexico, see 
De Heredia Romo, “México en la red transnacional de defensa de los derechos humanos en Uruguay 
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of the first publications in the country to actively utilize the term human rights, this to 
denote political violence.130  While many credit President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy 
(1977-1981) for the proliferation of human rights in the 1970s, the issue reveals that by 
early 1977 organizations like CENCOS were already associating the concept of human 
rights to political violence—in large part due to the campaign carried out by Amnesty 
International on behalf of prisoners.  Nevertheless, the editors recognized that since the 
election of Carter there had been an increase in the global discussion on matters of 
human rights, yet they underscored the ironies behind the United States taking on such 
a cause given their history of imperialism.  In noting a long trajectory of rights violations 
in the world since conquest, the editorial page argued that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’ (UDHR) principles remained null in fostering “national and 
international coexistence.”  However, the editors believed the reverence and promotion 
of the cause was certainly not an “amusing concession” from President Carter, nor a 
“clever maneuver”; rather, human rights were an exigency for all—for that reason 
América Latina: Derechos Humanos sought to “participate in the promotion and diffusion of 
the Human Rights cause.”131  As such, the use of the term human rights appeared with 
references of political violence, President Jimmy Carter, or the UDHR—and by 1977 
signaled a gradual replacement of other nationalist rights terminologies, including 
constitutional guarantees and economic rights upheld under nationalist state-driven 
development.  
 Early references to human rights in independent printings in the 1970s, like those 
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of CENCOS, reveal the sudden and global monopolization of political and civil rights.  
In the magazine’s feature article by Jesuit Enrique Maza, who also wrote for Proceso, he 
refers to human rights as universalities and as the inherent rights of man.  However, the 
sudden “rekindling of the international conscious” revealed contradictions—especially 
regarding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which he deemed “decorative.”  
Maza recognized the individual rights embedded in the UDHR, but deemed these 
rights vulnerable unless social and economic freedoms were also guaranteed, the latter 
required significant structural changes to the existing social, political, and economic 
institutions.  Maza’s analysis in América Latina and in Proceso proved the most concrete 
and suspicious of the rise of an individualist cause that left out mayor institutional 
reform and echoed adherents of Liberation theology and armed revolution.132  
Although Maza questioned the global human rights cause, he nevertheless, proved one 
of the first in the country to actively write on the subject—thus further disseminating the 
concept.  Likewise, the magazine reproduced the global concern for political and civil 
rights evident in its exclusive coverage of political prisoners, from cartoons depicting the 
loss of individual freedoms through incarceration and torture, individual and NGO-
collected testimonials of the disappeared and tortured, to the long lists of desparecidos (i.e. 
eight-pages of Argentine journalists and six-pages of civilians from Nicaragua).133  Notes 
and testimonials filled the pages of América Latina, such as the arrival to Mexico of 
fifteen-day-old Ana born in the embassy in Uruguay.134  While its editors primarily 																																																								
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focused on Latin America, Mexico also received scant coverage in the last pages of each 
issue; however, clearly the intention of América Latina: Derechos Humanos was to denounce 
desparecidos, incarcerations, extrajudicial killings, and torture primarily outside of 
Mexico.135  The magazine reveals the López Portillo administration’s tolerated 
published material on political prisoners so long as they were not Mexican, and this too 
signaled a wider availability and circulation of reporting about repression on the outside 
rather than internally, which was a direct outcome of the networks whose intensive data 
collection focused on the political terror in the Southern Cone, and to a lesser extent in 
Central America. 
 Such brutal realities in Latin America, nevertheless, linked CENCOS to local 
struggles.  The experience of exiles and key individuals passing through Pepe’s home 
and CENCOS, rendered credence to the general climate of violence in the region and 
helped CENCOS “find in Mexico processes of struggle for freedom and for the defense 
of human rights in Mexico.”136  CENCOS went on to provide spaces for other 
organizations, such as that of Rosario Ibarra de Piedra who founded in 1977 Pro-Defensa 
de Presos, Perseguidos, Desaparecido y Exiliados Políticos de México (Committee for the Defense 
of Prisoners, the Persecuted, the Disappeared and Political Exiles in Mexico; Comité 
¡Eureka!), an organization akin to Argentina’s Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.  After the 
disappearance of her son, Jesús Piedra Ibarra detained by the police and disappeared in 
the state of Nuevo León, Rosario pioneered a national movement demanding the 
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government give answers on the families’ missing relatives.137  The following year, 
Ibarra collaborated in the Frente Nacional Contra la Represión (The National Front against 
Repression; FNCR), “a coalition of human rights groups from throughout Mexico.”138  
Pepe opened his doors to the FNCR and other organizations, and to this day CENCOS 
houses offices for a number of international human rights organizations.  Emilio 
reminisced on Ibarra and the creation of the National Front Against Repression in the 
facilities of CENCOS—in the same room as the commemorative conference of 
CENCOS-Iglesias, with “long hours of struggle” to prove the repression the government so 
vehemently denied.139  The emergence of Comité ¡Eureka! openly and abrasively 
challenged the government on the question of Mexico’s missing, disappeared, and 
imprisoned, revealing the excesses of Mexico’s own Dirty War. 
 Little by little CENCOS took on diverse causes, including those of workers and 
indigenous peoples.  Pepe’s organizations become an active participant in the social 
transformations taking place in Mexico in the latter half of the 1970s.  As early as 1978, 
the CENCOS team put together testimonial material on the military repression in the 
state of Guerrero, a region rippled by counterrevolutionary violence.  The Secretary of 
Defense received a copy of the declarations of military violence.140  Through the 1970s, 
CENCOS carried out numerous campaigns on behalf of disadvantaged groups from 
throughout Mexico—community radios, journalists—and the massive quantities of print 																																																								
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material donated to the National School of Anthropology and History (ENAH) in 
Mexico City that bears testimony to the long trajectory of social work in print 
communications.   
 The legacies of CENCOS as Mexico’s first modern human rights organization 
have been long lasting.  Pepe and Rosario Ibarra were part of the wave of mobilizations 
for democracy in Mexico.  As demands for political reform grew stronger, Pepe and 
Rosario eventually expanded their efforts into the political realm.  Pepe became a 
militant of the Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (Mexican Workers Party; PMT), a party 
that drew from diverse sectors of the population in the 1970s and 1980s, but failed to 
obtain official registry until the mid-1980s.  Pepe worked closely with the party’s key 
leader Heberto Castillo; a teacher who had been incarcerated during the 1968 student 
was at the head of the party.  Even while Pepe had links to the PMT and its 
collaborators, CENCOS retained its journalistic independence but grew increasingly 
critical of the government, most likely leading to police sackings of the building.  
CENCOS came under surveillance soon after its creation, and would be monitored for 
almost two decades.  It is very likely police retained CENCOS’ documents today housed 
Mexico’s National Archive during the sackings of the building (see Illustration 4.1 and 
4.2).  During the July 7, 1977 intrusion, the police began in the last floor that housed the 
Latin files—according to Emilio—and by the time they reached the top they were too 
tired to take the most important documents.  Nevertheless, the happenings “served as a 
great trigger to restore hope and to strengthen the alliance, the relationship, CENCOS’ 
commitment with popular, social, and civil causes for the transformation of this 
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country.”141  After José passed away, CENCOS continued as an apolitical NGO and 
still serves a similar function in the field of social communications; however, with a 
vastly different forms of social media.  Since then, Pepe’s son has presided over the 
Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal (Mexico City’s Human Rights 
Commission; CDHDF) from 2001-2009 and since 2012 serves as the Executive 
Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  CENCOS today 
serves as an information outlet for individuals and organizations—from the victims of 
political repression, conferences on health, to indigenous peoples who travel great 
distances to the place they have known and trust.  
 
Conclusion: “Streams of ink and kilos of paper”142 
 The life of José Álvarez Icaza bears witness to the political radicalization of the 
Latin American continent in the 1960s, including the Catholic Church.143  In the latter 
part of his life, Álvarez Icaza questioned the official anti-communist stance of the 
Church.  In an interview published by Proceso magazine in 1980, Pepe revealed that 
although he was not a Marxist, he believed that the “future world would be socialist.”  
He criticized the Church for being “closed, repressive, and ideological.”144  He was not 
was not alone.  Individuals within the Church, like Jesuit Enrique Maza, dedicated their 
entire lives to challenge the Church’s stance on freedom of expression and encouraged 
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readers to look deeper into the structural problems plaguing Latin American countries 
as a way of protecting all categories of rights, not just political.145  Just like CENCOS 
distanced itself from the Church hierarchy, so did the Mexican Social Secretariat (SSM) 
that Father Pedro Velázquez headed for many years, acquiring its independence from 
the Episcopate in 1971.146  The SSM was created in 1920 and initially served as a 
response to the “growing revolutionary syndicalism,” and perceived a threat by 
traditional confederations of labor unions.147  The Episcopate’s leaders feared the social 
transformations in Mexico and Catholics feared the reinsertion of former president of 
Mexico, Lázaro Cárdenas, to the national scene after the Cuban Revolution.  As such, 
all Catholic organizations gathered under the auspices of anti-communism through the 
CON.148  Yet, the Latin American revolutionary scene, coupled with transformations 
brought on after Vatican II, drove many Catholics toward the social justice cause, 
including that of political prisoners. 
 The Catholic’s leftist turn, as reflected in Liberation theology, inspired mobilizers 
mirrored revolution.  This turn led many Catholics to the universal language of human 
rights. Driven by the teachings of a socially progressive and Marxist infused Catholic 
branch termed Liberation theology, adherents took on the cause and language of 
human rights in the height of the Cold War and thereafter.  In Latin Americas as a 
whole this change began with a wave of critical publication on class relations and power 																																																								
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structures along the lines of Frantz Fanon’s Les damnés de la terre (1961), translated as The 
Wretched of the Earth (1963), a meditation on the evils of colonialism and the best ways to 
oppose it.  Latin Americans too produced critical Marxist publications reflecting 
regional realities of underdevelopment, poverty, and oppression.  On education in 
Brazil, Paulo Freire wrote Pedagogia do oprimido (1968) translated in 1970 into Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed a work still on the reading curriculum of many aspiring teachers.  In the 
theological realm, Gustavo Gutiérrez’s Teología de la liberación: perspectivas in 1971, the 
translated version A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (1973), shook the 
Catholic Church for its interpretations.  Three years later, Ariel Dorfman and Armand 
Mattelart opened discussions on cultural imperialism and ideology by exploring Disney 
comics in Para leer al Pato Donald (1972), published as How to Read Donald Duck in 1975.149  
This leftward intellectual turn had a profound impact on social justice matters in Latin 
America.   
 Liberation theology, in particular, had long-lasting effects.  The death of 
Salvadoran Bishop Óscar Romero, assassinated in 1980 while saying mass, alerted 
many to the violent realties in Central America.  Romero, considered an adherent of 
Liberation theology, embodied the movement’s institutional engagement with social and 
political issues through a more radical interpretation of the scripture, but one that 
brought priests, laymen, and laywomen closer to people in need, including indigenous 
groups.  It is no coincidence that those actively engaged with Liberation theology in the 
1960s and early 1970s eventually pioneered human rights institutions in the succeeding 
decades.  The list includes Bishop Samuel Ruiz (1924-2011) who championed the rights 
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of indigenous peoples in San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, including those of 
Guatemalan refugees fleeing the Central American Civil Wars.  Another prominent 
individual was Ruiz’s counterpart in the state of Morelos, Bishop Sergio Méndez Arceo 
(1907-1992), who promoted a form of grassroots Catholic organization, known as the 
Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEB) or Basic ecclesial communities (BECs); Méndez was 
also famous for his support for Dr. Ivan Illich, founder of the polemic Centro de 
Investigaciones Culturales (CIC) in Cuernavaca and another in Anápolis, Brazil.150  
Mexico’s incipient human rights dialogues therefore have a strong rooting Vatican II 
and Liberation theology, especially after 1968.  The story of Pepe and CENCOS reveals 
how emerging non-governmental organizations collaborated with international 
ecumenical organizations and secular networks working on behalf of political prisoners 
and other causes, and through rising media communications challenged traditional 
institutions and disseminated the rising language of human rights.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
150 Jon Igelmo Zaldívar and Patricia Quiroga Uceda, “Ivan Illich and the Conflict with Vatican 
(1966-1969),” The International Journal of Illich Studies 2:1 (2010), 3.  
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ILLUS. 5.1.  “Luis Echeverría, former president of Mexico, next to Scherer.” Juan Carlos Talavera, 
“Alistan homenaje póstumo a Julio Scherer García (1926-2015),” Excélsior, 8 January 2015 
<http://www.excelsior.com.mx/expresiones/2015/01/08/1001502#imagen-1>.  (Reproduced without 
permission) 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
Julio Scherer García’s Proceso:  
Human Rights in the Liberalization of the Mexican Press, 1976-1977 
 
 
“La cirugía y el periodismo  
remueven lo que encuentran.   
El periodismo ha de ser exacto,  
como el bisturí.”1 
–Julio Scherer García 
 
 
Introduction 
 Thus far diverse groups – UN, Catholic, feminist – had struggled to establish 
new ways of seeing the individual’s relation to the Mexican state.  Ultimately, however, 
it was the transformation of the Mexican press in 1976 and the rise of Amnesty 
International that forced the diffusion of the human rights concepts in Mexico.  In the 
summer of 1976, just months before leaving office, President Luis Echeverría retreated 
from what had been a brief moment of liberalization for one of the country’s leading 
newspaper, Excélsior.  Dating to the armed phase of the revolutionary period, the daily 
never truly enjoyed complete freedom of expression; however, when Julio Scherer 
García took over as director in 1968, Excélsior became one of the most important papers 
in Mexico and came to enjoy a growing stature in Latin America.2  However, on the 8th 
of July 1976 and amid sexennial elections, Echeverría ousted Scherer.  The famous 
image taken just outside the installations of Excélsior, with Scherer in the center, shows a 
display of solidarity as colleagues walk out in protest alongside their beloved editor—to 
his respective left and right stand journalist Gastón García Cantú and cartoonist Abel 
																																																								
1 Translates to “Surgery and journalist remove (or stir) what they find.  Journalism must be 
precise as the scalpel.”  Julio Scherer García, Los presidentes (México: Debolsillo, ©1986, 2007), 20. 
 2 Julio Scherer García, “El periodismo frent al poder,” Proceso, no. 1993, 11 January 2015, 26. 
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Quezada (see Illustration 5.2).3  Novelist Octavio Paz and Scherer’s close friend and 
playwright Vicente Leñero as well as his first cousin, Jesuit priest Enrique Maza, also 
abandoned the paper (and many others).4  Interestingly enough, Echeverría’s assault on 
the press followed the government’s usual approach toward a critical media—that is, co-
opting, rather than censoring or nationalizing print sources, all measures that figured 
prominently in the long history of Mexico’s government-media relations.  This system of 
media control dated to the 1940s and 1950s, and “permitted ideological pluralism and 
occasional criticism of the government without compromising official control of the 
press.”5  President Echeverría’s attack on Excélsior, Julio Scherer García, and his team—
for exceeding the allotted level of government criticism—led to the establishment of new 
print sources that were less susceptible to co-optation and far more critical, and thereby 
contributed to increased media democratization in Mexico.  
 Of the various publications that grew from the “Golpe de Excélsior” (blow to 
Excélsior), it was the news magazine Proceso that most actively employed the term “human 
rights.”  The first issue of Proceso (Process) came out in November 1976, just before 																																																								
  3 According to Vicente Leñero, Juan Miranda took the famous photograph.  See cover and 
copyright page in Vicente Leñero, Los periodistas (México: Joaquín Mortiz, ©1978, 1994).  Also see Julio 
Scherer García’s first chapter on Gastón García Cantú in La terca memoria (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2007), 
13 and “Índex de Ilustraciones,” in Humberto Musacchio, Historia gráfica del periodismo mexicano (México: 
Gráfica, Creatividad y Diseño, 2003), 203; Julio Scherer García, Los presidentes (México: Debolsillo, 
©1986, 2007), 225.  
4 Leñero worked as a journalist, but is also recognized for his playwrights.  He wrote screenplays 
for some of Mexico’s top grossing films (adopted from books), like El callejón de los milagros, 1994; La ley de 
Heroles, 1999; and El crimen del Padre Amaro, 2002.  Leñero also wrote a theater play based on the work of 
anthropologist Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez, 1961.  Lewis asked Leñero if he was interested in 
doing the theater adaptation.  Leñero spent two years writing, but Lewis died before its completion.  The 
theater Jorge Negrete performed the play for almost half a year.  Gustavo Ambrosio, “Vicente Leñero y 
su legado en el cine,” Milenio-Hey, 3 December 2014 
<http://www.milenio.com/hey/cine/Vicente_Lenero_legado_peliculas_cine-muere_Vicente_Lenero-
muerte_Vicente_Lenero_0_420558139.html>; Virginia Bautista, “Los Hijos de Sánchez, un escándalo de 
medio siglo,” Excélsior-Expresiones, 7 August 2011 <http://www.excelsior.com.mx/node/759087>; 
Luciano Concheiro San Vicente and Ana Sofía Rodríguez, “Vicente Leñero: fragmentos de una 
conversación,” Nexos, 3 December 2014 <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=23559>.  
5 Chappell H. Lawson, Building the Fourth Estate Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in Mexico 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 26-27. 
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Echeverría left office.  Julio Scherer García, along with Vicente Leñero, Enrique Maza, 
and other contributors, created the publication very much in the style of Time or 
Newsweek magazine. The “golpe” intended to discipline a group of journalists and their 
daily, thus resulted in a profoundly important moment for freedom of the press in 
Mexico.  For cultural writer José Agustín, the attack on the daily and the subsequent 
establishment of Proceso proved an acute historical moment, given that “it broke with the 
practice whereby the victims of presidential arbitrariness resign or reintegrate into the 
system.”6  Scherer and his colleagues, on the other hand, defied co-optation tactics and 
proved that their work could survive with the support of their readers, thus ignited a 
new era of print production in Mexico of investigative journalism, one that still 
continues today, despite pressures from the government, the private sector, and now 
organized crime.7  In this context, Scherer and his team engaged internationalist 
conceptions of rights by systematically covering regional justice-themed stories, like 
South American government repression and Amnesty International’s campaigns on 
behalf of political prisoners.  Proceso reporting that includes the terms “human rights” 
between 1976 and 1978, prior to the visit of President James Carter to Mexico in 1979, 
demonstrate a slow progression toward the replacement of an earlier social justice 
terminology for that of human rights, which in the late 1970s became synonymous for 
political and civil rights (especially those of prisoners), largely due to the Amnesty 
International’s 1977 Prisoners of Conscience Year campaign.  The story of Julio Scherer 																																																								
6 Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2, 121.  
7 See comments by Sergio Aguayo Quezada on the repercussions of Julio Scherer Garcia’s 
death, which according to Aguayo Quezada the mass reporting’s on Scherer’s career reflect the 
journalist’s relevance.  For the COLMEX intellectual, Scherer passed away just when Mexico’s press is 
assaulted by various fronts: government officials, businessmen, and organized crime.  Moreover, Aguayo 
Quezada reminds viewers that Mexico is one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists. 
See “Julio Scherer García,” Primer Plano, Canal Once (Instituto Politécnico Nacional), XEIPN, Mexico 
City, 12 January 2015 (Television) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zA5WjopsKKg#t=237>.  
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García’s Proceso tells of a struggle for freedom of the press in Mexico, but also the 
growing nationalization of internationalist conceptions of rights, especially human 
rights, as delineated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
 “Plaza San Jacinto número 11, San Ángel”:  Before the Olivetti Typewriter8 
 Tall and robustly built, and with a presence that filled the room, Scherer García 
descended from a number of prominent Mexican families.  Julio Scherer’s grandfather 
was Hugo Scherer, a German banker who migrated to Mexico in the mid-nineteenth 
century.9  The German-born technocrat’s son, Pablo Scherer, was born in Mexico, but 
actually soldiered on behalf of Kaiser Wilhem during the First Word War.  Julio 
Scherer’s youthful comforts derived the family fortune, and “thanks to a job in relation 
to the stock market” his father Pablo had, that is according to his friend Leñero.  The 
Scherer García residence located in Plaza San Jacinto number 11 of the affluent 
neighborhood of San Ángel, which today houses the Saturday Bazaar, famed 
destination for countless Mexico City artists and tourists.10  But Julio’s background 
included other prominent families as well.  He often complained when people failed to 
reference his maternal last name of García, which he inherited from his mother Paz 
																																																								
  8 Leñero provides the exact location of Julio Scherer García’s childhood home in the prominent 
neighborhood of San Ángel in Mexico City.  Vicente Leñero, “Julio Scherer: Treinta y cinco años 
alrededor de Julio,” in Scherer, Salgar, Clóvis Rossi, Sábat: Premio Homenaje CEMEX+FNPI, edited by 
CEMEX+FNPI (México: FCE, Fundación Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2007), 15; Proceso reprinted portions of Leñero’s essay in “Treinta y cinco años alrededor de 
Julio,” Proceso, no. 1993, 11 January 2015, 29. 
9 Hugo directed the Banco Nacional de México (National Bank of Mexico, today Banamex) when the 
institution first arose after a merge between the old Banco Nacional Mexicano and the Banco Mercantil during 
the presidency of Manuel González Flores (1880-1884)—a fuse designed “to open to the government itself 
new sources of funds and loans.” Elena Poniatowska, “Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” La Jornada, 8 
January 2015 <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/004a1pol>. 
10 Vicente Leñero, “Julio Scherer: Treinta y cinco años alrededor de Julio,” in Scherer, Salgar, 
Clóvis Rossi, Sábat, edited by CEMEX+FNPI, 15; Vicente Leñero, “Treinta y cinco años alrededor de 
Julio,” Proceso, no. 1993, 11 January 2015, 29. 
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García Gómez—daughter of the prominent jurist Julio García Pimentel from 
Guanajuato, who served as president of Mexico’s Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación 
(Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, SCJN).11  From Pablo and Paz, an aristocratic 
mix between prominent and multinational families, Julio Scherer García was born, on 
April 7, 1926 in Mexico City, making him the third and last son of couple, a child born 
into many of the critical currents of a post-revolutionary Mexico.12  
Scherer’s upbringing and education resembled that of children from other well-
to-do families.  His initial formation grew out of his schooling in the Colegio Alemán 
“Alexander von Humboldt,” a German primary through high school established by migrants 
in 1894 so their children retain linguistic and cultural practices from the home 
country.13  At the Colegio Alemán he thought himself “clumsy, incapacitated for life,” and 
he left halfway through middle school.14  The remainder of secondary and high school 
he completed in the Jesuit school Colegio Bachilleratos, extension of the Instituto Patria, 
where Scherer “learned the pragmatism of the Society of Jesus, the anticommunist fury, 
the ignoble passion for Francisco Franco, el Caudillo.”15  Among Schere’s contemporaries 
were Pablo Latapí, expert in the study of education, and with journalist Manuel 
Buendía, remembered for his writings on police corruption and its links to the CIA, 
																																																								
  11 It was García Pimentel’s high position that first brought the family to Mexico City.  This same 
Julio García briefly acted as Undersecretary of Foreign Relations during the ill-fated governance of 
Francisco I. Madero (1911-1913). Elia Baltazar, “Homenaje biográfico a Julio Scherer, Periodismo en tiempo 
real, 16 January 2015 <http://periodismoentiemporeal.tumblr.com>; Julio Scherer García, Los presidentes 
(México: Debolsillo, ©1986, 2007), 74; Julio Scherer García, La terca memoria (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 
2007), 146.  
12 Elena Poniatowska, “Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” La Jornada, 8 January 2015 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/004a1pol>. 
13 Julio Scherer García, Vivir (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2012), 12; Colegio Alemán Von 
Humboldt, “Historia del Colegio,” <http://www.humboldt.edu.mx/index.php/prueba/hijo-2>. 
14 Julio Scherer García, Vivir (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2012), 11-12. 
15 Caudillo translates to strongman, political boss. Scherer García, Vivir, 11; Julio Scherer García, 
La terca memoria (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2007), 144. 
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which resulted in his brutal assassination in 1984.16  However, the comforts of a 
privileged upbringing came to an abrupt end with the family’s sudden economic 
downturn.17  But life continued for the Scherer-García family.  In 1945, after graduating 
from the Colegio Bachilleratos, Julio enrolled in law school in what had been the Escuela 
Nacional de Jurisprudencia (National School of Jurisprudence), in the Antiguo Colegio de San 
Ildefonso located in Mexico City’s historic center.18  
Scherer’s early life, however, remains a mystery due to his reticence for public 
exhibition and longstanding refusal to be interviewed.  “Ni madres (…) I am a reporter 
and I ask the questions,” was his famed 1971 response to an Associated Press reporter 
seeking an interview after Scherer accepted the María Moors Cabot Prize granted by 
Columbia University.19  “My father has insisted, and rightly so, that his work speaks for 
him: his interviews, his reports,” wrote his daughter María Scherer Ibarra upon Julio’s 
death.20  Indeed, Scherer García’s journalistic trajectory continues to speak volumes not 
only about his career, but the transformation of the press, journalists’ defiance of the 
long-standing system of a “prensa vendida” (co-opted press) that legitimized the 
																																																								
16 Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, Buendia: el primer asesinato de la narcopolítica en México (México, D. 
F.: Grijalbo, 2012).  Julio Scherer García, La terca memoria (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2007), 143-144. For the 
material on Scherer’s early schooling see Blanche Petrich, “Scherer, 1926-2015,” La Jornada, 8 January 
2015 <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/002n1pol>. 
17 Vicente Leñero, “Julio Scherer: Treinta y cinco años alrededor de Julio,” in Scherer, Salgar, 
Clóvis Rossi, Sábat, edited by CEMEX+FNPI, 15, Vicente Leñero, “Treinta y cinco años alrededor de 
Julio,” Proceso, no. 1993, 11 January 2015, 29-30. 
18 When the government began the construction of the UNAM, the Faculty of Law moved to the 
current campus in Ciudad Universitaria (University City, or CU).  Thereafter, he spent over a year in the 
Centro Cultural Universitario (University Cultural Center), the predecessor to the Iberoamericana 
UniversityJulio Scherer García, La terca memoria (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2007), 97. 
19 Ni madres is slang and vaguely translate to “hell, no” or “no [fucking] way.” Elena Poniatowska, 
“Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” La Jornada, 8 January 2015 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/004a1pol>. 
20 María Scherer Ibarra, “Julio Scherer García: Mi padre,” Letras Libres, October 2014 
[Reprinted 7 January 2015] <http://www.letraslibres.com/blogs/polifonia/julio-scherer-garcia-mi-
padre>. 
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revolutionary government.  As Elena Poniatowska wrote, “How to understand the 
reality of Mexico without the journalism of Julio Scherer García?”21 
 
Reforma 18: “De profesión, periodista.”22 
It was at Excélsior that Scherer emerged as one of the country’s foremost 
journalists.  His first contact with the daily took place in 1947 when he began working as 
a “mandadero,” an errand or messenger boy.23  At the age of twenty-one he entered as an 
apprentice.24  After various failed attempts at a college degree, his father spoke to him 
about his future and both concluded Scherer liked to write and how years earlier he had 
edited texts for the Jesuit editorial the Buena Prensa (Good Press).  Together they visited 
the general manager of Excélsior, at the time Gilberto Figueroa, an acquaintance his 
father made at the Rotary Club.  It was then that Scherer became an apprentice of 
Enrique Borrego Escalante, director of La Extra, the second printing of Excélsior’s noon 
edition Últimas Noticias (Latest News).  Demand for frequent news reporting during 
World War II had led to La Extra’s creation, and the section continued for several years 
thereafter.25  Soon, Julio could be described “journalist, by profession,” as the Dirección 
Federal de Seguridad (Federal Security Directorate, DFS) officer wrote in his 1977 
surveillance file.26  By the 1960s, very little of the errand boy remained; Scherer now 																																																								
21 Elena Poniatowska, “Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” La Jornada, 8 January 2015 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/004a1pol>. 
22 Jacinto Rodríguez, Munguía, “Julio Scherer García: Una historia intervenida por el 
espionaje,” emeequis, 19 January 2015, 43. 
23 Elena Poniatowska, “Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” La Jornada, 8 January 2015 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/004a1pol>. 
24 Granados article was originally published on December 4, 2005 in issue 1518 of Proceso. 
Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, “La obra editorial de Julio Scherer,” Proceso, no. 1993, 11 January 2015, 
74-75.  
25 Scherer García, Vivir, 15; Julio Scherer García, La terca memoria (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2007), 
93, 147-148. 
26 Jacinto Rodríguez, Munguía, “Julio Scherer García: Una historia intervenida por el 
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conducted exclusive interviews with world leaders when “Don” Manuel Becerra Acosta 
(senior) directed the daily and when Carlos Denegri stood as one of the paper’s most 
polemical and “sold-out” to the government journalist—who met justice from an 
unexpected source when he was shot by his wife in 1970.27  In fact, the unrelenting 
search for the interview characterized Scherer throughout his career.  In 1979 he asked 
his beloved friend Vicente Leñero how they were different, journalistically speaking.  
Frustrated with Leñero’s responses, Scherer finally replied: “In that if we were in front 
of Picasso, you would observe his paintings and I would interview him.”28  It was his 
journalistic drive, his interaction with the powerful and defiance of power, as well as his 
astute nature that led to his ascension to the directorship of Excélsior. 
Just as his father had predicted, Julio Scherer García became director of Excélsior 
in 1968, amid boisterous student protests.  In 1963 he entered management of the paper 
as its sub-director, and just five years later, amid boisterous student protests and an 
increasingly defensive national political order, he became director.29  “The day of the 
appointment President Díaz Ordaz called me by phone. Congratulations.  After him, all 
his secretariats, governors, senators, representatives.”  Scherer took leadership of the 
newspaper on August 31, and Reforma 18 became his second home, short for the famous 
Paseo de la Reforma—an elaborately designed avenue that runs across Mexico City—and 																																																																																																																																																																		
espionaje,” emeequis, 19 January 2015, 48. 
 27 Elena Poniatowska, “Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” La Jornada, 8 January 2015 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/004a1pol>; “La cooperativa que le amargaba el 
desayuno a Luis Echeverría,” La Coperacha, 10 July 2012 <http://www.lacoperacha.org.mx/cooperativa-
excelsior-recuento.php>; Manuel Ajenjo, “El chayote, origen y paternidad,” El Financiero [Opinión y 
Análisis], 7 October 2013 <http://eleconomista.com.mx/columnas/columna-especial-
politica/2013/10/07/chayote-origen-paternidad>. 
28 Vicente Leñero, “Julio Scherer: Treinta y cinco años alrededor de Julio,” in Scherer, Salgar, 
Clóvis Rossi, Sábat, edited by CEMEX+FNPI, 27; Vicente Leñero, “Treinta y cinco años alrededor de 
Julio,” Proceso, no. 1993, 11 January 2015, 32.  
29 Elena Poniatowska, “Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” La Jornada, 8 January 2015 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/004a1pol>. 
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for the Excélsior headquarters.30  All seemed well between Excélsior’s leadership and the 
government, especially since Díaz Ordaz had made a trip to the paper’s installations a 
month earlier on September 12 “to launch some new equipment.”31  However, public 
protests disturbed the relationship between the press and the government.  On the 
balcony of the third floor of the Reforma 18 building where Scherer often chatted with 
journalists, he witnessed crowds of students indicting the press with the slogan “prensa 
vendida” (sold out press), signifying journalists’ complicity with the government.  These 
cries deeply disturbed Scherer, yet he also sympathized with the protestor’s cause.32  
The protestors indicated that the Excélsior of 1968 differed little from other print sources.  
Scherer initially seemed aloof and more like an observer preoccupied with his newly 
assigned duties, and indeed much like the rest of the country that often showed itself 
insensitive and indifferent toward the demands of a generation of young people with 
considerably more privileges and opportunities than themselves. 
 All of this changed when soldiers fired on student protesters in the plaza of 
Tlatelolco.  The assault shocked many, transformed some, and muted most.  The 
Excélsior photographer commissioned for the October 2 meeting in the Plaza de las Tres 
Culturas (Plaza of Three Cultures) arrived frantic that evening and “stormed” into 
Scherer’s office. “It was awful…I stepped on corpses.  Soft.  I sank.”  Scherer questioned 
Jaime González on the happenings, “What did you see?  Tell me.”33  According to 
Claire Brewster, one of Excélsior’s October 3 front-page pieces noted the paper’s dismay 
toward the acts of Tlatelolco, where photographer González had been reportedly hurt, 																																																								
  30 Julio Scherer García, Los presidentes (México: Debolsillo, ©1986, 2007), 18.  
31 Claire Brewster, “The Student Movement of 1968 and the Mexican Press: The Cases of 
“Excélsior” and “Siempre!,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 21:2 (April 2002), 176. 
32 Scherer García, Vivir, 33-34.  
33 Scherer García, Los presidentes, 20-21. 
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a “bayonet wound in the left hand and his camera destroyed by blows from a rifle butt.”  
His colleague Ricardo Escoto’s camera was destroyed.34  The October 3 morning 
edition also included eight columns on the happenings, while hours later the front page 
of the Últimas Noticias published a photo by Jorge Villa Alcalá showcasing “a chilling 
photograph: shoes and clothing left on the grass in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas.”  
Political cartoonist Abel Quezada would send three illustrations every day to Reforma 18, 
“I don’t want to be left out.  If a cartoon does not work, you’ll have others to choose 
from.”35  Excélsior published Quezada’s graphic titled “¿Por qué?” (Why?), and below a 
complete blackout in the space designated for the comic (see Illustration 5.3).36  
Meanwhile, Elena Poniatowska dubbed October 3 as “the day on which the Tlatelolco 
massacre was practically silenced.”37  With the exceptions of some emblematic stories 
that filtered into press days following the killings, the majority of the Mexican media 
remained conspicuously silent about the October 2 assault, while the dailies that dared 
to report on the events in question were immediately reprimanded.  
In the days following, the Díaz Ordaz administrations sought to contain hostile 
media coverage and to reign-in undisciplined journalists.  On October 4, the president 
summoned editors and key media representatives to a noon meeting in the building of 
the Organizing Committee for the Olympic games.  The press convocation served as a 
routine measure, a simple reminder to communication representatives of their 
																																																								
  34 Daniel Cazés, Crónica 1968. México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés Editores, 1993), 218; Brewster, “The 
Student Movement of 1968 and the Mexican Press: The Cases of “Excélsior” and “Siempre!,” 182. 
35 Scherer García, Los presidentes, 20-21. 
36 Elena Poniatowska, “Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” La Jornada, 8 January 2015 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2015/01/08/politica/004a1pol>. 
37 Translation by Claire Brewster [“el día en que prácticamente se silencia la matanza en 
Tlatelolco”]. Elena Poniatowska, “La prensa en tiempos de Díaz Ordaz,” El Nacional, 8 February 1993, 1, 
cited in Claire Brewster, “The Student Movement of 1968 and the Mexican Press: The Cases of 
“Excélsior” and “Siempre!,” 173. 
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responsibility toward the “Patria” (homeland) and the Revolution.  President Díaz 
Ordaz never arrived.  “We all understood.  Tlatelolco weighed on the presidential 
mood,” wrote Scherer.  In the luncheon, Secretary of the Presidency Emilio Martínez 
Manautou (1964-1970) reminded everyone in attendance about the importance behind 
the Olympic games set for October 12.38   This was Mexico’s moment, and it was 
important for journalists to pay their part, to comply, to practice “patriotic language,” 
and to foment a positive image of the country for the world, emphasized the Secretary.  
The government planned on compensating all for their compliance; Martínez 
Manautou “told us that after the Olympics, the government would punctually pay our 
bills,” and “[h]e asked for discretion.”39  Those in attendance hailed Díaz Ordaz’s 
actions as patriotic.  Some believed “[h]is firm hand had saved the Olympiad and had 
preserved a clean image of Mexico to the world.”40  Others murmured that the 
“students” and “brawlers” had cornered the government, leaving it with no other 
choice.  For Scherer, these professionals served as spokesmen of their companies.41  
Conversely, it seemed to the government that Scherer and his team had acted against 
the homeland.  Martínez Manautou relayed a message to the Excélsior director, “You 
betrayed the President.”42  Thus began the “trying days” for the paper’s director, 
initially welcomed but soon after repudiated for his supposed “assault” on the president, 
one of the three pillars of Mexican society of which the press was not to speak ill of—
“the President and his family, the Army and the Virgin of Guadalupe”43  For Scherer, 																																																								
38 Scherer García, Los presidentes, 21-22. 
39 Scherer García, Vivir, 34.  
40 Scherer García, Los presidentes, 21. 
41 Scherer García, Los presidentes, 21. 
42 Scherer García, Los presidentes, 21-22. 
43 Scherer García, Los presidentes, 21-22; Elena Poniatowska, “Llanto por Julio Scherer García,” 
La Jornada, 8 January 2015.  
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the working days of October 1968 signaled “the beginning of a long battle between 
submission and freedom,” with himself at the forefront of a team divided between those 
who supported the director’s purported affront to presidentialism and those who 
respected President Díaz Ordaz’s 1968 pacification measures.44  
 
The Press Under Media Tycoons45 
While these events were playing out, other voices entered into the process.  By 
1968 important business interests monopolized the Mexican media, and for that reason, 
the October government-press meeting served to remind a critical branch of the private 
sector of its responsibility toward the “Patria” (homeland) and the Revolution… a 
responsibility all the more pressing, given the historic link between entrepreneurs and 
the federal government.  Indeed, according to journalist Blanche Petrich, the “¡Prensa 
vendida!” slogans had little effect on the media barons: “At the banquets most media 
owners, the O’Farrill and García Valseca, the Azcárraga and Alarcón, were inclined to 
applaud the ‘firm hand’ and the ‘exemplary response’ of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz 
to the ‘conspiracy,’ without acknowledging in any way this popular indictment.”46  Who 
were the O’Farrill, the García Valseca, the Azcárraga, and the Alarcón that Petrich so 
easily identified as the media barons?  The families represented Mexico’s 
communication dynasties, consolidated in the post-revolutionary period.  The O’Farrill 
and the Azcárraga families were pioneers of radio and commercial television in Mexico.  
Both groups had amassed significant amounts of wealth and industrial and political 																																																								
44 Scherer García, Los presidentes, 21.  
  45 Spanish for the Grand Press, term coined by Fátima Fernández Christlieb.  See Los medios de 
difusión masiva en México (México: Juan Pablos Editor, 1984), 81. 
46 Blanche Petrich, “¡Prensa vendida!” La Jornada [Suplemento Especial], 2 October 2008 
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/10/02/6.html>. 
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clout through government concessions, particularly during the Miguel Alemán Valdés 
administration (1946-1952), the latter deeply involved in Mexico’s media enterprises. 47  
Meanwhile, the O’Farrill’s diversified economic portfolio combined with alliances in the 
private and public sector, typifies the trajectory of powerful families in Mexico, dynasties 
whose affluence depend on the management of information which they regulate 
through the ownership of print media sources.     
Unlike its media counterparts, the García Valseca print empire met 
nationalization.  While he had ventured into the print world with comics, Paquito, and 
sports, Esto, García Valseca’s media enterprises did not take off until the late 1940s, 
when he obtained economic support from Maximino Ávila Camacho, older brother of 
President Miguel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946), as the latter was aspiring to the 
presidency.48  Regional strongman and former governor of Puebla (1937-1941), 
Maximino aided his friend García Valseca in 1940 in financing the chain’s initial 
publications, debuting in the border region with El Fronterizo in Ciudad Juárez, followed 
by the purchase of El Heraldo de Chihuahua and the creation of El Sol de Puebla.  Soon 
after, García Valseca acquired El Continental in El Paso.49  By 1972 the Cadena García 
Valseca or El Sol de México chain, as it became known, included “32 dailies, 36 color offset 
presses, 64 black and white presses and 23 newspaper buildings,” with several El Sol 																																																								
47 Efraín Pérez Espino, “El monopolio de la televisión comercial en México,” Revista Mexicana de 
Sociología 41:4 (Oct.-Dec. 1979), 1440-1442.  
  48 Poblano refers to a person from the state of Puebla.  Salvador E. Borrego, Cómo García Valseca 
Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida (Iztacalco, D.F.: 
Editorial Tradición, 1985), 7, 9-10. Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión masiva en México 
(México: Juan Pablos Editor, 1984), 77. 
49 Carlos Monsiváis, A ustedes les consta: antología de la crónica en México (México, D.F.: Ediciones Era, 
2006), 85; Salvador E. Borrego, Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada 
Trató de rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida (Iztacalco, D.F.: Editorial Tradición, 1985), 35, 39. For more on 
Maximino in Puebla see Sergio Valencia Castrejón, Poder regional y política nacional en México: el gobierno de 
Maximino Ávila Camacho en Puebla (1937-1941) (México: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la 
Revolución Mexicana, 1996). 
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versions in key regional cities.50  Likely contributing to the chain’s rapid growth was 
access to credit through the state’s financial institution the Nacional Financiera (National 
Financer, NAFIN).51  Created in 1934, NAFIN financed state-driven development 
projects (construction, irrigation, electric power, etc.), and stood as second in 
importance in Mexico behind the Banco de México. Due to World War II shortages and 
limited response from the private sector the Nacional Financiera expanded investments to 
“paper, cement, and steel.”52  State-directed initiatives in the post-revolutionary period, 
alongside banking institutions like NAFIN, spurred the development of privately owned 
media conglomerates like the Cadena García Valseca which grew tremendously under the 
Alemán administration, making it a primary producer of news in Mexico, with a pro-
government and nationalist stance.    
It is hardly surprising, then, that media companies proved susceptible to 
government intervention under subsequent PRI administrations.  By the Díaz Ordaz 
administration, the El Sol chain stood as a powerful media force in the country; from 
1964 to 1970 it stood at its peak.53 García Valseca and President Díaz Ordaz had been 
good friends, both coming from the state of Puebla; however, the relationship strained 
																																																								
50 Carlos Monsiváis, A ustedes les consta: antología de la crónica en México (México, D.F.: Ediciones Era, 
2006), 88. 
51 Peter Schenkel, “La Estructura de Poder de los Medios de Comunicación en cinco países 
latinoamericanos,” in Comunicación y cambio social, edited by Peter Schenkel and Marco Ordóñez (Quito, 
Ecuador: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, ILDIS; Centro Internacional de Estudios 
Superiores de Comunicación para América Latina, CIESPAL, 1975), 35, 38. 
52 Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe  , “The State as Banker and Entrepreneur: The Last-
Resort Character of the Mexican State’s Economic Intervention, 1917-76  ,” Comparative Politics 12:2 
(January 1980), 175-176; Pablo J. López, “Nacional Financiera Durante la Industrialización Vía 
Sustitución de Importaciones en México,” América Latina en la Historia Económica 19:3 (September-
December 2012), 130.  
53 Borrego, Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de 
rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, 13.  
	 291 
for no apparent reason.54  Because Valseca still held important contacts within the 
government he secured an endorsement from the Nacional Financiera for a ten million 
dollar loan, one offered to Valseca from the Casa Karl Loeb Rhoades.55  In 1970, 
however, Valseca sought a government buyer for his cattle ranch “El Sol” to meet the 
ten million dollar loan obligation.  Representatives from the Secretaría de Agricultura y 
Ganadería (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock) appraised the property, yet months before 
leaving office Díaz Ordaz broke off negotiations and notified Valseca that the deal 
needed the president-elect’s approval.56  In early 1971, Echeverría implied interest in 
aiding the chain, yet the purchase of the ranch never formalized.  Instead, Valseca 
signed a trust giving part ownership of his newspapers to the government on March 28, 
1972.57  Clearly a powerful media source, totaling thirty-seven dailies and representing 
twenty-two percent of Mexico’s newspapers, the 1972 government response to the 
Cadena García Valseca’s economic crisis signposted Echeverría’s nationalist agenda or 
what Borrego referred to as attempts to “estatizar” (statization) the chain.58 
Not long after, Echeverría nationalized the García Valseca newspaper 
enterprise.  Indeed, in 1972 the government assumed control of the Cadena García Valseca 
when one of the state’s financial institutions, Sociedad Mexicana de Crédito Industrial 
																																																								
54 Years later, the media magnate asked those close to the President why Díaz Ordaz distanced 
himself from Valseca, and came to believe it had been due to criticisms the Sol newspapers published of 
Dr. Rafael Moreno Valle when he served as governor of Puebla from 1969 to 1972.  Borrego, Cómo García 
Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, 82, 87.  
55 Borrego, Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de 
rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, 85, 87. 
56 Today the Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food, SAGARPA). Borrego, Cómo García Valseca 
Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, 87. 
57 Borrego, Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de 
rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, 89. 
58 The number of newspapers ranges between thirty-two and thirty-seven, with the latter number 
provided by Salvador E. Borrego.  Borrego, Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio 
Garza Sada Trató de rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, 76, 91. 
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(Mexican Society of Industrial Credit, SOMEX), collected on Valseca’s debt in the 
amount of 400 million pesos.59  In 1962 the state bailed out SOMEX, thus becoming 
proprietor of “a second major industrial development bank” and an investor in some 
forty firms.60  Through SOMEX, the state took ownership of several private entities.  
Valseca, however, sought to settle his loan with the government and gain back full 
control of his chain.  Northern industrialists’ attempts to rescue García Valseca signaled 
the private sector’s aggravation with Echeverría’s government.  Disturbed by 
government affront to private property, like other business leaders, Eugenio Garza Sada 
(1892-1973) offered Valseca help.  Eugenio expressed desire to help García Valseca 
secure a loan to pay off the government and retain full control of his newspaper chain.  
While negotiations proceeded, the assassination of Garza Sada on September 17, 1973 
permanently stalled the rescue attempt.61  On October 24, 1973, García Valseca sold 
his share of the chain to SOMEX for 125 million pesos to be paid over two years.  “I 
did it against my wishes and my interests,” recounted Valseca.62  While Echeverría 
announced the García Valseca Chain would remain national patrimony, many 
																																																								
  59 Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión masiva en México (México: Juan Pablos Editor, 
1984), 77-78.  Also see Peter Schenkel, “La Estructura de Poder de los Medios de Comunicación en cinco 
países latinoamericanos,” in Comunicación y cambio social, edited by Peter Schenkel and Marco Ordóñez 
(Quito, Ecuador: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, ILDIS; Centro Internacional de 
Estudios Superiores de Comunicación para América Latina, CIESPAL, 1975), 35.  
60 Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe  , “The State as Banker and Entrepreneur: The Last-
Resort Character of the Mexican State’s Economic Intervention, 1917-76  ,” Comparative Politics 12:2 
(January 1980), 179. 
61 See Promissory Note of Eugenio Garza Sada to First National Bank for 14 million dollars with 
the percentage distribution among the various Monterrey Group industries on page 118 and 119.  
Salvador E. Borrego, Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de 
rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, (Iztacalco, D.F.: Editorial Tradición), 93-101.  
62 Borrego, Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de 
rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, 104. 
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suspected the president had masterminded the takeover, and improbably enough, 
“whom the vox populi blamed [for] the murder.”63 
The García Valseca episode exemplifies the private and governmental scuffle 
over control and management of information.  Most narratives note Echeverría 
“purchased” the newspaper franchise implying no ill intent, touting the take-over as a 
nationalist measure, representative of his sexennial’s populist politics.64  Other, like 
Carlos Monsiváis, believed Echeverría needed the press to compensate for his lack of 
holdings in television—a need all the more important for the president’s “reconciliation 
project” and for cleaning up his image after serving in Gobernación during the Díaz 
Ordaz government.65  What better than the Valseca chain.  Some even speculated that 
Echeverría sought an ideological clout in the print medium that was comparable to 
what Alemán held in television.  Whatever the motivation, the nationalization of the 
García Valseca chain had profound implications on freedom of the press. The 
ideological clout behind large newspapers chains perpetuates a line of journalism that 
shields selected private interests and the government sector from any serious criticism, a 
legacy of a press highly linked to the revolutionary project with official backing that 
today still selectively omits and misinforms.66 
																																																								
63 Andrés Becerrill, “Excélsior en la Historia: Eugenio Garza Sada, el crimen que cimbró al 
país,” Excélsior, 17 September 2013 
<http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2013/09/17/918931#imagen-4>. 
64 See Monsiváis, A ustedes les consta: antología de la crónica en México, 88. 
65 Monsiváis, A ustedes les consta: antología de la crónica en México, 98-99.  
  66 On November 16, 1973, shortly after acquiring full ownership of the thirty-seven newspapers, 
the administration announced that the government had no intention of selling any publicly owned 
companies, including the press chain.  The front page of El Nacional reiterated the official stance that 
matters of national patrimony were not for sale.66 Approaching the end of his term, Echeverría sold the 
chain to the Organización Editorial Mexicana (Mexican Editorial Organization, OEM).  The key stockowner 
and close friend of Echeverría, Mario Vázquez Raña (1932-2015) took over in April 1976. Reproduction 
of front page of El Nacional see page 109. Borrego, Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo 
Eugenio Garza Sada Trató de rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida, 106-107; Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de 
difusión masiva en México (México: Juan Pablos Editor, 1984), 77. 
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Criticism that Legitimizes 
While the government sought control over the production of information, 
political leaders also encouraged criticism as a source of legitimation.  In Mario Vargas 
Llosa’s famous 1990 speech in Mexico, when he explained how Mexico was indeed a 
dictatorship, the Nobel laureate described the PRI as possessing “all the characteristics 
of a dictatorship: permanence, not of a man, but of a party.”  Moreover, the 
“camouflaged” dictatorship depended on state-accepted denunciation, with a “party 
that concedes enough space for criticism, in the measure that such criticisms serves its 
purposes; it serves, because it confirms it is a democratic party.”  Yet, the “criticism that 
somehow threatens its permanence” the party “suppresses by all means.”67  Through 
the recruitment of intellectuals, journalists in the case of the press, the PRI appropriately 
regulated rapprochement.  Vargas Llosa noted that he knew of no other Latin American 
system that so effectively incorporated intellectuals, subtly and through bribery—such as 
the dispensation of public posts or appointments, for example.68  As Vargas Llosa 
alluded, one way the official party and its political leaders secured the appropriate level 
of criticism was precisely through official funding.  The majority of newspapers, as well 																																																								
67 “México es la dictadura perfecta. La dictadura perfecta no es el comunismo. No es la Unión Soviética.  No es 
Fidel Castro.  La dictadura perfecta es México.  Porque es la dictadura camuflada, de tal modo que puede parecer no ser una 
dictadura.  Pero tiene de hecho, si uno escarba, toda las características de la dictadura: la permanencia, no de un hombre, pero 
sí de un partido. Un partido que es inamovible.  Un partido que concede suficiente espacio para la crítica, en la medida que 
esa crítica le sirva, le sirve, porque confirma que es un partido democrático, pero que suprime por todos los medios, incluso los 
peores.  Aquella crítica que de alguna manera pone en peligro su permanencia.  Una dictadura que además, ha creado una 
retórica que lo justifica, una retórica de izquierda, para la cual, a lo largo de su historia recluto, muy eficientemente, a los 
intelectuales, a la inteligencia.” See video “Vargas Llosa y la dictadura perfecta,” YouTube [Dr. Carlos 
Altamirano Cano] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iu60OuwuZtg>. 
68 “Yo no creo que haya en América Latina ningún caso de sistema de dictadura que haya reclutado tan 
eficientemente al medio intelectual, sobornándolo de una manera muy sutil, a través de trabajos, a través de nombramientos, a 
través de cargos públicos, sin exigirle una duración sistemática, como hacen los dictadores vulgares.  Por el contrario, 
pidiéndole mas bien una actitud crítica, porque esa era la mejor manera de garantizar la permanencia de ese partido en el 
poder.”  See video “Vargas Llosa y la dictadura perfecta,” YouTube [Dr. Carlos Altamirano Cano] 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iu60OuwuZtg>. 
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as numerous journalists on the state payroll, could not subsist without the regime’s 
monies, and so they engaged in self-censorship for the sake of their existence.69  Without 
official subsidies newspapers would have to sell sufficient publicity ads and secure wide 
circulation, something they could not yet secure.70  In that form of economic aid the 
government operated as both a client and “‘pressure group’ over the journalistic 
publication’s general politics, with all the grave consequences imaginable.”71  As Fátima 
Fernández Christlieb argues, these co-optation measures revealed the Mexican press as 
“an element that corporativized [corporativizador], a neutralizing instrument of demands 
and dissatisfactions.”72  Up to the 1970s, both private and publicly owned print sources 
displayed elements of modernization in their design (technology, distribution, content) 
alongside components associated with a dictatorial or militaristic system of governance 
(economic dependence on public funds, suppression if the limits of criticisms exceeded 
admissible levels).   
 State involvement in media production was in the form of official bulletins, and 
control of front-page spaces for official news.  The use of bulletined news resulted in two 
vices: “the passivity of the reporter who, instead of going after the news and investigate, 
awaits the official version, and the so-called ‘bribe,’ as the reward in cash or payment in 
kind that often accompanies the bulleting to ensure its dissemination is known.”73  																																																								
69 Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa,  “[A]proximación a la prensa mexicana (notas sobre el 
periodismo diario),” Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Política 69, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 
UNAM (July-Sept. 1972), 49-50. 
70 Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, “[A]proximación a la prensa mexicana (notas sobre el 
periodismo diario),” Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Política 69, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 
UNAM (July-Sept. 1972), 50. 
71 Daniel Cosío Villegas, “Mordazas: de oro y de hierro,” Excélsior, 7 March 1969, 6, cited in 
Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, “[A]proximación a la prensa mexicana (notas sobre el periodismo 
diario),” Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Política 69 (July-Sept. 1972), 51. 
  72 Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión masiva en México (México: Juan Pablos Editor, 
1984), 80. 
73 “Sin embargo, la práctica de los boletines genera, al menos, dos vicios que desde entonces lastran la labor 
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Moreover, the government press agencies instituted a system whereby newspaper 
editors employed their front pages on the “official version of national events” probed by 
bulletined news.74  While editors printed criticisms, they relegated them to other pages, 
especially reserved for the editorial section, often ideologically in opposition to front-
page news, however, the newspaper could not replace or discard the bulletin 
information altogether.  The exception to the front-page rule arose from small and 
independently funded print sources and from newspapers owned by powerful private 
business distressed by a particular government policy.75  In the case of Excélsior, conflict 
arose when criticisms in its editorial pieces grew in prestige, readerships, and its 
criticalness of the government.   
 
Excélsior 
This was an era of the controlled, centralized, and “sold-out” press, and Excélsior 
proved not totally an exception to those tendencies.  A cooperative ran the newspaper, 
yet like most other print sources Excélsior depended of government funding, whether 
through ads or paper.  Yet, Julio Scherer García and his team plastered critical pieces 
from 1968 until the golpe in July 1976, primarily through editorials by Mexico’s leading 
intellectuals.  In many ways, Excélsior’s published criticisms served as a source of the 
legitimacy for the government.  In 1960, a report by the US News and World Report 
included Mexico among the forty-four countries with evidenced freedom of 																																																																																																																																																																		
periodística: la pasividad del reportero que, en lugar de ir tras la noticia e investigarla, espera la versión oficial, y el llamado 
‘embute’, nombre con que se conoce la gratificación en dinero o en especie que suele acompañar al boletín para asegurar su 
difusión.” Silvia González Marín, Prensa y poder político: la elección presidencial de 1940 en la prensa mexicana 
(México, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores: UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones Bibliográficas, 2006), 122. 
  74 Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión masiva en México (México: Juan Pablos Editor, 
1984), 80. 
  75 Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión masiva en México (México: Juan Pablos Editor, 
1984), 81. 
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expression—the latter “understood as the absence of run-ins between newspapers and 
the public administration.”  Similarly the Inter American Press Association, IAPA 
(Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa, SIP), activist pressure group, “invariably points to 
Mexico as a country where freedom of the press reigns,” wrote Granados Chapa in 
1972.76  Because “every newspaper responds to defined economic or political interests,” 
Excélsior’s rested in being critical of the government, to the measure it served its interests, 
yet when his team posed a national and international threat to the image of the 
Echeverría administration he was ousted.77  Meanwhile, from the outside, co-optation 
or subtle repressive measures like the expulsion of Scherer from Excélsior through a 
cooperative maneuver, kept Mexico from the list of countries where open despotism 
against reporters prevailed, deeming it a country where journalists enjoyed freedom of 
the press.  In other words, the PRI’s corrosive measures transpired largely unperceived 
given their subtleness, and the national press served as it conspirator by turning a blind 
eye.  While the government afforded Scherer García with privileged information, with 
some level of control and awareness over the paper’s publications, Excélsior’s growing 
readership signaled an audience receptive to critical news—exemplifying a political 
opening, the forging of a space for a style of journalism that transcended co-optation 
measures and defied and threatened presidentialism.  
Yet, Excélsior’s trajectory proved similar to other newspapers of the revolutionary 
period.  Excélsior surged as part of the second generation of modern newspapers drawing 
from the Porfirian paper El Imparcial’s use of new print technology, formatting, and 																																																								
76 Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, “[A]proximación a la prensa mexicana (notas sobre el 
periodismo diario),” Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Política 69, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 
UNAM (July-Sept. 1972), 49. 
  77 Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión masiva en México (México: Juan Pablos Editor, 
1984), 69. 
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commercial advertising.78  For many, El Imparcial marked the rise of a modern Mexican 
press, with North American influence and exhibiting characteristics of industrialized 
nations.79  Its founder, oaxaqueño Rafael Reyes Spíndola introduced the rotary linotype, 
the first newspaper to employ the technology in Mexico.  During the constitutional 
skirmishes of the revolutionary period, two key publications emerged on opposing sides, 
El Universal in 1917 by tabasqueño Félix F. Palavicini and promoter of the Constitution, 
and Excélsior surged a few months after in opposition.80  From the state of Puebla, Rafael 
Alducín stood behind the creation of Excélsior on March 18, 1917, akin to North 
American newspapers.  Alducín also played a key role in the institutionalization of 
Mother’s Day in México (Día de las Madres), and popularized newspaper sections like the 
best newborn photo, or nativity scenes.81  However, the initial success of Excélsior proved 
short lasting.  As Alducin exited the Chapultepec Park in Mexico City an electric car 
whistle startled his horse, causing the pioneering editor to fall and break his skull.  The 
injury resulted in Alducin’s premature death in 1924.82  Nevertheless, from its inception 
until his death, Excélsior enjoyed considerable success and reached a national audience.  
However, 1963 marked a new era for Excélsior and the cooperative, one marred 
by direct confrontations with the government.  Since 1933 and up to the 1960s, under 
the restitution of Rodrigo de Llano as director with Gilberto Figueroa as general 
manager, Excélsior proved a conservative, non-confrontational, and complacent source; 																																																								
78 Enrique E. Sánchez Ruiz, “Los medios de difusión masiva y la centralización en México,” 
Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 4:1 (Winter 1988), 32. 
79 Claudia I. García Rubio, “Radiografía de la prensa diaria en México en 2010,” Comunicación y 
Sociedad [Departamento de Estudios de la Comunicación Social, Universidad de Guadalajara], No. 20 (July-December, 
2013), 66. 
80 Tabasqueño is a person from the state of Tabasco. Petra María Scanella, El periodismo político en 
México (Barcelona, España: Editorial Mitre, 1983), 11-12. 
81 Petra María Scanella, El periodismo político en México (Barcelona, España: Editorial Mitre, 1983), 
31. 
  82 Teodoro Torres, Periodismo (México: Ediciones Botas, 1937), x.  Héctor Minués Moreno, Los 
cooperativistas: el caso de Excélsior (Mexico: Editores Asociados Mexicanos, S.A., EDAMEX, 1987), 29.  
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yet, managed to obtain a steady readership and prestige in part due to its role during 
“relevant political moments.”83  The deaths of De Llano in late 1962 and Figueroa’s in 
early 1963 ended thirty years of relative stability ensued from a joint partnership of 
centralized leadership over the cooperative and the paper.84  This administrative 
adjustment succeeding their deaths opened a brief interval for the rise of a left leaning 
and progressive group, counterpart to the longstanding conservative leadership, and 
representative of the 1960s global rejection of traditional bearings and state 
institutions—a group to which Julio Scherer García belonged.  Granados Chapa 
describes the moment as a sort of reawakening to the country, whereby Excélsior’s 
“renovating tendency” sought to dispel the propagandist myth of a society without 
conflict and inform the new urban middle class of the “true nature of Mexican social 
processes.”85  Fronting this period of transition stood “Don” Manuel Becerra Acosta as 
director, with José de Jesús García de Honor presiding as general manager, and Enrique 
Borrego Escalante, who for many years directed the second edition Últimas Noticias, 
serving as president of the board of directors.86   However, soon after Becerra Acosta’s 
ascent in February 1963, thirteen days after the death of De Llano, discords arose.87  
The transformation to Excélsior’s content and editorial mirrored rising social 
tensions.  The paper’s critical stance under Becerra Acosta, with Scherer García as 																																																								
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assistant director, did not go unperceived among the majority of the nation’s newspaper 
editors, who were accustomed to turning a blind eye to key happenings in service to the 
nation and the president.  Within Excélsior, at least, the incipient push for more 
progressive reporting dated to 1965 with a group within the cooperative that pressured 
Becerra Acosta.  Under his leadership, initial efforts for a more open informative culture 
emerged; however, by the 1968 summer student mobilizations, Becerra Acosta was 
eighty-seven years old, sickly, only sporadically at the Excélsior office; for those reasons 
Julio Scherer García presided over much of the administrative decision making.  
Becerra Acosta died on August 9, 1968.  Julio Scherer García succeeded him as director 
of the paper, voted into the position by the cooperative on August 31.88  But even by the 
standards of 1968, Excélsior was not considered part of the leftist press, as were radical 
publications like Política (1960-1967) directed by Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, incarcerated 
in 1968, or Mario Menéndez Rodríguez’¿Por qué? (1968-1974), which Carlos Monsiváis 
deemed superfluous, lacking investigative rigor, that is with the exception of Siempre!, he 
thought.  Monsiváis also noted that in 1968 “[t]he criticisms are minor, investigative 
journalism barely looming, and the most innocuous and tedious rhetoric is exercised (no 
one reads the editorials, something the editors know well).”89  The post-1968 Excélsior, 
however, provided a space for investigative journalism, a moment where an entire team 
of journalists and intellectuals jointly pushed the limits of criticisms taking advantage of 
the press crevasse of President Luis Echeverría’s project of “apertura democrática.”   
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El Excélsior que no se vendió90 
Under the directorship of Julio Scherer García and a new cohort of intellectuals 
and young writers, Excélsior legitimized the crisis of the PRI.  Since becoming general 
manager, the right hand of Don Manuel Becerra, Scherer “invited to the editorial pages 
writers with their own lives and work,” that is with the authorization of the editor.  
Amongst those incorporated stood Jesuit Enrique Maza, epitome of Liberation 
theology—“believed in the God of love and loathed the God of power.”  Adolfo 
Christlieb Ibarrola—then president of the main oppositional party to the PRI, Partido 
Acción Nacional (National Action Party, PAN)—also joined Excélsior.91  Among others that 
contributed to the paper include: Alejandro Gómez Arias, often remembered for his 
links to Frida Kahlo and the letter paper trail documenting their relationship, journalist-
writers Ricardo Garibay and José Alvarado, novelist and playwright Hugo Hiriart, poet 
and feminist Rosario Castellanos, Ignacio Chávez—famed doctor who headed the 
UNAM in the 1960s and pioneered cardiology institutions in México, as well as 
journalist Froylán López Narváez who contributed to the creation of Proceso after 
Scherer’s ousting in 1976.92  In early August 1968, the prominent academic Daniel 
Cosío Villegas approached Scherer García about writing for Excélsior’s editorial—“From 
day one the historian warned he would subject the president to judgment.”93  In 1973 
sociologist and expert on indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen of the Colegio de 
México, joined the editorial team per Scherer’s invitation, his column appearing every 
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Tuesday and ending in July 1976.94  In 1971, after leaving his post as Mexican 
Ambassador to India 48 hours after the October 2 massacre through the legal recourse 
of “disponibilidad” or availability—not formally relinquishing his position or pay until 
1973—Octavio Paz joined Excélsior as head and founder of the cultural magazine Plural, 
a publication that bore from idea voiced by Scherer.95  Paz recounted that Scherer 
“never asked us to suppress a line or add a comma,” even while Plural’s viewpoints at 
times did not concur with those of Excélsior.96  Excélsior’s notoriety grew with the new 
cadre of prominent writers and the acute pen of intellectuals like Cosío Villegas, 
contributors whose writings “enriched the editorial pages during critical times,” while 
they challenged the government at a time when few dared.97  
And so the 1970s marked a new era for Excélsior.  “He ended that sold-out and 
brown-nosing journalism, which pays homage to the government, and the corrupt 
press,” wrote Elena Poniatowska in a written elegy to Scherer.98  Several accounts attest 
to his actions upon taking the directorship of Excélsior, and his efforts to clean house by 
targeting corruption within the paper.99  He ended the tradition of selling the “segundo 
titular de la primera página” or second headline of the front page, which usually sold for 
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8,000 pesos.100  Scherer “ultimately cancelled of the practice of selling the eight 
columns” and reversed the paper’s rightist tendency—“anticommunism as persecution 
of attempts at social justice.”101  In other words, Scherer tackled the culture of “embute,” 
or “funneling,” the acceptance of money, favors, or influence by journalists. 102  Over 
time, the editorials became known for their criticalness and plurality, the paper as a 
whole took on a new life denouncing some of the most acute social, political, and 
economic problems plaguing the country.103 Changes to the leaderships and subject 
matters in Excélsior derived in part from the journalistic culture Julio and his team 
fomented.  Upon Scherer’s death in January 2015 most memorandums corroborated 
and underscored a legacy of “incorruptibility.”104  Raúl Cremoux, who contributed to 
the editorials, believed “Julio Scherer’s great merit was to train young cadres and also 
guide those that were not so young.”105  But perhaps his best attributes were his 
managerial abilities, his vision for recruiting talent and knowing where to place writers 
based on their expertise.106  The combined efforts of recruiting prominent intellectuals 
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into the ranks, helping young journalists grow as thinkers and critics, and tackling some 
of the deeply rooted traditions of corruption evidently infused the paper’s content.  
However, Excélsior lived through a series of assaults by the private and 
governmental sector, the last that permanently ousted Scherer.  By the time of the June 
10, 1971 assault on students, Scherer was close to the administration, “I was at that time 
a regular at the presidential home,” recounted Scherer.107  As a regular at Los Pinos 
gatherings “were the ideal setting for my work.  There I ran into whomever I hoped to 
see and met with those I never imagined, there I set appointments and interviews to 
nourish the daily with privileged information.”108  However, by the following year, the 
business sector plotted against Excélsior pulling all their ads.  After their offensive, “the 
government appeared like the guardian angel,” wrote José Agustin, and filled the 
marketing void with ads of state owned companies, like Aceros Ecatepec and Cananea 
Mining Co.—noted Scherer García.109 Four months later, in December 1972, the private 
business ads resumed.  For Granados Chapa, Excélsior managed to get by due to the 
paper’s economic stability and the different types of work that came out of its 
commercial workshops, in addition to the government aid in the form publicity for 
public companies that usually did not partake in any marketing.110  Up to 1973, the 
private sector’s economic affront stood as one of the most difficult moments for the 
paper; yet, for the Echeverría administration—at a sexennial’s midpoint—an apt 
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gesture in defense of freedom of expression, intrinsically part of his politics of apertura 
democrática—an act of altruism that would not be repeated.   
The assaults on Excélsior did not cease. Scherer, however, seemed confident the 
president would not dare scheme for the termination of the paper, at least once 
responded to León Davidoff that the paper had “a double life insurance.”  The first was 
the Nobel Peace Prize and the second the UN Secretary General, two honors 
Echeverría sought—these, Scherer believed were Excélsior’s assurances.111  Echeverría 
did not win the Nobel, nor did he succeed Kurt Waldheim as UN Secretary General; at 
the same time, neither did Scherer García remain director of Mexico’s top daily.  While 
Excélsior was not terminated, the government scheme orchestrated ended a long streak of 
newsprint criticisms against Echeverría.  The Echeverría administration complotted 
with a group of cooperative dissenters led by Regino Díaz Redondo, at the time head of 
the second edition of Últimas Noticas, led those questioning Scherer’s leadership.112  The 
general consensus was that Excélsior’s “intransigent managers”—Scherer García and 
Rodríguez Toro—were gambling with the workers’ and their families’ patrimony.113  
Díaz Redondo orchestrated a prolonged land invasion of cooperative-owned land 
located in Paseos de Taxqueña.  Print and televised coverage portrayed those in the 
Paseos de la Taxqueña as victims, indigenous peoples, ejidatarios (communal land holder) 
whose rights the cooperative violated by failing to pay them for their land.  Scherer 
asked for a meeting with the president, but instead directed to the Agrarian Reform 
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Minster Félix Barra García.  Subsequent attempts at resolving the conflict failed.114  
Finally, Díaz Redondo group called for a cooperative meeting.  
By time of the July 8 cooperative meeting, the opposing group’s power had 
grown.  The assembly began at 11:00 a.m. with approximately eight hundred of the 
some 1,300 cooperative employees meeting to vote on the dismissal of the director, Julio 
Scherer García, and the general manager, Hero Rodríguez Toro, reported a DFS 
espionage agent, on the happenings on July 8.115  Confrontation spewed between those 
for and against Scherer.  The DFS agent noticed a pronounced division among 
workers.116  The leader of the opposing group, Regino Díaz Redondo, and Manuel 
Becerra Acosta “se mentaban la madre con los labios”—were swearing at each other while 
Hero Rodríguez remained calm, “stoic”—with a clear understanding of “what it was all 
about.”  The Boards of Directors and Surveillance denied Scherer and Rodríguez Toro 
the opportunity to speak.117  Moreover, a group of cooperative members had prevented 
the printing of a full page, according U.S. Ambassador Joseph J. Jova, a paid 
advertisement of a declaration signed by some forty-eight supporters of Scherer—
“which was to have been published in the July 8 edition but which under threats of 
violence was not printed.”  The page was left blank.118  The cooperative meeting 
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concluded at 4:30 p.m., by that time Julio Scherer García and Hero Rodríguez Toro 
had been displaced from their posts as a result of the voting.119 
The assault against the progressive wing of Excélsior succeeded.  Scherer García 
left the assembly hall at 2:30 p.m., according to the DFS police, before the cooperative 
meeting concluded and with some 130 workers by his side.  The famed photo of the 
“Golpe de Excélsior” captured Scherer and forty employees from various departments—
from photographers, correspondents, to editorial staff—exiting the building around 5:00 
p.m.120  “I saw around me old friends, young comrades,” reminisced Scherer.  “I do not 
remember at what point Abel Quezada took me by the arm nor when Gaston García 
Cantú did so, Abel on the right, Gastón on the left.  On Paseos de la Reforma I moved 
between the two the afternoon of July 8 of 1976 without knowing where to.”  Burdened 
by the memory of having been treated like a “thief” after what Julio deemed thirty years 
of honest work, he said to have left with “pockets free of others’ money.”121  On the 
corner of Paseos de la Reforma Avenue and Morelos St., the group exchanged contact 
information, yet planned to meet on July 21 at 11:00 a.m.  It was 6:20 p.m. by the time 
the group dispersed—Scherer looked “notably afflicted and tearful,” typed the 
espionage officer.122  
Immediately after, numerous intellectuals, public figures, and journalists 
declared their indignation against the ousting of Scherer.  Manuel Marcué Pardiñas 
published an open letter to Echeverría denouncing the assault—“in today’s Mexico 																																																																																																																																																																		
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there is no freedom of expression.  You have abolished it in a rash, violent, and illegal 
manner,” under his old magazine logo of Política.123  Marcué directed the radical 
publication Política (Politics, 1960-1967).124  Political cartoonists Eduardo del Río 
(“Rius”), Rogelio Naranjo, Bulmaro Castellanos Loza (“Magú”) and political leader 
Heberto Castillo collaborated in a special issue of the historieta (comic) Los Agachados (The 
Crouched) titled “Pinochetazo a Excélsior,” referring to the Augusto Pinochet military 
coup of 1973 that overthrew the democratically elected Salvador Allende in Chile, but 
in this case the act of intervention in Excélsior (see Illustration 5.4).125  Castillo, Naranjo, 
and Magú narrated their version of the rise and fall of a progressive Excélsior and toward 
the end of the cartoon strips the collaborators questioned Echeverría’s denial of 
government involvement—“The president denied ‘having a candle at the burial.’ Surely 
he thought us naïve…What do they have in store for the democratic trend?”126  Finally, 
the issue of “El Pinochetazo a Excélsior” reproduced Alan Riding’s New York Times articles 
on the ousting as well as other relevant press reports.127   
By far, the magazine Siempre! provided the most extensive print coverage of the 
July 8, 1976 episode.  Like Scherer and others, José Pagés Llergo started Siempre! after 
the government censored the magazine Hoy (Today) when he decided to publish a 																																																								
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photograph of the newlyweds Carlos Girón Peltier and Beatriz Aléman, former 
President Miguel Aléman’s daughter, while at a Paris cabaret in 1953.128  In the July 21, 
1976 issue of Siempre!, Sergio Méndez Arceo (“The Red Bishop”) offered his support to 
Scherer and wrote that many Catholics from his state of Morelos sought Excélsior and 
looked for his published Sunday homily.129  The following Thursday issue of July 28, 
1978 featured a statement by Octavio Paz and collaborators of Excélsior’s cultural 
magazine of Plural condemning the ousting of Scherer, signed by some seventeen 
individuals, including Gabriel Zaid, Rafael Segovia, Luis Villoro, and Enrique 
Krauze.130  The August 4 edition of Siempre! printed four large photographs of the 
Scherer and his team in the magazine’s building, alongside with Pagés Llergo (see 
Illustration 5.5).131  Pagés Llergo acted with public solidarity with Excélsior’s exiles by 
offering the team the offices of Siempre! in order for them to resume their projects and for 
those seeking to offer their support a forum to critically explore the happenings of July 8 
while most other media outlets—print, radio, and television—vaguely rendered 
coverage to the intellectual purge of one of Latin America’s most important daily.132   
 Meanwhile, news about Scherer made the international scene.  The New York 
Times reporter Alan Riding followed the story, most likely due to his knowledge of 
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Mexico and acquaintance with Julio.133  The international coverage of Julio Scherer and 
his team fingered the president and contended the assault on Mexico’s most liberal 
paper—acknowledging the general absence of media outlets critical of the 
government.134  On July 14 President Echeverría countered the indictment rendered by 
the foreign press.  In a Channel 13 interview he argued the criticisms that ran afoul 
abroad did not exist in the Mexican press, nor in the radio or television.  Rather, “very 
wealthy newspapers” of New York City, “newspapers not content with our nationalist 
outlook” had derived these anti-nationalist stories.  According to Echeverría, if those 
journalists cared to make a trip to Reforma 18 to inquire into what happened they 
would realize the government did not intervene—and what happened had been an 
independent cooperative decision.135  Unlike other direct assaults on individual 
journalists or government cooptation of publications, the assault on one of Latin 
America’s most important papers resulted in the purge of some of Mexico’s best 
editorialists, cartoonists, correspondents, and journalists—many trained by Julio 
Scherer—a professionalized team carefully assembled over decades left a significant 
intellectual gap in Excélsior. 
 
Birth of CISA and Proceso Magazine  
																																																								
133 Alan Riding, “Mexican Editor Ousted by Rebels: Excelsior’s Chief and Aides, the Target of 
Right-Wing Employees, Quit Offices,” The New York Times, 9 July 1976, 5; Alan Riding, “Paper in Mexico 
Ends Liberal Tone: Conservative View Appears After Ouster of Editor And 200 on Staff,” The New York 
Times, 10 July 1976, 8. 
134 Terri Shaw, “‘Murder’ of Mexican Paper Described,” The Washington Post, 14 July 1976, A6; 
George Natanson, “Editor Said Restricted by Mexico,” The Washington Post, 29 July 1976, A16.  
135 Luis Echeverría, “El Presidente y “Excélsior,” Siempre! 28 July 1978 (No. 1205), 7; Heberto 
Castillo, “Agresión a la libertad de expresión,” Los Agachados, Year IX, No. 270, 25 August 1976, front 
matter.  Also quoted in Scherer García, Los presidentes, 214. 
	 311 
It was at this point that Scherer embarked on an enterprise that would ultimately 
exert a huge influence on the growth of human rights in Mexico.  The initial idea was 
somewhat more modest, namely, the creation of a news services such as Associated 
Press.  According to Washington Post journalist George Natanson a crowd of some 3,000 
people met on July 19 attended the Scherer event paying an admission of about six 
dollars.  The group collected approximately $120,000 dollars for an upcoming project 
by selling shares at $40 dollars.136  Those gathered had apparently arrived by word of 
mouth and some by announcement of provincial newspapers, like El Tiempo from 
northern Mexico.137  Jova also reported on the July 19 meeting in support of Scherer 
García and other from his team.  Jova estimated a smaller crowd, according to the 
Ambassador some 1,500 people were noted in attendance, ranging from “second-level 
GOM officials,” intellectuals of the left, Heberto Castillo political leader and contributor 
of Excélsior, as well as Valentín Campa—railway worker leader and member of the 
Mexican Communist Party, and “a large contingent of Spanish and Chilean exiles.”138  
At the reception Scherer and supporters, Jova too reported, raised funds for a new 
journalistic project by selling shares at $500 pesos, approximately $40 dollars each. 
“Source reported that shares were selling well among reception,” wrote Jova.139  Scherer 
revealed to some in attendance his plan for a “News Service” in the model of the 																																																								
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Associated Press (AP) or the United Press International (UPI).  The organization would 
provide “reporting services” nationally, similar to the way in which Excélsior sold stories 
to provincial newspapers.140  In the July 22 and July 29 follow-up articles, the Washington 
Post confirmed the project to be a wire service for “the interior” of the country and a 
weekly newsmagazine.141  Although many would have expected the creation of a 
newspaper, Scherer and those collaborating with him opted for a political magazine and 
a news agency.  For Scherer, creating a news service was easier than starting up a daily 
given that it avoided competition with others print media in Mexico City and would not 
depend on the government aid or sources.142  As such, just ten days after the golpe 
supporters did effectively meet in Hotel María Isabel to announce the project and to sell 
stocks for what eventually consolidated in Comunicación e Información, S.A. De C.V. 
(communication and information, CISA) and a magazine for which they had yet to 
title.143  The 1976 purging of Excélsior’s varied intellectuals paved the road for the rise of 
several journalistic projects ranging from literary and political magazines, to a 
newspaper—inaugurating an era of increasingly critical reportage from a group of 
writers unwilling to tolerate further restrictions, and pitched to an audience of higher 
literary tastes willing to read criticism directed at a failing revolutionary project.  
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As CISA took off and the team prepared the inauguration of the first issue of a 
magazine, its planners encountered troubles.  “In the ill-fated days of July, I [Scherer] 
was summoned by the Procuraduría” (short for General Attorney’s Office).  El Heraldo de 
México newspapers published that Scherer would “probably appear upon the authorities 
with an amparo in pocket.”144  The new editors of Excélsior pressed charges against 
Scherer immediately after the July 8 ousting; however, the Mexico City Attorney 
General did not take action until late October.  According to a New York Times report 
Scherer had to answer to a charge of embezzling some $650,000 dollars.145   While the 
former editor agreed to respond to all allegations, he believed the investigation had been 
a “politically inspired” ploy to intimidate.146  As preparations for the first issue of a 
magazine consolidated, the state-owned paper company, PIPSA, refused to sell paper to 
the journalists.  The NYT reported Scherer “was forced to borrow paper from friendly 
newspapers or to buy it at an inflated cost on the black market.”147  Of the fifteen tons of 
paper the group needed to print a hundred thousand samples of the first number PIPSA 
declined the entire order.  Scherer and the team refused to wait until the new 
administration came in to get the paper, it was imminent for the first issue to appear 
before Echeverría left office—“We were interested in the man in the Palace, not the 
man back home”—in order to make judgment of the outgoing administration.  
Moreover, the former Excélsior journalists refused for the magazine to be born under the 
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paternalism a new administration entailed.148  Scherer believed Secretariat of Gobernación 
Mario Moya Palencia and Secretary of National Patrimony Francisco Javier Alejo 
carried out several ploys to prevent the printing of the first issue of their magazine, 
including impeding their ability to find a shop for printing.149  Founder of editorial 
Posada, Guillermo Mendizábal Lizalde “was the only printer who dared ‘challenge’ the 
government, by publishing the first issues of the magazine Proceso.”150  For Scherer, 
Mendizábal’s old printing machines did the job.151  Despite the official and logistical 
obstacles imposed to delay the publication, that came to be known as Proceso after the 
process the Excélsior journalists lived through on July 8, the 84-page political newsprint 
appeared on November 7, 1976—just three weeks before President Luis Echeverría left 
office.  
 
November 7, 1976 
 As such, Proceso served as an indictment against Echeverría.  The New York Times 
announced the magazine’s inauguration—Scherer “issued a new political weekly today 
that is highly critical of Mexico’s outgoing president, Luis Echeverría [Á]lvarez.”152  
The new editorial team pulled together enough paper for the 100,000 copies of the first 
issue, and another 50,000 of the following edition.153  Leading the magazine as director 
stood Julio Scherer García and Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa as his general manager.  																																																								
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His good friend Vicente Leñero and Miguel López Azuara stepped in as editors, and 
María de Jesús García, Carlos Marín, and Rafael Rodríguez Castañeda as 
coordinators—the latter is the current editor of Proceso.  Several journalists formerly at 
Excélsior became part of Proceso’s editorial team, including Scherer’s first cousin father 
Enrique Maza.  The leadership had been selected since the July 19 fundraising 
meeting.154  In its editorial page its contributors explained their fight against restrictions 
on freedom of expression, and the birth of Proceso as a symbol of “a perennial battle 
between a press that aspires to be responsible and an authority that does not feel 
constricted by the law.”155  Interestingly enough, a day after the first issue of the 
magazine came out a group removed the squatters from the Paseos de Tasqueña 
lands.156  Since its creation in November 1976, Proceso’s style of journalism has varied 
little; it is considered leftist and at times bordering muck-raking, yet consistently critical 
of public figures and sympathetic toward social issues—including human rights—
making it the first magazine to consistently employ the term.   
 Meanwhile, Echeverría concluded his term far from the redeemer he wanted to 
be remembered as.  During the Primer Congreso Latinoamericano de Periodistas (I Latin 
American Congress of Journalists) organized by the SNRP (Sindicato Nacional de Redactores 
de la Prensa, National Union of Press Reporters) in Mexico City on June 7, 1976 and 
whose members criticized Latin American dictatorships, including that of Argentina and 
Chile, agreed to nominate President Luis Echeverría for the Nobel Peace Prize.  During 
the plenary session of the journalistic event in Mexico City, the Federación Latinoamericana 																																																								
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de Periodistas (Latin American Federation of Journalists, or FELAP), an organization 
created at the Congress, agreed to carry out a request that had previously been 
suggested by the SNRP months before.  FELAP would then introduce the resolution to 
the prize committee in Norway and promote the candidate through a journalists’ 
commission dedicated to the campaign.  The Brazilian delegation at the Congress 
supported the decision and described Echeverría “as a champion of human rights, 
peaceful coexistence and universal peace.”157  However, the golpe seems to have 
unleashed a series of misfortunes for Echeverría, including the clouding of his image 
abroad, one he so carefully cultivated all through his sexennial.  Echeverría had many 
plans for his post-presidential times, and aspired to retain a footing in international 
affairs, preferably as UN Secretary-General.  However, Echeverría succumbed to the 
post-presidential blues as his national and international profile withered.  
 The July 8 purging of Excélsior journalists, however, gave rise to a variety of new 
print media.  In 1976 Octavio Paz, who directed Excélsior’s literary magazine Plural, 
created Vuelta, meaning “return.”158  After Vuelta’s August-September 1998 issue, Letras 
Libres continued the tradition with less literature and more politics under the editorships 
of Mexican intellectual Enrique Krauze, and with a Mexican and a Spanish edition 
published by Paz’ original publishing house Editorial Vuelta, S.A. de C.V.159 In 
November 1977, the second in command to Scherer and former sub-director of 
Excélsior, Manuel Becerra Acosta, created the newspaper Unomásuno, which immediately 																																																								
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rose to prominence, but toward the mid-1980s suffered from internal conflicts, causing 
dozens of writers to leave and create the daily La Jornada in 1984, today a major paper 
in the country.160  Although not directly linked to the Excélsior debacle, historians 
Enrique Florescano and Héctor Aguilar Camín too contributed to the proliferation of 
intellectual publications with the establishment of the cultural and political magazine 
Nexos in January 1978.161  However, Proceso’s proclivity for reporting on Latin America’s 
dictatorship and Mexico’s own internal violence rendered the magazine one of the first 
to actively utilize the term “human rights”—something it did far more often than any of 
its literary or political contemporaries in the new press.   
Indeed, a close reading of Proceso reveals the influence of the ideologies that 
underlay the very concept of human rights.  In the 1970s, while activists employed mass 
communications and the emerging transnational justice networks against repressive 
military dictatorships in Latin America, journalists engaged the emerging language of 
international rights.  Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay became the three countries the 
Mexican press most commonly associated with the abuse of human rights, at least until 
journalists began to describe Mexico’s own state violence as human rights violations in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In the Mexico of the 1970s, however, a nation that 
officially welcomed South American exiles, but at the same time forcibly repressed its 
own urban and rural guerrillas, the government systematically presented itself to the 
international community as a rights protector—journalists fractured the myth by 
attempting to disclose Mexico’s political violence.  In this context, the Proceso team 
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sought to expose and indict governments, while seeking justice and demanding peaceful 
democratic change as part of its journalistic agenda, while their counterparts, like Nexos, 
retained nationalist and often statist language regarding structural changes and more 
scholarly-based writings.  In sum, the gradual incorporation of new rights terminologies 
reveals the national diffusion of globalizing ideologies derivative of the 1970s and of a 
civil society exhausted by traditional party politics and armed guerrilla warfare—and 
one seeking a transition to democracy often employing new methods and language of 
social change.  
 
Amnesty International and Human Rights in Proceso 
Initial references to human rights in the Mexican press came in conjunction with 
Amnesty International’s (AI) year of the “Prisoner of Conscience.”  For two months in 
1976 and most of 1977, Proceso reporters employed the term “human rights” in relation 
to military dictatorships in other parts of the world, especially in South America, and 
occasionally made reference to victims of political repression in Mexico.  The coverage 
focused on Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile was in part due to how AI assigned political 
prisoners to local chapters from countries other than their own.  As such, Proceso’s first 
article on the subject announced the upcoming commemoration of Human Rights Day 
on December 10, 1976.  The pedagogical expert Pablo Latapí, who was once on the 
path to the priesthood, published an article entitled “We Are All Prisoners of 
Conscience” in the fifth issue of Proceso.162  AI opened its year of the Prisoner of 
Conscience on Human Rights Day, and Latapí announced the national 
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commemoration at the Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos (Center of Latin American 
Studies) of the UNAM created in 1960 by the renowned sociologist Pablo González 
Casanova.163  “Every day newspapers inform us of peoples imprisoned, tortured or 
killed because of their political or religious convictions,” wrote Latapí.  While he noted 
these realities had been the unfortunate reality of Latin America due to its military 
dictatorships, with the latest news at the time coming from Uruguay, he warned of the 
happenings in Mexico.  “As Mexicans believe we are far from widespread repression.  
Nor did Chileans, Argentines and Uruguayans think a few years ago, how far they have 
come.”  Latapí warned that the depoliticized nature of the Mexican society put it at a 
greater risk against repressive regimes in comparison to other more politicized societies 
in the hemisphere.  He then proceeded to explain the nature of the organization, and 
the 1,600 local groups worldwide, noting Spanish cellist Pablo Casals and Chilean poet 
Pablo Neruda as two famed members of the organization.164  Proceso’s initial graze with 
human rights concepts in 1976 came from international organizations and their links 
with their local chapters, as is the case of Amnesty International—information that 
proved uncomfortable for most national governments “because repressive regimes fear 
publicity,” noted Latapí.165 
Although the organization dates to the early 1960s, AI did not gain prominence 
until the late 1970s.  The organization’s rise derived from the realities of global 
repression and its role in conscious building on behalf of political prisoners.  Its 
beginnings date to an article British lawyer Peter Benenson published in the paper The 																																																								
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Observer on May 28, 1961 entitled “The Forgotten Prisoners.”166  In the article, 
Benenson underscored the rights embedded in Article 18 (“Everyone has the right of 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion”) and Article 19 (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression”) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).  His article went on to describe how political prisoners had been stripped of 
the rights embedded in these articles, giving rise to an international campaign 
specifically pushing for the application of the articles mentioned.  “That is why we have 
started Appeal for Amnesty, 1961. The campaign, which opens to-day, is the result of 
an initiative by a group of lawyers, writers and publishers in London, who share the 
underlying conviction expressed by Voltaire: ‘I detest your views, but am prepared to 
die for your right to express them,’” wrote Benenson.  From London the team ventured 
on fact finding missions—gathering information on prisoners from across the globe, 
their “names, numbers and conditions.”  These men and women came to be referred to 
as “Prisoner of Conscience,” whom the organization defined as “Any person who is 
physically restrained (by imprisonment or otherwise) from expressing (in any form of 
words or symbols) any opinion which he honestly holds and which does not advocate or 
condone personal violence.”167  In some sense, AI played a key role in conscribing 
“human rights” (as expressed in the 1970s) to a selected group of rights associated with 
political prisoners. 
Moreover, Amnesty International, excluded individuals that “conspired with a 
foreign government to overthrow their own.”  Their approach promoted four processes: 
a trial, the fortification of the Right to Asylum (as well as providing refugee services, i.e. 																																																								
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right to work), and the push for an “effective international machinery” to protect 
freedoms of opinion.  These practices became hallmarks of AI and eventually gaining 
notoriety for their success in shunning governments to release prisoners, often by 
offering a face and story to each prisoner in order to influence public opinion regarding 
prisoners.168  By December 1961, Amnesty International had solidified as an 
international organization based in London, but did not gain prominence elsewhere 
until the following decade.169  By the 1970s, Amnesty International had opened a new 
era of rights campaigns focused on individualistic justice for a targeted group—
specifically victims of political violence—whereby campaigns demanded that prisoners 
be processed as individuals through a legal and judicial procedure.  The approach broke 
with traditional and home-grown movements demanding structural and societal 
transformation, especially those within nationalist governments in Latin America (i.e. 
guerrilla, labor movements); in so doing, it provided a model and to some extent 
homogenizing internationally-based justice networks worldwide.  
Amnesty International’s expansion gave rise to Mexico’s local chapter.  Three 
individuals helped establish the Mexico section of Amnesty International in 1971, the 
very first in Latin America.170  Alicia Escalante de Zama, whose son was imprisoned 
during the 1968 student movements, mobilized for an IA local section in Mexico.  “My 
son Arturo was studying law at the National Autonomous University of Mexico 
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[UNAM].”  The police arrested Arturo and others at the Café Las Américas on July 26, 
amid the rising student movements.  Zama learned of her son’s whereabouts three days 
after the arrest when Excélsior published information regarding the arrest.  According to 
Zama, the UNAM’s rector José Barros Sierra rendered support to his son and others 
imprisoned in the infamous Lecumberri detention center.  Zama also appealed to 
Amnesty International in London, which assigned Arturo’s case to the local AI chapter 
in Canada.  When President Echeverría offered amnesty to several students on the 
condition they leave the country, the AI Canadian section planned Arturo’s placement 
and stay outside of Mexico upon his release on April 24, 1971.  Zama then wrote to 
Amnesty International in London expressing her interest in starting a chapter in 
Mexico.  The international section put Zama in contact with Dr. Héctor Cuadra, who 
was already a member of the organization.171  Cuadra had served as the Latin 
American specialist to the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in Geneva in 
1963.172  During that post, he published reports on dictatorships in Latin America, 
including Duvalier’s Haiti, Nicaragua under the Somozas, Paraguay under Stroessner, 
the Dominican Republic of Rafael Trujillo, and Batista’s Cuba.  While working for the 
ICJ, Cuadra met Seán McBride (1974 Nobel Prize)—at the time president of AI’s 
Board—who encouraged him to begin an Amnesty International chapter in Mexico.173  
After his return to Mexico in 1967, Cuadra along with Alicia Zama and Brígida 
Alexander, a survivor of Hitler’s Nazism exiled in Mexico, and others, remain some of 																																																								
171 Alicia Escalante de Zama, “Reseña de la historia de Amnistía Internacional México,” Amnesty 
International México <http://amnistia.org.mx/conocenosn/index.php?s=10>. 
172 Cecilia Ugalde Pimienta and María del Carmen Fortes Muradas, “Sección mexicana de 
Amnistía Internacional: una propuesta para su crecimiento y desarrollo,” (B.A. thesis, Universidad 
Iberoamericana, 1990), 151-152.  
173 “Homenaje Héctor Cuadra Moreno-Semblanza,” Artepepan, 
<http://www.artepepan.com.mx/homenaje_hectorcuadra/semblanza.html>. 
	 323 
Mexico’s AI founding members.174  Zama; however, notes that despite “sustaining 
several conversation” with Cuadra, there was little advancement toward creating a 
chapter—that is, until more people were recruited.  According to Zama, the first 
working group convened on May 28, 1971.175  As such, the local chapter of the rising AI 
organization gradually made its way to Mexico with several of its members having had 
contact with the mounting international justice network that came to characterize the 
1970s human rights movement.  
Although the local group materialized, the organization had difficulty raising 
funds and increasing its membership between 1971 and 1976.  According to activist 
Mariclaire Acosta, key non-founding member and sister Magdalena Acosta, the London 
office expressed its concern over the lack of growth of the Mexican section.176  The 
organization’s potential had been diminished in part by its inability to register as a civil 
organization.  The government ignored whenever Amnesty International attempted to 
register as a civil organization, thus obstructing their ability to organize public events.  
Every time Alicia Zama went to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs the agency would tell 
her file had been misplaced.  The Amnesty members suspected their file wound up in 
the Secretariat of Gobernación on the claim Amnesty’s actions were a matter of national 
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security.  Even with their small membership, Brigida Alexander, the most active and 
visionary of its members according to Mariclaire Acosta, had managed to organize some 
events and also worked with Chilean exiles after the overthrow of Salvador Allende in 
1973.  Other members, like Ester Zama, focused on keeping the organization alive, but 
were not necessarily interested in disrupting the government.  As such, the local chapter 
of Amnesty International in Mexico in the early 1970s was small, ran by “serious,” 
women “writing letters and eating cookies.”  That is, until a new generation joined the 
team, a group more adept to using print sources to promote Amnesty International’s 
cause.177 
Thereby, human rights in Proceso between 1976 and 1977 coincided with the 
arrival of a young leadership to Mexico’s section of Amnesty International.  During 
those years, Amnesty went from being a largely obscure organization ran by upper class 
women, to one with more visibility, actively engaged with the press.  The shift was in 
large part due to the arrival of Mariclaire Acosta, a young professional just returning 
from Essex [E-6] University.  “I was a young academic, I had studied sociology and 
political science, and I participated in the student movement of ’68,” recounted Acosta.  
“Just weeks after having returned [to Mexico]…I lived the massacre of the 10th of June,” 
also known as the Corpus Christi massacre in 1971, a sequel of 1968.  Those events 
greatly impacted Mariclaire, “because it was like a nightmare, again they are killing 
students,” she told herself.  After the overthrow of Allende in 1973 and the persecution 
of her friends, she saw an even greater reason to join Amnesty International.  For 
Mariclaire, the organization “offered an alternative to the polarization of the right and 
the left in the 1970s,” a democratizing discourse that resonated with what she had 																																																								
177 Interview with Mariclaire Acosta, 11 March 2014 (Mexico City).   
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learned from her professors in England, “an ideal that transcended political 
ideologies”—where what mattered most was the individual.178  Mariclaire Acosta’s 
educational background and Amnesty International’s philosophy represented the global 
shift toward a non-violent, less politicized and legalistic shift toward, and perhaps even 
revival of, a liberal democratic alternative—one intimately linked or perhaps even 
fueling the rise of human rights networks in the 1970s.  
As of 1975 Mariclaire Acosta, along with other new members gave Amnesty 
International a new direction.  That year, the Legal Adviser of the Internal Secretariat 
of Amnesty International, Sir Nigel Rodley, arrived in Mexico to investigate allegations 
of torture in the country.  While in Mexico, he met with Mariclaire and asked her to 
“give the organization leadership.”  Thereafter, Mariclaire received from London the 
material to carry out a campaign on torture.  She along with her team of five launched a 
major press campaign on Uruguay.  The focus was not on Mexico because local 
chapters of Amnesty could intervene on issues related to their home country.  In no way 
deterred by their lack of legal status, the Mexican section of Amnesty International used 
any means at their disposal to disseminate information on the subject of human rights 
violations in Uruguay.  Even while it may have seemed as though human rights was 
explicitly a South American matter, the few references to Mexico simply reflected 
Amnesty’s strategy to keep out of national matters.  Amnesty International’s local 
campaign in Mexico proved one of the reason Proceso writers first employed the term 
‘human rights’ to denote violations in South America, and the organization’s use of 
print media willing to publicize notes and data on state violence.179     
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Before the end of 1976, one additional article made use of the term human 
rights.  Proceso reviewed a piece that Abraham F. Lowenthal published in Foreign Affairs 
regarding the future of US-Latin American relations.  At that moment Director of 
Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, Lowenthal wrote on the deteriorating 
nature of relations between the United States and Latin America, especially as leaders 
rejected the notion of a “special relationship” with their Northern counterpart.  As 
Lowenthal noted the challenges the United States faced in the following decade, 
including the promotion of more equitable economic relations in the region, another 
included the protection of ‘human rights.’180  Lowenthal’s article responded to the Chile 
Report of the Senate Select Committee, which revealed “what the United States did in 
Chile from 1963 through 1973.” And he explained Latin America was no longer the 
passive backwater it used to be and how the United States could no longer forge its 
foreign policy toward the region based on past assumptions or understandings of the 
region.  While human rights were not the focus of the article, and while the actual terms 
was used but sparingly, the Proceso editorial concluded with a quote from the article 
regarding the future of human rights in the region.  “As a region with long-standing 
doctrines regarding respect for human rights but one now suffering from a plague of 
brutal repression, Latin America’s evolution will importantly affect the future of human 
rights and their institutionalized protection or suppression,” argued Lowenthal.181  Less 
than two months since the magazine’s launch, Proceso became a forum on behalf of 
political prisoners in Latin America and a print source ready to shame any government, 
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including its own, even if Amnesty International did not do so directly.   
 
1977: The Year of Human Rights in Proceso  
Amnesty International’s Year of the Prisoner coincided with the beginning of 
José López Portillo’s presidential administration.  Coincidently, the United States and 
Mexico both inaugurated presidents in 1977: that of James Carter (Jan. 1977-Jan. 1981) 
and López Portillo (Dec. 1976-Nov. 1982), whereby both statesmen sent their wives to 
their counterpart’s inaugurations, Rosalynn Carter attended López Portillo’s ceremony 
in December 1976 and First Lady Carmen Romano de López Portillo assisted Carter’s 
swearing-in on January 1977.182  Early on in López Portillo’s presidency, several groups 
made political prisoners centerpieces of their campaigns, a fact reflected in Proceso’s 
publications since November 1976.  By early March, Proceso announced the publication 
of two issues giving special attention to Mexico’s political prisoners.  “In the past and in 
this issue, Proceso publishes documents, interviews and testimonies on political prisoners 
or prisoners who committed crimes under the pretext of an idea,” announced the 
magazine.  Unlike previous articles making use of the term human rights to reference 
South America, Proceso in the March 8 issue utilized the terms to make reference to 
political violence in Mexico.  Most importantly, the magazine announced the intentions 
behind the publication of the materials and explicitly their desire to contribute to the 
“creation of a climate that makes possible, without detriment to true justice and a true 
coexistence, the freedom of those who attempted to oppose the regime in ways we 
consider erroneous.”  An article entitled “Violation of human rights” became one of the 																																																								
182 Jimmy Carter, “Visit of President Jos[é] L[ó]pez Portillo of Mexico Remarks of the President 
and President L[ó]pez Portillo at the Welcoming Ceremony,” 14 February 1977, The American Presidency 
Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7877>; Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2, 138.  
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first to link human rights to Mexico’s political repression.  The article focused on the 
constitutional rights of political prisoners and made no reference to international 
documents or mandates, rather it explicitly noted the violation of rights based on articles 
16, 19, and 20 of the Mexican Constitution.183  Attorney Guillermo Andrade Greesler 
provided Proceso material on the proceedings of some three hundred prisoners.  
According to Greesler, Mexico’s political prisoners had been illegally arrested and their 
homes sacked without an official order (article 16), they had been held for over 72 hours 
without being formally charged (article 19), and had not been tried within four 
months—if the charge of the offense does not exceed two years—or within a year if the 
maximum penalty is longer than two years (article 20).  According to defender Andrade 
Greesler, the authorities violated article 20, section VIII of “99 percent of the processes 
of political prisoners.”184  As such, by 1977 Proceso revealed a distinct brand of national 
defense in Mexico that pushed for an Amnesty Law, spurred by defense lawyers like 
Guillermo Andrade Greesler, the Comité de Familiares y Ex-Presos Políticos (Committee of 
Relatives and Former Political Prisoners), the Mexican Communist Party (PC), and the 
Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (Mexican Worker’s Party, PMT).185 
While Amnesty International, along with leftist groups and lawyers, all fought on 
behalf of political prisoners, they did so through different means.  Mexican groups, with 
few or no links to the international community, pushed an Amnesty Law proposal for 
the release of political prisoners.  The negotiations started sometime in May 1976 
between political groups and lawyers with a congressional committee.  However, violent 
happenings linked to Mexico’s guerrilla group Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre (September 																																																								
183 “Violación de derechos humanos,” Proceso (No. 18), 8 March 1977, 12-17.  
184 “Violación de derechos humanos,” Proceso (No. 18), 8 March 1977, 13. 
185 “Violación de derechos humanos,” Proceso (No. 18), 8 March 1977, 14, 17. 
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23 Communist League) stalled talks regarding amnesty.  These included the death of 
two people during a dog show at the UNAM and a kidnapping attempt in August on 
the president-elect’s sister, Margarita López Portillo, the latter the same week officials 
agreed to announce a resolution.186  Nonetheless, by December 29, 1976 President 
López Portillo, Secretariat of Gobernación Jesús Reyes Heroles, and the Attorney General 
Oscar Flores all received a copy of a complete draft for the Amnesty Law.187  Congress 
approved a version of the law almost two years later, on September 28, 1978.188  
Mexico’s section of Amnesty International, however, centered its campaign on media 
dissemination of the conditions of prisoners in South America.  While not directly linked 
to the national efforts for the passage of amnesty, the organization did raise 
consciousness on political prisoners by humanizing their condition without directly 
attacking the Mexican government.  However, over time the organization disseminated 
material from London on torture in Mexico—chipping at the international image of the 
country.189  Even while Proceso published numerous editorials on torture and the 
condition of Mexico’s urban and rural prisoners incarcerated for their attempts against 
the government, the writers did so primarily from nationalist perspective—denouncing 
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contra la hermana del presidente electo de México,” El País, 13 August 1976 
<http://elpais.com/diario/1976/08/13/internacional/208735206_850215.html>. 
188 Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Nación Unión, “Ley de Amnistía,” 28 
September 1978 <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/abro/lamn78/LAmn78_abro.doc>. 
189 “Informe de Amnistía Internacional sobre la tortura en México,” Proceso (No. 24), 16 April 
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the violation of political rights as protected by the Mexican Constitution, and rarely 
employing the nascent language and universalities of human rights.190 
However by April 1977 a new brand of criticisms on human rights emerged in 
the writings of Jesuit Enrique Maza.  Founding member of Proceso, fierce advocate for 
freedom of expression within the Catholic Church, and first cousin of Julio Scherer 
García, Maza’s writing reflected certain affinities with the political left.191  Maza’s 
writings could be placed within Latin America’s wave of Liberation theology—alongside 
the social teachings and work of other prominent Catholics in Mexico like Morelos’ 
Archbishop Sergio Méndez Arceo (“The Red Bishop”) and Chiapas’ Bishop Samuel 
Ruiz García for his work with indigenous peoples—both perceived by the Church as 
radicals but who rose to prominence for their progressive politics.192  Born to Mexican 
parents in El Paso, Texas, Maza spent part of his life in the United States, finishing a 
journalism degree at the University of Missouri.  Maza returned to Mexico and at some 
began working as a journalist for Excélsior until 1976 when he too left and became a 
founding member of Proceso.193  According to Jean Meyer, Jesuit seminaries and training 
went through a serious transformation around 1969, and in 1970 Colegio Patria pioneered 
a new curriculum, where Pablo Latapí had been asked to evaluate the program and 
who concluded: “we feed power structures, we contribute to maintaining an order of 
social injustice.”  As such a new generation of Jesuits emerged, one influenced by the 																																																								
190 José Reveles, “Reos en Morelos: Tortura e intimidación, medios de pesquisa,” Proceso (No. 
18), 8 March 1977, 18-20.  Reveles has authored several books on political corruption and the narco 
traffickers in Mexico.  See, Una cárcel mexicana en Buenos Aires (México: Proceso, 1980), Las manos sucias del 
PAN: historia de un atraco multimillonario a los más pobres (México, D.F.: Planeta Editorial, 2006), El cártel 
incómodo: el fin de los Beltrán Leyva y la hegemonía del Chapo Guzmán (México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2010), El Chapo: 
entrega y traición (México, D.F.: Debolsillo, 2014).  
191 See Enrique Maza, La libertad de expresión en la Iglesia (México, D.F.: Oceano, 2006). 
192 Teryn Louisa Piper, “The 1974 Congreso Indigena: The Church, the State, and the 
Emergence of the Indigenous Movement of Chiapas,” (M.A. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 2011). 
  193 Enrique Maza, Rumores de silencio (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
Coordinación de Difusión Cultural, Dirección de Literatura, 2008), jacket cover.  
	 331 
work of Brazilian Paulo Freire and Austrian Iván Illich and their teachings on social 
justice.  It is possible that Maza’s progressive ideological underpinning derived from this 
new wave of Jesuit seminary trainings.  As early as 1969, Maza dissented with the 
mainstream Church.  That year he wrote an article on the Buena Prensa (The Good 
Press), prominent Catholic press dating to 1936, in which he believed the power of the 
press could be used for transforming society and not merely for evangelizing.194  From 
that point onward, Jesuits left the Buena Prensa and began writing for organizations like 
CENCOS, a media NGO with Catholic origins (and subject of chapter four).  In 1978 
Buena Prensa also ceased publishing the Jesuit theology magazine Christus.  Between 1978 
and 1979, critics accused the magazine of being against the Church and pro-Marxist, 
among other things.  In the north, Jesuit teachers left their posts in one of the country’s 
top private university, the Tecnológico de Monterrey (Technological Institute of Superior 
Studies of Monterrey, ITESM) and at least one supporter of their exit claimed they were 
the “the Mexican [Herbert] Marcuse who want to make of the TEC a new Berkeley.”195  
As such, Maza’s criticism of the rising conceptions of international human rights echoed 
his own affinities with a conception of social justice that seeks advancement of groups 
through structural transformations of society, and one which questions the effects of 
capitalism on social relations.  
Maza’s first article in Proceso on human rights sought to bring attention to the 
condition of indigenous peoples in Mexico.   Most importantly, Maza outlined the irony 
behind Mexican dismay over other countries’ human rights violations—like when “an 																																																								
194 Jean Meyer, “Disidencia jesuita,” Nexos, 1 December 1981 
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author is expelled or a foreigner killed”—while at home “[we] will continue impassive, 
committing our genocide…”196 Maza employed the term “human rights” in reference 
to systematic disregard for the condition of indigenous communities, as expressed 
through the 1977 Second National Congress of Indigenous Peoples held in the town of 
Santa Ana Nichi, State of Mexico.197  According to the Jesuit, while the press ran stories 
of a single crime, day after day, there existed little alarm regarding the condition of 
Mexico’s most deprived peoples.  Maza questioned the roots of this indifference and 
concluded “we have reduced their human reality, to our materialized interests...”198 
While he criticized the failures of the revolution; Maza also questioned the economic 
model pursued in Mexico and its social structures.199  He added: “We have already 
acquired the coldness of capitalism that sacrifices generations for an economic project 
and for profit.”  For the Jesuit the ‘scandal of misery’ had been muted and replaced by 
other priorities when the problem should instead foment debate on the “conception of 
man, of society, of Revolution, and economy.”  Finally, Maza commented on President 
José López Portillo’s stance on inequality and he advised against the fear of injustice and 
how it must not distract or slow production—an official stance exemplifying the state’s 
stance toward economic recovery as the path for remedying social ills.  Interestingly 
enough, in his article Maza analyzed human rights from a nationalist perspective by 
applying the term to indigenous peoples, whilst also recognizing Mexico’s fixation with 																																																								
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other countries’ political rights records as it turned a blind eye to those slighted by the 
revolutionary economic model—an argument framed in structural and social justice 
terms, and fairly skeptical of the rights crusade emanating from the United States.    
Moreover, by mid-March Proceso’s short columns on international news 
periodically began employing the term human rights.  Most of the sections that utilized 
the terms reported on U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America.  For instance, the first 
on the “Southern Cone” placed quotation marks around the term “human rights.”  
According to the Proceso briefs, the Argentine and Uruguayan military governments 
protested against U.S. government stance toward “human rights,” matters these 
countries deemed of internal concern.  Argentine and Uruguayan officials claimed they 
would reject U.S. foreign assistance if it was to be used as a tool to intervene in their 
affairs, as they discerned from statements by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.  Argentina 
made the announcement through radio and television, according to Proceso, and 
supposedly came as a surprise to Ambassador Robert C. Hill.  Uruguayan officials on 
the other hand presented a formal letter of protest to Ambassador Ernest V. Siracusa 
where they documented their frustrations with Carter’s human rights politics, which 
they perceived as U.S. interventionism.  Meanwhile, on the 6th of March Ernesto 
Beckmann Geisel of Brazil (1974-1979) used the chancellor’s office to communicate a 
similar message, a step that further strained relation with the United States, since the 
latter intervened in the southern country’s nuclear negotiations with Germany.  Aid to 
Argentina had been set at $15 million, reduced during Carter’s administration, and 
Uruguay at $3 million—yet these southern dictatorships that had welcomed military 
and economic aid on the count of combating the spread of communism claimed their 
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right to sovereignty once U.S. foreign policy sought greater oversight on matters of 
human rights for countries receiving aid.200  
Certainly by March 1977, reports of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy on human 
rights began to seep into Proceso.  This was also due to Julio Scherer’s keen interest in the 
Chilean and Argentine military dictatorships, a concern dating to his time at Excélsior.  
While editor of the paper Scherer traveled to Santiago, Chile.  Of the 1974 trip he 
noted his longing “to see and listen to General Augusto Pinochet.”  Although one of his 
objectives was to talk to Pinochet, another quest included his “search for evidence of the 
brutality imposed on the country by a bloody regime.”  At the time he journeyed with 
contacts provided to him by exiles living in Mexico, most likely friends.  In this 
particular instance, upon his return home met up with Echeverría to inform him of 
what he witnessed, given the president’s keen interest in sheltering exiles as part of his 
“progressive” foreign policy.201  Scherer’s pursuit of news on Chile after the 1973 coup 
derived in part from what had been his personal friendship with Allende.202  Scanella 
notes Scherer’s hard stance toward Latin American dictatorships, but in particular 
against the “pinochetazo” and Spain’s “franquismo.”203  Moreover, many South American 
exiles found refuge in the press and universities in Mexico in the 1970s, particularly the 
Universidad Autónoma de Metropolitana (Metropolitan Autonomous University, UAM) 
founded in 1974, and FLACSO-México (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 
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Sociales) created in 1975.  Given their presences in the press, many journalists like 
Scherer and those in his team forged personal relationships with Argentine and Chilean 
refugees, who often reported on their country’s political realities, a fact that in turn 
predisposed many Mexican journalists to write on the subject of dictatorship.  
Often times key stories on state violence derived from the relationships forged 
between Mexican and exiled journalists.  Scherer, for instance, became close friends 
with Miguel Bonasso, an Argentine exile and resistance member.204  Bonasso—
journalist, author and today political leader—met Julio in 1975 while the latter still 
headed Excélsior.  At the time, the Argentine exile had taken leave from his profession in 
order to “immerse” himself “in the resistance against State terrorism already reigned in 
the ‘constitutional’ government of María Estela Martínez de Perón [1974-1976] and her 
Warlock, José López Rega,” wrote Bonasso.  When they met, Scherer was getting ready 
for a trip to Argentina, and Bonasso along with his friend Carlos Suárez visited the 
director to give him the insights into “the mystery that Argentina has always been to the 
world.”  The same year, Bonasso and his family voyaged back to Argentina in 
clandestine.  In 1978 he returned to Mexico as press secretary for the urban guerrilla 
movement Movimiento Peronista Montonero, and it was then that Bonasso reconnected with 
Scherer.205  Because the Mexican government wholeheartedly accepted South 
American exiles in the 1970s, the happenings in Latin America had a strong presence in 
the press and in the president’s discourse on foreign policy.  Such was Echeverría’s 																																																								
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support that Chileans received a building that served as their meeting ground and to an 
extent their personal press station for communicating on Pinochet’s atrocities, Casa de 
Chile (Chilean Home).206   
In some ways, Mexico became the platform from which exiles launched their 
information campaigns against the military dictatorships.  Given the government’s 
support for the exile cause, many journalists wrote freely on the subject of Latin 
America’s dictatorships.  Moreover, in the case of Argentina, argued Bonasso, “[t]he 
imminence of the [1978] World Cup enabled us to intensify the reports of the atrocities 
perpetrated by the military dictatorship.” Once in Mexico, Bonasso asked Scherer if he 
was interested in interviewing the resistance in Argentina, and the former Excélsior 
director gladly accepted.  Scherer met with the clandestine resistance—the montoneros—
in 1978.207  The story on the guerrilla movement that rocketed Jorge Rafael Videla’s 
dictatorship [1976-1981] appeared as the cover story of the 87th issue of Proceso 
published on June 3, 1978.208  Of his trip, Scherer remembered Argentina winning the 
Cup and Videla’s inaugural address at the event where the military leader evoked God, 
an act the journalist “despised.”  Scherer also concluded “[i]n the blood that stains the 
Southern Cone, Argentina was the extension of Chile, the agony of nations shared like 
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that of two brothers.”209  Finally, in 1984 Scherer invited Bonasso to contribute weekly 
to Proceso.  And by the time the Argentine journalist returned home in 1988, wrote 
Bonasso, he had with him the credentials of having worked for Proceso, and Scherer’s 
backing.210  The relationships forged in Mexico between exiles and journalists 
strengthened the national and international press networks against the dictatorship and 
by default disseminated news on Carter’s human rights policies toward South American 
military dictatorships in an effort to help dismantle these—thus seeding individualist 
notions of rights, particularly those of political prisoners.  
 
Jimmy Carter’s Human Rights…and the “Blah, Blah, Blah”211 
However, Carter’s campaign of political pressures on repressive regimes also 
generated criticism.  Enrique Maza initiated the denunciation.  In an article entitled 
“Human Rights and Blah, Blah, Blah,” Maza’s began with the following remark: “The 
issue of human rights is complicated . . . [t]he world begins to think of them; because 
Jimmy Carter has ordered it and so begins his evangelist offensive to defend them in the 
world.”212  Maza concluded that the new U.S. initiative on human rights was a policy 
that benefited the United States, because it attempted to prove the capitalist system it 
represented worked, and served to retract the rising current against democracy since 
Vietnam.  Most importantly, the Jesuit dismissed the sudden adherence to human rights 
as part of the Cold War ideological struggle against the Soviet Union, insofar as the 
United States no longer wanted “the socialist countries to be the global defenders of 																																																								
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210 Miguel Bonasso, “Don Julio,” Proceso (No. 1993), 11 January 2015, 69-71.  
211 Title partially from Enrique Maza’s article, “Los derechos humanos y el bla, bla, bla,” Proceso 
(No. 20), 19 March 1977, 40-41.  
212 Title partially from Enrique Maza’s article, “Los derechos humanos y el bla, bla, bla,” Proceso 
(No. 20), 19 March 1977, 40-41.  
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oppressed peoples” or for human rights to remain a weapon wielded against capitalism 
and “reserved and exclusive” of the Soviet Bloc—“meaning, the oppressive imperialism 
goes on the offensive and snatches ideological banners.”  While Maza recognized that 
Carter’s policy in some ways looked inward—inspecting its own policies toward 
undocumented immigrants, for example—and could be beneficial.  However, he 
believed that the United States lacked the moral authority to carry out these policies, 
given that the country had been built on the violation of human rights.  From the 
[a]nnihilation of its indigenous peoples; discrimination toward its minorities, which 
according to Maza the United States “gunned to excess” (most notably Native 
Americans, Africans and African-Americans, Italians, Polish, Irish, Chicanos, Puerto 
Ricans, and Catholics); bribed, corroded, spied, and overthrew governments; promoted 
and sustained dictatorships they now indicted; engaged in wars and invaded other 
countries; attempted against heads of state and killed others; pillaged other countries’ 
natural resources; and placed military bases all over the world.  In that sense, the United 
States “Dictated.  Perverted.  Owned the World,” concluded Maza.  And if Carter 
sought to honestly speak out for human rights, the U.S. government would have to start 
with restitution for all its wrongdoing.  Moreover, the human rights policy already in 
place had been made a condition of foreign aid and applied to countries like the Soviet 
Union and Uganda, but most notably towards Latin America—from Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Cuba.  Maza viewed 
Carter’s human rights policy as one conducted, “from the ivory tower as masters of the 
world,” a position acquired ironically through repressive measures.  For such reasons, 
the Mexican theologian viewed the new era of accusations and the “human rights talk” 
	 339 
as “blah, blah, blah, blah.”213  Critical writings like those of Maza proved one key 
avenue by which human rights concepts made their way into the Mexican press and to 
readers in urban centers, particularly in Mexico City.  However, these writings signaled 
the difficulties Carter’s initiatives faced in the context of the Cold War, whereby 
hospitality toward the United States ended up in bitter divisions over matters of human 
rights, even when individuals like Maza supported their advancement.   
Other writers explored the sociological currents behind dictatorships, yet still 
making use of the term “human rights.”  Spanish exile Francisco Carmona Nenclares, 
in the same issue, wrote the article “Bad Time to Remember Human Rights,” printed 
next to Maza’s on Carter’s foreign policy.  Carmona, unlike Maza, looked at the 
reaction of South American military leaders to the sudden interference “in the internal 
affairs of so many beautiful and healthy tyrannies” and the stumping of the “cheerful 
genocide perpetrated in the soul and body of their peoples.”214  Nenclares, perhaps 
reminded of the atrocities of Francisco Franco (1939-1975) in Spain, mocked the Latin 
American dictators and how they must have been feeling as pressure mounted against 
their governments.215  In looking at the psyche of the dictator, Nenclares concluded that 
these leaders destroy rights precisely because “social consensus of economic power 
sponsors and promotes the maneuver.”  These dictators derive their power from 
violence.  Their projects of annihilation of dissidence cannot happen without prior 
approval and support from society, from what are supposed to be pressure groups.  																																																								
213 Enrique Maza’s article, “Los derechos humanos y el bla, bla, bla,” Proceso (No. 20), 19 March 
1977, 40-41. 
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Because injustice bears fruits and privileges for sectors of the population, it “integrates” 
under the premise of security and solidarity.  Nenclares exposed the perverseness and 
the historic nature of dictatorship and violence toward a people—and reminds its 
leaders of the silent complicity of society itself in the suppression of rights.  “Bad time to 
remember human rights.  I suspect foul play,” he wrote.216 
Unlike Maza, the Spanish exile took a historic approach to the subject of military 
dictatorship and the role citizens played in the preservation of authoritarianism in their 
home countries, and he questioned Carter’s indictments toward South America 
dictatorships when the United States had previously provided aid to continue repressive 
measures. 
Proceso also began publishing human rights in its international news section—
Proceso Internacional.  In its March 19th “United States” column the magazine reported on 
a 1977 Geneva meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), since 
2006 replaced by the UN Human Rights Council, in which deputy leader of the U.S. 
delegation, Brady Tyson, publicly apologized for his government’s involvement in the 
overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende—“the first such public admission,” 
reported the Wilmington Morning Star.  The admission came during a resolution proposal 
on the condition of human rights violations in Chile under Augusto Pinochet.217   While 
at the time such admittance seemed consistent with the political values and ideas of the 
new approach toward the world, the Carter administration quickly disavowed the 																																																								
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statement, which it deemed as personal to Tyson and not previously authorized by the 
president.  Tyson’s remarks, however, have been credited for contributing to the 
censure resolution passed against the Chilean government, a resolution signed by 
twenty-six countries.  Proceso reported that Pinochet’s cabinet resigned and that twenty-
four hours later he purportedly dissolved the country’s political parties, including the 
Christian Democratic Party, although the magazine did not clarify on whether these 
actions had been a direct response to the UN resolution of censure against Chile.  While 
the news piece recognized a shift in the way the United States understood Latin 
America’s problems, it nevertheless noted the underlying interests toward the region 
remained the same.218  As Carter’s presidency progressed, reports on his human rights 
politics only heightened in Proceso—and ranged from general reproductions of U.S. 
policies toward Latin America, critical pieces on the imperialistic nature behind the 
human rights initiatives, to cartoons by renown artists.   
Meanwhile, leftist illustrators also left their mark in the history of human rights 
in popular culture.  Zamora (Michoacán) native Eduardo “Rius” del Río drew one of a 
series of political comics mocking Carter’s rights agenda.  The illustration titled “The 
Biggest Seller” shows Carter in an outside podium with a flimsy wooden background, 
and lighting to the backdrop motto: “We Are For Human Rights,” in small text and 
parenthesis “In the USSR” (see Illustration 5.6).  Behind the stage stands a five-story 
building resembling a prison with windows signifying countries targeted by Carter’s 
human rights interventionism—mostly Latin American countries in addition to the 
Philippines and Korea.  From Brazil’s window an “Ahh!” cry, from Nicaragua’s what 
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seems as blood drippings, from Chile’s a lifeless arm, at the top of the building a 
billboard reading “The Free World” and at the bottom a barbed wire barrier 
surrounding the building.  In the center bottom, a logo with two hands shaking in a 
crest of the American flag, the emblem of the US Mutual Security Agency, a 1950s 
Cold War aid institution responsible for managing foreign economic and military aid, 
launched by President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953).219  In the podium, next to a cross, 
stands Carter wearing a halo with a price tag that reads “For Rent” in English.  
Meanwhile, his audience is composed of two people turning to Carter, Uncle Sam 
clapping and a humble woman pondering at the backdrop slogan.  Above the political 
scene, Rius included a sun resembling the all-seeing eye often associated with U.S. 
surveillance or the eye in the one-dollar bill.220   
The Proceso comic proved a precursor to others that appeared in Rius’ comic 
magazine, Los Agachados, and which saw Carter’s human rights agenda as merely as a 
political ploy—one highly strategic and embedded in Cold War geopolitics.   In the 
issue “Do We Really Want to Be Like Them?” Rius dedicates the entire comic to the 
“good neighbor. Model of what?”  He begins by noting many Mexicans’ desire to be 
part of the United States, but then attempts to answer whether the country remains 
exemplary and prosperous like most people believe.  In the first section, the comic opens 
with one of the main characters, the young “Nopálzin” tries to decide whether to 
migrate as a bracero laborer to the north, while his peers advise him not to leave.  
Thereafter, Ruis attempts to deflate myths regarding the country’s affluence, as featured 																																																								
219 C.J. Chivers and John Ismay, “American White Phosphorus Shells in Libya: A Challenge to a 
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in films, and begins by detailing poverty among minorities—especially in ghettos and 
barrios—the lack of attention for the mentally ill, high rates of urban crime, divorce 
rates, drug use among the youth, wealth disparity, unemployment, and the “chaos” in 
public education.221  In the following section, Rius makes reference to U.S. foreign 
policy—“For years north American propaganda has sought to portray the USA as the 
country of freedom, of human rights deference, etc, etc.”  Below this he places an 
illustration of political prisoners, and next to a cartoon of the U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Andrew Young, accompanied by an unidentified woman.  She notes 
that Americans don’t even believe that of the United States anymore, while Young 
acknowledges the presence of thousands of political prisoners in the country.222  Ruis 
then makes references to peace movement and anti-war political prisoners, as well as the 
effects of police brutally on the society, and CIA involvement around the globe.  Finally, 
Nopálzin concludes the United States is not the paradise he had imagined and asked the 
“Professor” character how he learned all those things about the United States.  He 
replied he bought Michael Harrington’s The Other America: Poverty in the United States 
(1962).  Nopálzin then asked to borrow the book, and the Professor agreed, but asked 
that he take care of the book and not to throw it at Mr. Carter in his upcoming visit to 
Mexico.223  In this particular issue, Rius explored U.S. society with brief mention of 
foreign policy; but nevertheless, linked the terms human rights to Carter’s policies and 
political prisoners.   																																																								
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While Rius dedicated several issues to the United States, he only referenced 
human rights in relation to Carter’s presidency.  In a 1972 issue titled “More Nixon?” 
he explored McCarthyism, racism, economic families and their bearing on US foreign 
relations, Kissinger, and the Vietnam War.224  In 1974, another appeared titled “Do 
You Still Believe Democracy Exists in the United States” (The Rockefellers Part 2A) in 
which he explored CIA interventions in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia 
(1965), Brazil (1964), Greece (1947 and 1967), Cambodia (1970), Bolivia (1971), and 
Chile (1973).225  Just a little over a month prior to his “Do We Really Want to Be Like 
Them?” Rius devoted the entire edition to the desaparecidos (disappeared) of the 
Echeverría and López Portillo’s administrations.  Rius included names and photographs 
of the missing in Mexico, including one of Jesús Piedra Ibarra, whose mother Rosario 
Ibarra initiated a movement on behalf of political prisoners and desaparecidos—Comité Pro-
Defensa de Presos Perseguidos, Desaparecidos y Exiliados (Comité ¡EUREKA!).  Rius’ sources 
for the magazine’s number came from Comité ¡EUREKA!226  While Rius placed 
Mexico within a larger context of repression in the region, along with Guatemala, his 
language regarding the happenings remained isolated from his discussion on Carter’s 
human rights policies toward Latin America.  Even while U.S. imperialism seemed a 
common theme covered in Los Agachados, Rius did not utilize the terms human rights 
until 1977, that is only after the election of President James Carter and the shift in U.S. 
foreign policy toward Latin America, and just before Carter’s announced visit to 
Mexico for 1979.  While Rius’ socialist inclinations were known, his illustrations reached 																																																								
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a middle class that grew disillusioned by the politics of the time.  Most importantly, 
however, Rius’ humor reveals the lefts’ skepticisms towards concepts like human rights 
and ideologies espoused by the United States, and certainly this initial contempt toward 
“human rights” as promoted by Carter was a byproduct of the polarities of the Cold 
War.  
Proceso also captured the geopolitical difficulties in attempting to define the 
meaning of human rights.  Enrique Maza in “The Two Freedoms, the Two Rights” 
touched on the use of the term human rights by two separate countries, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, but signaling different meanings—“Two languages are 
being used with the same words.”  While the United States espoused individual freedom 
with corresponding rights, the Soviet Union promoted social freedom—whose 
consequential rights varied significantly from those of the American counterpart, argued 
Maza—this a reflection of the ideological fissure between capitalism and socialism.  To 
Maza these were “two irreconcilable concepts of freedom, of man, of rights, of society.”  
And while some rights were primordial under capitalist countries, such as the right to 
private property whereby a person could accumulate wealth, under a socialist system 
these proved a social crime.  Moreover, Maza wrote of the transformative nature behind 
a wholesome system of social justice, one that can transform an individual when 
becoming a norm, a rule, when it “inspires decisions”—this by the “socioeconomic and 
legal structure it encompasses, one that conditions and regulates social coexistence.”  
Maza believed communist countries deserved credit for their permanent compromise to 
social justice, even while they had not achieved it, yet at least attempted.  Rooted in 
Catholic social justice teaching, Maza questioned Carter’s individualist path toward the 
fulfillment of human rights maintaining “[i]ndividual freedom will never be the outset of 
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justice.”227  Just as skeptical as Rius, Maza’s writing on human rights echoed the 
perceived threat of the changing nature of Mexico’s economic model of development 
that gradually moved toward free market capitalism, and President Carter’s 
employment of human rights in foreign policy as a weapon to deflate the influence of 
communist countries over countries with nationally-directed models of development and 
social justice.  In that sense, Maza signaled defiance from nationalists’ and leftists’ at the 
changing nature of society in the 1970s toward the privatization of the state—resulting 
in their inability to accept the civil and political rights inherent in the new U.S. foreign 
policy of human rights that undoubtedly dismissed economic rights and promoted a 
type of individualism compatible with free market policies that triumphed thereafter in 
Mexico and in Latin America, known as neoliberalism. 
 
The Point of No Return  
 By April 1977, the frequent appearance of the term “human rights” in Proceso 
must be credited to President Carter, and as a result dismissed as propaganda.  Even 
while many key stories on dictatorship in South America and other places alike 
appeared, these often focused on the national context—from including names of the 
disappeared to their personal stories—thus leaving out any allusions to U.S. foreign 
policy or human rights.228  However, when discussions regarding foreign policy arose, 
most journalists focused on the U.S. human rights agenda toward the Soviet Union or 
Latin American dictatorships.  Alejandro Avilés, who like Maza wrote extensively on the 
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subject, made references to the ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the 
United States for control over their meaning.229  Abelardo Villegas distinguished 
between Carter’s human rights policy toward the USSR versus Latin America, 
whereby, in the former the U.S. has few pressure points to affect internal policy toward 
the Jews, for example.  Meanwhile, in South American countries like Argentina, the 
Carter administration could pressure international funding organization like the World 
Bank or limit U.S. foreign aid through congressional approval, while also benefiting 
substantially from the publicity—and in that sense Villegas explained twofold purpose 
Carter’s rights policies.230  More interestingly, however, Abelardo noted the national 
challenge to adhering to the U.S. rights initiative included the disintegration of the 
opposition in several countries—“There has been in Chile, in Argentina, in Uruguay, in 
Bolivia, in Paraguay and even in Brazil no sectors of strong opposition that have been 
able to capitalize and channel Carter’s pose.”231  Moreover, Villegas believed the 
motivation for the U.S. democratic wave lay in the country’s attempt to reverse the 
adverse effects of previous administrations, particularly the ideological rift away from 
the United States since Henry Kissinger’s years as National Security Adviser (1969-
1975) and Secretary of State (1973-1977).  “The appeal to the fulfillment of human 
rights is an attempt to recover a territory that has been lost,” wrote Villegas regarding 
U.S.-Latin American relations.  Interestingly, in Villegas’ assessment of the region, 
Mexico again proved an exception.  Mexico had not been as affected by the Kissinger 
policies of economic aid for the anti-communist crusade that resulted in the 																																																								
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establishment of several military dictatorships in Latin America, this in part to the 
political stability the country maintained since its Revolution and the reign of a single 
party.  For that reason, the López Portillo administration found it easier to comply with 
the “international indictment of the U.S. government” through its Amnesty Law that 
released political prisoners “while preserving its dignity.”232  Additional reports in the 
Proceso Internacional section continued to explore human rights as a concept deriving from 
the United States, fraught over by the Soviet Union, and estranged from national 
contexts.233  In exceptional cases, Proceso general news reporting on international issues 
explored military dictatorship and referenced the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and by default utilized the term human rights.234  No other foreign or national 
policy issue led journalists to employ the term human rights like that of Carter’s rights 
ideological contest with the Soviet Union over the concept or the economic pressure 
toward South American dictatorships—this association held long-term consequences for 
dissemination of human rights ideology in the region and in Mexico.   
 Paradoxically, by April 1977 the disassociation of human rights from Mexico’s 
national context ceased.  Up until April, journalists writing on human rights in Latin 
America focused on Carter’s pressure on South American dictatorships, and did not 
associate the term with repression in Mexico, or with matters of political amnesty in the 
country.  While Proceso rendered considerable coverage to the condition of political 
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prisoners in the country, journalists did not link the term to the happenings within 
national borders—which built on the myth that Mexico was an exception to the 
generalized violence in the region.235  However, an Amnesty International report 
became one of the first publications that fractured the myth by linking Mexico to the 
larger context of political repression in Latin America.  An introductory note to the 
report explained that two Amnesty International representatives from London visited 
Mexico in July 1975.  With the permission of President Echeverría the two AI members 
spoke with government functionaries, independent attorneys, while also visiting 
detention centers where they spoke to prisoners.  The note explains Proceso obtained the 
portion of the report published from Amnesty International’s central offices in London, 
further noting that both President Echeverría and President-elect López Portillo had 
been sent a copy in November 1976.  Aside from explaining the objective the mission, 
the “Amnesty International Report on Torture in Mexico” resulted from complaints to 
the organization of illegal detentions, disappearances, torture, and delayed judicial 
processing—among other items listed.  Sr. Nigel Rodley, one of the AI representatives, 
arrived in Mexico City from London on July 13, 1975 and established the necessary 
contacts to investigate the internal happenings in Mexico.  For each section of rights 
violated, the authors noted an article from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) that protected such rights, followed by the articles from the Mexican 
Constitutions that guaranteed the previously listed entitlements.  For example, when 
listing article 9 of the UDHR on arbitrary detention, the AI representative then listed 
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Article 19, portions of Article 107, and Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution as jointly 
protecting Mexicans from violations related to arbitrary detention.  Thereafter, 
proceeded the evidence and testimony on specific happenings related to the subject of 
detention.  The portion of the report published covered a total of three UDHR articles: 
Article Nine, listed above, Article Three on individual right “to life, liberty and security 
of person”—which focused on disappearances and executions—and finally Article Five 
on torture and inhuman treatment.236  The report broke ground and stands as one of 
the first by an international monitoring organization sanctioned the Mexican 
government on its human rights record, and defied what the PRI so preciously guarded 
for decades—state sovereignly by resisting foreign meddling on matters of internal 
affairs (see Illustration 5.7).   
 Moreover, the AI report underscores the Mexican government’s method for 
responding to international criticisms on its human rights records.  In the case of 1977, 
neither did Echeverría or López Portillo respond to the AI findings.  Moreover, the 
president assigned political leaders from key ministries to respond.  In the case of the AI 
report, Echeverría’s Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada faced the findings and 
agreed to discuss the “various aspects of human rights violations in Mexico.”  AI 
provided Ojeda with advance notice of their findings, yet he did “not admit to any of 
the charges,” but according to the report, Ojeda showed disposition to listen and 
respond to any questions the representatives.  Moreover, the Attorney General also 
explained why Mexico had not yet ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights or the American Convention on Human Rights, both of which 
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recommended by the AI representatives as means of advancing international human 
rights.237  Mexico did not ratify the covenant or convention until 1981, during the 
presidency López Portillo.  The AI report published in 1977 reveals Mexico’s apparent 
willingness to cooperative with international monitoring organizations regarding human 
rights investigations, in part to portray an image of compliance.  
 Scherer, however, was not afraid to publish any material that criminalized the 
government.  Proceso obtained the torture report due to the relationship between the 
magazine and the Mexican section of Amnesty International.  However, Proceso 
obscured the true source of the report.  As president of AI-Mexico, Mariclaire Acosta 
approached Julio Scherer García, due to the organization’s links to Proceso since its 
creation.  “From London, we received a report on torture in Mexico…no one wanted to 
publish it, so I went to see Julio Scherer and I offered him the report,” said Mariclaire.  
Scherer, according to Acosta, replied “give it to me, I’ll publish it.”  Mariclaire gave the 
report to Scherer with one condition: “I am going to give you the report, but I do not 
want it to be known that I gave it to you…I can be expulsed from the [AI] section and I 
just do not want any problems.”  In return for the London report, Scherer was to help 
the Mexican section of Amnesty International obtain official registry.  Deal made.  
Scherer anonymously published the report in the April 16, 1977 issue of Proceso.238  
Scherer felt confident in his ability to help Acosta given that he had a close contact 
within the López Portillo administration that is with the Secretary of Gobernación, Jesús 
Reyes Heroles.  But, when Amnesty International won the Nobel Peace prize in 1977, 
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announced on October 10, little was needed to get the Mexican section legal standing.  
The moment the prize was announced, Scherer phoned Acosta and told her: “We have 
it made.  What we are going to do is publish in the cover of Proceso that the organization 
that wins the Nobel Peace price does not have legal registry in Mexico.”239 A week later 
the headline of the October 17 issue of Proceso read: “NOBEL PEACE PRIZE 1977: 
Amnesty International, slighted in Mexico.” 240  In laughter, remembering the ordeal, 
Acosta concluded: “That is how it happened, that evening, we were given our registry.”  
It was Amnesty International’s relationship with Proceso that eventually enabled the local 
chapter to obtain a legal standing in Mexico, no less than six years after its original 
founding. 
 
“Démelo, yo lo publico”: Why Proceso Pioneered Human Rights News241 
 The term human rights in Proceso appeared in relation to repression in Latin 
America.  The magazine became one of the first print publications in Mexico to actively 
employ and diffuse the concept.  The creation of the magazine and other print sources, 
from Vuelta and Unomásuno to Nexos, signaled a new age of print media in Mexico.  It was 
the context of the late-1970s that these new print sources were created, signaling the 
rising social tensions and the growing demands for a peaceful path toward 
democratization.  The human rights campaigns carried out by Amnesty International 
depended on print media in order to shame and pressure repressive governments for the 
pain they inflicted through their counterrevolutionary measures.  In the case of Mexico, 
																																																								
239 Interview with Mariclaire Acosta, 11 March 2014 (Mexico City).   
240 “Premio Nobel de la Paz 1977: Amnistía Internacional, menospreciada en México,” Proceso 
(No. 50, Cover), 17 October 1977, 6-9. 
241 Interview with Mariclaire Acosta, 11 March 2014 (Mexico City).   
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Proceso offered the space for indicting the military actions in Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Chile, and in the process introducing the terms into the Mexican public.  Why the focus 
on the Southern Cone?  When it came to the Americas, the AI facility in London was 
flooded with demands from the trio countries of Argentina, Uruguay and Chile 
(hereafter AUC).  Such proved the atrocities that Amnesty International was inspired to 
carry out its first international camping on torture specifically focus on a single country, 
that country being Uruguay (February 20-March 20, 1976).242  These global campaigns 
and its fact-finding mission reports brought greater attention to the happenings in South 
America, which of course also influenced the U.S. Congress to limit military aid to the 
AUC countries.  While initially most attention went to South American countries, 
furthering the myth that human rights violations were not happening in Mexico, 
eventually though even Proceso began to associate the term with López Portillo’s political 
prisoners and desaparecidos.  This turn toward associating human rights to Mexico’s own 
Dirty War crimes coincided with the rise of dissident groups like EUREKA! that 
demanded the government respond to the demands of family members of the 
imprisoned, exiled, and disappeared. 
Proceso’s coverage of dictatorship in Latin America between 1976 and 1979 by 
far surpassed that of any other new print sources of the time.  Proceso was the only 
publication that consistently employed the term human rights in its coverage of Latin 
American between 1976 and 1979.  From its inception, Proceso served as a political 
indictment against the Mexican government and against the military campaigns in 
South America.  With the exception of the newspaper Unomásuno in its coverage of the 
																																																								
242 This according to an interview with Mariclaire Acosta, see “Premio Nobel de la Paz, 
Amnistía Internacional, defensores de los prisioneros olvidados,” Proceso (No. 50), 17 October 1977, 8. 
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Central American wars in the late-1970s and 1980s, no other publication employed 
human rights as the preferred lexicon for reporting on the happenings in the latter half 
of the 1970s.  This can be attributed to Scherer and his team’s knowledge and 
familiarity with the work of Amnesty International and their focus on Jimmy Carter’s 
rights campaign.  Such proved the attention on the region, that the Atlas World Press 
Review granted Scherer García the “Journalist of the Year” award on November 8, 
1977, a few days shy of Proceso’s first year anniversary.  It director, Alfred Black, 
described Scherer’s role in carrying out changes “unprecedented in Mexican 
journalism.”  Moreover, he added:  of Excélsior in disseminating information on military 
dictatorships in the region.  Black wrote:  “Among other things he introduced the so-
called investigative reports and from abroad he himself denounced acute repression of 
the military governments in Latin America and with great audacity submitted Mexican 
institutions to a critical and ongoing review.”243  While Scherer used the moment to talk 
about the constraints to freedom of the press in Mexico and the assault on Excélsior, Mr. 
Black only verified that in reality the former editor carried to Proceso his devotion for 
informing the atrocities his fellow Latin Americans suffered.    
In the process, the magazine introduced a rights vernacular in the process of 
globalization. Proceso undoubtedly rendered significant space to Latin American 
dictatorships, and in 1977 Scherer questioned Octavio Paz on Vuelta’s own coverage of 
the region in a manner that indicated he perceived such reportage on violence as an 
obligation.  Scherer’s interview with Octavio Paz was widely circulated.  Some of the 
discussion focused on the absence of projects, on what Paz perceived as an absence of 
																																																								
243 “Prensa: Recibió Scherer el premio al Periodista del Año,” Proceso (No. 54), 14 November 
1977, 24-25. 
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viable projects from either the left or the right.  That is until, Scherer implied Paz had 
given considerable intellectual space in Plural and eventually in Vuelta to discussing 
repression in the Soviet Union, while the “persecuted, tortured or exterminated by the 
military regimes of the South did not even occupy a minimum space as the one 
dedicated to” criticizing Gulag and defending Soviet and Central European dissidents. 
“False!,” replied Paz, “In Plural and in Vuelta we always attempted to denounce the 
crimes of military regimes of Latin America.”  In defense, Paz listed a report Plural 
published on fusillades in the Trelew prison in Argentina, and the many texts published 
on the overthrow of Allende (including one of his that was reproduced by Le Monde and 
the New York Times).  In his defense he noted that the denunciation of military 
dictatorships (like the Pinochets and Videlas of the world) and its linkages to Washington 
were a campaign of “moral and political cleansing,” while the examination of the so-
called socialist regimes “was a work of historical analysis.”244  In some sense, the editors’ 
magazines like Vuelta and Nexos believed their publications as intellectual endeavors 
focused on producing in-depth philosophical, historical and cultural analysis of the left, 
rather than engaging or mirroring the “West’s” (i.e. Carter or AI human rights 
campaigns) shaming operations of military dictatorships.  In that sense, while Vuelta did 
include publications on the conditions in South and Central America, these did not 
employ the language of human rights commonly found in Carter’s foreign policy or in 
Amnesty International campaign on behalf of prisoners.  Rather, Vuelta and others 
seemed to distanced themselves from human rights because they either refused to 
																																																								
244 Julio Scherer García, “Octavio Paz: Veo una ausencia de proyectos,” Proceso (No. 58), 12 
December 1977, 6-7.  Both Scherer and Paz reproduced the interview, Scherer in Encuentro: Octavio Paz y 
Julio Scherer (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014), and Paz in El ogro filantrópico (Barcelona: 
Editorial Seix Barral, ©1979 and 1990), 322-338.  
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engage in what they perceived as ‘unintellectual’ leftist indictment of dictatorship or to 
participate in reproducing the Carter’s morality campaign.245  While Proceso, particularly 
through the writings of Enrique Maza and others, may have echoed leftist politicking 
emblematic of the Cold War polarization—these nevertheless should be recognized for 
their contribution to the diffusion of internationalist notions of rights through their 
coverage of dictatorships in Latin America.  Moreover, South Americans as a subject 
matter and as actors played a key role in the global diffusion of human rights in the 
1970s, despite not always historically recognized for their efforts as reporters, teachers, 
as exiles, as pressure groups indicting their governments from abroad and in 
collaborations with publications like Proceso.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
245 Vuelta did indeed publish articles on the political conditions in Central and South America.  
These, however, did not employ the term human rights.  When reviewing the 1970s publications in Vuelta, 
I did not find a single article making use of the terminology.  However, scholars have evaluated political 
essays published in Plural and Vuelta.  Paz once remarked of his time as editor of Plural, “Scherer’s friends 
thought that we were old fashioned liberals and that it had been a mistake to give us the magazine.  The 
cooperativists in Excélsior thought we were Communist intellectuals.  Scherer always defended us.”  John 
King also includes Vuelta’s coverage of repression against Argentine intellectuals.  Although, it seems Vuelta 
legacy remains outside of Mexico and more pronounced in the cultural rather than the political realm. 
See John King, The Role of Mexico’s Plural in Latin American Literary and Political Culture: From Tlatelolco to the 
“Philanthropic Ogre” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 60-93; Malva Flores, Viaje de Vuelta: estampas de 
una revista (Mexico DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2011), 179. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
A Black Valentine:   
Human Rights in U.S.-Mexico Relations, and the Burden of Oil in Jimmy 
Carter’s 48-Hours in Mexico, February 14-16, 1979 
 
 
“The most serious problems  
between the two countries is one of attitude.   
Again, the Mexican people feel that the United States has often  
treated them unfairly and almost always with condescension.   
They suspect that you are visiting them now  
only because they have become energy-rich.” 
-- Jerry Rafshoon1  
 
Introduction 
 Of all the many events that helped catalyze discussion of human rights in 
Mexico, none rivaled the two-day visit of U.S. President Jimmy Carter in February 
1979.  Two years into his presidency, Carter’s foreign policy toward Latin American 
dictatorships had drawn extensive coverage in the Mexican press, particularly in Proceso.  
However, editorials prefacing his arrival introduced to the nation a leader and his global 
human rights agenda and by default circulated a limited definition of human rights, one 
derived from the United States and espousing political and civil rights as a counterpoint 
of social rights loudly championed by socialist countries.  While Carter’s foreign policy 
toward the world, particularly South American countries, was subject to significant 
criticism, the most outstanding press coverage of his trip extended to matters of border 
security and drug control, undocumented Mexican immigrants, nuclear arms 
disarmament, trade, and, most acutely, oil.  “Mutual cooperation,” and not human 
																																																								
1 Rafshoon served as President Carter’s Assistant on Communications.  These remarks derived 
from a trip to Mexico by two U.S. government representatives whose duty was to gage the receptiveness 
climate for Carter’s visit. Memo, Jerry Rafshoon to the President, “Trip to Mexico,” 5 February 1979, 
2/14/79-2/16/79—Mexico [Trip] RH; Box 41, Records of the Speechwriters Office, Jimmy Carter 
Presidential Library. 
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rights, stood as the primary theme of the U.S.-Mexico meeting embedded in Carter’s 
trip to Mexico.   
 The Valentine’s Day trip exemplifies a pattern of absent pressure from the 
United States toward human rights violations in Mexico.  President Luis Echeverría 
raised Mexico’s international profile, possibly one of his least credited achievements.  By 
the time his successor José López Portillo took office, Mexico’s northern neighbor took 
notice and saw the country as a regional force to be reckoned with, especially after the 
discovery of massive oil reserves.  For that reason, Carter consistently emphasized the 
country’s growing economic and political influence in the world, most notably in Latin 
America.  By the time of the 1979 visit with López Portillo, Carter utilized a language of 
partnership whereby Mexico stood as a joint promoter of regional justice, not as a 
human rights violator.  For the purposes of greater cooperation, President Carter did 
not consider raising the specter of human rights violations in Mexico—because the 
country had not been flagged as such, nor had it been a large receptor of U.S. foreign 
aid; rather, by 1975 it had become a large debtor of private foreign loans.2  Thus 
Mexico avoided international scrutiny during one of the loudest U.S. presidencies 
pushing for the limitation of military aid to repressive governments.  Mexico’s 
counterpart leaders took notice.  A March 1977 Washington Post article noted that 
“officials say privately the only reason Mexico has avoided being targeted in the human 
rights campaign is that it is controlled by an authoritarian leftist regime rather than an 																																																								
2 According to Rosario Green, Mexico began its debt with multilateral institutions like the Inter-
American Development Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
the late 1950s; however, by 1966 rate of aid significantly decreased (see graph 1, p. 59).  Moreover, by 
1975 Mexico’s public debt to private institutions constituted about 60%, and mainly owed to foreign 
banks, principally those in the United States.  Rosario Green, “Deuda externa y política exterior: la vuelta 
a la bilateralidad en las relaciones internacionales de México,” Foro Internacional 18:1 (July-Sept. 1977) 59, 
67. 
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authoritarian rightist regime.”3  Certainly its revolutionary past and civilian rule when 
the rest of the region fell to military dictatorships shielded Mexico’s internal, subtle, and 
maturing repressive mechanisms from international scrutiny until the mid-1980s, when 
the massive influx of Guatemalan refugees, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, the rise of 
NGOs, and the strengthening of oppositional parties all combined to change the 
equation.  Nonetheless, the Carter presidency initiated a pattern in U.S.-Mexico 
relations, whereby economic and political interests (bilateralism) have consistently been 
placed above those of human rights; for that reason, U.S. foreign policy has usually 
failed to actively pressure the Mexican government on its internal failings in comparison 
with other Latin American countries.   
 
Return to U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations 
 The Mexican and U.S. presidents involved in this historic visit had begun their 
terms only a month apart.4  President José López Portillo was sworn in on December 1, 
1978, and in place of President Jimmy Carter his fully bilingual wife Eleanor Rosalynn 
Carter attended the inaugural ceremonies—a deed to which Carter pointed as evidence 
of his government’s esteem for its southern neighbor during his 1979 visit to Mexico.5  
And when Carter took office on January 20, 1977, Carmen Romano de López Portillo 
																																																								
3 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Losing the Latins,” The Washington Post, 16 March 1977. 
Embassy Dispatches, Mexico-United States, III-3315-3. Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada.  Acervo 
Histórico Diplomático.  Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE).   
4 According to Carter, it had been twenty-fiver years since both countries elected presidents at 
the same time.  See, Jimmy Carter, “Visit of President Jos[é] L[ó]pez Portillo of Mexico Remarks of the 
President and President L[ó]pez Portillo at the Welcoming Ceremony,” 14 February 1977, The American 
Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7877>.  
5 Interview, “Interview With The President By Joaquin Lopez-Doriga, Channel 13, Government 
of Mexico Television,” 8 February 1979, 2/8/1979—Interview—Joaquin Lopez-Doriga, Channel 13, 
Government of Mexico TV, [Map Room]; Box 40, Records of the Speechwriters Office, Jimmy Carter 
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attended the ceremony.6  By Rosalynn’s invitation Carmen, accompanied by her three 
children and son’s fiancée, was the “only member of a reigning family in world politics 
invited to the Carter Inauguration.”  According to the Washington Post, Carmen “wasn’t 
hard to spot”, given her large eyes, blue eyelids, and extravagant clothing, from her 
“diamond-and-enamel necklace and matching mobile ring” to her “bright red, tight-
fitting suit with fur collar, and matching pumps.”7  Even while the press poked fun, 
Carmen’s visit exemplified a return to bilateral relations, which Echeverría had 
attempted to downplay in favor of a flirtation with Third World politics.8  Nevertheless, 
the rapprochement between both leaders almost seemed inevitable, given the United 
States’ energy crisis, together with Mexico’s faltering economic model and a foreign 
debt, which by 1977 had reached alarming proportions.  
As such, both leaders made symbolic efforts to advance relations between their 
two countries, at one of their lowest points by the end of the Echeverría and Ford 
presidencies.9  López Portillo seemed the most eager in his engagement with the United 
States, possibly due to the massive inflation, capital flight, and rumors of devaluation 
months before his inauguration.  As president-elect, he met with Ford in Washington at 
																																																								
6 Jimmy Carter, “Visit of President Jos[é] L[ó]pez Portillo of Mexico Remarks of the President 
and President L[ó]pez Portillo at the Welcoming Ceremony,” 14 February 1977, The American Presidency 
Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7877>. 
7 Judith Martin, “First Lady’s Return Visit,” The Washington Post, 22 January 1977, E4. 
8 For Rosario Green, the return to bilateral relations with the United States derived from 
Mexico’s increased public debt funded by an increase in private loans from international banks, 
principally North American.  Rosario Green, “Deuda externa y política exterior: la vuelta a la 
bilateralidad en las relaciones internacionales de México,” Foro Internacional 18:1 (July-Sept. 1977), 54-80. 
9 U.S. Ambassador Joseph J. Jova documents his visit with Fausto Zapata, Echeverría’s 
Undersecretary of the Presidency, in which the Mexican leader expresses his concern over the state of 
US-Mexico relations by the summer of 1976: “One of the President’s confidants, Fausto Zapata, sought 
an appointment with me to express concern over a perceived deterioration in our bilateral relations.”  
Joseph J. Jova, “Conversation with Fausto Zapata,” American Embassy (Mexico) to Secretary of State 
(Washington), 31 July 1976, Canonical ID: 1976STATE189157_b, Declassified/Released US 
Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006, Wikileaks 
<https://wikileaks.org/About.html>, 1-3. 
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the end of September 1976, just before the US presidential elections.10  According 
novelist José Agustin, López Portillo assumed Ford would win the election, a fact that 
explained the timing of the early trip.11  After Carter’s win, four Mexican senators 
traveled to Washington in November 1976 to begin contact with Carter’s assessors.12  
The surprise victory meant a return trip for López Portillo.  In mid-February 1977 
López Portillo arrived as the first foreign chief of state to visit during Carter’s 
administration.13  While Agustin notes a warm welcome, journalist Armando Ayala 
Anguiano on the other hand believed that “in reality López Portillo was treated like an 
insolvent Third World cacique.”14  Like Ayala, Robert A. Pastor, National Security 
Council staff advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean during the Carter years, 
points to financial reasons behind the Mexican leader’s visit.  Pastor states that Carter 
invited López Portillo in order “to help restore the financial community’s confidence in 
Mexico.”  The “conversation,” according to Pastor, “went exceedingly well.”15  For 
Rosario Green, López Portillo’s visit proved the second key act of his administration in 
relation to the country’s public debt, when he interviewed with “world representatives of 
official finances from the United States, international banking and American private 																																																								
10 For date of López Portillo’s visit with Ford, see Biblioteca Benjamín Franklin, “Reuniones 
Presidenciales México-Estados Unidos,” Biblioteca Benjamín Franklin-Embajada de los Estados Unidos 
en México-Servicio Cultural e informativo, <http://www.usembassy-
mexico.gov/bbf/pdf/bfVisitasPresidenciales.pdf>. 
11 Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2, 122.  
12 The four senators included Roberto de la Madrid, Eliseo Mendoza Berrueto, Adolfo de la 
Huerta and Rodolfo Landeros, “Estados Unidos: Sigilo y cautela de Carter,” Proceso (No. 2), 13 
November 1976, 52.  
13 Dispatch, Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Announcement by the President of 
Vice President Mondale’s Visit to Mexico,” Not Dated; Mexico: 1-12/77 and 1-12/78; Box 48, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’s Country Files, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library.  
  14 Cacique is Spanish for political boss. Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2, 141; Armando Ayala 
Anguiano, JLP: secretos de un sexenio (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1984), 34. 
15 Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle,” The 
Carter Center, (July 1992), <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>, 29.  A shorter version of 
the article was published in The United States policy in Latin America: a quarter century of crisis and challenge, 1961-
1986, edited by John D. Martz (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988).  
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banking.”16  Those with whom López Portillo met included: W. Michael Blumenthal 
(Secretary of the Treasury), Antonio Ortiz Mena (president of the Inter-American 
Development Bank), Robert McNamara (Director of the World Bank), and David 
Rockefeller (president of Chase Manhattan Bank).17  Mexico so desperately needed 
access to key financial institutions that it even signed with the International Monetary 
Fund in the fall of 1976—an institution the country had avoided since its last loan there 
in 1961.18  Meanwhile, López Portillo insisted that the objective of his trip had not been 
“to borrow”; rather, he explained, “we went to present financial problems, of trade, 
monetary . . . that if we posed exclusively as credit problems, would be incorrect.”19  
Aside from the financial meeting, the trip also offered López Portillo the opportunity to 
chat with private business about the massive oil reserves and his project for a gas 
pipeline; the conversations defied the wishes of the Carter administration, which had 
asked Mexican officials to negotiate with the U.S. government first.20   
Despite the breach of protocol, Carter remained keenly concerned about 
mending and expanding U.S.-Mexico economic relations.  Unlike his predecessors 
Nixon and Ford, Carter “devoted substantial time in the White House to guiding the 
development and the implementation of his administration’s policy toward Latin 
																																																								
16 Rosario Green, “Deuda externa y política exterior: la vuelta a la bilateralidad en las relaciones 
internacionales de México,” Foro Internacional 18:1 (July-Sept. 1977), 75, 70.  
17 Others included Juanita Kreps (Secretary of Commerce), William B. Dale (Deputy Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund), Arthur Burns (U.S. Chairman of the Federal Reserve), 
Proceso Nacional, “Presidencia: Un viaje con signo económico,” Proceso (No. 17), 26 February 1977, 19-
20. 
18 Rosario Green, “Deuda externa y política exterior: la vuelta a la bilateralidad en las relaciones 
internacionales de México,” Foro Internacional 18:1 (July-Sept. 1977), 75, 70.  
19 Others included Juanita Kreps (Secretary of Commerce), William B. Dale (Deputy Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund), Arthur Burns (U.S. Chairman of the Federal Reserve), 
Proceso Nacional, “Presidencia: Un viaje con signo económico,” Proceso (No. 17), 26 February 1977, 19-
20. 
20 Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle,” The 
Carter Center, (July 1992), <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>, 30.   
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America and the Caribbean.”21  According to Pastor, his interest in the region surpassed 
that of his primary foreign policy advisers, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National 
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.22  This was in part true due to Carter’s 
knowledge of and travels in Latin America, including Mexico, and his limited 
knowledge of the language—the first president since Thomas Jefferson to attempt to 
learn Spanish.23  As such, Carter responded to his southern neighbor’s invitations and 
sought greater cooperation between both countries.  After López Portillo’s visit in 
February 1977, Ms. Carter met with Ms. Romano de López Portillo in November of the 
same year, afterwards Rosalynn toured in the summer through seven Latin American 
and Caribbean countries, where she reiterated Carter’s project for the region and 
encouraged leaders to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the American Convention on 
Human Rights.24  The following year, and by presidential invitation, Vice President 
Walter Mondale made a one-day trip to Mexico, from January 20 to the 21st.  For 
Carter, Mondale visited as his “personal representative to continue this important 
process of consultations on both bilateral and multilateral issues with our good friends 
and neighbors in Mexico.”25  These diplomatic overtures eventually culminated with 
Carter’s two-day visit to Mexico in February 1979. 
																																																								
21 Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle,” The 
Carter Center, (July 1992), <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>, 3. 
22 Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle,” The 
Carter Center, (July 1992), <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>, 5. 
23 Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle,” The 
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24 The Tlatelolco Treaty sought to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of 
Principle,” The Carter Center, (July 1992), <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>, 22-23. 
25 Dispatch, Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Announcement by the President of 
Vice President Mondale’s Visit to Mexico,” Not Dated; Mexico: 1-12/77 and 1-12/78; Box 48, Zbigniew 
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Like their policy approaches, both men could not have been more different.  
Born in Mexico City in 1920, José López Portillo was the grandson of José López 
Portillo y Rojas, a politician, man of letters, and author of one of nineteenth-century 
Mexico’s most important novels, Nieves (1887).26  The future president’s father, José 
López Portillo y Weber, had served as a military cadet during the short-lived 
administration of Francisco I. Madero, then went on to become an engineer.  Third-
generation José completed both grade school and his bachelor’s degree with his good 
friend Luis Echeverría, both graduating with law degrees from the UNAM.  In 1959 he 
entered the ranks of government at a relatively high level, having previously dedicated 
his life to private law.  During Echeverría’s presidency, Portillo held three different 
posts, ascending from the Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Development to the 
state-owned Federal Electricity Commission, and finally taking over the Secretary of 
Finance.27  There was nothing particularly outstanding about Portillo’s career; rather, it 
has been speculated that Echeverría picked him in order to continue to serve as de facto 
ruler of Mexico, or at least to provide for his allies, for whom he negotiated posts in the 
new administration.28  However, López Portillo eventually grew so tired of Echeverría’s 
meddling in his presidency that he assigned his two immediate predecessors to 
embassies in distant parts of the globe.  After several post swaps, Echeverría ended up 
some six thousand miles from home as the Mexican emissary to New Zealand, 
Australia, and the Fiji islands.29  In the meantime López Portillo exploited Mexico’s 
large oil reserves, enjoying a life of lavish spending that he shared with his immediate 																																																								
  26 José López Portillo y Rojas, Algunos cuentos (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, 1996), IX; Armando Ayala Anguiano, JLP: secretos de un sexenio (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1984), 15-17. 
27 Armando Ayala Anguiano, JLP: secretos de un sexenio (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1984), 15-17. 
28 Ayala Anguiano, JLP: secretos de un sexenio, 24-25; Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2, 134. 
29 Ayala Anguiano, JLP: secretos de un sexenio, 30; Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2, 150. 
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and extended family through paternalistic governance—most notably by dispensing 
public posts.30  Through his varied public relations maneuvers he became famous for his 
athleticism—from swimming, tennis, karate, and boxing to equestrianism—while 
adding to his family’s political legacy, given that his grandfather served as governor of 
the state of Jalisco, and less gloriously, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs under 
counterrevolutionary Victoriano Huerta (1913-1914).31  It would be this unusually 
flamboyant individual who would initiate, however reluctantly, Mexico’s transition from 
a system of state-directed economy backed by revolutionary rhetoric and its adjacent 
social groups to one placing the country on the path towards economic liberalization, 
deregulation, bilateralism, oil dependency, and independent social mobilization 
espousing individual rights through the emergent language of human rights.  
Meanwhile, his counterpart Jimmy Carter had risen to the national spotlight in 
the midst of a post-Vietnam, post-Nixon, and post-Kissinger political crisis.  Son of a 
farmer, most often noted for his cultivation of peanuts, Carter grew up in Plains, 
Georgia, a town of some six hundred inhabitants.32  After marrying and establishing a 
career in the Navy, where he worked under the direction of the legendary Admiral 
Hyman Rickover, Carter returned to his hometown to run the family farm when his 
father passed away.  Once back, he entered politics, eventually making an unsuccessful 
run for governor in 1966 that led him into a journey of spiritual re-discovery, this after a 
conversation with his sister: “I decided along with Ruth, that I would try to reassess my 
relationship with God, and did.”  After a series of evangelizing trips as a “born-again” 
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Christian through his home state, Philadelphia, and Central America, Carter returned 
to politics.33  Carter competed once more for the Georgia governorship in 1970, this 
time successfully.  In 1976 he won the presidential election by stressing his position as an 
“outsider,” reinforcing southern mores, and noting his cultural and political distance 
from Washington politics—or as Pastor described, “someone untainted by Lyndon 
Johnson’s war, Richard Nixon’s cover-up, or Gerald Ford’s pardon.”34  Unlike his 
Mexican counterpart, once in office Carter sought frugality in the White House—from 
reducing staff to selling the presidential yacht Sequoia—in some sense a measure of self-
protection.  According to a Carter’s physiological profile written by Peter G. Bourne, 
these efforts “were motivated, at least to some extent, by Carter’s subconscious 
reservations about his own stature and fitness for the job as well as his apprehensions 
about what other people thought of him.”35  Nevertheless, greater problems lay outside 
himself.  By the late 1970s the United States remained scarred by the twin experiences 
of Vietnam and Watergate, while stridently anti-U.S. revolutions loomed in both the 
Middle East and Central America.  Worse still, a dramatic rise in world oil prices after 
1977 brought shortages and rising inflation.  These challenges lay beyond the power of 
any one individual to correct, but it would be Carter who, as president of the United 
States, paid the price.  His at times uncertain performance alienated many, disappointed 
others, and failed to meet the expectations for morally redeeming the political system.  
But whatever his shortcomings, Jimmy Carter’s human rights policies toward Latin 
																																																								
33 Peter G. Bourne, “Jimmy Carter: A Profile,” Yale Review 72 (Oct. 1982), 130, 136. 
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America in his first two years in office would bear long-lasting consequences that merit 
incorporation into the larger historical discussions on his presidency.   
The root of Carter’s human rights ideology and policies has been the subject of 
much historical debate.  Peter G. Bourne and others believe Carter’s dedication to 
matters of human rights were rooted in “his Southern experience,” and as such “the 
extension of his domestic civil rights policy into a global human rights policy.”36  In that 
sense, human rights in foreign policy derived from his own experience in the South and 
the struggles of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States.  While Carter’s 
religious, civil and political experience in Georgia certainly predisposed him to take up 
human rights, he did not actually address the topic until campaigning for the 
presidency.37  Interestingly, Henry Kissinger employed the term before even Carter took 
them up; that is, human rights in U.S. foreign policy began during the Ford 
administration and in Congress.38  Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Don Fraser (D-MN) 
initiated hearings to limit funding to repressive governments; they essentially “provided 
intellectual leadership to translate America’s moral impulse into a coherent policy for 
reducing aid to countries that abused the right of their citizens.”39  Alongside Congress 
stood nongovernmental organizations like Amnesty International; together, they 
inserted human rights into the national political debate, eventually resulting in 
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legislation that established State Department reports on human rights.40  It was 
somewhere in his presidential campaign that Carter fused his own justice and religious 
ideology with a wave of political activism already present in Congress, and it would be 
these ideas that he was to globalize through his foreign policy.   
More than anywhere else, it would be Latin America that served as the testing 
ground for Carter’s rights crusade.  Just as Greg Grandin has argued Latin America 
served as a type of “laboratory” for strategic and military measures that have 
empowered the United States, in similar form human rights policies were tested in the 
region beginning in the 1970s.41  While these policies “dismissed as morally bankrupt 
the Cold War theories of containment that drew the line between anti-communist 
friends and Communist foes,” they also institutionalized human rights as international, 
and hence suitable for application abroad.  At the same time, those same policies dealt 
almost exclusively with civil and political rights, while steering clear of social or 
economic guarantees.42  Carter thus employed human rights in Latin America as a way 
to reconfigure a new strategic approach toward the region, one presumably more 
benevolent than its Cold War predecessor.  However, U.S. rights policies toward the 
region institutionalized a selective process by which some countries avoid scrutiny due 
to their economic positioning in relation to the United States—as was the case for 
Mexico.   																																																								
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U.S.-Mexico Relations, 1977-1978 
 Between 1977 and 1978 Carter and López Portillo reached several agreements, 
none of which garnered significant media coverage.  In November 1977, for example, 
both countries signed a tropical products agreement “representing the first such 
agreement between an industrialized nation and a developing nation within the context 
of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.” 43  The following month, an exchange of 
prisoners treaty was reached whereby inmates could complete their terms in their home 
countries’ detention facilities.  A year later, 137 Mexicans imprisoned north of the 
border returned to Mexico, and 350 to the United States.  Carter’s presidency praised 
the diplomatic effort as “a model for similar agreements with Canada, Bolivia and 
Turkey.”44  Before the agreement, Proceso reported on the Senate discussions regarding 
the “human rights” violations of U.S. citizens imprisoned in Mexico on a previous failed 
attempt to pass the exchange of prisoners’ law.  Among the most outspoken about 
Mexico’s police force included Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), while Fortney Stark (D-CA) 
opposed the initiative, yet noted the prisoners’ treatment as an “insult to human rights” 
and blamed Mexico’s highly bureaucratic legal system.  According to their estimates, 
Mexican prisoners held some 579 U.S. citizens, eighty-percent of which had been 
charged for possession or trafficking of drugs.  The use of torture, forced confessions, 
and extortion were among several of the charges leveled by U.S. representatives, former 
detainees, and by current prisoners through written statements.  For example, Robert 																																																								
43 Report, “Mexico—Presidential Visit, Background Report by Office of Media Liaison, The 
White House Press Office,” 12 February 1979, 2/14/79-2/16/79—Mexico [Trip] RH; Box 41, Records 
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Richard, at that moment held in a Guadalajara facility, noted that citizenship did not 
matter and that Mexican prisoners also suffered physical and human rights abuses.  By 
June 1977, Mexican authorities passed the law of exchange, yet Congress failed to do so 
until the following December.45   
 The Mexican press and the Carter administration featured the negotiation as 
evidence of amicable relations between both countries.  In the December 21 “Prisoners 
as a Christmas Gift” article by Proceso, the director of Santa Marta Acatitla prison 
announced twenty-five of the prisoners set for exchange did not want to return to the 
United States due to family links, while others remained simply because they enjoyed 
the modus vivendi of Mexican prisons.  The director noted the treaty did not stipulate 
any transfer arrangement for family members of prisoners residing in Mexico.  
Nevertheless, Proceso announced the exchange scheduled for December 20 and 24, 
1977.46  The first exchange of sixty-one prisoners to the United States, and thirty-six 
Mexicans held in San Diego did indeed take place, amid a small ceremony in the 
hangar of the General Attorney’s Office.  The prison directors from both countries 
underscored the role good conduct played in the selection of prisoners for transfer, the 
majority indicted on drug charges.47  The exchange signaled a diplomatic moment 
whereby U.S. officials publicly discussed rights violations in Mexico, yet did not pressure 
the country toward reforming its justice system, despite known charges of police 
corruption and complicity in the illicit drug trade.48   																																																								
45 Raymundo Riva Palacio, “Enjuicia el Senado de EEUU a México,” Proceso (No. 33), 20 June 
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46 “México-EU: Presos como regalo de Navidad,” Proceso (No. 55), 21 November 1977, 30.   
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Meanwhile, other developments suggested growing political and economic 
accord between both countries.  A January 1978 aviation agreement expanded air 
services between Mexico and the United States—“the largest expansion of air services 
with any other nation since World War II,” and one that would translate into more 
travel and “an additional boost to the flow of tourist dollars.”  In a similar line of 
economic linkages since 1977, the White House staffers’ report celebrated a tourism 
agreement without a specific date, but one that again would “encourage investment in 
the tourist sectors and stimulate increased tourism into both countries from third 
countries.”  U.S.-Mexico relations also involved the transfer of technology, a key point 
of contention in Latin America dating to Raúl Prebisch’s time as director of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), where he and others noted the lack 
of access to technology as a contributing factor to the region’s underdevelopment and 
dependency.49  Although not cited by name, the transfers included agreements reached 
“on science and technology cooperation,” distinguished for having “increased in 
quality,” meaning agreements already in place on matters dealing with solar and 
nuclear energy, and agricultural research.50  Finally, the other two agreements were a 
new extradition treaty “replacing convection terms dating to 1899,” signed in May 
1978, and a maritime boundaries treaty signed the same month—Treaty of Maritime 																																																																																																																																																																		
and burst into flames, resulting in the death of all ten passengers—this after the plane had wandered over 
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Boundaries between the United Mexican States and the United States of America 
(1978).51  The latter simply specified locations for the maritime boundaries already 
negotiated in the 1970 “Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain 
the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary,” which recognized 
the maritime border “a distance of twelve nautical miles seaward.”52  None of these 
agreements received significant coverage in the media, yet they factored into the 
preparatory discussions for Carter’s trip to Mexico, a trip on which U.S.-Mexico oil 
relations hinged.  
Matters of narcotics proved a key U.S.-Mexico issue for negotiation and 
contention.  By 1979 the White House Press Office lauded the commitment of Mexican 
officials to drug eradication, deeming “[c]ooperation on narcotics control” as excellent.  
According to the same report, U.S. and Mexican justice departments had worked hard 
to control smuggling, leading to an estimated eighty-percent drop of “detectable surface 
areas devoted to poppy cultivation,” that is according to aerial photography.53  
However, the public discovery of the use of the paraquat herbicide in Mexico’s drug 
eradication initiatives gained significant media attention and momentarily alarmed the 
Carter administration.  As part of an overall national effort to curtail heroin, the U.S. 
government turned to targeting supply countries, including Mexico.54  Starting in 1972 																																																								
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the State Department provided Mexico funding through the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 and as part of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drug (1961).  No major 
technology had been used to eradicate marijuana; rather it had been done manually by 
uprooting and burning since 1972, efforts that had proved inefficacious.55  Since 
enforcement authorities received funding and helicopters for spraying heroin, they 
negotiated the use of equipment to target marijuana as well.  Peter Bourne, Special 
Assistant to the President for Health Issues during the Carter administration, traveled to 
Mexico and evaluated the program for spraying opium but also flew over areas 
cultivating marijuana.  Bourne found that the Mexican government was “far more 
concerned about marijuana cultivation, because they felt that it was being used 
significantly domestically, and it was creating an economic problem for them.”  The 
Mexican government thus asked to employ “US-donated helicopters” to spray the 
marijuana as well, and U.S. authorities conceded on the condition that officials get their 
own chemicals, which they did—by purchasing paraquat from Europe.56  As a result of 
this agreement, the Mexican government began spraying marijuana fields with paraquat 
in November 1975, but it was not until early 1977 that the media and other 
organizations engaged in a national frenzy on paraquat-contaminated marijuana from 
Mexico.57 																																																								
55 Kathy Smith Boe, “Paraquat Eradication: Legal Means for a Prudent Policy?” Boston College 
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Oil for Immigration Reform?: Chicanos, Carter, and López Portillo   
The question of undocumented immigrants also factored into the López-Carter 
agenda.  As Mexico’s political leverage increased due to oil reserves, several Mexican-
Americans spoke to President López Portillo about pressuring Carter on immigration 
reform.  In his February 1977 trip to Washington, the Mexican leader spoke twice in 
Chicago to Mexicans residing in the United States.  According to Proceso the meetings 
felt a lot like his campaign sessions.  He asked “Mexican friends” to remain true to 
themselves and their heritage, while also reiterating his government efforts toward 
advancing Mexico—and maintained he had not traveled to the United States solely for 
financial reasons.58  While López Portillo may have not brought up matters of 
immigration reform during his visit, Mexican-American leaders from Texas made 
efforts to negotiate with the Mexican leader.  In January 1978, a delegation of eight met 
with López Portillo in Mexico City, including José Ángel Gutiérrez from La Raza 
Unida Party (RUP), Eduardo Morga (President of the League of United Latin American 
Citizens, LULAC), Antonio Morales (National President of the G.I. Forum), and the 
more radical Reies López Tijerina (formerly in the Alianza Federal de Mercedes).  One of 
the meeting’s focuses included the rights of undocumented immigrants and Mexico’s 
responsibilities in defending them.  “President L[ó]pez Portillo assured the delegation 
that Mexico would not endorse a bracero program…without the delegates’ active 
participation in the negotiations,” and offered fifty scholarships for Mexican-American 
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students to study in Mexican institutions.59  According to Jorge Bustamante, Special 
Council to López Portillo on immigration issues, the scholarships specifically for the 
medical profession had been initiated during the Echeverría sexennial, and proposed by 
José Ángel Gutiérrez.60  Chicano leaders looked for political leverage in Mexico on 
behalf of a segment of the U.S. population whose legal livelihoods depended on a well-
founded immigration reform rather than the renunciation of a labor agreement between 
Mexico and the United States. 
The Carter administration, meanwhile, took on a traditionalist approach to the 
problem of immigration by adhering to the argument of legality.  For one, President 
Carter proposed an immigration plan to Congress that sought to “increase legal avenues 
of immigration for Western hemisphere immigrants,” whose limits had been affected by 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and some argued resulted in an increase in 
undocumented immigration—tripling from 1965 to 1970.61  At least in the case of 
Mexico, legal entry numbers “plummeted from 450,000 annual guest worker visas and 
unlimited number of resident visas to just 20,000 visas for permanent residence.”62  In 
that sense, Carter’s plans sought to limit undocumented migration by broadening the 
legal avenues, in addition to increasing border security and penalties on employers 
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hiring undocumented workers.63  Part of this reform also included deportations and 
heightening border security.  Under the Ford and the Carter administrations alarming 
numbers of undocumented immigrants were rounded up and deported, and by 1974 
some 800,000 Mexicans involuntarily arrived in their home country.64  Unlike his 
successor, who “had much more contact with Mexico and understood it better than 
many other politicians,” Carter did not fully grasp the problem of Mexican 
immigration, nor did he gage the political value of reform on U.S.-Mexico oil talks.65   
Chicanos responded vociferously to Carter’s proposals.66  Some believed his 
immigration reform revived the Bracero program (1942-1964) by importing 800,000 
laborers, a proposal “to meet the demands of agribusiness and other employers for 
cheap labor, easily exploitable labor.”  Some activists believed this plan was “nothing 
but a sugar-coated ‘Bracero program.”67  In late 1978, RUP members in association 
with Mexico’s Socialist Workers Party (PST), represented by Carlos Olamendi, 
denounced Carter’s immigration policies and plans to build fences along several states, 
efforts at the time denoted to as “Tortilla Curtain,” or what they referred to as the 
“Karter, Kastillo Kurtain” (KKK).68  Mexican-American leaders also pointed out the 																																																								
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absence of Hispanics in Carter’s cabinet, as well as recent mass deportations; their 
portrait of the plight of undocumented immigrants contrasted sharply with the 
president’s own language of human rights.69  While Chicanos had been historically 
adamant at the presence of undocumented immigrants, given the role cheap labor had 
played in diminishing unions’ bargaining power, by 1975 it had become clear that the 
anti-Mexican workers posture shifted as Chicanos realized that anti-immigration 
policies would indirectly target them as well.  Chicanos’ response and efforts during the 
Carter-López administrations therefore seem to indicate a new posture toward the 
needs of minorities and exploited groups of Hispanic descent: no longer separating 
Mexican-American struggles from those of Mexican immigrants.70 
Carter’s announced trip to Mexico amid oil talks further incited suspicion and 
opportunity for Mexican-American leaders.  A May issue of Texas Monthly suggested that 
some politicians had offered López Portillo more favorable oil prices if he supported 
Carter’s immigration reform initiative.  Featuring Tejano singer José María de León 
Hernández, best known as “Little Joe,” the editorial briefly chronicled the singer’s trip 
to Mexico City by invitation of José Ángel Gutiérrez.  He joined the group of Chicanos 
in their meeting with the Mexican president.  Joe Nick Patoski, who traveled with Little 
Joe, recounted “[t]he purpose of the delegation’s visit with López-Portillo was to apply a 
wedge of pressure between the United States and Mexico regarding Jimmy Carter’s 																																																								
69 “In an era when human rights are being carefully scrutinized on a worldwide basis, we must 
call the attention of President Carter the fact that the undocumented person may be little better off than 
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Corpus Christi Caller, “Mexican-Americans urge emancipation for illegal aliens,” in which Mexican-
American groups demand immigration reform from the Carter Administration.  Memo, Raúl Roel 
Martínez to C. Director General del Servicio Diplomático-Edificio. Embassy Dispatches, Mexico-United 
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proposed immigration policy.”71  According to the Texas Monthly, American officials had 
been contacting López Portillo “purportedly to suggest, among other things, that the 
U.S. government might be more amenable to purchasing some of Mexico’s huge surplus 
of natural gas at their advertised price of $2.60 per thousand cubic feet,” if the Mexican 
government supported Carter’s immigration plan.  Vice President Mondale and 
California Governor Jerry Brown were listed among those supposedly chatting with the 
Mexican president about the plan.72  For that reason, the envoy the Tejano singer 
joined formed part of a unified Chicano front to lobby the Mexican government against 
Carter’s plan.  The night before meeting with López Portillo, the group met with 
Mexican hosts in the lobby of the Hotel del Prado, with its famous Diego Rivera mural; 
there they hashed out the plans for their meeting in Los Pinos.  López Portillo assured 
his guests “that he would not let the sale of gas affect his position on immigration and 
promised Gutiérrez that Chicanos would be included in any immigration talks involving 
the border area and the bracero program.”  Like many in Mexico, López Portillo seemed 
surprised to learn that Latinos constituted “a larger minority than blacks in some areas 
of the United States.”73  By 1978 an organized Chicano initiative ensued against 
Carter’s immigration plan that led prominent community leaders to López Portillo; the 
latter apparently consistently held an “open door” policy for Mexican-Americans 
seeking to speak with him, and according to anthropologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen, it was 
during the Echeverría sexennial that the Mexican government first sought to strengthen 
its contacts with Chicanos.74  																																																								
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Chicano advocates thus sought to delegitimize Carter’s reform by questioning 
his economic intentions in Mexico and did so by using the language of human rights.  
To that end, activists juxtapositioned Mexico’s oil reserves with matters of immigration 
reform.  In 1979 Chicanos in California believed “the issues of oil and immigration are 
factors that would ultimately affect the social-economical and human rights of Chicano-
Mexicano people.”  Chicanos employed Carter’s language of rights, and regarding his 
trip to Mexico in 1979, poet, former boxer, and prominent Chicano leader Rodolfo 
“Corky” Gonzáles noted: “The Carter trip to Mexico City has nothing to do with 
human rights.  Carter[’]s meeting with Portillo is not on human rights but profits.”  
Given the legacies of labor and political exploitation of Hispanics north of the Rio 
Grande, it was only normal that in the context of the 1970s the more radical spokesman 
to view Carter’s trip within the lens of U.S. imperialism at home and abroad.  As did 
Corky when he said, “Mexico is in danger of being raped again.”  On February 11, 
1979, just days before Carter’s trip, Chicanos marched in San Ysidro, California, in one 
of the largest demonstrations against the construction of a combined six-mile fence in 
San Diego’s and El Paso’s border crossing.  Activists not only protested against the 
fence, which they deemed served to “dehumanize the undocumented worker,” but also 
gathered in opposition to Carter’s immigration plan that they argued militarized the 
border.75  Yet, after Carter’s proposal failed in Congress, Senator Edward Kennedy 
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75 The newsletter also includes a letter the Committee on Chicano Rights (CCR) sent to Sentaor 
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formed a Special Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy whose 
recommendations for immigration formed the basis for Senator Alan Simpson and 
Romano Mazzoli’s 1982 proposal version for comprehensive reform that eventually 
solidified into the 1986 Immigration Reform Control Act (IRCA) signed by President 
Ronald Reagan.76  While plans for the fence were eventually dropped, they were 
revived and solidified during the Bill Clinton administration (1993-2001).77  
Nevertheless, on matters of immigration, Chicanos seemed rather aware of Mexico’s 
political leverage after the discovery of oil reserves, and as such they sought to derail 
North American policies by making alliances with López Portillo, a strategy that initially 
bore some fruits. 
Meanwhile, Proceso journalists gave considerable coverage to Mexican laborers’ 
experience abroad and Carter’s immigration proposal.  In October 1977, Proceso 
published an interview with Patrick J. Lucey, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico (1977-1979), 
in which he declared his dedication to protecting the rights of migrant workers and 
affirmed the increase in border patrol, an approach, which he assured, did not mean the 
closure of the U.S.-Mexico border or anything resembling the Berlin Wall.  Lucey also 
revealed that that Mexican authorities had been consulted on May 6, June 1 and 12, 
1977 on Carter’s immigration plan and had rendered their support for the initiative.  
The proposal sent to Congress on August 4 was better received than those previously 
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77 See Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Making of the U.S.-
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presented to the Mexican government.78  In the same issue of Proceso, Jorge A. 
Bustamante sent an article for reprint he had written for Los Angeles times in which he 
challenged Carter’s notion that the issue of undocumented workers stood as “one of the 
country’s most complex domestic issues.”  As Carter submitted his August 4 reform 
proposal, Bustamante seemed critical of the manner in which the president approached 
the problem of migration.  He believed Carter’s proposal for heightened border security 
would undoubtedly lead to massive deportation and civil and human rights violations, 
even while the president sustained he does not seek massive roundups.  In addition, 
Bustamante deemed the reform a political scapegoat that stigmatized immigrants as a 
cost on the economy and deemed the proposal as narrow, unilateral, non-inclusive, and 
a short-term solution.79  Immigration discussions north of the border factored into the 
Mexican press, where journalists scrutinized policies proposed by the Carter 
administration for most of 1977 and sympathized with fellow Mexicans, using their 
writings served as a platform on behalf of a group of people largely forgotten by the 
general population and left out of Mexico’s public agenda.   
Nevertheless, the coverage in Proceso revealed solidarity for their Mexican 
counterparts at the center of an unfolding of a politics of repression around the issue of 
immigration.  Renowned anthropologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen, most known for his 
research on indigenous peoples, wrote extensively for Excélsior, and after 1976 for Proceso, 
on Chicano culture and the repatriation of Mexicans.  Up to 1976 Stavenhagen 
reported on general Chicano culture, Chicano and Mexican immigrant relationship, 																																																								
78 According to Lucey, the Carter proposal included a category of “non-deportable” immigrants, 
valid for five years, for those who arrived in the United States between 1970 and 1977. Rodolfo Guzmán, 
“El embajador Patrick Lucey: EU no fue unilateral, consultó con México el plan sobre los braceros,” 
Proceso (No. 51), 24 October 1977, 6-10.  
79 Jorge A. Bustamante, “EU procede como si los braceros solo fueran problema suyo,” Proceso 
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anti-Mexican campaigns in California, and the repatriation of thousands of workers to 
Mexico.80  Other news pieces reported violence and repression against Mexican 
migrants and Chicanos and the rise of a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) initiative against the 
entry of undocumented workers.81  An article titled “There They Live Badly, but Better 
than Here” reproduced the story of the union leader José Rodríguez from San Luis de 
la Paz, Guanajuato.  Rodríguez, along with twenty men and fifteen women, walked 
some 1,800 miles from Texas to Washington to talk to Carter.  The group sought for 
the U.S. government to recognize their union, La Unión de Campesinos de Texas (Texas 
Farmers Union) and to demand that their employers pay them wages sufficient to 
survive—“so the government can give us what is just.”  Rodríguez added he did not 
want to return to Mexico, “[o]nly if they throw me out I will leave, but I have already 
given a lot to the United States,” but argued what they demanded was not wealth, 
rather just to be treated humanely.82  The article implied migrants’ acculturation and a 
desire to remain in the United States, while also reflecting a conscious effort to demand 
just treatment.  
Jesuit columnist Enrique Maza, who also wrote extensively on human rights, 
grappled with the question of migrants.  Maza believed that undocumented immigrants 
in the United States were the result of one of the “intrinsic failures of the socio-
economic-political structures of capitalism,” emanating from the growing disparity 
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between wealthy and poor countries.  Using Carter’s own language of rights but with a 
critical stance toward the president’s approach to the problem of migration, Maza 
believed “the real problem posed by illegal workers is the universality of human rights, 
beyond national borders.”  Maza wondered whether human rights could transcend 
national borders and argued there could be no human rights where structures of 
inequality existed, nor could human rights exist merely in the realm of individual 
freedoms at the margin of social realities.  For Maza the underpinning problem of 
undocumented immigrants lay in global questions of inequality and of humanity.83  In 
August Proceso also reported on the meeting of Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, with López Portillo and other political leaders to discuss undocumented 
Mexicans abroad and negotiations over the Panama Canal, among other things.84  By 
the end of 1977, coverage on undocumented immigrants featured in Proceso decreased 
with a clear shift in U.S.-Mexico relations reporting toward the pipeline project and the 
United States’ refusal to accept its southern neighbor’s price for gas.  
By the February trip, Mexican writers and Chicanos had appropriated Carter’s 
own language of rights to scold him on injustices in his own country.  The southern 
democrat had made human rights a cornerstone of his foreign policies.  While the 
general population in the United States remained aloof to the emerging terminology of 
“human rights,” Mexican-Americans learned the language from Carter.  The Carter 
administration, however, did not associate or apply human rights terminologies to 																																																								
83 Enrique Maza, “Ilegales y derechos humanos internacionales,” Proceso (No. 40), 8 August 
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matters of immigration, border security, and much less did officials associate these with 
the rights of minorities in the United States.  Rather, human rights in the 1970s were 
confined strictly to the realm of foreign policy—precisely from where they had been 
endorsed by members of congress just a few years prior to Carter’s election.  Because of 
the way they were promoted by members of Congress, human rights became intimately 
linked and confined to U.S. foreign policy, and especially marred by Cold War politics 
of counterrevolution.  In that sense, human rights terminologies were tagged to 
happenings abroad, particularly in developing countries, and they embodied the 
excesses of a strong and closed state that infringed on individual values prioritized by 
Western democracies: political and civil rights.  In the context of the Cold War, human 
rights policies emanating from the State Department were used as a measure of anti-
communism, as a strategy to counter an ideology that privileged social and economic 
rights over civil and political.  Because Mexico had not been flagged as a hub for 
revolutionary movements, neither Carter nor his predecessors or successors challenged 
the government on its human rights records, although enough knowledge of the 
country’s faulting justice system existed.  The absence of non-governmental 
organizations looking into violence in Mexico, and Carter’s priorities in Latin America, 
explains another reason why human rights were never of major importance for the 
February 1979 U.S.-Mexico meeting.   
 
(Avoiding) International Scrutiny: Documenting Mexico’s Human Rights Violations  
While the U.S. government certainly knew of its southern neighbor’s rights 
violations, Mexico also worked diligently to dispel such charges.  According to Kate 
Doyle, during the Echeverría sexennial First Secretary of the U.S. embassy T. Frank 
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Crigler met with officials from Mexico’s Secretariat of Foreign Relations to talk about 
“U.S. interests in the current human rights situation.”  When Mexican officials 
wondered if the U.S. government needed an official statement on human rights in 
Mexico, Doyle documents, Crigler immediately assured authorities stating “that there 
was no intention on our part whatever to meddle in Mexico’s internal affairs, but that 
we simply wished to cooperate and consult with the Mexican government on means by 
which other nations might be encouraged to pay attention to human rights values.”85  
Moreover, Doyle states, “Declassified U.S. documents from 1968-78 show clearly that 
the United States knew the Mexican government was committing grave human rights 
violations - they also show that the U.S. was uninterested in publicizing that fact, either 
to the Mexican government or to the U.S. Congress.”86  It seems that rather than risk 
antagonizing the country, the U.S. government sought Mexico’s cooperation in 
pressuring other Latin America nations on their human rights records—as Echeverría 
diligently did, especially through his policy of welcoming South American exiles.   
Even so, Mexico still factored into the State Department’s country reports on 
human rights.  The 1976 report, compiled by the Coordinator for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, placed Mexico in the category of “partially free” countries, while 
Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Haiti and Panama were deemed “not free.”  At 
the time, however, Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada denied any human rights 
violations in the country.87  The 1977 report predictably called attention to Mexico’s 
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single-party rule yet deemed the PRI “a channel for considerable political participation 
and debate.” The State Department also recognized that while individual rights were 
“generally respected in practice,” the government did not condone human rights 
violations as part of its public policy debates.88  The 1979 report kept faith with earlier 
perspectives by stating that the Mexican system promoted social justice derivative of its 
Revolutionary past; but at the same time the report documented complaints of 
“individual human rights abuses” in relation to “anti-terrorism or restraint of political 
opposition.”89  The U.S. government also recognized that the López Portillo 
government addressed some of the accusations through an amnesty law and by 
accounting for “disappeared person,” a category not included in the evaluation on 
Mexico for 1979; by 1980 the State Department bluntly reported that the country did 
“not acknowledge the existence of disappeared persons.”90  While Mexico’s repressive 
measures were largely overlooked for lack of “conclusive evidence,” the State 
Department consistently pressured the country on its treatment of U.S. citizens 
incarcerated in Mexico, but did not publicly condemn its human rights records in the 
press or diplomatically.   
Whatever their limitations, the State Department reports set an important 
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precedent for evaluating human rights in the world.  These documents reviewed 
conditions for each country based on several criteria, particularly those related to civil 
and political rights, the principal exception being the category on economic and social 
rights.91  They drew on the terminology of rights primarily from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, ranging from torture, disappearances (category excluded 
from the 1978 report on Mexico altogether), arbitrary arrest, denial of a fair public trail 
to freedom of speech and press—all relevant to rights espoused on behalf of political 
prisoners—with a single category on social and economic rights related to food, shelter, 
health, education, and employment.92  In January 1978 an internal State Department’s 
newsletter outlined Carter’s foreign policy on human rights in which it defined the latter 
as “based on our historical documents and experience, the UN Charter, and other 
international instruments,” including the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
The GIST newsletter (U. S. Department of State’s Global Innovation through Science 
and Technology) listed three groups of rights the State Department pursued:  
--Freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, torture, unfair trial, cruel 
and   unusual punishment, and invasion of privacy;  
--Rights to food, shelter, health care, and education; and 
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--Freedom of thought, speech, assembly, religion, press, movement and 
participation in government.93 
Despite the somewhat narrow list of rights evaluation, the State Department reports 
institutionalized a measures contingent with the legal priorities of the United States 
unique legal trajectory and Western legal systems prioritizing individual over group 
rights, and focused primarily on civil and political rights.  Yet even when sufficient 
evidence existed on rights violations, the Carter administration (and its many successors) 
selectively chose the countries to publicly pressure versus those with whom it privately 
negotiated on matters of repression.   
Conspicuously absent in the State Department country reports was data from 
NGO fact-finding missions to Mexico.  The U.S. government relied heavily on 
documented material published by non-governmental organizations for their own 
reports.  Evidence of the absence of international groups working in Mexico was 
reflected in the State Departments 1977 report.  In the four pages, officials documented 
numerous claims of “no conclusive evidence,” and a single paragraph to material 
collected and published in the Amnesty International Report for 1977.94  Incredibly, the 
1977 report did not include surveys of Chile or Argentina, two of the most egregious 
human-rights offenders in the western hemisphere.95  Two years later, the 1979 and 
1980 the report on Mexico more than doubled to nine pages.  The State Department 																																																								
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officials included detailed material from local dailies and magazines, including such 
ideologically opposed publications as the right-wing Diario de Yucatán and the more left-
leaning Proceso, in addition to first and second-hand information “received by American 
consular officers,” as well as U.S. consulate reports as related to North American 
prisoners in Mexico, and from NGOs—including the Defense Committee for Political 
Prisoners, Disappeared Persons and Exiles (DCPPDPE, in Spanish Comité ¡Eureka!) 
and the International League for Human Rights (ILHR).96  The 1980 report also 
referenced Mexico’s rising political position, given the discovery of oil and material from 
the President’s State of the Union reports (informe de gobierno), which staffers often took at 
face value reproducing propagandistic material on social, political, and economic 
advancements in the country—such as the arguments that “Men and women are equal 
before the law, and women participate freely in the political process,” along with 
percentages of women in universities and claims of an absence of hiring or wage 
discrimination for women in the unskilled, semi-skilled, and professional fields.97  
Despite some misstatements and shaky interpretations, the documentation improved in 
quality from 1977 up to 1979 and 1980, and the terminology regarding political 
dissidents diversified from merely utilizing “terrorists” and the government 
counterrevolutionary efforts as “anti-terrorism” to showcasing specific cases and noting 																																																								
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the repression against specific groups, like students, workers, and left-wing guerrillas.   
However, Mexico’s reportage lagged in comparison to material recompiled on 
Argentina and Chile after 1977.  Country reports on human rights relied heavily on 
evidence collected in fact-finding missions carried out by non-governmental 
organizations.  The information reproduced by the State Department reports reveals a 
disparity in missions to South American countries versus Mexico.  Evaluations of 
Argentina’s human rights record, for example, reflects the U.S. government’s use of 
documentation by several local and international organization, from the Peace and 
Justice Movement headed by Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, to the New York City Bar Association.98  Argentina’s case shows the 
existence of a specialized transnational network of activists, political leaders, and exiles 
working to document and diffuse stories, names by providing a general panorama of 
repressive conditions on the ground.  Because more people advocated on behalf of 
repressed peoples in Argentina and Chile, the U.S. government pressure exerted on 
these countries varied significantly from others not flagged as violators.  Most 
importantly, Mexico’s groups most vulnerable to human rights violations and political 
repression found themselves in rural areas with little or no access to the national or 
international media.  Unlike primarily urban societies, Mexico avoided international 
scrutiny in large part due to the absences of a transnational exile and media networks 
actively engaged in the 1970s emerging device of fact-finding missions—and the 
especially non-existent surveys of government repression in extremely poor, isolated, 																																																								
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and rural communities.   
Moreover, Mexico’s double discourse on human rights spared the country from 
international scrutiny.  The State Department exemplifies how the Mexican 
government distanced itself from countries with public records of rights violations. Both 
Echeverría and López Portillo actively criticized military governments and adhered 
internationally to protecting human rights, while also demanding their right to 
sovereignty on internal matters.  The State Department, for instance, noted Mexico’s 
cooperation and argued the country “had a good human rights record in international 
affairs, with traditional support for the persecuted of other countries and with frequent 
participation in multilateral approaches to human rights problems.”99  Subsequent 
reports replicated the statement, almost verbatim, and in 1980 the State Department 
added “Mexico has traditionally provided asylum for dissidents from throughout Latin 
America.”100  The open door policy to South American exiles served to solidify Mexico 
as a protector, rather than a violator, of human rights.  Likewise, in López Portillo’s 
February 1977 speech in the U.S. Congress he outlined Carter’s priorities in Latin 
America, noting negotiations over Panama and the “evolution” of relations with Cuba, 
yet he proved critical in that the U.S. government was less concerned by human rights 
violation in Chile.101  In similar manner, López Portillo employed international forums 
to denounce human rights violations, even in the United States. Moreover, Carter built 
on this notion of Mexico as a protector by referring to López Portillo as a leader 																																																								
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committed to advancing the human rights cause in the region.  In that manner the 
Mexican government appropriated the emerging language of international human 
rights by openly scrutinizing Latin American dictatorships as part of its foreign policy 
and deference for state sovereignty, partly a strategy to limit speculation on its own 
repressive measures.   
When charges of human rights violations did surface, Mexican authorities 
deflected criticisms by opening the door to international organizations.  Amnesty 
International proved one of the few institutions surveying Mexico’s human rights 
records, primarily its treatment of political prisoners.  As such, representatives traveled 
to the country on several occasions, with the first visit taking place in July 1975.102  
When AI delegates presented Attorney General Pedro Ojeda Paullada with their 
findings on the condition of human rights violations in Mexico, he did not admit any of 
the charges, but delegates acknowledged his willingness to answer queries.  Ojeda also 
diverted from explaining why Mexico had not ratified the International Bill of Human 
Rights, which includes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.103  Luis Echeverría, 
now a Nobel Peace Prize candidate, failed to respond to the various recommendations 
AI presented the country after their visit.104  Moreover, in November 1976, AI delegates 
presented President Echeverría and President-elect López Portillo with the report of 
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their findings from the 1975 visit to Mexico.105  When Amnesty International won the 
Nobel Peace Prize in October 1977, Proceso again pressed the question of Mexico’s 
political prisoners and the government’s failure to give the national section of AI official 
registry.106  The State Department’s 1977 report on human rights described Mexico as 
being “generally cooperative with international human rights groups,” whereby 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Santiago Roel García announced to the OAS General 
Assembly that both the Inter-American Human Rights Commission would be 
welcomed in Mexico.  Other officials said the same to Amnesty International 
representatives interested in visiting Mexico.107  According to the State Department, in 
1978 the Mexican government “received a high-level delegation from Amnesty 
International and a study group from the International League for Human Rights.”  
The Amnesty International 1979 annual report welcomed Mexico’s Amnesty Law but 
also questioned the safety of prisoners when released, and noted some were simply 
transferred from one prison to another.108  In January 1980 Mexican authorities 
welcomed another mission group from Amnesty International, which continued to 
document political repression in judicial procedure, disappearances, and complaints 
against the paramilitary group known as the White Brigade that had been created to 
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Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 367. 
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counter leftists in the country.109  Amnesty International became one of the key groups 
that surveyed the conditions of political prisoners in Mexico throughout the 1970s; 
however, the group also served to legitimize Mexico’s stance as a cooperative and 
responsive country to international scrutiny on its human rights records, as evidenced in 
the State Department reports.  
While on the one hand Mexico welcomed surveyors, on the other authorities 
challenged report findings and denied any wrongdoing.  When Amnesty International 
reported in December 1976 on the existence of more than two hundred political 
prisoners in civil and military clandestine prisons, Mexican authorizes denied the 
charges and demanded evidence to support AI’s claims.  In press conferences the 
Attorney General Oscar Flores Sánchez and Secretary of Defense Felix Galván López 
demanded the names of those said to be disappeared, imprisoned, and subjected to 
torture and denied the existence of political prisoners in military camps and, like some 
South American military leaders, parried AI’s demands by proclaiming the right to 
sovereignty: “we have no reason to show foreigners our military installations.”  Proceso 
noted the Mexican government asserted on several occasions that human rights were 
not violated in Mexico and consistently denied the existence of political prisoners.110  
When in 1977 AI claimed the existence of one to two hundred political prisoners in the 
country, the State Department overlooked the charges on the basis that the “Mexican 																																																								
109 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices [Report Submitted to the 
Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 487. 
110 The Attorney General had previously argued that the doors to Military Camp No. One were 
open to prove there are no political prisoners in Mexico.  Meanwhile, the report’s facts dispelled the 
government claims by noting the existence of 166 political prisoners in Mexican prisons and 240 
disappeared and kidnapped by the various military and police forces in the country, information collected 
by the Mexican NGO Comité Pro-Defensa de Presos, Perseguidos, Desaparecidos y Exiliados Políticos (Comité 
¡Eureka!). “Amnistía Internacional: ‘Creencias’ lo de las torturas aquí,” Proceso (No. 59), 19 December 
1977, 27-28.  
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Government has presented evidence that the prisoners in question are charged with or 
convicted of common crimes.”111  In December 1977 Flores Sánchez sent AI’s Secretary 
General a letter stating that an invitation had not been made for the organization to 
inspect detention centers.  He added, “I agree with the Mexican government’s approach 
not to accept the intromission of foreign groups in matters that only corresponds to 
Mexicans and the Mexican government.”112  While Mexican authorities announced in 
international forums their open doors to international organizations, when authorities 
disagreed with the findings and recommendations they fervently adhered to state 
sovereignty and reverted to their motto of non-intervention in national matters. 
It was through the invite-and-deny maneuver that the Mexican government 
disavowed international NGO claims of human rights violations.  Mexican officials 
publicly rejected charges of political repression, even while local organizations like 
Comité ¡Eureka! disseminated the names and locations of prisoners in the country, the 
data that both Flores Sánchez and Galván López demanded from Amnesty 
International.  Popular print media reproduced the names and faces of political 
prisoners and desaparecidos (the disappeared).  In the December 1978 issue of Los 
Agachados, Rius used satire to reproduce the material collected by Comité ¡Eureka!, 
namely photos, stories, and photographs of young women and men, urbanites as well as 
campesinos, missing or harassed in various parts of Mexico.113  Nevertheless, Mexican 
authorities proved more responsive to international charges and avidly concerned with 																																																								
 111 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices [Report Submitted to the 
Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 187. 
112 “Derechos Humanos: Amnistía Internacional no va a fiscalizarnos,” Proceso (No. 60), 26 
December 1977, 25. 
113 Rius, “Los desaparecidos de Echeverría y sucesores…,” Los Agachados (Year 1, No. 4), 20 
December 1978, 6-25.  
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dismantling such claims, while local groups almost invariably confronted bureaucratic 
obstacles when seeking official registry, or on some occasions had organizations’ offices 
sacked.114  Even though political repression existed in the country, organizations like 
Amnesty International did not believe there to be an emergency in Mexico in matters of 
human rights when the urgent cases upon the international secretary came largely from 
Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, described Mariclaire Acosta from the Mexican section 
of AI.115  The local networks with international links and access to global media simply 
did not consolidate efforts as they did in the Southern Cone.  For that reason, the 
government could lavishly deny charges of political repression in international forums.  
As such, Mexican authorities espoused a language of decency in matters of human 
rights in international scenes and by inviting international organizations like Amnesty 
International, yet consistently denied charges from AI and ignored those posed by 
national organizations on matters of political repression—an approach commonly 
employed still today.116  These maneuverings of denial also detracted the Carter 
administration and other international non-governmental organizations from fully 
gaging the extent of the repression in Mexico, contributing to the climate of oversight.    
 
																																																								
114  The offices of CENCOS and the Jesuit church Angels in Mexico City were both sacked by 
the government. “Lío internacional por el saqueo de CENCOS,” Proceso (No. 37), 18 July 1977, 10-11; 
“Represión: Violencia contra los jesuitas,” Proceso (No. 45), 12 September 1977, 25-26.  
115 “Premio Nobel de la Paz: Amnistía Internacional, defensora de los prisioneros olvidados,” 
Proceso (No. 50), 17 October 1977, 7-8. 
116 Mexico is a signatory of the majority of international human rights covenants and has 
consistently welcomed monitoring institutions to visit Mexico, as has been the case of the missing 43 
students from Iguala, Guerrero, yet has worked diligently to publicly discredit international investigations 
that tarnish the government’s judicial and military systems.  An expert group from the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights released a report on their findings on September 6, 2015 of the 
disappearance of the Ayotzinapa students.  The government welcomed the report, yet, expressed their 
concerns and doubts regarding the material posed given that the experts questioned the official story 
presented by Mexican authorities and revealed the existence of a fifth bus carrying drugs headed for 
Chicago.  Complete report can be found here <http://goo.gl/uQfNsv>. 
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Carter-López Portillo Oil Talks, 1977-1978 
Mexico’s recently discovered oil deposits also placed a newfound weight on U.S.-
Mexico relations, and on Carter to negotiate a deal.  Some estimates placed Mexico’s oil 
reserves at 60 billion barrels, significantly more than the United States’ 42 billion, thus 
converting Mexico, according to George W. Grayson, “from a neglected stepchild of the 
petroleum world to a dazzling Cinderella.”117  The Mexican government understood 
the political leverage and the economic possibilities for the country: “[t]he world is now 
divided into two camps; nations that produce oil, and nations that do not.  Mexico is a 
nation that does!” López Portillo proudly declared.118  Naturally, the Mexican 
government looked for a market in the United States.  However, as early as April 1977 
“Carter administration officials informed Mexico that it needed to negotiate an 
agreement with the U.S. government before talking to the gas companies . . . ,” wrote 
Pastor.119  López Portillo, however, began talks with private companies soon after taking 
office.  The president and his key negotiator Jorge Díaz Serrano, director of Mexico’s 
state-owned oil company created in 1938 Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), “met at least ten 
times during the first half of 1977” with Tennessee Gas Transmission Company 
officials.  The intent lay in reaching an agreement for the exportation of natural gas.120  
By August 1977, PEMEX and six U.S. pipeline companies signed the Memorandum of 																																																								
 117 Clint E. Smith, Inevitable Partnership: Understanding Mexico-U.S. Relations (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000), 61; George W. Grayson, “The U.S.-Mexican Natural Gas Deal and What We 
Can Learn From It,” Orbis (Fall 1980), 573. 
  118 Clint E. Smith, Inevitable Partnership: Understanding Mexico-U.S. Relations (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000), 61. 
  119 George W. Grayson, “The U.S.-Mexican Natural Gas Deal and What We Can Learn From 
It,” Orbis (Fall 1980), 587; Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of 
Principle,” The Carter Center, (July 1992), <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>, 30.  Also 
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D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1995), 51. 
  120 George W. Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1980), 187. 
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Intention agreement, which provided for an opening production of some fifty million 
cfd (cubic feet daily) at an initial price of $2.60 per Mcf (thousand cubic feet) with 
possible delivery as “early as the 1977-1978 heating season.”121  Negotiations with the 
private sector also jump-started the gasoducto project (gas pipeline) from Cactus, Chiapas 
to the border region, with a projected cost of one billion dollars.  By the summer of 
1977, the Mexican government and U.S. private business reached an oil agreement in 
record time.122 
 However, the Carter administration and some businessmen opposed the price 
established for the gas deal.  Negotiating with Mexico was no doubt a sane option—
“only three days steaming time from Mexican oil ports compared to forty-five days from 
the Persian Gulf”—but the López Portillo administration’s asking price posed several 
problems for the U.S. government.123  Portillo argued energy sources should be 
considered world heritage, and in the words of journalist Ayala Anguiano “industrial 
countries should commit to paying higher prices for all other products they acquire from 
the developing world.”124  Meanwhile, Carter and James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of 																																																								
121 The six companies included: Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, Texas Eastern 
Transmission Corporation, El Paso Natural Gas Company, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation, 
Southern Natural Gas Company, and Florida Gas Transmission Company.  Percentage varied between 
37.5 of the gas to only 3.5 of the total shipment.  George W. Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), 187; George W. Grayson, “The U.S.-Mexican Natural 
Gas Deal and What We Can Learn From It,” Orbis (Fall 1980), 582. 
122 The Mexican government seemed satisfied and “preferred to work with private firms rather 
than with the U.S. government,” given that the latter “demanded extensive information on reserves, 
productive fields, and financial matter”—an arrangement that at least had been the case for Canadians 
on similar negotiations.  PEMEX officials, however, preferred to safeguard such information. George W. 
Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), 188; George W. 
Grayson, “The U.S.-Mexican Natural Gas Deal and What We Can Learn From It,” Orbis (Fall 1980), 
582. 
123 George W. Grayson, “The U.S.-Mexican Natural Gas Deal and What We Can Learn From 
It,” Orbis (Fall 1980), 574. 
124 In a joint communiqué of Carter’s meeting with López Portillo in February 1979, the term 
“patrimony of mankind” resurfaces in reference to how oil resources should be considered and 
negotiated. Armando Ayala Anguiano, JLP: secretos de un sexenio (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1984), 35.  Also see 
Agustín, Tragicomedia mexicana 2, 191.  For the complete joint communique of Carter’s trip, see United 
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the Department of Energy, submitted a plan to Congress calling for a price of $1.75 per 
Mcf for new natural gas discoveries and the gradual deregulation of natural gas in stages 
with an end date of December 31, 1984.  Paying Mexico its asking price of $2.60 per 
Mcf weakened the Carter-Schlesinger gas proposal and it would inflate the price paid 
for Canadian gas, which “supplied gas to the upper Midwest and Pacific Northwest at 
$2.16 per Mcf.”125  Schlesinger made a final year trip to Mexico and offered no more 
than $2.16 per Mcf.  In the meeting with Díaz Serrano and Roel García, Mexican 
officials did not budge on the price and again pressed to tie the price to fuel oil, then 
$2.76 per Mcf.  By December 22 the Mexican government announced it would not 
“renew the Memorandum of Intent, due to expire at the end of 1977.”  Pipeline 
companies complained and blamed Schlesinger for the deal going sour, but the Energy 
Secretary believed the Mexican government would eventually reach out to the United 
States when left without an alternative.126  Despite the absence of direct pressure on 																																																																																																																																																																		
States, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter: 1979-Book I - January 1 to June 22, 1979 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 291. 
125 Because the gas price was subject to regulatory provisions, individuals like Senator Adlai E. 
Stevenson III (D-Ill) worried that Canadians could demand a higher price for their gas, thereby inflating 
the price for U.S. buyers. Stevenson also believed that Mexicans “could recover the gas, operate the 
pipeline, finance its debt, and still enjoy an attractive profit” at price of $1.75 per Mcf, while the extra 85 
cents could mean an additional $620 million in annual deficit on fuel imports for the United States.  
Stevenson’s position on the matter led to a postponement of a loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to 
Mexico since he served as the chairman of the Banking Committee’s Subcommittee on International 
Finance, the charge being that the institution acted too prematurely—a move that primarily antagonized 
Mexican officials’ plan for the pipeline which still started in October 1977. Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter 
Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle,” The Carter Center, (July 1992), 
<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>, 30; George W. Grayson, “The U.S.-Mexican 
Natural Gas Deal and What We Can Learn From It,” Orbis (Fall 1980), 586; “México-EU: Senadores 
contra el crédito para el gasoducto,” Proceso (No. 51), 24 October 1977, 49; Robert A. Pastor and Jorge G. 
Castañeda. Limits to Friendship: The United States and Mexico (New York: Knopf, 1988), 101. 
126 Schlesinger worried about the impact of the $2.60 price tag and believed that pairing the gas 
price to fuel oil, which is “volatile and subject to manipulation by OPEC,” subjecting U.S. prices to a 
global market price set by OPEC, and one liable to unpredictable change.  Finally, the possible problems 
stemming from a change of Mexican presidential to the next also posed a threat for Schlesinger, who 
believed the length of the gas deal should be set for twenty years to avoid disruption. Despite official 
opposition to the private sector’s gas deal, Mexican authorities preceded.  Some speculate that the gas 
companies convinced López Portillo or his energy minister, “perhaps with some material inducements,” 
that Carter would back down and approve the deal. George W. Grayson, “The U.S.-Mexican Natural 
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López Portillo, people like Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr. believed Carter’s policies 
toward the region alienated Argentina and Brazil, and detracted from advancing 
strategic relations with Mexico.127  In that sense, the pressure on the Carter 
administration to reach an oil deal in the midst of an energy crisis required that the U.S. 
government negotiate cautiously with the government, further constraining any pressure 
on human rights violations that could antagonize López Portillo.   
Meanwhile, the Mexican press projected nationalist anxieties over the expected 
U.S.-Mexico oil talks.  Between May and December 1977, cartoonist Rogelio Naranjo 
drew numerous political sketches featuring the perceived threats of a gas deal between a 
devious “Uncle Sam” and Mexican leaders, along with his signature image of a poorly 
dressed and malnourished campesino as the ultimate casualty of the energy negotiations.  
The cartoons themselves illustrated particular stages of the negotiations, starting with 
“Debajo del agua” (Under the Water) in which a big bellied Mexican in mariachi attire 
fished across from a hunched back and big-nosed Uncle Sam (see Illustration 6.1).128  
The next featured a technocrat with vampire fangs whose horns derived from a two 
graphics, one featuring a downfall in the national economy and one on with a sharp rise 
in the production of petroleum—and in his desk a fallen woman symbolizing the patria, 
the homeland (see Illustration 6.2).129  In another López Portillo played a violin and 																																																																																																																																																																		
Gas Deal and What We Can Learn From It,” Orbis (Fall 1980), 587-589; Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter 
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<http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>, 30. 
127 Letter, Raúl Roel Martínez to Director General de Asuntos Diplomáticos, 8 June 1978, 
Annex: James Cary, “Danger of ‘Losing the Continent’: Gen. Sumner Warns U.S. Of Latin America 
Neglect,” The San Diego Union, 2 June 1978, A5.  Embassy Dispatches, Mexico-United States, III-3345-3. 
Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada.  Acervo Histórico Diplomático.  Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 
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128 The men on the ledge had both caught something; the mariachi pulled an oil derrick while 
Uncle Sam fished a “prestamos” (loans) submarine with a claw grabber that reached for the Mexican’s 
derrick Naranjo, “Debajo del agua,” Proceso (No. 28), 16 May 1977, 5. 
129 Naranjo, “Gráfica simétrica,” Proceso (No. 30), 30 May 1977, 4.   
	 401 
asked for a collection in dollars (see Illustration 6.3).130  Between September and 
October the cartoonist proceeded with illustrations on U.S. interests in Mexico’s 
growing oil infrastructure, particularly the gasoducto (see Illustrations 6.4 to 6.10).131  
Finally, Naranjo concluded 1977 with cartoons on restrictions placed on Mexico by the 
International Monetary Fund and the practical sell-off of oil at a very cheap price.132  
While other cartoonist like Magú and Ruis also explored the question of gas in their 
work, Naranjo’s often heavy-handed cartoons best exemplified the distrust and 
uneasiness toward the Mexican government’s dealings with the United States and the 
gasoducto project, a reflection of a nationalist ideology protective of its emblematic 
natural resource whose ownership went to the state in 1938.133  Most importantly, 
however, the images revealed Mexican’s reservations about its newfound economic 
relationship with the United States, the implications behind an expanding relationship 
with the outside world, and the gradual erosion of a key pillar of Revolutionary 
nationalism: oil.  
Interestingly enough, the press coverage on President Carter and the oil 																																																								
130 In this illustration López Portillo plays a violin in which the string half of the instrument was 
made-up of an oil derrick, and with a music book titled “Primer Informe,” a term referring to the President’s 
government report to Congress given every September 1.  The title “Paganini” implies “pay up” in the first 
half of the term “nini” alluding stereotypically to a famed composition or composer’s name suffix—and 
there López Portillo awaits contribution in a bucket with the sign “Only Dollars.  Thank you.” In this 
cartoon Naranjo is making reference to the President’s first Informe, which was marred with discussions of 
the gasoducto.  Naranjo, “Paganini,” Proceso (No. 44), Proceso (No. 44), 5. 
131 In September Naranjo drew “Cactus” in which he featured the pipeline as essentially North 
American-owned and safeguarded.  By October 1977, the famed cartoonist continued to feature U.S. 
interests in Mexico’s growing oil infrastructure, particularly the gasoducto, followed by another titled 
“Suicidio” (Suicide) featuring Díaz Serrano and a skeletal campesino on the edge of a magic rabbit hat—
along with an oil barrel tied to the energy baron’s neck and the campesinos ankle. Naranjo, “Cactus,” 
Proceso (No. 46), 19 September 1977, 5; Naranjo, “Cliente natural,” Proceso (No. 48), 3 October 1977, 5; 
Naranjo, “Espontáneo,” Proceso (No. 51), 24 October 1977, 5. 
132 In these comics López Portillo attempts to navigate the IMF’s instructions, while the final year 
depiction showed a Christmas tree in the shape of an oil derrick titled “Ganga” or bargain, with a sign 
announcing cheap prices on all existing stock and home delivery service. Naranjo, “Guía practica,” Proceso 
(No. 57), 5 December 1977, 5; Naranjo, “Ganga,” Proceso (No. 58), 12 December 1977, 5. 
133 Magú, “Somos independientes,” Proceso (No. 48), 3 October 1977, 37;  
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negotiations also disseminated term “human rights” into the country’s print media. Díaz 
Serrano consistently and for the most part successfully countered any charges against 
PEMEX or its pipeline project and shamed the “bad Mexicans” who opposed gas 
ventures due to a supposed threat to state sovereignty.134  Díaz Serrano maintained that 
Carter’s global commitment to the human rights cause safeguarded Mexico from any 
possible wrongdoing on the part of the United States. On several occasions, Díaz 
Serrano refuted leftists who argued the gas deal made the country vulnerable to a U.S. 
invasion if their gas supply was under threat on the basis that he trusted in “the 
philosophy raised by President Carter and his great concern for human rights.”  
According to Díaz Serrano, such philosophy served as a guarantee that the United 
States and Mexico could “work in peace,” this he expressed in his appearance in the 
Cámara de Diputados.135  While in Cosoleacaque, Veracruz, he again deemed the 
possibility of territorial aggression by the United States in defense of the gasoducto as 
senseless because the country “has proven to be the key Human Rights defender.”  
Again he stressed Carter’s global human rights crusade as an assurance the country 
posed no threat of intervention. “In terms of physical aggression, I think in a world that 
is so concerned with human rights and in which the largest and most powerful country 
on earth makes a cult of the defense of human rights,” claimed Díaz Serrano, “I don’t 
think it would be sensible to think they will territorially attack.”  Rather than risking 
																																																								
134 In October, Díaz Serrano answered questions in the Cámara de Diputados or the lower house of 
Congress, on the various charges published by Proceso incriminating PEMEX and its dealings with private 
contractors linked to the Cactus-Reynosa gasoducto. Elías Chávez, “Dos días de sesiones: Los diputados, 
convencidos por Díaz Serrano,” Proceso (No. 52), 31 October 1977, 10-11; Heberto Castillo, “La CIA 
informa: México proveerá hasta 4.5 millones de barriles diarios de petróleo en 1985,” Proceso (No. 52), 31 
October 1977, 12; “Energéticos: El gasoducto nos liberará, opina Díaz Serrano,” Proceso (No. 52), 31 
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(No. 52), 31 October 1977, 11. 
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Mexican sovereignty through the growing bilateralism with the United States, the 
PEMEX leader believed the projected gasoducto annual revenue of $2,000 million dollars 
would mean economic independence for Mexico.136  Meanwhile, the president’s global 
human rights policies helped forged an image of internationalism and well-founded 
cooperation as opposed to unilateralism that helped leaders like Díaz Serrano dispel 
fears of U.S. military aggression; although unexpectedly, this was precisely the outcome 
Carter hoped for when it came to U.S.-Latin American relations.  
 
A Final Attempt: Preparing Carter’s Trip to Mexico 
 Despite various attempts at an oil agreement, the Carter-López Portillo 
relationship reached a new low by 1979.  Even though Carter had hoped to improve 
relations with the region, including brushing up on his Spanish with lessons at the White 
House, a stalemate prevailed in U.S.-Mexico relations in his third year.137  By 1979, the 
optimism of early 1977 had faded away; particularly troubling for Carter was the 
manner in which López Portillo negotiated with private enterprises, along with Energy 
Secretary Schlesinger’s reluctance to settle on a gas deal.  Moreover, by 1978 the 
Mexican government had adopted a nationalist strategy whereby the gas previously 
destined for the United States would be used locally and particularly to advance 
industry—all as though nothing had been lost or wasted in the construction of a pipeline 
configured primarily to supply its northern neighbor.  Still, and as early as August 1978, 
the U.S. government initiated preparations for Carter’s February 1979 trip to Mexico—
this with a major review of U.S.-Mexico Relations through a Presidential Review 																																																								
136 “Energéticos: El gasoducto nos liberará, opina Díaz Serrano,” Proceso (No. 52), 31 October 
1977, 26. 
137 Peter G. Bourne, “Jimmy Carter: A Profile,” Yale Review 72 (Oct. 1982), 129. 
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Memorandum (PRM-41) designed “to reverse previous U.S. neglect of policy issues 
between the two countries and to correct past problems…”138  According to Pastor, 
PRM-41 proved the longest high-level review of U.S. government policies toward 
Mexico ever conducted, and one that involved fourteen federal agencies and “three 
cabinet-level NSC meetings.”  The number of participants often complicated reaching a 
consensus; nevertheless, the recommendations served as the basis for the U.S. approach 
toward Mexico for the remainder of the Carter years.  The review was meant to be kept 
secret, but portions of it invariably leaked out.139  By October 1978 it had become 
evident that two issues dominated U.S.-Mexico relations, at least for the Carter 
government: immigration and energy.  The inter-agency group reviewed U.S. policy 
toward Mexico for immediate and long-term policies and the State Department as the 
responsible entity for drafting the findings identified two key policy issues that would 
“require decision,” one of which sought to define if Carter’s government would revise 
immigration legislation for undocumented immigrants and “a strategy for natural gas 
negotiations.”  Not surprisingly, perhaps, negotiations for the revival or reinstatement of 
a worker program disappeared somewhere along the way.140   
 From November until the February 1979 visit, Carter’s staff strategized on an oil 
deal and evaluated Mexican feelings toward the trip.  In early November, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski sent James Schlesinger a memo on the need to develop a coherent strategy 
for Carter to negotiate not only on natural gas, but also oil.  Given the earlier problem 																																																								
138 “PRM-41 and the great Mexican oil grab,” Executive Intelligence Review 5:42 (Oct. 31-Nov. 6, 
1978), 37.  
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York: Knopf, 1988), 102-105. 
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of negotiations with private companies, Brzezinski suggested “We will not only want to 
be clear on our objectives, but also on our tactics both with regard to U.S. companies 
and regulatory agencies and Mexico.”  The National Security Advisor emphasized that 
the strategy should be developed within the guidelines and context of the PRM-41, 
meaning a multilateral approach that did not antagonize the Mexican government, 
since Schlesinger had already received most the blame for the outcome of the 1977 
failed negotiations.141  Moreover, Deputy Assistant to the President for 
Communications, Greg Schneiders, together with Carter’s chief speechwriter, Rick 
Hertzberg, made a trip to Mexico for three days to evaluate the official and the public’s 
feelings toward the U.S. president’s set for February 14.  Jerry Rafshoon, the Assistant 
to the President for Communications, summarized for Carter the overall impression 
based on Schneider’s and Hertzberg’s interviews with “Mexican and American officials 
(including Ambassador Lucey and his staff), journalists, writers and other cultural 
figures, Mexican pollsters and some plain folks about your visit.”  Rafshoon had 
recommendations for both public and private conversations, and publicly Carter’s goal 
was to “win the hearts of the Mexican people” through his televised address to 
Congress.142  Rafshoon wrote to Carter that Mexicans “overwhelmingly believed” the 
United States does “not treat them fairly,” adding that their attitude toward the 
president was “divided and somewhat negative.”  The poll results confirmed the former 
assertion, namely, that “Mexicans respect our competence but doubt our compassion . . 
. [t]hey suspect that you are visiting them now only because they have become energy-																																																								
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Carter Presidential Library. 
142 Memo, Jerry Rafshoon to The President, “Trip to Mexico,” 5 February 1979, 2/14/79-
2/16/79—Mexico [Trip] RH; Box 41, Records of the Speechwriters Office, Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library. 
	 406 
rich.”143  The latter feelings about Mexico’s oil and the Carter’s interests in the energy 
source consistently appeared in Siempre and Proceso news reports before, during, and after 
Carter’s trip.  Finally, Carter’s Communication Assistant concluded with: “They are 
justifiably proud people and bristle at what they see as North American condescension 
towards and ignorance of Mexico.”144  Given the observations, Carter’s team prepared 
and made concerted efforts to approach the Mexican president and the country’s 
peoples with respect in an attempt to distance themselves from decades of U.S. 
imperialistic tendencies.   
 Rafshoon provided Carter with sound recommendations, at times taking lessons 
from Pope John Paul II’s trip to Mexico.  Early on, Carter decided he wanted to speak 
to Congress in Spanish, and as such he would be the first U.S. president to do so, and 
much hinged on this single act.  “In our judgment this will be the one opportunity to 
make the trip not just a success but a triumph,” a proud moment for Mexicans, U.S. 
citizens, and Spanish-speaking peoples in the United States, believed Rafshoon.  “It will 
be a dramatic demonstration of your respect for the Mexican people and their heritage 
and of your determination to treat them as equals,” just as the Pope’s own discourses 
had demonstrated.  John Paul II had traveled to Mexico just a month prior to Carter, 
and had delivered several speeches phonetically in Spanish. Carter’s communications 
advisor believed the language had played a bigger role in impressing Mexicans than the 
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content itself.145  He also suggested Carter keep the speech short, something between 
twelve and fifteen minutes, and he added: “It should contain explicit discussion of the 
biggest bilateral issues—especially energy and immigration—but its major thrust should 
be to put Mexican-Americans relations in a new and brighter historical and emotional 
context.”  Rafshoon also warned against going into the specifics of the issues discussed.  
In order to guarantee the success of the delivery, Carter’s advisor sent tapes of previous 
speeches given in Spanish to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico for employees to evaluate, 
and they concluded the president’s Spanish was “readily understandable” but lagged in 
“rhythm and intonation.”  His communications advisor recommended special recording 
of his speech for Carter to practice through listening and repeating.  Finally, he ended 
with: “By the way, Rosalynn is perceived universally as a tremendous asset.  We are 
going to try to arrange for her to be seen as much as possible conversing in Spanish with 
some Mexican people.”146  By February 5, 1979, Carter was set for his trip to Mexico; 
his speech to Congress loomed as one of the greatest challenges, one that his advisors 
hoped would help bridge negotiations between both countries and show the president’s 
knowledge of and respect for Mexico.  Others worried the address could go badly. 
 Meanwhile, the Mexican journalists, intellectuals, and commentators speculated 
on the motives of President Carter’s trip to Mexico.  The U.S. news roundups in early 
February revealed several concerns by Mexican writers, mostly in reaction to the 
suspected gas negotiations that would take place with Carter in Mexico, and these 
expressed a nationalist fear of a threat to sovereignty.  The writer of El Heraldo’s column 																																																								
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“Entre empresarios” (between businessmen) wondered about the real reason for Carter’s 
visit.  El Día reported on scheduled demonstrations by the Mexico’s Socialist Party at 
the Cárdenas Monument with the theme of “Carter, our sovereignty is not for sale.”  
Commentators in El Universal and Excélsior worried that Carter’s oil policies would widen 
the technological gap between Mexico and the United States, with journalist Oscar 
González López noting the visit would be used to further the interests of those seeking to 
make Mexico more economically dependent on its northern neighbor through the 
promotion of a system of free enterprise—a model seen as the solution to the country’s 
economic woes by some.  González López encouraged Mexicans to stick together to 
“ensure that Mexico will not always be a supplier of cheap raw materials and labor for 
the United States.”  La Prensa, Unomásuno, and El Universal included articles on the 
Chicano campaign to be indemnified for land lost during the reign of Antonio López de 
Santa Ana; on protests in San Isidro (California) in response to the treatment of 
undocumented workers; and on Latino farmworkers seeking to get migrants on the 
Carter-López Portillo agenda.  Heberto Castillo represented the workers, who warned 
that the Pope’s visit (“the maximum spiritual representative of the Western economic 
system”) followed that of Carter’s (“the maximum representative of the world economic 
power”)—a leader who “comes for oil and gas and to maintain his hegemony.”  Castillo 
warned laborers: “He will fulfill his objective if we workers do not act.”  Meanwhile, 
Luis Spota in his column “Picaporte” in El Heraldo warned that U.S. “secret agents” in 
Mexico worked to capture delinquents and drug traffickers and demanded that Attorney 
General Oscar Flores explain why such “agents are permitted” to operate in such 
manner.   While criticisms varied, the majority of them reflected suspicion and anxiety 
toward a possible renunciation of oil and gas negotiations, and a dependence on 
	 409 
revenues from raw materials that stumped industrialization projects. The anti-Carter 
sentiments expressed in the press alerted the president’s staff to the emotional depth of 
the controversy that awaited his arrival.147 
Even so, Carter and his team boarded Air Force One on Valentine’s Day at 7:00 
a.m. en route to Mexico City.  The timing could hardly have been worse.  President 
Carter, his National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Vance dealt 
with several problems abroad, including the assassination of the U.S. Ambassador to 
Afghanistan and an Iranian attempt on the U.S. Embassy.148  Even so, the trip 
continued as planned.  The president arrived at the Mexico City airport around 11:50 
a.m. and made it to the National Palace around 12:10 p.m.149  From the first meeting 
with the Mexican president, Carter viewed the Diego Rivera murals in the corridor 
walls of the National Palace and from there he made his way to the Foreign Ministry for 
a formal luncheon with López Portillo and his wife Carmen Romano—a luncheon 
marred by confrontational remarks from the Mexican leader.150  According to Pastor, 
the two presidents met twice for presidential conversation on both days of the visit, in 
meetings that lasted more than three hours and where Carter found himself “repeatedly 
frustrated by his inability to elicit a comment specific enough from López Portillo to 
permit some progress or agreement.”151  Meanwhile, López Portillo used the trip as a 																																																								
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nationalist platform to shame Carter and expose the abusiveness of the United States, in 
defense against criticism of his weakness toward the United States.  For journalist Ayala 
Anguiano, “Carter received a treatment of something between discourteous and 
coarse.”152  Both Anguiano and Pastor noted the criticisms against Carter for allowing 
López Portillo to scold him, which the press took to further the image of a weak chief 
executive—despite the agreements reached on the second day, which received little 
coverage.153  Anguiano goes even further to say that López Portillo “contributed to 
weakening Carter and strengthening the electoral triumph of Ronald Reagan, for whom 
López Portillo ended up being a common Latin American puppet.”154  Nevertheless, 
conservatives looked to further relations with Mexico on matters of oil and also foster 
the notion that Carter was a weak leader.  Despite the hostile treatment, Carter 
proceeded courteously in an attempt to reach concrete accords and salvage the U.S.-
Mexico relationship in the midst of unfolding events in Afghanistan, Iran, and Central 
America.  
 The following day talks went somewhat better.  Carter left Ambassador Lucey’s 
residency for Los Pinos around 8:45 a.m. and discussions began around 9:00 a.m. until 
around 1:00 p.m.155 According to Pastor, on February 15 “López Portillo accepted 
direct government-to-government negotiations on natural gas.  In addition, the two 
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presidents agreed on several projects, such as electricity exchanges on the border.”156  
Thereafter, key leaders headed by helicopter to the town of Ixtlilco el Grande in the 
state of Morelos where the presidential couple visited a farming community and saw an 
irrigation pump that was part of the Program for Integrated Rural Development.  Later 
that day Carter gave a speech in Spanish to those gathered in the town square and 
expressed his gratitude to those he met, like the Sánchez farming family, and conveyed 
his admiration for the advancements he saw in the countryside.  “You showed me some 
of the finest tomatoes and onions and corn and cantaloupes and watermelons and rice 
that I have ever seen,” said the president.  Drawing connections from his own farming 
background he added: “And you have showed me your peanuts.  As you know, I have 
been a peanut farmer for much longer than I have been a president—and the peanuts of 
Ixtlilco el Grande look just as good as the ones on my own farm.”157  In the evening, the 
Mexican and U.S. Delegations made their way to the City Theater (Teatro de la Ciudad 
Esperanza Iris) in Mexico City’s historic center where the Mexican Symphony Orchestra 
performed, with no less a person than Leonard Bernstein conducting.  The evening 
concluded with the traditional dinner in honor of the Mexican president and his wife.  
Customary and official socializing marred most the events on February 15 between 
Mexican and U.S. delegates; nevertheless, all was ready for Carter’s final act the 
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following morning: his address to the Mexican Congress.158  
 Carter ended his trip with a speech before Congress at 10:25 a.m. Despite some 
hesitation on the matter, the president spoke in Spanish.159  After a brief discussion on 
the language, Carter proceeded with a quote by Octavio Paz, as suggested by Brzezinski 
who in a memo referred to the poet as “Mexico’s greatest living man of letters.”  The 
security advisor added: “His statement vividly articulates the feelings of all Mexicans 
about the U.S.  There could be no better way to catch their attention, and to prove that 
you have heard them, than to lead with that quotation.”  The president’s 
communications assistant Rafshoon did not like the quote, which he deemed 
condescending, Brzezinski later wrote.160  Paz’s writing depicts the United States as a 
giant luring Mexico on, but concludes that if that neighbor happens to listen the 
“possibility of coexistence” emerges—representative of Carter’s goal to forge a new 
sense of friendship between Mexico and the United States.161  “My friends, I have come 
to Mexico to listen.”  Carter underscored the shared history between both countries and 
the cooperation deals that had taken place during his and López Portillo’s 
administrations.  He hoped for another meeting during the upcoming summer to keep 
resolving remaining problems.  On immigration matters the president underscored his 
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responsibility to uphold the law, yet he promised to do so in a humane manner and 
protecting the basic human rights of those within national borders, citizens or not.  
When he discussed energy resources, he noted: “We understand clearly that Mexican oil 
resources are the national patrimony of the Mexican people, to be developed and used 
and sold as Mexico sees fit.”  Carter also stated the U.S. government’s intentions to buy: 
“As a good customer, we are prepared to pay a fair and just price for the gas and oil that 
you may wish to sell.”  The president wanted to make it clear that the Mexican 
government decided how to manage and sell their natural resources, and the United 
States was merely a customer—an explicit response to the numerous criticisms in the 
national press implying the sole reason for the trip was gas and the aggressive and 
domineering nature of Mexico’s northern neighbor in pushing energy negotiations.  
Finally, Carter discussed talks of reducing barriers on trade for “a future in which more 
trade flows freely between our countries . . .” and a reality that unfolded in subsequent 
sexenios.162  The seemingly successful 48-hour trip for mending relations and resuming 
gas negotiations eventually led to a gas deal, but the Iran crisis appeared to detract from 
greater cooperation between the United States and Mexico.163  
 Not long after, relations between the Carter and the López Portillo 
administrations reached a new low.  According to Pastor, “Carter did not return with a 
warmer feeling for López Portillo,” but at least “his sense of importance of Mexico was 
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strengthened.”164  That perception probably led to Carter seeking asylum for the 
deposed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Shah of Iran) in Mexico, an act that further 
damaged U.S.-Mexico relations.  In reality it had been Henry Kissinger and David 
Rockefeller who sought out a place for the Shah after he left the Bahamas, and as such, 
the leader arrived in Mexico City that June and settled in the outskirts of the city of 
Cuernavaca, in the state of Morelos.  In an interview, the Shah thanked the country he 
had visited in 1975 and stated he was uncertain how long he would remain in 
Mexico.165  But on October 22, 1979 the Shah left Mexico to seek treatment at the New 
York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center.166  On November 4, Iranians seized the U.S. 
embassy, further complicating the Shah’s stay in the United States.  According to 
Carter, the Shah had responded well to the radium treatment he received in New York 
and was ready to return to Mexico.  However, on November 29 at 6:30 p.m. Secretary 
of State Vance telephoned Carter letting him know that the “Mexicans” had changed 
their minds about letting the Shah back into the country.  In his diary, Carter noted, 
“López Portillo is not a man of his word.”  And added: “I was outraged.”  The president 
could not make sense of the change of mind given that the Mexican government had no 
personnel in Iran, nor did they have interests in oil from the country, and López Portillo 
had assured Carter the Shah could return.  Without warning, “apparently the President 
of Mexico had simply changed his mind at the last minute,” wrote Carter.  “It was a 
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serious blow.”167  Instead of making it back to Mexico, the Shah arrived in Panama.168  
According to Pastor, no other incident affected Carter’s “feelings toward the Mexican 
president as much or as adversely as López Portillo’s decision on the Shah.”169  Mexico’s 
refusal to open its doors to the Shah drove a deep wedge between a preoccupied Carter 
and the López Portillo administration—an act of defiance on the part of the Mexican 
president that still raises questions regarding why he shunned his northern neighbor at a 
critical time of need—perhaps an act of retaliation for failing to agree on a gas deal in 
1977.  
  
“New Sense of Partnership”170: Oil, Not Human Rights 
 By late 1979 the brief, new-found friendship had officially ended.  Even while 
Carter became even more occupied with the happenings in Iran, he still made a cordial 
attempt to dissipate negative feelings about his trip.  When asked a leading question by a 
top TV presenter, Joaquín López-Dóriga—“Mr. President, would you tell us, please; 
what is the main purpose of your visit to Mexico?  Oil, gas, only gas or altogether?”—
Carter sought to reverse the nationalistic fervor against the United States and one 
heightened by the refusal to accept the $2.60 gas price.171  Even when López Portillo 
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publicly harangued the U.S. government, Carter consistently reiterated Mexico’s 
autonomy in the matter: “We want to be customers to purchase both oil and natural gas 
and we want to be good customers.”  In terms of prices, he added, “We want to pay a 
fair price and those prices will be negotiated in good faith with very careful attention 
paid to the sensitivities and the needs of the people of Mexico and to the needs of our 
own country as well.”172  Despite all the political verbiage and provocative 
simplifications, however, the situation was deeply complex, and from the start reflected 
a wide variety of motives.  In many ways, Carter’s treatment of López Portillo did 
indeed reflect his attempt to forge more amicable relations with Latin Americans and 
ease rising sentiments against the United States.  His good intentions, however, revealed 
he lacked real knowledge of the region or the social movements that unfolded.  And in 
this case, well-intended words failed to win the day.  Despite the proposed “plan for 
government-to-government talks” on future energy exchanges, an increased sense of 
anti-Americanism prevailed in Mexico—including student protests with slogans like 
“Cuba si: Yankee no” that demanded the president leave.173  The media coverage in the 
United States proved equally critical.  Greg Schneiders, the Deputy Assistant to the 
President for Communications, sent a note to Jerry Rafshoon in which he expressed his 
frustrations with U.S. media coverage of Carter’s visit.  “We have gotten pretty 
consistently negative press on the Mexico trip which is totally unjustified on the basis of 
the results,” he wrote.  Schneiders hoped Rafshoon could contact experienced 																																																								
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journalists like Scotty Reston and Joe Kraft, who were both in Mexico, and have them 
“discuss how badly the trip has been distorted by people who did not follow it closely 
and who know next to nothing about Mexican-American relations.”174  It was precisely 
the two nations’ friendship that Carter sought to salvage, even at the cost of seeming 
weak before López Portillo and the North American public; yet privately the president 
sought diplomatic solutions—perhaps an approach that cost him a significant amount of 
political clout.  
 In matters of human rights in Mexico, Carter himself often felt conflicted, and 
word of those feelings occasionally leaked.  Journalist Fred Barnes captured Carter’s trip 
response toward Mexico: “President Carter has privately chided Mexican President 
Jos[é] L[ó]pez Portillo for criticizing the United States, but publicly he is taking the 
approach that relations between the two countries are moving along amicably.”175  In 
the same manner, Carter approached the Mexico’s leader about human rights 
violations, initially with a direct proposal for the implementation of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, an initiative he and First Lady Rosalynn lobbied for in 
Latin America.176  On more serious charges of political violence or corruption, Carter 
could not shame Mexico publicly nor add its southern neighbor to the list of foes—that 
would have resulted in yet another and perhaps even greater problems in terms of 
diplomatic relations, commercial ties, and national security.  Harvard Professor Stanley 
Hoffmann best explained the human rights dilemma of selecting which countries to 																																																								
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shame and which to ignore in terms of abuses.  “If the United States is too selective 
about which countries to denounce, it risks becoming hypocritical (for instance, if it 
singles out only its foes and spares its friends).”  But, “If it pursues the cause of human 
rights everywhere, in an almost crusading manner, that is likely to be a highly self-
destructive ordeal.”177  The Panama treaty meetings served as one of various forums in 
which Carter talked human rights with South American leaders.  In the September 7, 
1977 meeting the president spoke with several leaders, including Argentina’s Jorge 
Videla, Uruguay’s Aparicio Méndez, and in Washington he spoke with Chile’s Augusto 
Pinochet and Paraguay’s Alfredo Stroessner.178  López Portillo defied Carter by not 
attending the ceremony, even when the U.S. president called him and asked that he 
reconsider attending.  The Mexican leader declined on the pretext that the meeting was 
too close to the day of his Informe Presidencial, also in September.179  According to Peter 
Bourne, “Carter did discuss human rights with L[ó]pez Portillo but the Panama Canal 
and corruption were the highest priorities.”180  Like Hoffman, Bourne recognizes the 
Carter administration’s knowledge of Mexico rights context; however, “Carter did not 
want it to look as though he was attacking all the countries in Latin America,” especially 
when he needed support for the treaties.181  Given that the State Department did not 
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see Mexico as a priority country in matters of human rights, and because Carter’s 
priorities in Latin America lay heavily on the Panama treaties, Mexico avoided 
international scrutiny on its repressive measures.   
 The fact that international organizations and the Carter administration spared 
Mexico a public shunning did not go unnoticed.  A Stockholm independent liberal 
paper, Dagens Nyheter, published a February 16 editorial of Carter’s treatment toward 
Mexico, in which the leader thought it “necessary to create good relations on a more 
equal basis” in order to improve relations.  The writer added, “But Mexico has the same 
dark sides as the rest of Latin America.  When Carter praises Mexico’s respect for 
human rights, it easily sounds a bit out of tune considering how miserably insecure the 
Mexican Revolution has let life remain for millions of people who are without any 
influence or voice…”182  Despite countless efforts, including those of Ambassador 
Lucey, to counter the idea that U.S. interests lay solely on gas and that Carter’s human 
rights approach toward Mexico were tainted by his own priorities, those notions could 
not be dispelled, in part because while much of the human-rights initiative was doubtless 
sincere, oil nevertheless did play a key role in U.S.-Mexico relations in the 1970s.183  
Yet, few could deny the ability for both countries to work together on drug eradication.  
Carter described the cooperation on the matter as “one of the most exciting and 
gratifying experience” since being president.  He believed that “The cooperation there 
has been superb and there has been a drastic reduction in the trafficking of drugs across 																																																																																																																																																																		
October 2015, E-mail. 
182 Media Reaction Watch-list, U.S. Embassy in Stockholm to Washington, “Media Reaction: 
President Carter’s Mexico Trip,” 16 February 1979, p. 2 Files: February 14-17, 199, Part II, Mexico 
Trip; Box 1, Speech Files, Hendrik Hertzberg, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
183 “Well, the visit is solely to deal with energetics, or solely to deal with gas, or solely to deal with 
migration.” Address, “Ambassador Lucey’s Meeting with Members of Club de Columnistas,” Mexico 
City, 12 December 1978. Files: February 14-17, 199, Part II, Mexico Trip; Box 1, Speech Files, Hendrik 
Hertzberg, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
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the border.”184  Yet, on matters of human rights and unlike Augusto Pinochet, both 
Echeverría and López Portillo cared deeply about the image projected abroad.185  
López Portillo prided himself on liberating political prisoners through his Amnesty Law.  
In other instances he claimed to be a defender of human rights by shaming South 
American dictatorships and welcoming political refugees from the region, and in some 
cases welcomed Amnesty International even while failing to accept its findings.  As 
Bourne rightfully notes, “The Mexican government was, and always has been, very 
skilled at handling the public relations of human rights in the international arena.”186  
Even while two of his administration’s top leaders, Jorge Díaz Serrano and Mexico 
City’s Chief of Police Arturo “El Negro” Durazo, eventually paid the price for a 
repressive and corrupt administration, the long-term consequences of placing economic 
and political interests in U.S.-Mexico relations above those of human rights have been 
long-lasting and have contributed to the institutionalization of a system immune to 
reform.187 
 Nevertheless, U.S.-Mexico negotiations during the López Portillo and Carter 
administrations also reveal the cooperation that put Mexico on the path to economic 
liberalization.  In the early phase of the relationship, Carter helped the Mexican 
government regain the trust of banking institutions both in the United States and 
abroad.  As a result, Mexico pursued a market for its newly found oil reserves and 																																																								
184 Interview, “Interview With The President By Jacobo Zabludovsky, Televisa,” 8 February 
1979, 2/8/1979—Interview—Jacobo Zabludovsky, Televisa Mexico, Map Room; Box 40, Records of the 
Speechwriters Office, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
185 “Chile, no mendiga el aplauso ni el favor internacional de nadie, por lo cual no modifica ni 
modificará el rumbo que soberanamente se ha trazado.” “Proceso Internacional: América Latina-EU: 
Carter pasa revista,” Proceso (No. 46), 19 September 1977, 40-42. 
186 Peter Bourne, “Re: Questions on your visits to Mexico,” Message from Ariana Quezada, 10 
October 2015, E-mail. 
  187 On the corruption scandal of Díaz Serrano and Durazo see: Manuel Buendía, Los petroleros 
(México, D.F.: Océano; Fundación Buendía, 1985) and José González G., Lo Negro del negro Durazo 
(México, D.F.: Posada, 1984). 
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became subject to the reforming policies of the International Monetary Fund, including 
economic liberalization, deregulation, limits on public spending and tariff reductions.  
Meanwhile, the U.S. government and private enterprises sought greater economic 
engagement with Mexico, but not exclusively in relation to energy resources.  Yet, by 
the end of 1977, the López Portillo jockeyed with nationalist rhetoric in response to the 
failed negotiations for gas, but by 1979 and 1980 he transformed his cabinet with a 
group of technocrats far more willing to find solutions to Mexico’s economic woes in 
free market economics.188  As such, López Portillo routed Mexico’s path away from the 
project of state-driven development and negotiated industrialization toward one 
espousing private enterprise, foreign investment, and the slimming down of state.  In 
this economic and political context, individual conceptions of rights as espoused by 
international organizations like Amnesty International and Jimmy Carter’s human 
rights—which placed civil and political rights above economic protections—took root.  
No other NGO and no other U.S. president disseminated individual rights conceptions 
through the language of human rights—guided chiefly by principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights—like Amnesty International and President Jimmy 
Carter.  For victims of political repression in countries like Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay, the human rights crusade cemented a powerful network of people working 
against the apparatus that kept military governments in power.  In the case of Mexico, 
the government appropriated the language of rights protections as espoused in the 
1970s and avoided international scrutiny and legitimized a state as a protector rather 
																																																								
188 Carlos Tello and Rodolfo Moctezuma resigned, the former a promoter of a state-driven 
economic model and the latter a technocrat in favor of free market economics.  See Rolando Cordera and 
Carlos Tello, México: La disputa por la nación—perspectivas y opciones de desarrollo (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 
1981). 
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than a violator of rights.  However, civil society began to engage with the emerging and 
individualist conceptions of rights rarely used before the 1970s, initially to reproducing 
news on the campaign against South American dictatorships and eventually to shun its 
own government.  The leftist press reproduced the term “human rights” as espoused by 
President James Carter to report on political repression in Latin America, and 
eventually as a weapon of civil society against repressive elements of Mexico’s 
institutions.  Although initially detrimental in advancing institutional change through 
international pressure, human rights eventually inserted local NGO’s to the 
international network—at the cost of group rights previously pursued by state affiliated 
institutions.  In Mexico’s insertion into a neoliberal world system, also came a language 
consonant with a more individually organized way of demanding rights, one that came 
to replace previous conceptions of revolutionary social justice—as such those that came 
into existence with the 1910 Revolution.  
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ILLUS. 7.1.  Rius, “Aniversario,” Proceso (No. 55), 21 November 1977, 37. Dialogue bubble: “I am little 
bit confused, pal: Is it the anniversary of the triumph of the Revolution or the triumph over the 
Revolution?” (Reproduced without permission) 
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CONCLUSION: 
 
The Revolution in Crisis:  
Human Rights in a Neoliberal Mexico  
 
 
“Latin America, so to speak,  
became a testing ground  
for so many universal declarations  
and high-flown human rights mechanisms.” 
--Rodolfo Stavenhagen1 
 
 
In November 1946 the distinguished Mexican intellectual Daniel Cosío Villegas 
published an essay that hit the nation’s elite with all the force of a mortar attack. In “La 
Crisis de México,” or “Mexico’s Crisis,” Cosío opined that “MÉXICO has been 
suffering for some years now a crisis that worsens day by day,” he wrote, “but like in 
cases of a fatal illness in a family, no one talks about it, or does so with a tragically 
unrealistic optimism.”  So what exactly was this illness plaguing the Revolutionary 
family?  He deemed the goals of the Revolution exhausted—“to the extent that the term 
revolution itself lacks meaning,” as he put it.  Social justice dispensed through 
protections for the workers and peasants, and the redistribution of public lands, for 
example, had been compromised.  When the essay reached a wider audience through its 
re-reprint in Excélsior, the public reacted defensively at what it perceived to be an 
unjustifiable assault on nationalism.2  More than anything else, the vociferous response 
proved that many of the ideals generated by the Revolution and their accompanying 
political system was alive and well.  Mexico in the post-war period still very much 																																																								
1 Rodolfo Stavenhagen, “América Latina: Desarrollo y derechos humanos,” Nexos, 1 July 1990 
<http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=5921>. 
2 The essay first appeared in the journal Cuadernos Americanos in April 1947.  Daniel Cosío 
Villegas, “La crisis de México,” Cuadernos americanos, XXXII: 2 (March-April 1947), 29; Enrique Krauze, 
“Daniel Cosío Villegas (1898-1976),” Fondo Aleph—Biblioteca Virtual de Ciencias Sociales, 22 May 2012, 183-
184, <http://aleph.academica.mx/jspui/handle/56789/24709>. 
	 425 
guarded its state sovereignty, and while it briefly looked outward during World War II, 
it soon returned to its tradition of isolationism.  In that sense, when Cosío Villegas 
questioned Mexico’s Revolutionary institutions he stood as a lone voice in a country 
where its people still held the government in high esteem, and the one-party state, in 
that self-same year re-christened as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or by its more 
famous initials, the PRI, reigned unopposed.3 
The words of Cosío Villegas may have seemed dyspeptic in 1946, but they 
gained force and cogency as time went on.  Thirty years later, it become clear that not 
only had the goals of social justice been abandoned but also its accompanying economic 
model.  By the 1970s several intellectuals, including soon-to-be Nobel Prize winner 
Octavio Paz, publicly critiqued the failing project of modernization.  “Here I will only 
repeat that we Mexicans have undertaken various projects of modernization since the 
time of the great Hispanic schism . . . Not only have all these projected proved 
unworkable but they have disfigured us,” he wrote in August 1978.4  At the time of the 
publication, President López Portillo’s “Cambridge boys,” a group of foreign-educated 
economists—José Andrés de Oteyza, Vladimiro Brailovsky, and Carlos Tello—faced a 
declining economic model, one that came to suffer from rampant inflation, peso 
devaluations, trade deficits, and internationally imposed austerity measures.5  Like the 																																																								
3 The essay first appeared in the journal Cuadernos Americanos in April 1947.  Daniel Cosío 
Villegas, “La crisis de México,” Cuadernos Americanos, XXXII: 2 (March-April 1947), 29; Enrique Krauze, 
“Daniel Cosío Villegas (1898-1976),” Fondo Aleph—Biblioteca Virtual de Ciencias Sociales, 22 May 2012, 183-
184, <http://aleph.academica.mx/jspuind /handle/56789/24709>. 
  4 After Paz left Excélsior and his post as the editor of the newspaper’s magazine Plural, he created 
Vuelta.  Many of his writings for these two magazines have been reproduced in texts like El ogro filantrópico.  
Octavio Paz, “El ogro filantrópico,” in El ogro filantrópico (Barcelona: Editorial Seix Barral, 1990), 85-100.  
The English translation has been taken from Octavio Paz, Lysander Kemp, Yara Milos, and Rachel 
Phillips, The Labyrinth of Solitude and Other Writings (New York: Grove Press, 1985), 397.  
5 The trio studied under neo-Keynesian economists Nicholas Kaldor, Ajit Sing, and Joan 
Robinson; the latter dubbed a “Marxist economist.”  In an unprecedented act, Tello resigned from his 
post as Budget and Planning Minister in November 1977 and criticized the austerity measures imposed 
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“Cambridge camarilla,” nationalists remained faithful to public spending and the state-
directed economic project; however, from the context of Paz’s disfigured Mexico ensued 
the competing project of free market economics, that of neoliberalism.6 
 But the story was not entirely declensional.  For while the midcentury vision of a 
brokered, corporate state faltered and the promise of easy petroleum wealth gave way to 
a hard lesson in market vicissitudes, the controversial neo-populist sexenios of Echeverría 
and López Portillo also formed the birthplace of a distinctly Mexican version of human 
rights.  When John P. Humphrey held the 1961 U.N. seminar in Mexico, human rights 
politics did not challenge national sovereignty, nor would the government welcome 
diplomats seeking to monitor its internal workings.  Rather, human rights as promoted 
by an international organ like the United Nations sought to strengthen individual rights 
through legal and constitutional means.  Challenges to state sovereignty over the rights 
of individuals heightened with the rise of independent print sources, and radio to 
television coverage which raised the specter on human suffering, or began what Michael 
Ignatieff referred to as a “revolution of moral concern.”7  NGOs both on the ground 
and internationally disseminated information on human rights violations and pressured 
governments for the release of political prisoners and to adhere to international rights 
covenants.  Moreover, by the mid-1970s, and under pressure to limit its links to 
repressive regimes (particularly in Latin America), the U.S. government appropriated 
and contributed to the globalization of human rights, in this instance through Jimmy 
Carter’s foreign policy.  Amid all the international processes underway promoting 																																																																																																																																																																		
by the International Monetary Fund. Armando Ayala Anguiano, JLP: secretos de un sexenio (Mexico: 
Grijalbo, 1984), 114; Alan Riding, “Director of Mexico’s Central Bank: Carlos Tello Macias,” New York 
Times, 8 September 1982, D1, D4. 
6 Journalist Armando Ayala Anguiano uses the term “Cambridge camarilla,” see JLP: secretos de 
un sexenio (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1984), 114 
  7 See Michael Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2000). 
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human rights, the terms remained obscure and confined to a few groups and to foreign 
policy. 
 However, by the 1980s, human rights proliferated amid demands for 
democratization in Mexico.   The term appeared far more frequently in the press, 
among social organizers and in intellectual circles.  It happened after a decade of 
bourgeoning social uprisings in the country.  After the 1968 student movement, the PRI 
dealt with a legitimacy crisis that soon into a far-reaching critique of almost every aspect 
of Mexican society.  Unlike other Latin American countries, Mexico had lived through 
a social revolution early in the decade whereby it established a system of negotiating 
conflict and dispensing justice through the ruling party.  This unique revolutionary 
system coupled with rapid economic growth had allowed the PRI to enjoy relative 
political stability with minimal internal dissidence or international oversight.  After 1968 
the party struggled to redefine its stronghold amid growing social demands.  As Soledad 
Loaeza rightfully argues “the student movement was the first step towards the 
implementation of the pluralist model and the displacement of corporatism.”8  It was 
therefore from the initial schisms of the Revolutionary corporatist system in the 1970s 
that the term human rights expressions appeared, as evidenced by the publications of 
CENCOS, the discussions in the 1975 IWY Conference, and publications in Proceso.  
Even then, and as Carter’s foreign policy and AI’s campaign reveal, the terms “human 
rights” remained obscure and its meaning limited to civil and political guarantees.  In 
that sense, human rights became the nationalist alternative to armed revolutionary and 
																																																								
8 Soledad Loaeza, “México, 1968: Los orígenes de la transición,” in La Transición interrumpida: 
México 1968-1988, edited by Ilán Semo (México, D.F.: Departamento de Historia, Universidad 
Iberoamericana, 1993), 17. 
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traditional party politics when the PRI embraced neoliberalism and abandoned its 
commitment to Revolutionary social justice.    
 At the same time, the rise of human rights in Mexico remains uniquely linked to 
the legacies of its Revolution, not apart from them.  Unlike other Latin American 
countries, Mexico avoided international scrutiny for its counterrevolutionary tactics 
during its own Dirty War, precisely because of the PRI’s ability to maintain social 
control when leftist revolutionary movements and military dictatorships thrived in 
Central and South America.  The PRI’s relative political stability, its proximity to the 
United States, and the lesser expressions of democratic demands due to its co-optation 
and carrot-and-stick allowed the authoritarian government to maintain control while 
other countries turned to states of siege and large-scale torture regimes.  Most 
international organizations and certainly Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy looked directly 
to the atrocities committed under military dictatorships, and few (if any) international 
NGOs looked to Mexico.  This, coupled with the growing bilateralism, particularly after 
the announcement of oil reserves, and Carter’s attempts to reach a gas deal, initiated a 
tradition in which economic interests in U.S.-Mexico relations have been placed above 
those human rights matters.  A key legacy of international oversight on Mexico’s 
internal repression mechanisms has translated into the absence of both internal and 
external pressure toward significant institutional reform of its justice system as those seen 
in Argentina and Chile after the fall of the dictatorships.  Nevertheless, when individual 
conceptions of rights bourgeoned in Mexico in the late-1970s and 1980s, these 
embodied “the development of a culture of participation led by the values of the middle 
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classes, who have been identified with democratic values.”9  The rise of modern 
democratic expressions projected the triumph of neoliberalism, the disillusionment of 
traditional party politics and armed struggles as an avenue of change, and the crisis of 
Mexico’s Revolution and its corporativism system guiding social, economic, and 
political change.  The history of human rights in Mexico embodies the triumph of 
individual over group rights in the late-1970s and early 1980s at a time when the 
country’s leaders decided between the continuation of economic nationalism and the 
implementation of neoliberal policies, a struggle Tello dubbed “Dispute for the 
Nation.”10  The mere existence of this dispute reveals that within the global history of 
human rights lies a unique narrative of their development at a national level whose 
legacies are conspicuously evident in modern day social movements.  
 In Mexico as elsewhere, concepts of legal rights necessarily existed as part of a 
larger arrangement that very much included economic models.  The country took a 
turn toward free market economics as early as 1978.  Most scholars point to Miguel de 
la Madrid (1982-1988) as the first neoliberal president; however, it was López Portillo 
that in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund pressure to trim down state 
expenditures that streamlined the country for the turn to neoliberal economic policies.  
That came despite the fact that López Portillo nationalized the banking system as a 
response to an overspent economy and placed Tello as the head of the Bank of Mexico, 
all of this as the last nail in the coffin of economic nationalism.  De la Madrid 
immediately disapproved and so began Mexico’s greater engagement with free market 
economics, further eroding corporativist protection.  For example, he stopped 																																																								
9 Soledad Loaeza, “México, 1968: Los orígenes de la transición,” 46. 
  10 Spanish for “Dispute for the Nation.” Rolando Cordera and Carlos Tello, México, la disputa por 
la nación: perspectivas y opciones del desarrollo (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1981), 10. 
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“channeling money and state patronage to trade union and farmer leaders due to the 
shortage of government resources for those areas under neoliberal policies.”11  However, 
civil society engaged with human rights discourses in the absence of a state responsive to 
their needs.  As early as 1984, the Mexican Academy for Human Rights (AMDH) made 
up of intellectuals began publishing scholarly material on human rights conditions in the 
country, including the condition of Guatemalan refugees arriving and settling in 
Mexico.  The newspaper Unomásuno made use of the term as it afforded considerable 
coverage to the Central American crisis.  Most importantly, however, were the 
organizations that arose to fill the role of the state during the destructive 1985 Mexico 
City earthquake.  Perhaps no other 1980s event crystalized the failings of the 
revolutionary party as much as the earthquake, which served as a catalyst for the 
mushrooming of civil organizations.  Finally, the 1988 election signaled and stalled the 
expectations for a democratic and peaceful electoral transition away from one-party 
rule.   
 Unlike South American countries, the Mexican government did not make 
human rights part of its public policy until 1990, in part because it did not have to 
confront a legacy of abuses remotely on the scale of places like Argentina, Brazil, or 
Chile.  After clear electoral fraud, President-elect Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) 
met with members of the Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos (Mexican Academy of 
Human Rights, AMDH), in order to gauge the condition of human rights in the 
country.  These late 1988 discussions led to the creation of a short-lived government 
institution (Dirección General de Derechos Humanos).  Just months after, Human Rights 
																																																								
  11 Ariadna Estévez, Human Rights and Free Trade in Mexico: A Discursive and Sociopolitical Perspective 
(New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 41.  
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Watch published a damaging report on Mexico’s human rights violations.  Salinas, who 
was set on carrying out a free trade agreement during his administration, responded 
quickly and dissolved the earlier commission and created today’s National Human 
Rights Commission, the Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) in June 1990.12  
Initially, the organization seemed promising.  Today the CNDH is one of Latin 
America’s best-funded human rights bureaucracies, yet one with only the ability to 
render recommendations and still unable to legally investigate matters of labor or 
electoral fraud.13  Although the rise of local and state human rights institutions have 
multiplied in the last decades, these remain poorly funded and have little or no official 
links to the national commission.14  Moreover, in recent years Mexico, along with 
countries like Brazil, has attempted to weaken the growing power of the Inter-American 
courts by purposely selecting individuals not specialized in matters of human rights.  It is 
difficult to avoid the suspicion that it has done so in order to reverse the trend toward 
holding the states accountable in the international realm.  While the region experienced 
a rapid expansion of an international system, there now seems to be a reversal and 
subtle return to non-intervention in matters of human rights.  Such efforts further erode 
at the possibilities of justice for Mexicans in the international rights system.15 
																																																								
12 Ellen L. Lutz, Human Rights in Mexico: A Policy of Impunity (New York: Human Rights Watch, 
1990); Ariana Quezada, “El pueblo refugiado”: Guatemalan Refugees and the Emergence of Mexico’s 
Human Rights Discourse,” (M.A. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 2009).  
13 “¿Sirve la protección internacional a periodistas? “Seminario Sobre Violencia y Paz, 21 April 2014 
(COLMEX), <http://violenciaypaz.colmex.mx/index.php/conferencias/2015/sesion-16>. 
14 According to the CNDH’s current president, Luis Raúl González Pérez (2014—) the national 
commission does not have strong links to local and state governmental human rights commissions.  It is 
only when a local complaint reaches the CNDH that often times these local institutions are asked to 
investigate further. See “¿Cómo están los derechos humanos en México? El Ombudsman Nacional 
Opina,” Seminario Sobre Violencia y Paz, 7 July 2015 (COLMEX) 
<http://violenciaypaz.colmex.mx/index.php/conferencias/2015/sesion-18>. 
15 Catalina Botero (Ex-relatora Especial para la Libertad de Expresión Comisión Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos, Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression for the Inter-American 
Commission), “¿Sirve la protección internacional a periodistas?” Seminario Sobre Violencia y Paz, 21 April 
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Nevertheless, great progress has ensued since the 1970s.  The work of human 
rights organizations and their education efforts can be seen in the country; NGOs 
consistently pressure the government for the rights of victims of drug violence by taking 
cases to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (where Mexico presented 
the most cases),16 by proposing legislation, and demanding freedom of the press.  Rights 
activists have learned to negotiate change and pass legislation by working with 
politicians.  That proved the case with the decriminalization of abortion in Mexico City 
(2007), a real transformation in the realm of women’s rights, and an effort that 
succeeded in large part when framed as a matter of public health.17  Meanwhile 
organizations like Institute for Human Rights and Democracy (Instituto de Derechos 
Humanos y Democracia) have started working with the government in order to better 
educate public workers on matters of human rights in an effort to raise consciousness 
and limit abuses.18  Other public initiatives have made government institutions, like the 
Human Rights Commission of the Federal District, more accessible to its public.  
Planning for the relocation of the Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal 
(CDHDF) began under the leadership of Emilio Álvarez Icaza.  Today, the CDHDF is 
located near the metro stop Viveros, and the city has subsequently amended the original 
																																																																																																																																																																		
2014 (COLMEX), <http://violenciaypaz.colmex.mx/index.php/conferencias/2015/sesion-16>. 
16 Noted Emilio Álvarez Icaza, currently the Executive Secretary of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in his March 2015 visit to Mexico.  Previously, Álvarez Icaza 
served as President of Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission from 2001-2009.  He is the son of 
José Álvarez Icaza, the subject of chapter four of this dissertation.  
17 Marta Lamas details the convergence of negotiations that took place between key political 
leaders, local NGOs, and other public figures in order to legalize abortion in Mexico City.  See, El largo 
camino hacia la ILE: Mi versión de los hechos (Mexico City: UNAM, 2015). 
18 Interview with Rocío Culebro (Executive Director of the Instituto de Derechos Humanos y 
Democracia), 14 July 2014 (Mexico City). 
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name to included Derechos Humanos or Human Rights.19  The advances in human rights 
matters and conscious building can indeed be seen, although primarily in urban areas. 
Meanwhile, the upsurge of organized crime has further complicated the social 
rights milieu in urban and narco-dominated regions.  The state of Veracruz, an oil 
region, has seen the rise of drug violence.  Under the leadership of Javier Duarte 
(2010—) Veracruz has been labeled as one of the most dangerous places in the world for 
journalists.20  Between 2015 and 2016 the State of Mexico and Jalisco have declared a 
femicide emergency in their territory, after decades of violence against women in the 
border region of Ciudad Juárez.  This sad trend has recently been coupled with the 
androcides, or the systematic killing of men, that have claimed the lives of thousands of 
Mexico’s youth involved in the drug industry and others victims of cross-fire since the 
beginning of the War on Drugs.  Alongside these atrocities exist organizations like 
Desarma México (Disarm Mexico) that seek to limit the number of weapons entering the 
country.  However, the militarization of Mexico and the increased U.S. funding for the 
War on Drugs continue to claim lives, with little or no formal international pressure for 
the government to improve its human rights’ record.   
The privatization of rights under neoliberal governments seems to have 
complicated the chances of significant structural changes—that is the legacy of the 
global proliferation of individual rights.  Human rights as promoted in the 1970s 
initiated new ways for demanding change by circumventing traditional party politics, 
asserting universalities, creating networks of cooperation outside the nation-state, 																																																								
19 Interview with Emilio Álvarez Icaza, 14 March 2012 (Mexico City). 
20 Javier Garza Ramos, “Being a journalist in Mexico is getting even more dangerous,” The 
Washington Post, 18 February 2015 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/18/being-a-journalist-in-mexico-is-
getting-even-more-dangerous/>. 
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shamming repressive governments, promoting liberal democracy and favoring free 
market economics.  Since then, no other major structural alternative has arisen for 
mending democracies’ failure to guarantee the safety and wellbeing of citizens.  The 
move away from state-directed economic policies has inevitably left out many of the 
protections guaranteed under corporate social justice, and the increased attention to 
human rights may well provide one of the best available mechanisms for protections 
against the worst abuses that the new order has generated.   
None of this is to suggest that Mexico’s newest legal orientation will result in 
some sort of utopia.  Human rights movements carry their own limitations, and some of 
those limitations have already become evident.  Samuel Moyn points to precisely such 
problems in his assessment of the political legacy of the rise of human rights: 
In his recent manifesto for a reclaimed social democracy, Ill Fares the Land, Tony 
Judt stirringly calls for a revival of an unfairly scuttled domestic politics of the 
common good. Judt argues that if the left, after a long era of market frenzy, has 
lost the ability to ‘think the state’ and to focus on the ways that ‘government can 
play an enhanced role in our lives,’ that’s in part because the ruse of 
international human rights lured it away. The antipolitics of human rights 
‘misled a generation of young activists into believing that, conventional avenues 
of change being hopelessly clogged, they should forsake political organization for 
single-issue, non-governmental groups unsullied by compromise.’ They gave up 
on political tasks, Judt worries, for the satisfying morality of Amnesty 
International and other human rights groups.21 
																																																								
21 Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (London; Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2014), 85.  
Essay originally published as “Human Rights in History,” The Nation, 30 August/6 September 2010 (No. 
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Whether or not these concerns about the potential ill consequences of the Mexican 
human rights movement prove justified, or whether the tens of thousands of individuals 
moved to action since the early days of the United Nations’ first campaigns will 
ultimately find their efforts vindicated by the emergence of a more respectful, tolerant, 
and peaceful nation: all are questions that remain for the future.  What can say now is 
that the human rights debate was one of the most dynamic intellectual ferments of the 
country’s past half-century, and that it involved participants from virtually every part of 
the political and social spectrums.  Nations with such ferments are destined to confront 
many answers, some more serviceable than others; nations without them are 
condemned to moral and intellectual stagnation.  In their quest for a better world, the 
Mexican people decidedly belong in the former group. 
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ILLUS. 3.2.  Mexico’s official International Women’s Year logo. Programa de México, México 75: año 
internacional de la mujer, no. 1. (México, D.F.: Juventud, S.A., 1975). (Reproduced without permission) 
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ILLUS. 6.9.  Naranjo, “Nightmare,” Proceso (No. 119), 12 February 1979. (Reproduced without 
permission). 
	 450 
 
ILLUS. 6.10.  Naranjo, “Wide, Open and Honest,” Proceso (No. 120), 29 February 1979. Card: “The Oil 
is Ours.” (Reproduced without permission) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 451 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Archives  
 
Archivo General de la Nación, México (AGN) 
-Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 
Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada.  Acervo Histórico Diplomático.  Secretaría de 
Relaciones  
Exteriores (SRE) 
Hemeroteca Nacional   
Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social (CENCOS) 
Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia (ENAH) 
-Biblioteca “Guillermo Bonfil Batalla” (Acervo) 
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library  
Universidad Iberoamericana  
-Hemeroteca 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
 
Bloomberg Businessweek Magazine 
Chicago Tribune 
CNN Expansion (Digital) 
Crisol Plural (Digital) 
Design Week 
Diario Rotativo: Noticias Querétaro. 
El Día 
El Financiero 
El Nacional 
El País 
El Universal 
Emeequis 
Excélsior 
La Cooperacha (Digital) 
La Jornada 
La Prensa 
Lancaster Farming 
Letras Libres 
Lodi News Sentinel 
Los Agachados 
New York Times 
New York Times Magazine 
News Week Global 
Nexos 
Nuestro Diario (Edición Dominical) 
Prensa Libre  
Proceso 
Punto Crítico 
	 452 
Sala de Prensa (Digital) 
Sarasota Herald-Tribune 
Siempre! 
Stylepark (Digital) 
Texas Monthly 
The Evening News 
The Nation 
The New York Sun 
The Observer 
The Times-News (Hendersonville, NC) 
The Wall Street Journal 
The Washington Post 
Unomásuno 
Vertigo Político (Digital) 
Vuelta 
Washington Post 
Washington Star 
Wilmington Morning Star 
Xinhua News Agency 
 
Interviews  
 
Acosta, Mariclaire (Director of Freedom House-Mexico). March 11, 2014. Mexico City.  
Álvarez Icaza, Emilio (Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on  
Human Rights). March 14, 2012. Mexico City. 
 
Bourne, Peter (Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues, Carter  
administration). “Re: Questions on your visits to Mexico.” October 10, 2015. E-
mail. 
 
Culebro, Roció (Executive Director of the Instituto de Derechos Humanos y Democracia). July  
14, 2012. Mexico City. 
 
Pettis, Valerie (Designer of the IWY logo). “Re: My role in International Women’s Year  
Logo.” September 9, 2014.  E-mail. 
 
Ruíz, Clara (Former CENCOS Secretary). February 16, 2012. Mexico City. 
 
Published Primary Sources 
 
“Ley General de Población.” Diario Oficial de la Federación. 7 January 1974, Tomo  
CCCXXII, México, DF: 1-10. 
 
“Texto del discurso pronunciado por el Secretario de Gobernación ante los Diputados  
	 453 
de la XLIX Legislación, con motive de la presentación de la iniciativa de la Ley 
General de Población de México.” Demografía y economía 8:1 (1974): 109-114. 
 
Balboa, Marie Whitesell. “Annual Conference for the Non-Governmental  
Organizations,” Women Layers Journal 61:2 (Spring 1975): 71-81. 
 
Document 1: “Executive Order Establishing a National Commission on the Observance  
of International Women;s Year, 1975,” Executive Order 11832 signed by  
President Ford, 9 January 1975, reprinted in National Commission on the 
Observance of International Women’s Year, “… To Form a More Perfect Union…”: 
Justice for American Women (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1976):117-120. Included in How Did the National Women’s Conference in Houston in 
1977 Shape a Feminist Agenda for the Future?, edited by Thomas Dublin, Stephanie 
Gilmore, and Kathryn Kish Sklar. Binghamton, NY: State University of New 
York, 2004.  
 
Echeverría, Luis. México ante el mundo. México: Secretaría de la Presidencia, 1974. 
 
Economic Commission for Latin America. “Second Latin American Meeting on  
Population—Information document no. 1.” 17 January 1975, 
ST/CEPAL/Conf. 54/D.1. 
 
Lutz, Ellen L. Human Rights in Mexico: A Policy of Impunity. New York: Human Rights  
Watch, 1990. 
 
Patterson, David S., and Bruce F. Duncombe. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 
1976, Volume IV: Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-
1972. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 
 
TD/180, Vol. I, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Proceedings of  
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Third Session, Santiago De Chile, 
13 April to 21 May 1972, Volume I (Report and Annexes). New York: United Nations, 
1973. 
 
U.S. Department of State. “U.N. World Conference of the International Women’s Year  
Held at Mexico City,” The Department of State Bulletin. Vo. LXXIII, No. 1886 (18 
August 1975): 233-261. 
 
UN Documents ST/TAO/HR/12. “Seminar on Amparo, Habeas Corpus and Other  
Similar Remedies.” New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 1962. 
 
UNCTAD/GDS/2006/1, UNCTAD secretariat. UNCTAD: A Brief Historical Overview.  
  Geneva: [UN], 2006. 
 
United Nations. Meeting in Mexico: The Story of the World Conference of the International  
Women’s Year (Mexico City, 19 June-2 July 1975). New York: United Nations, 1975. 
 
	 454 
United States. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter: 1979-Book I –  
January 1 to June 22, 1979. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980. 
 
Secondary Texts 
 
Acevedo-Muñoz, Ernesto R. Buñuel and Mexico The Crisis of National Cinema. Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 2003. 
 
Aguayo Quezada, Sergio. “The Uses, Misuses, and Challenges of Mexican National  
Security: 1946-1990.” In Mexico: In Search of Security, edited by Bruce Michael 
Bagley, and Sergio Aguayo. Coral Gables, Fla: North-South Center, University 
of Miami, 1993.  
 
Aguilar Rivera, José Antonio. El manto liberal: los poderes de emergencia en México, 1821-1876.  
México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2001.  
 
Andes, Stephen J. C. “A Catholic Alternative to Revolution: The Survival of Social  
  Catholicism in Postrevolutionary Mexico.” The Americas 68:4 (April 2012): 529-
  562. 
 
Arriola, Carlos. “El acercamiento mexicano-chileno.” Foro Internacional 14:4 (April-June  
1974): 507-547.  
 
Ayala Anguiano, Armando. JLP: secretos de un sexenio. Mexico: Grijalbo, 1984. 
 
Baker, Richard D. Judicial Review in Mexico; A Study of the Amparo Suit. Austin: Published  
for the Institute of Latin American Studies by the University of Texas Press, 
1971. 
 
Barranco, Bernardo. “La iberoamericanidad de la Unión Nacional de Estudiantes  
Católicos (UNEC) en los años treinta.” Cultura e identidad nacional, edited by  
Roberto Blancarte, 188-232. México: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las 
Artes, 1994. 
 
Baum, Gregory. “Human Rights and Liberation Theology.” Windsor Yearbook of Access to  
  Justice, no. 6 (1986): 327-336. 
 
Becker, Davida and Claudia Díaz Olavarrieta. “Decriminalization of Abortion in  
Mexico City: The Effects on Women’s Reproductive Rights.” American Journal of 
Public Health (February 14, 2013): e1-e4. 
 
Beezley, William H. “Conclusion: Gabardine Suits and Guayabera Shirts.” In Populism  
in Twentieth Century Mexico: The Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría, 
edited by Amelia M. Kiddle and María L. O. Muñoz. Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 2010: 190-205. 
 
	 455 
Bennett, Douglas and Kenneth Sharpe . “The State as Banker and Entrepreneur: The  
Last-Resort Character of the Mexican State’s Economic Intervention, 1917-76 .” 
Comparative Politics 12:2 (January 1980): 165-189. 
 
Berryman, Phillip. Liberation Theology: Essential Facts About the Revolutionary Movement in Latin  
  America—and Beyond. New York: Pantheon Books, 1987. 
Blancarte, Roberto. Historia de la Iglesia Católica en México. México: Colegio 
Mexiquense, 1992. 
 
Blancarte, Roberto. Historia de la Iglesia Católica en México. México: Colegio Mexiquense:  
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992. 
 
Boe, Kathy Smith. “Paraquat Eradication: Legal Means for a Prudent Policy?” Boston  
College Environmental Affairs Law Review 12 (1985): 491-526. 
 
Borrego, Salvador E. Cómo García Valseca Fundó y Perdió 37 Periódicos y Cómo Eugenio Garza  
Sada Trató de rescatarlos y Perdió la Vida. Iztacalco, D.F.: Editorial Tradición, 1985. 
 
Bourne, Peter G. “Jimmy Carter: A Profile.” Yale Review 72 (Oct. 1982): 137- 127. 
 
Boylan, Kristina A. “Mexican Social Secretariat [Secretariado Social Mexicano].”  
Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Politics, Volume II, L-Z, edited by Roy P. Domenico 
and Mark Y. Hanley. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006. 
 
Bradley, Mark, and Patrice Petro. Truth Claims: Representation and Human Rights. New  
  Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002. 
 
Brewster, Claire. “The Student Movement of 1968 and the Mexican Press: The Cases  
of “Excélsior” and “Siempre!” Bulletin of Latin American Research 21:2 (April 2002): 
171-190. 
 
Budrys, Valmantas. “Chapter 10 – Frida Kahlo’s neurological deficits and her art.”  
Progress in Brain Research 203 (2013): 241–254. 
 
Butler, Matthew. “The Church in ‘Red Mexico’: Michoacán Catholics and the Mexican  
Revolution, 1920-1929.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 55:3 (July 2004): 520-541.  
 
Calderón Aragón, Georgina, and Blanca Rebeca Ramírez Velázquez. “De campesino  
yuntero a jornalero: neoliberalismo y desarrollo en el campo.” In Agricultura y 
espacio rural en Latinoamérica y España: posibilidades y riesgos ante la mundialización de la 
economía, edited by José Antonio Segrelles Serrano, 265-322. Madrid: Ministerio 
de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, Centro de Publicaciones, 2002. 
 
Camargo, Pedro Pablo. “The Right to Judicial Protection: ‘Amparo’ and Other Latin  
American Remedies for the Protection of Human Rights.” Lawyers of the Americas 
3:2 (Jan. 1971): 191-230. 
 
	 456 
Camp, Roderic A. “Informal and Formal Networking among Elite Mexican Capitalists  
and Politicians.” Comparative Sociology 2:1 (2003): 135-154. 
 
---. Crossing Swords: Politics and Religion in Mexico. New York: Oxford  
  University Press, 1997. 
 
---. Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico. Austin: University  
of Texas Press, 1985. 
 
---. Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1993. Austin: University of Texas  
  Press, 1995. 
 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and development in Latin  
  America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 
 
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. Fayetteville, AR: University of  
  Arkansas Press, 1995. 
 
Castañeda, Jorge G. Perpetuating Power: How Mexican Presidents Were Chosen. New York:  
  New Press, 2000. 
 
Castañeda, Jorge. “La carta de derechos y deberes económicos de los estados: desde el  
punto de vista del derecho internacional.” Justicia Económica Internacional (1976): 
9-41. 
 
Castillo V., Gustavo del. Crisis y transformación de una sociedad tradicional. México: Centro de  
  Investigaciones Superiores del INAH, 1979. 
 
Cazés, Daniel. Crónica 1968. México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés Editores, 1993. 
 
CEMEX+FNPI. Scherer, Salgar, Clóvis Rossi, Sábat: Premio Homenaje CEMEX+FNPI.  
México: FCE, Fundación Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2007.  
 
Claffey, Patrick, and Joe Egan. Movement or Moment?: Assessing Liberation Theology Forty Years  
  After Medellín. Oxford: P. Lang, 2009.  
 
Cmiel, Kenneth. “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States.”  
Journal of American History 86:3 (December 1999): 1231-1250. 
 
Concha Malo, Miguel. La Participación de los cristianos en el proceso popular de liberación en  
  México, 1968-1983. México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1986. 
 
Consejo Nacional de Población [CONAPO]. La situación demográfica de México 2009.   
  México, D.F.: Secretaría de Gobernación, CONAPO.  
 
Cordera, Rolando, and Carlos Tello. México, la disputa por la nación: perspectivas y opciones  
	 457 
  del desarrollo. México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1981. 
 
Cosío Villegas, Daniel. “La crisis de México.” Cuadernos Americanos 32 (March-April  
1947), 29-51.  
 
---. La constitución de 1857 y sus críticos. México: Fondo de Cultura  
Económica, 1998.  
 
---. Memorias. México: J. Mortiz, 1976. 
 
Dasgupta, Riddhi. International Interplay: The Future of Expropriation Across International  
Dispute Settlement. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2013. 
 
Dawson, Alexander S. Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico. Tucson: University of  
Arizona Press, 2004. 
 
Díaz Prieto, Gabriela. “Abrir la casa.  México y los asilados politicos chilenos.” In  
México, país refugio: la experiencia de los exilios en el siglo XX, edited by Pablo 
Yankelevich. México: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 2002, 265-
280. 
 
---. “Un exilio venturoso: chilenos en México (1973-1990).” In  
Revolución y exilio en la historia de México: del amor de un historiador a su patria adoptiva : 
homenaje a Friedrich Katz, edited by Javier Garciadiego Dantan, Emilio Kourí, and 
Friedrich Katz. México, D. F.: El Colegio de México, 2010. 
 
Díaz Redondo, Regino. La gran mentira, ocurrió en “Excelsior”, el periódico de la vida nacional.  
  México, D.F.: EDAMEX-Libros para Todos, 2002. 
 
Domenico, Roy Palmer, and Mark Y. Hanley. Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Politics.  
  Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2006. 
 
Dosman, Edgar J. The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch, 1901-1986. Montreal: McGill- 
  Queen’s University Press, 2008. 
 
Dumbrell, John. The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation. Manchester, UK: Manchester  
  University Press, 1995. 
 
Engler, Mark. “Toward the ‘Rights of the Poor’: Human Rights in Liberation  
Theology.” Journal of Religious Ethics, 28:3 (2000): 339-365. 
 
Estévez López, Ariadna. “Transición a la democracia y derechos humanos en México:  
la pérdida de integralidad en el discurso.” Andamios 3:6 (June 2007): 7-32. 
 
---. Human Rights and Free Trade in Mexico: A Discursive and Sociopolitical  
  Perspective. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
	 458 
 
Fazio, Carlos. Algunos aportes del Secretariado Social Mexicano en la transición a la democracia.  
  México, D.F.: Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, 1997. 
 
Ferguson, Niall, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent, eds. The Shock of  
the Global: The 1970s in Perspective. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2010. 
 
Fernández Christlieb, Fátima. Los medios de difusión masiva en México. México: Juan Pablos  
  Editor, 1984. 
 
Fernández Menéndez, Jorge. Nadie supo nada: la verdadera historia del asesinato de Eugenio  
Garza Sada. México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2007. 
 
Fiz Zamudio, Héctor. “The Writ of Amparo in Latin America.” Lawyer of the Americas  
  13:3 (Winter 1981): 361-391.  
 
Flores, Malva. Viaje de Vuelta: estampas de una revista. México D.F.: Fondo de Cultura  
  Económica, 2011. 
 
Fraser, Arvonne S. “Becoming Human: The Origins and Development of Women’s  
  Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 21:4 (1999): 853-906. 
 
---. The U.N. Decade for Women: Documents and Dialogue. Boulder: Westview  
  Press, 1987. 
 
Friedan, Betty. It Changed My Life: Writings on the Women’s Movement. Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
Fuentes, Carlos. La región más transparente. México, D.F.: Alfaguara, 1998. 
 
Galeano, Eduardo, and Cedric Belfrage. Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the  
  Pillage of a Continent. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997. 
 
Galey, Margaret E. “Women Find a Place.” In Women, Politics, and the United Nations,  
  edited by Anne Winslow, 11-28. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1995. 
 
García Rubio, Claudia I. “Radiografía de la prensa diaria en México en 2010.”  
Comunicación y Sociedad [Departamento de Estudios de la Comunicación Social, Universidad 
de Guadalajara]. No. 20 (July-December, 2013): 65-93. 
 
García, Elvira. Ellas, tecleando su historia. México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2012. 
 
Garner, Karen. “World YWCA Leaders and the UN Decade for Women.” Journal of  
  International Women’s Studies 9:1 (September 2007): 212-233. 
 
González de Bustamante, Celeste. “Muy Buenas Noches”: Mexico, Television, and the Cold  
	 459 
  War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012. 
 
González Marín, Silvia. Prensa y poder político: la elección presidencial de 1940 en la prensa  
mexicana. México, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores, UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones 
Bibliográficas, 2006. 
 
Gowan, Peter. “US:UN.” New Left Review 24 (Nov./Dec. 2003): 5-28.  
 
Granados Chapa, Miguel Ángel. “[A]proximación a la prensa mexicana (notas sobre el  
periodismo diario),” Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Política 69 (July-Sept. 1972): 47-52.  
 
---. “1970-1976: un sexenio de comunicación.” Asociación Mexicana de Investigadores de la  
  Comunicación (1981). 
 
---. Excélsior y otros temas de comunicación. México, D.F.: Ediciones el Caballito, 1980. 
 
Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New  
  Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006. 
 
Grayson, George W. “The U.S.-Mexican Natural Gas Deal and What We Can Learn  
From It.” Orbis (Fall 1980): 573-607. 
 
---. The Politics of Mexican Oil. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980. 
 
Green, Rosario. “Deuda externa y política exterior: la vuelta a la bilateralidad en las  
relaciones internacionales de México.” Foro Internacional 18:1 (July-Sept. 1977): 
54-80. 
 
---. La deuda externa de México, 1973-1987: de la abundancia a la escasez de créditos. México,  
D.F.: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1988. 
 
Gutiérrez Casillas, José. Jesuitas en México durante el siglo XX. México: Editorial Porrúa,  
1981. 
 
Hale, Charles A. “Political and social ideas in Latin America, 1870-1930.” In The  
Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume IV c. 1870 to 1930, edited by Leslie 
Bethell. London: Cambridge University Press, 1986).  
 
Hale, Charles A., Lucrecia Orensanz and Dra. María del Refugio González. “La  
tradición del derecho continental europeo y el constitucionalismo en el México 
del siglo XX: el legado de Emilio Rabasa.” Historia Mexicana 48:1 (Jul.-Sep. 
1998): 97-125.  
 
Harvey, Neil. The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy. Durham: Duke  
  University Press, 1998. 
 
Healy, Teresa. Gendered Struggles against Globalisation in Mexico. Aldershot, England:  
	 460 
Ashgate, 2008. 
 
Herrick, John Middlemist, and Paul H. Stuart. Encyclopedia of Social Welfare History in  
  North America. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005. 
 
Hobbins, A.J. “Humphrey and the High Commissioner: the Genesis of the Office of the  
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,” Journal of the History of International 
Law 3 (2001): 38-74. 
 
Hoffmann, Stanley. “A View from at Home: The Perils of Incoherence.” Foreign Affairs  
  57:3 (1978): 463-491. 
 
Holman, Frank E. “An ‘International Bill of Rights’: Proposals Have Dangerous  
  Implications for U.S.” American Bar Association 34 (November 1948): 984-986. 
 
Hopgood, Stephen. Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International. Ithaca, N.Y.:  
  Cornell University Press, 2006.  
 
Humphrey, John P. Human Rights & the United Nations: A Great Adventure. Dobbs Ferry,  
  N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1984. 
 
Humphrey, John P., A. J. Hobbins, and Louisa Piatti. On the Edge of Greatness: The Diaries  
of John Humphrey, First Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights, volume I. 
Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 1994. 
 
Igelmo Zaldívar, Jon, and Patricia Quiroga Uceda, “Ivan Illich and the Conflict with  
Vatican (1966-1969).” The International Journal of Illich Studies 2:1 (2010): 3-12. 
 
Johnson, Stanley. World Population and the United Nations: Challenge and Response. New York:  
  Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
 
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in  
International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
 
King, John. The Role of Mexico’s Plural in Latin American Literary and Political Culture: From  
  Tlatelolco to the “Philanthropic Ogre”. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
 
Krauze, Enrique. Mexico: biography of power: a history of modern Mexico, 1810-1996. New  
York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997. 
 
Landrigan, Philip J., Kenneth E. Powell, Levy M. James, and Philip R. Taylor.  
“Paraquat and Marijuana: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment.” American Journal of 
Public Health 73:7 (July 1983): 784-788.  
 
Lawson, Chappell H. Building the Fourth Estate Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in  
Mexico. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
	 461 
Leñero, Vicente. Los periodistas. México: Joaquín Mortiz, ©1978, 1994. 
 
Lewis, Stephen E. “Una victoria pírrica en el México posrevolucionario: los finqueros  
alemanes, las escuelas Artículo 123 y la formación del Estado en la costa de 
Chiapas, 1934-1942.” Anuario de Estudios Americanos 67:2 (July-December 2010): 
445-465. 
 
Loaeza, Soledad. “México, 1968: Los orígenes de la transición.” In La Transición  
interrumpida: México 1968-1988, edited by Semo, Ilán. México, D.F.: 
Departamento de Historia, Universidad Iberoamericana, 1993. 
 
López Portillo y Rojas, José. Algunos cuentos. México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional  
  Autónoma de México, 1996. 
 
López, Pablo J.  “Nacional Financiera Durante la Industrialización Vía Sustitución de  
Importaciones en México.” América Latina en la Historia Económica 19:3 
(September-December 2012): 129-163. 
 
López, Yolanda M. “A Chicana’s Look at the International Women’s Year  
Conference.” In Chicana Feminist Thought: The Basic Historical Writings, edited by 
Alma M. García, 181-182. New York: Routledge, 1997.  
 
Lowenthal, Abraham F. “The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic  
  Presumption.” Foreign Affairs 55:1 (October 1976): 199-213. 
 
Luis Buñuel, and Abigail Israel. My Last Sigh: The Autobiography of Luis Buñuel. New York:  
Vintage Books, ©1983, 2013. 
 
Lynch, John. The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826. New York: Norton, 1973. 
  
Malpica de Lamadrid, Luis. La influencia del derecho internacional en el derecho mexicano: la  
  apertura del modelo de desarrollo de México. México: Noriega, 2002. 
 
Manges Douglas, Karen, Rogelio Sáenz, and Aurelia Lorena Murga. “Immigration in  
the Era of Color-Blind Racism.” American Behavioral Scientist 59:11 (2015): 1429-
1451. 
 
Maulen de los Reyes, David F. “Cohesión social como programa arquitectónico:  
genealogías tentativas del edificio UNCTADIII/CCMGM.” Revista de 
Humanismo [Universidad de Chile-Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo] 25 
(Fall 2011): 92-95.  
 
Maulen de los Reyes, David F. “Proyecto Edificio UNCTAD III: Santiago de Chile  
(June 1971- April 1972).” Revista de arquitectura 13 [Universidad de Chile-Facultad 
de Arquitectura y Urbanismo]: 80-91. 
 
Maza, Enrique. La libertad de expresión en la iglesia. México: Oceano, 2006. 
	 462 
 
---. Rumores de silencio. México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de  
  México, Coordinación de Difusión Cultural, Dirección de Literatura, 2008. 
 
McCaa, Robert. “Missing Millions: The Demographic Costs of the Mexican  
Revolution.” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 19:2 (Summer 2003): 367-400. 
McCarthy, Helen. Women of the World: The Rise of the Female Diplomat. London, 
England: Bloomsbury, 2014. 
 
Middlebrook, Kevin J., and Cirila Quintero Ramírez. “Protecting Workers’ Rights in  
Mexico: Local Conciliation and Arbitration Boards, Union Registration, and 
Conflict Resolution in the 1990s.” Labor Studies Journal 23:1 (Spring 1998): 21-51. 
 
Minués Moreno, Héctor. Los cooperativistas: el caso de Excélsior. Mexico: Editores Asociados  
  Mexicanos, S.A., EDAMEX, 1987. 
 
Monsiváis, Carlos. A ustedes les consta: antología de la crónica en México. México, D.F.:  
Ediciones Era, © 1980, 2006. 
 
Moon, Danelle. Daily Life of Women During the Civil Rights Era. Santa Barbara, CA:  
  Greenwood, 2011. 
 
Mooney, Annabelle, and Betsy Evans. Globalization: The Key Concepts. London: Routledge,  
2007. 
 
Morales, Juan Jesús. “De los Aspectos Sociales del Desarrollo Económico a la Teoría de  
la Dependencia: Sobre la gestación de un pensamiento social propio en 
Latinoamérica.” Cinta de moebio 45 (2012): 235-252.  
 
Moyn, Samuel.  Human Rights and the Uses of History. London; Brooklyn, NY: Verso,  
  2014. 
 
---. The Last Utopia Human Rights in History. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press  
of Harvard University Press, 2010. 
 
Mraz, John. Nacho López, Mexican Photographer. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
  Press, 2003. 
 
Muñoz, María L. O. “‘We Speak For Ourselves’: The First National Congress of Indigenous  
Peoples and the Politics of Indigenismo in Mexico, 1968-1982.” Ph.D. diss., University 
of Arizona, 2009.   
 
Murphy, Craig. The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. 
 
Musacchio, Humberto. Historia gráfica del periodismo mexicano. México: Gráfica,  
  Creatividad y Diseño, 2003. 
 
	 463 
Napolitano, Valentina.  “Between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ Catholic church religious  
discourses in urban, Western Mexico.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 17:3 
(1998): 323-339.  
 
Navarro, Aaron W. Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954.  
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. 
 
Navarro, Armando. The Cristal Experiment: A Chicano Struggle for Community Control.  
  Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998. 
 
Negretto, Gabriel L., and José Antonio Aguilar-Rivera. “Rethinking the Legacy of the  
Liberal State in Latin America: The cases of Argentina (1853-1916) and Mexico 
(1857-1910).” Journal of Latin American Studies 32: 2 (May 2000): 361-397. 
 
Nichols, Madaline W. “Las Siete Partidas.” California Law Review 20:3 (March 1932):  
260-285. 
 
Nicklen, Challen. Rhetorics of Connection in the United Nations Conferences on Women, 1975- 
  1995. Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 2008. 
 
Novo, Salvador. La vida en México en el periodo presidencial de Luis Echeverría. México:  
Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 2000. 
 
Ochoa, Guillermo. Reportaje en Chile. México: [Centro de Información Política], 1972. 
 
Ojeda Gómez, Mario. México: el surgimiento de una política exterior activa. México: Cultura  
  Sep, 1986. 
 
Olcott, Jocelyn. “Cold War Conflicts and Cheap Cabaret: Sexual Politics at the 1975  
United Nations International Women’s Year Conference.” Gender & History 22:3 
(November 2010): 733-754. 
 
---. “Empires of Information: Media Strategies for the 1975 International Women’s  
  Year.” Journal of Women’s History 24:4 (Winter 2012): 24-84. 
 
---. “Globalizing Sisterhood: International Women’s Year and the Limits of  
Identity Politics.” In The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, edited by Niall 
Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent, 281-293. 
Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010. 
 
---. “The Battle within the Home: Development Strategies and the  
Commodification of Caring Labors at the 1975 International Women’s Year 
Conference.” In Workers Across the Americas: The Transnational Turn in Labor History, 
edited by Leon Fink. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
 
Ortiz-Ortega, Adriana and Mercedes Barquet. “Gendering Transition to Democracy in  
Mexico.” Latin American Research Review (Special Issue, 2010): 108-137.  
	 464 
 
Parry, Manon. “Betty Friedan: Feminist Icon and Founder of the National  
Organization for Women.” American Journal of Public Health 100:9 (September 
2010): 1584-1585. 
 
Pastor Escobar, Raquel. José Álvarez Icaza y la puesta en práctica del Concilio Ecuménico  
Vaticano II en el laicado mexicano. Ph.D. diss, Ciencias Políticas y Sociales con 
Orientación en Sociología, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
México, 2004. 
 
Pastor, Robert A. “The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle.”  
The Carter Center (July 1992) 
<https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf>. 
 
---. El remolino: la política exterior de Estados Unidos hacia América Latina y el Caribe. México,  
  D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1995. 
 
---. Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean.  Princeton N.J.:  
  Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Pastor, Robert A., and Jorge G. Castañeda. Limits to Friendship: The United States and  
  Mexico. New York: Knopf, 1988. 
 
Paz, Octavio, Lysander Kemp, Yara Milos, and Rachel Phillips. The Labyrinth of Solitude  
  and Other Writings. New York: Grove Press, 1985. 
 
Peebles Lane, Joy Lee. Las organizaciones no gubernamentales de derechos humanos en México: su  
formación y esfuerzos para realizar cambios socio-políticos. M.A. thesis, Estudios 
Latinoamericanos, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, UNAM, 1993. 
 
Pérez Espino, Efraín. “El monopolio de la televisión comercial en México.” Revista  
Mexicana de Sociología 41:4 (Oct.-Dec. 1979): 1435-1468. 
 
Persinger, Mildred Emory. “Unfinished Agenda.” Journal of Women’s History 24:4 (Winter  
  2012): 186-192.  
 
Piper, Teryn Louisa. “The 1974 Congreso Indigena: The Church, the State, and the  
Emergence of the Indigenous Movement of Chiapas.” M.A. thesis, University of 
Oklahoma, 2011. 
 
Preston, Julia and Sam Dillon. Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy. New York:  
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004. 
 
Quezada, Ariana. “El pueblo refugiado”: Guatemalan Refugees and the Emergence of  
Mexico’s Human Rights Discourse.” M.A. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 
2009. 
 
	 465 
Rama, Angel, and John Charles Chasteen. The Lettered City. Durham, NC: Duke  
  University Press, 1996. 
 
Requelme, Julio. “Francisco Carmona Nenclares. Perfil Bibliográfico.”  In Los maestros  
del exilio español en la Facultad de Derecho, edited by Fernando Serrano Migallón. 
México: Porrúa, 2003. 
 
Riding, Alan. Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. 
 
Rodríguez Castañeda, Rafael. Prensa vendida: Los periodistas y los presidentes: 40 años de  
  relaciones. México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 1993.   
 
Rodríguez O., Jaime E. “The Emancipation of America.” The American Historical Review  
105:1 (Feb. 2000): 131-152. 
 
Rojas Mira, Claudia F. “La Casa de Chile en México.” In Exiliados, emigrados y retornados:  
chilenos en América y Europa, 1973-2004, edited by José del Pozo, 107-126. 
Santiago de Chile: RIL Editores, 2006. 
 
Rosenn, Keith S. “Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights in Brazil.” American  
Journal of Comparitive Law 59 (Fall 2011): 1009-1050. 
 
Rubenstein, Anne. Bad Language, Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to the Nation: A Political  
  History of Comic Books in Mexico. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. 
 
Rubin, Barry M., and Elizabeth P. Spiro. Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy. Boulder:  
  Westview Press, 1979. 
 
Sabato, Hilda. “On Political Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century Latin America.” The  
American Historical Review 106:4 (October 2001): 1290-1315. 
 
Safford, Frank. “Politics, ideology and society in post-Independence Spanish America.”  
In The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume III, From Independence to c. 1870, 
edited by Leslie Bethell, 367-441. London: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
Saltalamacchia Ziccardi, Natalia, and Ana Covarrubias Velasco. “La trayectoria de los  
derechos humanos en la política exterior de México (1945-2006).  In Derechos 
humanos en política exterior: seis casos latinoamericanos, edited by Saltalamacchia 
Ziccardi and Ana Covarrubias Velasco. México, D.F.: ITAM, 2011.  
 
Saltalamacchia Ziccardi, Natalia. “1968 y los derechos humanos en México.”  Foreign  
Affairs Latinoamérica 9:1 (February 2009): 133-142.  
 
Sánchez Mejorada, Carlos. “The Writ of Amparo. Mexican Procedure to Protect  
Human Rights.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 243 (Jan. 
1946): 107-111. 
 
	 466 
Sánchez Olvera, Alma Rosa. El feminismo mexicano ante el movimiento urbano popular: dos  
expresiones de lucha de género (1970-1985). México: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, Campus Acatlán, 2002. 
 
Sánchez Prado, Ignacio M. “Claiming Liberalism: Enrique Krauze, Vuelta, Letras Libres,  
and the Reconfigurations of the Mexican Intellectual Class.” Mexican 
Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 26:1 (Winter 2010): 47-78. 
 
Sánchez Ruiz, Enrique E. “Los medios de difusión masiva y la centralización en  
México,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 4:1 (Winter 1988): 25-54. 
 
Scanella, Petra María. El periodismo político en México. Barcelona, España: Editorial Mitre,  
1983. 
 
Schenkel, Peter and Marco Ordóñez, eds. Comunicación y cambio social. Quito, Ecuador:  
Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, ILDIS; Centro 
Internacional de Estudios Superiores de Comunicación para América Latina, 
CIESPAL, 1975. 
 
Scherer García, Julio and Carlos Monsiváis, eds. Parte de guerra, Tlatelolco 1968: documentos  
del general Marcelino García Barragán: los hechos y la historia. México, D.F.: Nuevo 
Siglo/Aguilar, 1999. 
 
---, and Carlos Monsiváis. Tiempo de saber: prensa y poder en México. México, D.F.: Aguilar,  
  2003. 
---. La terca memoria. México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2007. 
 
---. Los presidentes. México: Debolsillo, ©1986, 2007.  
 
---. Vivir. México, D.F.: Grijalbo, 2012. 
 
Schryer, Frans J. “Peasants and the Law: A History of Land Tenure and Conflict in the  
Huasteca.” Journal of Latin American Studies 18:2 (Nov., 1986): 283-311.  
 
Shapira, Yoram. “The Impact of the 1968 Student Protest on Echeverría’s Reformism.”  
  Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 19:4 (November 1977): 557-580. 
 
Smith, Angel. Historical Dictionary of Spain. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2009. 
 
Smith, Clint E. Inevitable Partnership: Understanding Mexico-U.S. Relations. Boulder: Lynne  
  Rienner Publishers, 2000. 
 
Sonnenfeld, David A. “Mexico’s ‘Green Revolution,’ 1940-1980: Towards an  
Environmental History.” Environmental History Review 16:4 (Winter 1992): 28-52. 
 
Soto Laveaga, Gabriela. “‘Let’s Become Fewer’: Soap Operas, Contraception, and  
Nationalizing the Mexican Family in an Overpopulated World.” Sexuality 
	 467 
Research and Social Policy: Journal of NSRC 4:3 (September 2007): 19-33. 
 
Spalding, Rose J. “State Power and its limits: Corporatism in Mexico.” Comparative  
Political Studies 14:2 (July 1981): 139-161.  
 
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. Testimonios. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de  
  México, 1978. 
 
Stephenson, Carolyn M. “Women’s Organizations and the United Nations.” In  
Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today, edited by James P. Muldoon, Jr., 
JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano, and Earl Sullivan, 207-227. Cambridge, 
MA: Westview Press, 2005. 
 
Stuckey, Mary E. Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda. College Station:  
  Texas A & M University Press, 2008. 
 
Suárez, Luis. Echeverría en el sexenio de López Portillo: El caso de un expresidente ante el sucesor.  
  México: Grijalbo, 1983. 
 
Taylor, Ian, and Karen Smith. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
(UNCTAD). London: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Tenenbaum, Barbara A. “Streetwise history: the Paseo de la Reforma and the Porfirian  
State, 1876-1910.” In Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and 
Popular Culture in Mexico, edited by William H. Beezley, Cheryl English Martin, 
and William E. French. Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 1994.  
 
Thomson, Guy P. “Popular Aspects of Liberalism in Mexico, 1848-1888.” Bulletin of  
Latin American Research 10:3 (1991): 265-292. 
 
Thorp Rosemary. “A Reappraisal of Origins of Import-Substituting Industrialisation  
  1930-1950.” Journal of Latin American Studies 24:S1 (March 1992): 181-195. 
 
Toledo Ocampo, Ezequiel. “El sistema para el desarrollo integral de la familia (DIF):  
Expresión de una política social del estado mexicano,” Horizonte Sanitario 2:3 
(November 2003), 8:20. 
 
Tombs, David. “Latin American Liberation Theology: Moment, Movement, Legacy.”  
In Movement or Moment?: Assessing Liberation Theology Forty Years After Medellín, edited 
by Patrick Claffey and Joe Egan, 29-53. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009. 
 
Tulis, Jeffrey, and Stephen Macedo, eds. The Limits of Constitutional Democracy. Princeton,  
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
 
Urquidi, Víctor L. “La carta de derechos y deberes económicos de los estados: la  
cuestión de su aplicación.” Foro Internacional 20 (October-December 1979): 181-
190. 
	 468 
 
Verdoy, SJ, Alfredo. “La confederación nacional española de las Congregaciones  
 Marianas o la movilización de la juventud de la Virgen (1919-1923).” Estudios  
 Eclesiásticos 85:334 (June 2010): 547-573. 
 
Villegas, Cosío. “Historia moderna de México.” The Hispanic American Historical Review  
  46:3 (August 1966): 274-282. 
 
Wheat, Andrew. “Mexico’s Privatization Piñata.” Multinational Monitor 17:19 (October  
1996). 
 
Winslow, Anne. Women, Politics, and the United Nations. Westport, Conn: Greenwood  
  Press, 1995. 
 
Wollny, Hans. “Asylum policy in Mexico: A Survey.” Journal of Refugee Studies 4:3 (1991):  
219-236. 
 
Womack, John Jr. “The Spoils of the Mexican Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 48:4 (July  
1970): 677-687.  
 
Zolov, Eric. “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics.”  
The Americas 61:2 (October 2004): 159-188. 
 
